Military Review

Russian aerospace "network centrism" against the American concepts of "CEC", "Kill Chain" and "Kill Web"


The photo carrier strike group of the US Navy, led by the aircraft carrier CVN-65 USS "Enterprise". In the foreground, you can see the destroyer URO class "Arley Burke" DDG-78 USS "Porter", behind the aircraft carrier - EM URO DDG-94 "Nitze", closes its missile cruiser URO class "Ticonderoga" CG-69 USS "Vicksburg". In addition to the “Link-11 / 16” channels integrated into the Aegis IIC, it was on “Vicksburg” that one of the first sets of equipment for the integrated exchange of tactical information of the network-centric naval air defense / missile defense system CEC / NIFC-CA was installed

The geopolitical ambitions of the world's leading superpowers that have been changing for centuries have been dictated by their military-strategic concepts in relation to various economically important regions of the planet for hundreds of years. Now, as we see, the geostrategic “poles” have firmly entrenched themselves in Western Asia, IATR, the Baltics and the Arctic region, which led them to immediately militarize the armed forces of the leading world states, as well as allied allies belonging to various military and political alliances, which are today the main participants of the "Big Game". Estimating the military capabilities of the parties in a major regional or global conflict is a very delicate and complex task, for which it would not be enough to simply compare, for example, the quantitative composition and tactical and technical parameters of various types of military equipment of the CSTO and Russia with the same technology of the North Atlantic alliance. It will require an integrated approach that combines an analysis of the system coordination between the units of this equipment in the likely combat conditions, taking into account the heterogeneity of mixed groups of troops. This fact is leading in the consideration of the laws of network-centric warfare.

We will try to apply this approach today to reliably assess the combat effectiveness of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the US Navy in the event of a large-scale military conflict. These types of armed forces of the two superpowers were chosen absolutely not by chance, but on the basis of the strategic ambitions of the states. Thus, the US Navy plays a key role in retaining Western influence in various regions of the world, pointing to the policy of "absolute hegemony"; and the Russian Aerospace Forces, which have enhanced air and anti-missile components, perform to a greater extent defensive functions in the aerospace space of our country, as well as tactical and strategic strike qualities required for a proper counter strike against the enemy at near and far borders from the country: typical defensive the policy applied in the system of a developing multi-polar world order.

The impetus for writing this review was an interesting and very progressive opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Michael Manazir, regarding the methods of waging a modern war on the ocean theater, which was expressed at the Sea Air-Space 2016 exhibition. It is on this basis that our further analysis will be based.

Firstly, M. Manazir defined any successful military operation in the future not as the result of the superiority of the technologically superior destroyer URO, multi-purpose nuclear submarine or anti-submarine aircraft, but as the result of a correctly functioning system in battle that detects, tracks, selects the most important enemy targets, and also their correct distribution between all links and individual elements (units) of this system. In this case, even ships and submarines that do not possess technological superiority of avionics and armaments can get the better of the enemy thanks to faster and more efficient tires for transmitting tactical information about the underwater, surface, ground and aerospace conditions in the area of ​​operation of a friendly aircraft carrier strike group. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the American Navy applied in relation to combat potential fleet the term "aggregate power" (from the Latin aggregatio - "joining"), which indicates the power of all types of ships, submarines, deck and sea, tied into a single "fighting organism" aviationthat is close to an ideal network-centric structure.

Secondly, in his judgments, Michael Manazir relied on the existing naval concepts of “Kill chain”, “CEC” and “NIFC-CA” and pointed to the need to move to a new level, embodied in the developed concepts of “Kill web”, “ADOSWC "And" NIFC-CU ". What is behind these militaristic abbreviations?

The US military uses the term “Kill chain” as a description of the existing strike tactics aimed at anticipating an enemy strike, but in a general sense, this is a typical aggressor tactic. “Kill Chain” consists of a sequence of actions: target detection, its subsequent classification, identification, distribution and preparation of air / underwater attack means for its destruction, “seizure”, opening fire and destroying a target. This concept has been used in the US armed forces for quite a long time, but allows only one or several network-centric-linked combat units to calculate the pattern of the effectiveness of the destruction of a particular target in a short period of time. But in difficult combat conditions, in a thick sheet of REP, when tactical communication systems are overwhelmed with hundreds and thousands of coordinates of various targets, the Kill chain does not provide for the accurate transmission of data on the results of strikes to other friendly units.

