If the Finns wanted to, or Once again about the Winter War
The Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940) certainly takes a special place in stories of our country, and it must be considered in conjunction with the situation that prevailed in the world at that time. From spring to autumn 1939, the situation was heating up, and the approach of war was felt. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France believed that Germany would attack the USSR. However, Germany was not yet ready for such a step, and soon concluded a military alliance with Italy, directed not only against the USSR, but also against England, France and Poland. In order to look more decent in the eyes of the world community, the Anglo-French politicians decided to start negotiations with the USSR, during which the Soviet side sought to conclude a military agreement to prevent fascist aggression. To implement this, we developed a plan for the deployment of Soviet troops and the countries participating in the negotiations to jointly repel possible aggression. The theme of the plan was discussed at a meeting of military missions in mid-August 1939. Our military delegation proposed the development and signing of a military convention that accurately determined the number of divisions to be allocated, tanks, aircraft and naval squadrons for joint action by the contracting parties. Seeing that the delegations of Britain and France were not going to sign such a convention, the USSR was forced to complete further negotiations.
In an effort to eliminate the possibility of war on two fronts (in Europe - with Germany and in the East - with Japan), the USSR accepted the offer of the Germans to conclude a non-aggression pact. Poland, which pinned all hopes on the British and French, refused to cooperate with our country and turned out to be almost alone, becoming an easy prey for the aggressor. When, after the German attack, the Polish army was on the verge of a catastrophe, the Soviet troops undertook a campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and in 12 days advanced in places to 350 kilometers. The shift of the Soviet border to the west had a positive effect on the strategic position of our country. The signing of mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic states in the fall of 1939 also contributed to the enhancement of the defense capability of the Soviet Union.
If the western border could be secured, then in the northwestern section the situation remained difficult. Even before the revolution, Finland was part of the Russian Empire, and earlier (more than six centuries) was under the domination of Sweden. In the struggle of Russia and Finland, the issue of access to the Baltic Sea became vital for the former. In 1700, Peter I began the Northern War with Sweden, which lasted until the 1721 year. As a result of its victorious completion, Karelia, Vyborg, Kexholm, the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga and many islands withdrew to Russia. Having defeated Sweden, Peter I generously ceded Finland to her, but the relations of the states were again tense, and in 1808, a war broke out between them, as a result, Finland completely retired to Russia as an autonomous principality with its constitution and diet. But these rights were then curtailed by the tsarist government, and Finland became one of the outskirts of the Russian Empire.
The right of nations to self-determination proclaimed after the revolution gave Finland a real opportunity to become an independent, independent state. After reviewing the Finnish Seym resolution of 6 on December 1917 of declaring Finland an independent state and the appeal of his government to recognize this, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 4 of January 1918 recognized Finland’s independence. The new Finnish government transferred its distrust of Russia to the Soviet Republic. 7 March 1918, it entered into an agreement with Germany, after the defeat of which in World War I reoriented to the Entente. With regards to our country, the Finnish government retained a hostile attitude and already in May broke off relations, and later openly and disguisedly fought against Soviet Russia.
The victories of the Red Army in the Civil War and over the interventionists prompted the Finns to conclude a peace treaty on October 23 with Soviet Russia on October 1920. But still, the relationship remained tense, as evidenced by the adventurous attack undertaken by 1922 in the year of armed “volunteer” squad troops on the land of Soviet Karelia. You can not call a good relationship in the future. P. Svinhuvud (President of Finland from 1931 to 1937 a year), stated that any enemy of Russia must be a friend of Finland.
The construction of roads, airfields, various fortifications, and naval bases began at a fast pace on Finnish territory. On the Karelian Isthmus (a little more than 30 km from Leningrad), our neighbor, using foreign experts, built a network of defenses that are better known under the name of the Mannerheim Line, and in the summer of 1939, the largest military maneuvers in Finnish history took place here. These and other facts testified Finnish readiness for war.
The Soviet Union wanted to peacefully strengthen the north-western borders, but the military route to achieve this goal was not ruled out. The Soviet government initiated negotiations with Finland on mutual security issues with 1939 in October. At first, the Soviet proposal to conclude a defensive alliance with our country was rejected by the Finnish leadership. Then the USSR government made a proposal to move the border, passing along the Karelian Isthmus, several kilometers to the north and lease the Hanko Peninsula to the Soviet Union. For this, the Finns were offered a territory in the Karelian SSR, which was several dozen times (!) Larger than the exchange area. It would seem that one can agree with such conditions. However, such a proposal was rejected, primarily due to the fact that Finland was assisted by England, France and a number of other states.
