D-19 rocket complex with a P-39 ballistic missile

104
In the early sixties in our country, work began on the creation of solid-propellant ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. By the end of the decade, the strategic missile forces received the first complex of a new class. Soon began the development of similar systems for placement on submarines. Several new complexes were created, the most successful of which was the D-19 with the P-39 rocket.

The decision to develop a new rocket was made in the middle of 1971. SKB-385 / KB engineering, headed by V.P. Makeev, was instructed to create a new missile system for submarines. It was necessary to create a three-stage solid-fuel rocket with a starting weight of about 75 and a length of up to 15. The product had to carry a single-piece or split head (3-5 or 8-10 of warheads) and deliver warheads to a distance of 10 km. The project of the new missile complex received the designation D-19 and the cipher "Typhoon". The rocket was designated as P-39.

For about a year, the design bureau has completed the development of an advance project of a new complex. At this stage, the main features of the promising complex were identified, which were later brought to use in the final project. A general product architecture was formed and launch methods were defined. Also, engineers completed the selection of the main units of the future rocket. It was proposed to transport the missile on a carrier with the help of a shock-absorbing rocket-launch system (ARSS) and to launch without filling the launch shaft. In addition, the preliminary design implied the use of a starting engine placed on the nozzle of the first-stage mid-flight propulsion system.

D-19 rocket complex with a P-39 ballistic missile
Rocket R-39 during loading on the submarine. Photo Rbase.new-factoria.ru


16 September 1973 of the Year The USSR Council of Ministers decided to begin the development of the technical design of the D-19 / P-39 rocket complex. The lead developer of the project was appointed KB Mechanical Engineering. Also involved in the project related organizations. In particular, the development of a first-stage solid-fuel engine was commissioned by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and Altai Scientific and Production Association. The September decree also asked for the development of a promising nuclear submarine of the 941 project, which was to be the carrier of the new missiles.

The outline of the D-19 complex was completed by the end of 1974. By this time, some changes had been made to the project, which had a definite impact on the rocket's appearance. In particular, due to changes in the layout and composition of the units, the loading mass of the product (including APCC, launch systems, etc.) increased to 90 T. The draft design implied several combat equipment options, with one to ten different warheads bearing different capacities.

In the middle of 1975, the technical task was again changed and approached its final appearance. The P-39 rocket was supposed to carry ten 100 kt warheads, attack targets at a distance of 10 thousand km and launch using a powder pressure accumulator. The ratio of the required range and combat load received the unofficial nickname of "ten to ten." In the future, the requirements for the project have been changed again. The new versions of this document stipulated the change of fuel of the second and third stages. In addition, in the latest version of the task, the flight range was reduced to 8300 km.

Within the framework of the D-19 / P-39 project, several original ideas were proposed and developed concerning the architecture of the rocket. In particular, it was proposed to use a new design of the casing of the steps, which would significantly reduce the starting weight of the rocket. Shells were proposed to be made of high-strength organic fiber by winding using cocoon technology. While providing the required strength, such cases were significantly lighter than traditional metal ones.


A shot of the P-39 rocket for one of the international treaties. Photo by Fas.org


The idea of ​​"recessed" engine placement was again applied. Nozzles were proposed to be partially placed inside the engine housings, which made it possible to reduce the dimensions of the entire product assembly. At the same time, however, the main features of solid-fuel engines did not allow for a relatively large reduction in step sizes. In addition, the authors of the project were forced to use small transitional compartments connecting the stages to each other in the rocket design.

The first stage of the product Р-39 was equipped with a solid-fuel 3Д65 engine, unified with the units of the РТ-23 rocket. The engine received a charge of solid fuel with an internal channel of a star-shaped section. 48 tons of fuel in the liquid form was proposed to be poured into the body during the assembly of the rocket, after which it was supposed to freeze. The form of charge was calculated in such a way that during the last 17 seconds of engine operation there was a decrease in thrust. This made it possible to improve the controllability of the rocket before the discharge of the spent first stage. Inside the nozzle of the first-stage engine was placed a powder pressure accumulator designed to pull the rocket out of the launcher.