So, for example, if the newest ultra low noise multipurpose SSN-23 submarine "Jimmy Carter" (Sea Wolf class) inflicts a confident torpedo or missile attack on an enemy surface ship, but it will continue to stay afloat for many years, 5 multi-purpose carrier-based fighters of the 35 generation F-1B The US Marine Corps or the strategic B-XNUMXB missile carriers can continue the anti-ship operation against this ship due to the lack of information about its decommissioning, which will lead to accelerated depletion of ammunition, as well as unnecessary "Unprofitable", from a tactical point of view, "bodily movements" machinery of various arms against a common goal.

Applying the “Kill Chain” concept showed many flaws during the Desert Storm in 1991. American battalions of antiaircraft missile complexes «Patriot PAC-1», designed in the Near East to combat the Iraqi tactical ballistic missiles 9K14 PTRC 9K72 "Elbrus", "friendly fire" destroyed the British tactical strike fighter "Tornado» GR.4, and also the US Navy multi-purpose fighter F / A-18C "Hornet", which were recognized by the AN / MPQ-53 MRLS operators as Iraqi OTBR 9-72 "SCUD" in the initial segment of the trajectory. Because of the systemic inconsistency of actions between the "AWACS", "Patriot" and tactical aircraft, these events occurred, requiring the modernization of the concept.

The 21st century network-centric concept of “Kill web” refers to the most promising trends of the American army, and as it should have happened, its embodiment in hardware and artificial intelligence began precisely in the Navy, which plays for the United States the decisive role of world domination. It solves all the system flaws described in the “Kill chain” and, in addition, allows infinitely expanding the information and tactical aggregation between various combat elements thanks to the open software architecture of modern digital computerized avionics. Currently, the “Kill web” concept is gradually integrated at the link level in the AUG of the US Navy, and is presented today by the sub-concepts of naval air defense / missile defense “NIFC-CA” and anti-ship defense “ADOSWC”, as well as work on the advanced concept of anti-submarine defense of the submarine fleet. NIFC-CU. Of particular interest to us is precisely the anti-aircraft / anti-missile "NIFC-CA", which is part of the network-centric system "CEC". Thanks to the “Cooperative Engagement Capability” (in Russian, “collective defense capability”), various combat elements of the US Navy and the International Police Commission will be able to fully exchange tactical information about the air situation in a particular theater sector. Also, the structure of the "CEC" will include ground units of the US Marine Corps air defense and, if possible, even the Patriot PAC-3 air defense missile systems.

Due to the presence of this system, the capabilities of the Integrated Fire Control integrated fire control system were fully revealed, thanks to which ERINT anti-aircraft missiles could hit a horizon cruise missile, or a UAV according to target designation from the F-35B or the E-2D carrier aircraft "Advanced Hawkeye" ". Examples are many.

NIFC-CA gives the IFC system additional opportunities for comprehensive data exchange, based on the departure from the hierarchical structure of the tactical network of information exchange Link-16 (TADIL-J). For the full functioning of the Integrated Fire Control, the new concept provides for the introduction of a new additional radio channel for the exchange of tactical information DDS (Data Distribution System), which also has a high frequency hopping frequency (pseudo-random operating frequency tuning). This radio channel is introduced after integration into the CICS unit of a specialized REO tactical information exchange equipment based on a single CEP processor (Cooperative Engagement Processor), and various equipment models based on CEP were developed for ground, sea or air combat units : for NK - this is AN / USG-2, for deck aircraft DRLO and At E-2C / D “Hawkeye / Advanced Hawkeye” - AN / USG-3, for PBU of ground divisions of SAMs - AN / USG-5. The demonstration modification of the CEC / NIFC-CA devices was first tested on a carrier strike group led by the CVN-69 USS "Dwight D. Eisenhower" aircraft carrier in the 1995 year, later they were installed on TRO-class rocket cruisers, in particular, CG-66 USS "Hue City", CG-68 USS "Anzio", CG-69 USS "Vicksburg" and CG-71 USS "Cape St. George. "