The possibility of solving the problem by military means is shown by the deployment of Red Army units in advance. Thus, the 7 Army, formed by the order of the Soviet Union Commissar for Defense of 14 in September 1939 in the Kalinin area, was later transferred to the Leningrad Military District (LVO) under operational control. By the end of September, this army began its advance towards the borders of Latvia, and by December it was already on the Karelian Isthmus. The 8 Army I, which was deployed on the basis of the Novgorod Army Group, was redeployed near Petrozavodsk by November, and by December its units were already on the border with Finland. September 16 The 1939 of the year forms the Murmansk Army Group, which was renamed the 14 Army two months later. It is easy to notice that simultaneously with the negotiations, deployment and concentration of troops took place, completed as a whole by November 28 of 1939.
So, the troops of the LVO replenished, deployed and concentrated near Finland, but the Finns did not want to sign the agreement. All that was needed was an occasion to start a war. It should be noted that our troops set combat missions as early as November 21, 1939. According to the LVO directive No. 4717 of November 21, the 7th Army, after receiving a special order, was required together with aviation and the Red Banner Baltic fleet (KBF) defeat the Finnish units, take possession of the fortifications standing on the Karelian Isthmus and go to the line of Art. Chitola, Art. Antrea, Vyborg; after that, together with the 8th army leading the offensive in the Serdobol direction, developing success, go to the line of Lakhta, Kyuviansk, Helsinki.
The cause of the war were provocations at the border. There were these provocations on the part of the Finns or ours, now it is difficult to say unequivocally. In a note from the Soviet Union on November 26 1939, for example, the Finnish government was accused of shelling by artillery causing human casualties. In response, the Finnish leadership refuted the accusations against it and proposed the creation of an independent commission to investigate the incident.
The Finns made similar demands to withdraw Soviet troops to 25 km, to our demands to withdraw their troops deep into their territory. 28 November was followed by a new note, which stated that, on the basis of the continuing provocations and impudent Finnish demands, the USSR considers itself discharged from the obligations of the 1920 peace treaty of the year. The note was printed in the Pravda newspaper of 28 and 29 of November 1939 of the year. In addition, on these days on the pages of the newspaper are placed various messages confirming the provocations of the Finnish military. Thus, the article “New provocations of the Finnish military” was published in Pravda on 29 November, which stated that, according to information received from the headquarters of the Baltic Military District, on November 11, 28 on the isthmus between the Fishing and Medium fishermen, five noticing our outfit moving along the border, fired at him and tried to capture him. The outfit began to depart. By the actions of a group that approached from our side, the Finns were driven back into the depths of their territory, and they captured three soldiers. In the 17 clock towards the USSR five times shot from a rifle. Ours did not respond. On the night of November 18, troops of the Military District ordered to cross the state border.
What did the leadership of the USSR count on? First of all, in the Soviet Union did not plan to start a big war, as evidenced by the initial composition of the troops - only four armies. Being within the framework of a beautiful, but not supported by the facts of the world solidarity of the working class, the Soviet government naively expected that as soon as our troops cross the state border, the Finnish proletariat will rise against its bourgeois government. The winter war proved the fallacy of such hopes, but the belief in proletarian solidarity, contrary to logic, remained in the minds of many until World War II.
After the outbreak of hostilities, the leadership of Finland transmitted through the Swedish embassy in Moscow a message to the Soviet government about its readiness to resume negotiations. But V.M. Molotov rejected this proposal, saying that the USSR had now recognized the provisional people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic (FDR), which had been created on the territory of our country from among the emigrant representatives of the Finnish left forces. Naturally, this government was ready to sign the necessary agreement with our country. Its text was posted in the Pravda newspaper 1 December 1939 of the year, and a day later an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship between the USSR and the FDR was signed and announced to the Soviet people.
What did the government of Finland hope for? Of course, it was well aware that if it could not agree, a military clash would inevitably be. Therefore, straining all forces, preparing for war. However, military experts considered this training insufficient. Already after the end of the Winter War, Lieutenant Colonel I. Khanpula wrote that those who carried out preparation for war “in good years” did not consider it necessary to increase the power of the Finnish armed forces, who in the course of military operations even lacked weapons and ammunition, Finnish soldiers paid for these mistakes on the Karelian isthmus with their blood. The leadership of Finland believed that in their northern theater of war the offensive could be carried out only in the winter or summer period. For directions above Lake Ladoga, it did not bother at all, as it was confident that the Finnish army was better prepared than the Soviet troops, who would have to fight on foreign territory and overcome the enormous difficulties associated with providing, while behind the strong fortifications that covered the Karelian Isthmus, Finnish troops hold out until spring thaw. By this time, the Finnish government was hoping to receive the necessary support from European countries.
The plans of the Soviet General Staff to defeat the enemy troops were as follows: active actions in the northern and central areas to pin the Finnish troops and not allow the Finns to receive military assistance from the Western powers (and the threat of landing of troops of other states existed); the main blow was to be inflicted by the troops of the 8 Army, bypassing the Mannerheim Line, the auxiliary - by the 7 Army. All this was given no more than 15 days. The operation included three stages: the first was the rout of the Finns to the predpole and the achievement of the main defensive line; the second is the preparation for the breakthrough of this band and the third is the complete rout of the Finnish armies on the Karelian Isthmus and the seizure of the Kexholm, Vyborg line. It was planned to achieve the following offensive rates: in the first two stages from 2 to 3 km, and in the third from 8 to 10 km per day. However, as you know, in fact, everything was different.
The Finnish command concentrated the main forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying 7 from the 15 infantry divisions, 4 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, and, in addition, reinforcement units. All these forces became part of the Karelian army of General X. Esterman. North of Lake Ladoga, on the Petrozavodsk direction, stood the army corps of General E. Heglund, which included two reinforced infantry divisions. In addition, by December, the group of troops of General P. Talvela was deployed to Vyartsilyu. The Ukhta sector was blocked by the group of troops of General V. Tuompo, and in the Arctic, on the Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions, the Lapland group of General K. Valenkus. Total Soviet troops opposed to 600 thousand Finnish soldiers, about 900 guns, 64 tank, all these forces supported the Finnish fleet (29 ships) and the Air Force (about 270 combat aircraft).
As part of the LVO (commander KA Meretskov) deployed 4 army: in the Arctic - 14-i in the 2-x infantry divisions; in Karelia - 9 of the 3 rifle divisions; east of Lake Ladoga — 8 of the 4 rifle divisions and on the Karelian Isthmus — the 7 of the army supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet forces.
Fighting to defeat the enemy is usually divided into 2 period. The first is counted from the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army 30 connections on November 1939 of the year and ends on February 11 of the year 1940. During this period, the troops operating in the strip from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland managed to advance to a depth of 35 –80 km, close Finland’s access to the Barents Sea and overcome the barrier of the Karelian Isthmus with a depth of 25 to 60 km and reach the Mannerheim line. During the second period, the Mannerheim Line was broken through and the fortress city of Vyborg was captured, it ended on March 13, 12, with the conclusion of a peace treaty.
In 8 h 30 mines 30 November after half an hour of artillery preparation, the Red Army troops crossed the border and, encountering insignificant resistance, advanced to 4-5 km by night. In the future, with each passing day, the resistance of the enemy increased, but the offensive continued in all directions. In general, only the troops of the 14 Army, who occupied the city of Petsamo, as well as the Rybachy and Medium Peninsula, took 10 days to complete their task. Shutting down Finland to the Barents Sea, they continued to make their way deep into the territory. The troops of the 9 Army, leading the offensive in the most difficult off-road conditions, were able to advance deeper into 32-45 km in the first week, and the 8 Army in 15 days by 75-80 km.
The peculiarity of the polar theater of operations complicated the use of large military forces and military equipment. It was possible to attack only on some separate directions, which divided the troops and disrupted the interaction between them. The commanders did not know the terrain well, which gave the enemy the opportunity to lure the Soviet units and subunits to places from which it was not possible to return.
The Finnish command seriously feared the withdrawal of parts of the Red Army in the central regions of the country from the north. In order to prevent this, additional forces were urgently transferred to these directions. For the most part these were perfectly prepared and equipped ski units and troops. The ski training of our troops turned out to be weak, and besides, the sports skis we had were unsuitable for use in real combat operations. As a result, parts and formations of 14, 9 and 8 armies were forced to go on the defensive, in addition, some of the troops were surrounded and fought hard. The 7 Army at first also successfully developed an offensive in its sector, but its course was greatly slowed down by a strip of engineering obstacles, starting directly from the border and having a depth from 20 to 65 km. This lane was equipped with several (up to five) lines of barriers and a system of strong points. During the fighting, 12 reinforced concrete structures, 1245 bunkers, more than 220 km of wire obstacles, about 200 km of forest debris, 56 km of ditches and escarpes, up to 80 km of ridges, almost 400 km of minefields were destroyed. However, the troops of the right flank of 3 December already managed to break through to the main line of the Mannerheim line, while the rest of the army units reached it only on December 12.