The main contractor of all the equipment carrying the CEC / NIFC-CA concepts in the US Navy is the same eminent company Raytheon with the support of the Applied Physics Laboratory of D. Hopkins University. On the state resource, back on January 23, 2014, an interesting analytical review "Inside the Navy`s Next Air War" appeared, where the tactical and technical details of all the above concepts were considered in detail, based on the opinion of Michael Manazir. It shows a very interesting tactical scheme of action of the modern AUG of the US Navy at the time of the strategic aerospace offensive operation on the coastal sector of the enemy's territory, and also taking into account the concept of "NIFC-CA".

Pay attention to the intensification of communication channels between the air and naval units of the American AUG as they move away from the likely impact of enemy EW assets

All combat elements are located here on the "pyramidal" principle. The top of the “shock pyramid” of the American fleet is the wing of the inconspicuous multipurpose carrier-based fighter F-35B / C, which, in numbers from the squadron (12 aircraft) to the air regiment (more than 24 aircraft), enter the airspace of the enemy and begin to scan the coastal zone and airspace using airborne radar AN / APG-81 for the presence, type and number of enemy ground-based air defense systems and fighters capable of posing a threat to conduct a massive missile-air strike of the American AUG. At the same time, long-distance airborne battles with the use of AIM-120D missiles can be conducted to distract and wear down enemy aircraft before and during the main attack. Simultaneously with the implementation of local tasks "air-to-air", the optical-electronic sighting and navigation system with a distributed aperture AN / AAQ-37 "DAS" will detect the mass of enemy ground and air targets, transferring all the information to the electronic warfare and suppressions far behind Air Defense F / A-18G “Growler”, which then retransmit it to the arms of the Advanced Advice Hokaev airborne unit, and also select the most important enemy radio equipment for radio-electronic suppression.

The first thing that ensures sufficiently high information security of the advanced F-35B / C-F / A-18G deck-and-deck ligament is the use of the MADL tactical information exchange channel that is in the Ku-band at frequencies from 11 to 18 GHz. A protected frequency hopping radio channel will be turned on literally for a second period of time to transmit to the Growlers information on targets that are on the front edge of the theater. F-35B at the time of sending the information package will be located with the 3-5-kilometer deprecation relative to F / A-18G, which will partially avoid the enemy's suppression of the signal by airborne EW equipment. This low-level and poorly perceptible tactical radio channel was called the “Small Data Pipe”, and today represents the main problem on which KRET and other domestic developers of modern electronic warfare devices must work. Also noteworthy is the presence of the F / A-18E / F “Super Hornet” auxiliary aviation squadron flying between the leading Lightnings and Growlers. What is it done for?

Lightning is far from Raptors, and in the case of independent air combat with such promising vehicles as Su-35С, T-50 PAK-FA or Chinese J-15S and J-31, can suffer a complete defeat right in the airspace the adversary. The first ones will begin rapid penetration into the air orders of the “Growlers” and “Hokaev”, which will instantly “blind” the entire American AUG. Squadron "Super Hornets" will be able to temporarily hold enemy fighters on the front lines of a weakened air "pyramid" to reinforcements in the form of another squadron of "Lightnings", capable of keeping the "air patrol" of AUG safe. Before us is a powerful and full-fledged air component of a naval air defense system with several echelons and lines of defense.

The central link (“heart”) of the AUG air component, represented by Advanced Hokaya, the UCLASS deck UAV and the Super Hornet covering them (the latter are not indicated in the diagram), no longer refers to the airborne reconnaissance base, but to the command and staff structure of the aircraft carrier group. Radar patrol and guidance aircraft for safety will only operate within range (under cover) of the Aegis shipboard CMS with RIM-174 SM-6 ERAM interceptor missiles (i.e., 200-250 km from the flagship aircraft carrier), F / A-18E / F slightly further (in 300 - 400 km). We draw attention to the type of data transmission channel from the “Growlers” to the “Hokaya” and from the “Hokayev to the surface AUG”. There is already a full-fledged and “long-playing” decimeter radio channel for transmitting tactical information “TTNT”, which is a backup channel “Link-16 / CMN-4”. Due to the large distance from the enemy's REP funds (more than 700 - 800 km), "TTNT", directly in 200-300, the kilometer zone from AUG will be stable protected: the information illumination of the ship’s personnel is unlikely to suffer.

The American aircraft carrier strike groups themselves will significantly increase their anti-aircraft / anti-missile potential over the coming years by replacing the existing AN / SPY-1D (V) MRLLS antenna station with the prospective AMDR radar, which, instead of 1-channel radar searchlights, has AN / SPG illumination -62 will receive high-grade multichannel antenna arrays capable of “capturing” several dozen aerial targets at once. The interceptor missiles RIM-174 ERAM will fix the effect due to the presence of ARGSN, capable of obtaining target designation from the "Ajis", and from the "Grouler", and from the "Lightning". To overcome the missile defense of such an AUG will be quite difficult: only the Chinese and Russian Air Forces and the Navy will be able to carry out the destruction of such a naval compound in a certain period of time.

An equally important task is a decent air defense / missile defense of the territory from the strikes of the advanced AUG of the US Navy.


If the progress of the 21st century system coordination in the United States has largely affected the main strike component of the army, the naval forces, then we have touched the defense component most of all - the Air Force and Air Defense, because these types of VKS should always be ready to "kindly" meet Thousands of NATO strategic cruise missiles, as well as hundreds of tactical aviation units armed with the low-profile HARM and ALARM anti-radar missiles, planning bombs, ADM-160C “MALD-J” missiles, as well as the most complex container multiplex electronic countermeasures.

Without a doubt, the basis here is made up of numerous anti-aircraft missile divisions and regiments of various modifications of the Three Hundreds (C-300PS, C-300PM1, C-400 Triumph, C-300B / B4), Buk-M1 / 2, and also numerous anti-aircraft missile systems of military air defense ("Tor-М1 / В", "Tor-М2", "Armor-С1", "Tungusska-М1", "Arrow-10М4", "Gyurza", "Igla-S" , "Willow", etc.); but without integrated network-centric linkage and support for air defense aviation, all these systems would not look as threatening as we see today.

All this is provided today with a unique automated control system for anti-aircraft missile units at the level of the Polyana-D4М1 ASU brigade as part of the anti-aircraft missile defense system, as well as with the unified RNZhir 9-NNXX battery pack as part of the military anti-aircraft system. “Polyana-D737М4” collects tactical information about the air situation from ground-based radar-DRLO (“Sky-U”, “Sky-M”, “Opponnik-G”, “Gamma-C1”, 1- X96, etc.), the Shmel-M radar systems installed on the A-6U base and other RTR / XEM facilities, and then analyzes their routes, selects the most dangerous and / or priority targets and performs the distribution and targeting of combat control points (PBU) by anti-aircraft missiles divisions / teams. The high computational characteristics of computerized data exchange and display devices PBU MP50RPM, KSHM MP06RPM and ARM 02С9 are realized due to modern microprocessor element base with high performance, as well as due to high-speed data transfer modules. “Polyana-D929М4” is capable of “leading” to 1 accompanied by airborne targets supplied with X-ray radar, and also stores in memory information about the 255 VC coordinates tracked in the review mode. Information processing is handled by 500 operators on modern ARMs with liquid crystal MFIs, and the command and staff AARM 8C9, equipped with one large-format LCD, helps to systematize information into one visual tactical interface.

The greatest capabilities in the “Polyana-D4М1” missile defense system can simultaneously manifest in conjunction with the most powerful 55ЖХ6М “Sky-M” radar complex capable of detecting air attack weapons in near space at distances to 1800 km (in sector view mode), as well as with an aircraft DLA A-50U, capable of detecting remote low-profile targets at distances from 150 to 200 km. Above the covered area is set fully viewed closed airspace. "Glade" is able to receive information simultaneously from 3-x sources and transmit it 6-five customers, which may include: command and control points 5N63S, 54K6E, 9S457M and 55K6E (of S-300PS / PM1 / and C-400 «Triumph », Respectively), as well as troop units of the Thor, Tungussk and Strela-10 families, but only through an intermediate, integrated into the brigade combat information and control system, the UXP 9-737" Ranzhir ".