December 13 troops received an order to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was a system of heavily fortified bands and positions. The main strip had a depth of up to 10 km, and included 22 defense nodes and numerous strong points, each consisting of 3-5 pillboxes and 4-6 pillboxes. The 4-6 strongholds formed a resistance node, usually extending along the front for 3-5 km and a depth of 3-4 km. The strongholds, pillboxes and bunkers were connected by communications and trenches, had a well-developed system of anti-tank obstacles and various engineering barriers. The second lane was located in 3-5 km from the main, and had almost 40 pillboxes and around 180 bunkers. It was equipped like a basic, but with less engineering development. Vyborg had a third lane, which included two positions with a multitude of pillboxes, pillboxes, engineering barriers and strong points.
The troops of the 7 Army hoped to break through the main line of the Mannerheim line, but they did not achieve any results in this attempt, but suffered serious losses. Having repelled the attacks of the Red Army, the enemy tried to seize the initiative by conducting a series of counterattacks, but without success.
At the end of the year, the High Command of the Red Army gave the order to stop the attacks and prepare thoroughly for a breakthrough. From the troops of the 7 Army, supplemented by new formations, they formed two armies (7 and 13), which became part of the created North-Western Front. The GN Directive of 28 December 1939 of the year determined the methods of training troops, some tactical issues and organization of command and control of the troops, which were as follows: to ensure that the arriving units were familiarized with the conditions of hostilities and not to be unprepared to fight; not to get involved in the tactics of rapid advancement, but to advance only after thorough preparation; for reconnaissance and surprise strikes create ski units; join the battle not with the crowd, but with companies and battalions, echeloning them in depth and providing a three-fold superiority over the enemy; not to throw infantry into the attack until enemy pillboxes at the front line of defense are crushed; the attack must be carried out after a thorough artillery preparation, the guns must be fired at targets, not at squares.
Implementing these instructions, the front command deployed preparations for a breakthrough: the troops were training on specially created training fields, equipped with dots and bunkers, similar to those that were to be really stormed. At the same time, a plan of operation was developed, on the basis of which the front forces were to break through the defenses on the 40-kilometer stretch of adjacent flanks of the armies. By this time, the North-Western Front had more than twice superiority in infantry, almost three times in artillery and multiple in aircraft and tanks over the enemy.
February 11 after the artillery preparation, which lasted for almost three hours, the front troops launched an offensive. The artillery barrage was attacked to a depth of 1,5 -2 km, and the assault groups carried out the blocking and destruction of the pillboxes. The first to break through the defense were the units of the 123 division, which had penetrated the first day on 1,5 km. The emerging success developed the second echelon of the corps, then the army and front reserves were introduced into the breakthrough. As a result, by February 17 the main line of the Mannerheim Line was broken through and the Finns retreated to the second lane. Soviet troops, having regrouped in front of the second line of defense, resumed the offensive. February 28, after artillery preparation lasting an hour and a half, they unanimously attacked enemy positions. The enemy could not stand the onslaught and began to withdraw. Pursuing him, the troops of the Red Army reached the city of Vyborg and stormed it on the night of March 13 on 1940.
With the breakthrough of the Mannerheim line by the Soviet armies, the Finnish leadership realized that without Western support, defeat was inevitable. Now the Finns have two options: accept the conditions of the USSR and conclude peace or seek military support from Britain and France, that is, enter into a military agreement with these states. London and Paris increased diplomatic pressure on our country. Germany also convinced the governments of Sweden and Norway that if they could not convince Finland to accept the conditions of the USSR, then they themselves could become a war zone. The Finns were forced to resume negotiations. Their outcome was a peace treaty concluded on March 12 of 1940.
His conditions completely erased the possible reproaches that our country wanted to deprive Finland of sovereignty and restore the borders of Tsarist Russia. The real goal of the Soviet Union was indeed the strengthening of the Soviet north-western borders, the security of Leningrad, as well as our non-freezing port in Murmansk and the railway.
The public condemned this war, which is evident from some publications in the press of those years. However, a number of politicians blame for the outbreak of war and put on the Finnish government. The famous Finnish statesman Urho Kekkonen, almost 26 years (1956 -1981) was the former president of this country, stressed that it was easy to avoid war, it was enough for the Finnish government to show understanding of the interests of the Soviet Union and Finland itself.
Sources:
Sokolov B. Secrets of the Finnish War. M .: Veche.2002. C. 8-49, 309-352.
Meltyukov M. The Popular Front for Finland? (on the question of the goals of the Soviet leadership in the war with Finland in 1939-1940) // Patriotic History. 1993. No. 3 C. 95-101
Vashchenko P. If Finland and the USSR. // visage 1990. No.6. C.27-34.
Kilin Y. View from Karelia on the "Winter War". // International life. 1994. No.3. 1994. With 46-50.
A group of authors. The history of the Second World War 1939-1945's. T. 3. M .: Voenizdat, 1974. C. 356-362.
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