“Ranzhir”, to some extent, is also an automated control system, but its capacity, communication range and the number of types of interfaced systems are severely limited. UBCF "Ranzhir" is capable of processing only 24 followed by the passage of the CC, and 48 - surveyed, i.e. 10 is shorter than “Poliana-D4М1”, the execution time of one target designation is 5 seconds (for Polyana it is 1 second), only Air Force weapons can be consumers, due to which 9С737 can participate only in the near air defense / missile defense range , but with a "bold" plus in the form of the main element of the defense of the "dead zones" of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems. There is a tracked "ranzhirov" and the second advantage - the deployment time, which is only 5 minutes, the "Glade" it can be up to 35 minutes. The complex is capable of simultaneously issuing 4 target designation to consumers, and receiving information from Polyana, DRLOU helicopters within 30 radius of the km and from the 9C18М1 Kupol radar of the review and targeting radar systems (Buk-М1).

Later developed in 1987, UBKP "Ranzhir" was deeply improved. The new version is called "Ranzhir-M" (9C737M). Of the main differences from the base product, it is worth noting almost 3 times the increased throughput of the target paths (it increased from 24 to 60), the implementation time of one target designation decreased to 2 seconds, the number of communication channels increased to 5. Thanks to the modernization of the radio-electronic element base, the list of connecting tactical information consumers also included Igla-S man-portable air defense systems and later Verba, which are equipped with specialized tablets for displaying markers of approaching air targets. In addition to the automatic distribution of target designations from helicopter VKP / DRLO for BM ZRSK, the product 9С737М is able to systematize the targets accompanied by 6 ZRSK. For example, if the X-NUMX of the Tor-M3 complex and the 1 of the Tungusska-M3 complex connected to the Ranger ranger air defense missile complex are almost completely excluded from the anti-aircraft defense missile brigade of the anti-aircraft missile brigade, it is completely impossible to seize the same means of air attack by several above ZRSK / ZRAK. This, firstly, in 1 - 1,2 times reduces the useless missiles, and secondly, increases the useful overall target canal of an anti-aircraft missile brigade by approximately the same amount. “Ranzhir-M” has an increased physical memory of the memory of the targets detected by sources of radar data: the memory can contain the coordinates 1,6 of the observed targets. The upgraded Ranzhir-M, developed by the Penza-based Radiozavod OJSC in 170, has the GM-90 tracked chassis, while the Ranzhir was based on the MT-LBu chassis, unified with the Tor-М1 complex.

The operators "Ranzhir-M" have the disposal of 4 AWP on the basis of modern computers "Baguette-21" (commander, operator of the RL-environment and radio operator) and "Baguette-41" (additional AWS). There is a topographic location system based on GLONASS / GPS, as well as optoelectronic means for video documentation and analysis of the interception of targets by brigade registrars.

In the photo is another automated control system of the VKS of Russia "Baikal-1МЕ". This automated control system is a superior command over Polyany and Ranzhira and is able to simultaneously control 8 anti-aircraft missile systems with 24 ЗРДН complexes of С-300ПМ1 and С-300В, Buk-М1, etc. The instrumental altitude ceiling of Baikal is 1200 km, and the maximum target speed is 18430 km / h, which indicates its further use in the C-500 “Prometheus” air defense system

The latest version of "Ranzhira", created for the modular version of ZRSK "Tor-М2КМ", was first introduced at MAKS-2013. The performance of the UDCP “Ranzhir-М1” (9С737МК) reached the “Polyana-D4М1” indicators: the new unified command center is capable of displaying target markers on the MFIs up to 255. Processing a single target can be 500 second. The instrumental range of the observed airspace of the “Ranzhir-М1” reaches 1 km, which confirmed the software and hardware integration with all modifications of the С-200ПМ300 SAMs. All previous "Razhira" in conjunction with the "Three Hundred" did not work. Thus, the personnel of OJSC Radiozavod embodied all the best qualities of Polyana and Ranzhira in the 1С9MK product, allowing them to work on the long-range air defense / missile defense too. Placed on the wheeled chassis TATA "Ranzhir-M" has a significantly increased mobility on highways and dry ground surfaces, allowing for the deployment much faster than early modifications. In fact, from a unified brigade command center "Ranzhir-М737" turned into a full-fledged automated control system, equivalent in level "Poliana-D1М4", and these two systems will not be able to turn our air defense into a single network-centric, informationally saturated "organism" for more than one decade "Able to counter any aerospace threats from the enemy beyond.
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  1. sa-ag
    sa-ag 31 May 2016 07: 40
    "... Su-35S, T-50 PAK-FA or Chinese J-15S and J-31, can be completely defeated right in the airspace of the enemy. The first ones will begin to quickly penetrate the air formations of the" Growlers "and" Hokaev ", which will instantly "blind" the entire American AUG. "

    It’s all in one gate, Groler’s electronic warfare plane, so the Su-35S isn’t all that easy to be guided by, Hokkai isn’t in the first order at all, it’s just going to highlight targets, as for Chinese fighters, it’s a bold statement nowhere and did not show
  2. Alez
    Alez 31 May 2016 08: 02
    To go forward, you need to run. In order not to stand still, you need to go. Continuous improvement of the characteristics of the complexes will allow Russia to avoid many problems.
    1. Monarchist
      Monarchist 31 May 2016 08: 45
      I agree. We need to constantly upgrade and create progressive weapons. Even Alexander3 correctly stated: Russia has two faithful allies, its army and navy!
  3. Riv
    Riv 31 May 2016 08: 45
    The ass is certainly tricky, but there is also a threaded tool on it. For example, a flock of several hundred drones, of which every second works like an electromagnetic jammer, and every first is aimed at the enemy’s radar. At the same time, drones themselves are several times cheaper than an interceptor missile.
    Or some fully automatic, computer-controlled submarines attacking with a wolf pack. Such a submarine does not need to dodge the destroyer. On the contrary: it is one of the priority goals.
    Or stupidly high-altitude nuclear explosion, completely disrupting radio communications. The warhead can also be lowered from orbit without bothering with all kinds of ICBMs. She will fly and it will be only two hundred kilometers. No interceptor will be in time.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 31 May 2016 14: 05
      "For example, a flock of several hundred drones, of which every second works,
      like an electromagnetic jammer, and every first one is aimed at the enemy's radar "///

      Absolutely right idea. So in the IDF and they think of an attack on multi-defense air defense.
      1. Parsec
        Parsec 31 May 2016 14: 56
        Quote: voyaka uh
        "For example, a flock of several hundred drones, of which every second works,
        like an electromagnetic jammer, and every first one is aimed at the enemy's radar "///

        Absolutely right idea. So in the IDF and they think of an attack on multi-defense air defense.

        Those. every second radiates powerfully at the frequencies of "multi-echeloned air defense", and every first one is directed to radars emitting at the same frequencies?
        And the drone has narrowly directed antennas, and the drone always flies with a zero parameter to the radar, and the reflections of the signals emitted by the drone and the signal along the side lobes do not affect the first ones that should be aimed at the radar?

        1. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 31 May 2016 18: 03
          I only roughly picked up the idea
          dear Riv. About "every first", "every second" - his thoughts.
          But the general concept of an attacking UAV flock with different functions (and, of course,
          Air Force planes after them) - what is now being considered in Israel,
          and in the USA.
          1. Parsec
            Parsec 31 May 2016 21: 20
            Who reported to you what is being thought out there in Israel and in the USA?

            It is not arithmetic that works in the air raid on layered air defense, there is a kind of algebra, and 1 + 1 can give 8, or maybe -3. For each specific air defense group, terrain conditions, weather, covered grouping of troops / object.

            It is clear that to suppress the grouping, and then to clear the sky, and to strike at the attached, and better highlighted goals, this will be a brilliant victory. A trifle remained, crush the group.

            A flock of drones ... God is always on the side of large battalions, but with drones the situation is twofold. When the drone appears, according to its signatures fully repeating combat aircraft, then it will benefit from such an application. When a drone can be distinguished from a combat aircraft, it is possible to create a difficult situation for troops using this drone.

            In general, different types of weapons were periodically put on the role of the prodigy, which is now radically changing the war - a crossbow, a gun, a rifled gun, a machine gun, a tank, an airplane, a rocket, a radar, a laser, a REP, GPS. Now is the time for drones to play this role. Here’s a drone, that’s all going to be wrong, here we’ll break through a hundred drones, and then the Air Force planes.

            I painted you for interference.

            You need to pick up the idea after critical reflection. And you "only approximately, approximately, idea picked up ", and even hung the decorators, speaking on behalf of the United States and Israel, knowingly not dealing with these issues.
            1. voyaka uh
              voyaka uh 31 May 2016 22: 51
              "an air raid on a layered air defense does not work with arithmetic, there is a kind of algebra, and 1 + 1
              may give 8, or maybe -3 "/////

              There is nothing to object to. smile especially if -3 ... laughing you have strong arguments
  4. Berber
    Berber 31 May 2016 19: 00
    Five-plus article. There is a military-scientific thought, concrete, and not unfounded analysis. Many thanks to the author.
  5. Sergey
    Sergey 31 May 2016 19: 32
    Having two higher educations, experience, appropriate training, etc., I could not understand the fashionable term "NETWORK WARS (OPERATIONS)" for 5 years ... Americans are trying to transfer flow control in TRADE into command and control of troops and defeat, and we this second ...
    Quote: BerBer
    Five-plus article. There is a military scientific thought

    I did not see anything scientific ... There is no object, subject of research ... Give me an example of at least one WORKING complex of ACCS, even with us, even with them .... For information, the Americans only after the 2nd company in Iraq understood that you need to have ACCS facilities in the company (battery) unit. TOTAL - article "ABOUT NOTHING" ...
    1. Parsec
      Parsec 31 May 2016 22: 57
      Previously, it was called "Improving the interaction of heterogeneous forces and means of the fleet at the stage of target allocation during the preparation of the first strike and repelling enemy countermeasures using information systems."

      Navy is so-so for the fleet, given the number of control objects and targets for destruction. For a ground operation, the number of targets changes by an order, if not two.

      "Cooperative Engagement Capability" (Russian. "Collective defense") here is more likely "the possibility of concentrating the blow", the opposite is completely the meaning.

      How is an ACSM seen in a company or battery unit?
      Problem setting for the company / battery?

      The control object of the company / battery changes every minute, in tense moments every second - maneuverable, fire, communication (I do not like "communication") capabilities, spatial position, hence the influence of the terrain, and the flow of requests for service - ammunition, fuel, repairs, evacuation of the wounded and cars, and a dozen more indicators.

      And the task of the company / battery should be set including and after evaluating the capabilities of the company. Well, how will it look in dynamics? The delay of company data for a minute after a fire raid on the company on the march, and the system will send you to the tip of the main strike after thirty percent of losses, die without result, the injured will remain, the heavy will die, and the lungs will become heavy and also die if the company’s ASUV company is damaged result of a raid.

      The battery can be lowered, and you can implement them in the machine too. But the fighting of artillery is not one fire, there are also a dozen types of support and not all of the ramparts.

      And here the question of the price of the executor’s error and system failure pops up, which, in fact, was demonstrated in Iraq. The DARPA report is much cooler than all the opuses of Zhvanetsky and Zadornov together.
    2. mav1971
      mav1971 31 May 2016 23: 03
      Quote: Sergey
      Having two higher educations, experience, appropriate training, etc., I could not understand the fashionable term "NETWORK WARS (OPERATIONS)" for 5 years ... Americans are trying to transfer flow control in TRADE into command and control of troops and defeat, and we this second ...

      And they have experience building Po for working multinational corporations, with hundreds of branches around the world, working in a single environment in real time.
      and this is a big plus.
      Of course you can’t buy a commercial product and deliver it to the troops - this is nonsense and stupidity.
      Any use of weapons by a combat unit, interaction of combat units, including different types of troops, is a "normal" clearly defined "business process." Accordingly, all network centricity can be built on an understanding of the interaction of business processes, the scale of transnational companies, which companies such as IBM have been successfully doing for many years. Look at the list of IBM products - there almost everything for managing a network-centric system is already in the potential. it remains to add a technical component in the form of communication protocols, frequencies, equipment - and get a basically workable idea.
      1. Parsec
        Parsec 31 May 2016 23: 26
        A business process is a reflection of real life on a certain system of symbols with its own algebra.

        Quote: mav1971
        Any use of weapons by a combat unit, interaction of combat units, including different types of troops, is a "normal" clearly defined "business process."

        Clearly state the interaction of combat units, including various military branchesWithout modeling a spherical horse in a vacuum, you will need twenty years. During this time, your description will become hopelessly outdated, but children will correct before retirement, and grandchildren will experience it. Well, great-grandchildren after a couple of iterations will change the concept.

        A transaction delay in the multinational corporation will not cause serious consequences, an error in the data in normal software will not allow the transaction to be conducted. In battle, the dynamics are different. Your information about the enemy with a delay of 10 minutes will be uninteresting.
        1. mav1971
          mav1971 31 May 2016 23: 49
          Quote: Parsec

          A transaction delay in the multinational corporation will not cause serious consequences, an error in the data in normal software will not allow the transaction to be conducted. In battle, the dynamics are different. Your information about the enemy with a delay of 10 minutes will be uninteresting.

          That is, about data transfer protocols, channel redundancy, ensuring noise immunity, fault tolerance - you did not want to think?
          They are important. I do not argue.
          But ...
          these factors are secondary!

          Primary - the concept!
          The idea of ​​implementation!
          The whole architecture in the form of a global self-scalable infrastructure, interaction, integration, security, identification, distributed computing, mobile and cluster solutions, data management, unification, network management, network load management - these are the primary tasks. which must be formulated in a single key and formulated not only as a concept, but also as an implementation.
          In this, that is, big achievements from global business applications.
          And to "finish" the technique to the required level of ensuring the performance of the terms of reference is a much simpler task and does not require the "level of an architect-developer".

          A car could and can be assembled by many, but to come up with a car "in principle" as it was in the year 1804-05 is the lot of units ...
          1. Parsec
            Parsec 1 June 2016 02: 17
            Axapta Adept?

            So we are for all the good, against all garbage.
            Those. people are sitting somewhere highly immersed in the routine, and they don’t know that there are business processes that can be used to describe such a complex and dynamic phenomenon as war, they don’t have any idea about protocols, noise immunity, fault tolerance, and that the tasks need to be formulated in in a single key, not only in the form of a concept, but also of implementation! They didn’t want to think!

            But there are, there are young (or not so already?) Specialists flying on the leading front of the wave of innovation forward towards the bright future of full automation!
            They know that primary is the end! The idea of ​​implementation!

            Here is the association - Ostap Bender's holiday set and something from Tukhachevsky.

            Without everything that you have painted, the information system will not work, but the self-scalable global infrastructure is five.
            Give artificial intelligence tomorrow! And to work on non-rectangular tables! And he could make the right decisions on an incomplete input matrix!

            There is a concept, and it was implemented in the 9C717 system, on clients and servers that they don’t put on a children's phone now, but it was implemented.

            "In the TZU ACS" Maneuver "was created and comprehensively tested a mobile SOD with a distributed structure, providing the organization of networks for any configuration of command and control and launchers by troops and weapons.
            SOD provided in the mode of packet switching (codograms) automatic multi-route data transmission with a functionally unlimited number of retransmissions and regeneration of codograms.
            The SOD was oriented to the structure of the ACCS of the TZU, but at the same time it made it possible to promptly reconfigure the networks if necessary. "

            This is 1991, a 486 processor is a rarity, 386SX power and strength, Windows 3.1 is new.



            Once again - the control object and external conditions (the enemy) are dynamically variable over a wide range.
            To give an AWP specialist on which the information he needs will be displayed and the commands / data required from him will be formed is not a problem. But it will be mechanization, not automation.

            The interpretation of the data and the proposal of a solution can be automated for some combat arms in certain types of combat operations, and indeed it is automated in anti-aircraft missile systems when firing; it is possible to put some air defense systems / air defense systems in the machine, and the goal will be ranked by importance, and the method of shooting to determine and evaluate the shooting; however, fighting is not only shooting.

            And here, see above - the variability of the control object and external conditions and the need to update all this in the system with great pace and high reliability.