To control the flight of the rocket in the initial part of the flight was proposed using special gas injection valves located on the stationary nozzle. Eight pairs of such devices allowed changing the total thrust vector and controlling the rocket on all three channels.

The second stage of the rocket also received a solid-fuel engine with a charge having a central channel of complex multipath form. An interesting feature of the second stage engine was the use of a telescopic rocking nozzle. Before switching on the engine, the nozzle had to be transferred to the working view about the displacement of the moving part. By changing the inclination of the nozzle, the rocket control system could change the trajectory parameters. At the same time, separate small-sized engines were used for yaw control.


The flight path of the rocket. Photo Rbase.new-factoria.ru


The third stage received a solid-fuel engine, similar to the systems of other stages. The engine was equipped with a telescopic nozzle without the possibility of changing the thrust vector. For maneuvering, it was proposed to use a liquid power unit of a combat stage integrated with the third. The engines and fuel tanks of the breeding stage were mounted on the sides of the third stage casing. It was proposed to attach the instrument compartment divided into two parts to the head of the latter. In the head part of it, the astrocorrection apparatus was placed on a gyro-stabilized platform, in the tail part - inertial apparatus with a frame suspended on shock absorbers. The astrovising device was covered with a drop dome.

Fastenings for warheads were located on the body of the third stage, next to the units of the breeding stage. After 1975, only one warhead was developed, carrying ten warheads with an 100 power. From external influences, warheads and equipment were protected by a fairing discharged in flight, formed by several conical surfaces.

Rocket R-39, like some previous domestic weapons for submarines, was to receive a combined control system. The main tasks of flight control were assigned to inertial equipment capable of tracking the movement of the rocket in three planes and issuing commands to the steering systems. After the discharge of the spent first stage, an astrocorrection session should be performed with the missile coordinates specified and an additional change in the flight path. Updated control systems have improved the accuracy of the hit compared to existing samples. The estimated QUO of the new missile was 500 m.

A promising missile for submarines received a special depreciation rocket-launch system, the task of which was to ensure the transportation and launch of the product. ARSS received a corpus of characteristic mushroom shape, intended for installation on the head of the rocket. Inside the system, various units were placed, including means of holding the rocket and a gas generator for optimal release of the rocket from the water. It was also proposed to install several belts with rubber-metal shock absorbers on the body of the rocket. After the release of the rocket from the water should have been a discharge of all attachments. For this, a set of several low-power solid-fuel engines was used.


Р-39, established as a monument in Biysk. Photo of Wikimedia Commons


A new type of ballistic missile had a total length of 16 m and a case diameter of 2,4 m. The total weight of the product was 90 t, while the missile without an ARSS had a mass of 84 t. The throw weight exceeded 2,5 t.

The D-19 complex received an original launcher with non-standard means of fastening the rocket. On the upper section of the launch shaft, it was proposed to install a special support ring on which the external part of the ARSS was placed. Thus, in the transport position, the P-39 rocket should have been suspended. The dimensions of the rocket-launch device and the belt with shock absorbers protected the rocket from movements in the horizontal plane.

The launch of the new rocket was supposed to look like this. After the pre-launch preparation with the calculation of the flight task and data entry into the rocket automatics, the command at the start should have followed. At the same time, the charge of the powder accumulator was ignited. In addition, the APSS gas generator was turned on. The pressure accumulator was supposed to create high pressure in the launcher, pushing the rocket out of the mine. When a rocket hit the water, the gas generator created a gas cavity and ensured the correct withdrawal of the product from the water. After rising above the surface of the water, the first stage sustainer must have started. In case of engine failure, the system of automatic diversion of the rocket to the side of the carrier was activated.

The development of the D-19 / P-39 project was completed in 1977 year, after which testing of new systems began. By this time, the requirements were again changed. The maximum range was reduced to 8300 km, and also adjusted the timing of the completion of the project and the adoption of the complex for service.


The K-153 submarine used in the early stages of the D-19 / P-39 tests. Photo Submarines.narod.ru


As before, it was decided to carry out the test in three stages: on the submerged stand, on the ground stand and on the submarine carrier. The first stage of testing was launched in September 1977 of the year and was conducted on the Black Sea. With the help of the submersible stand PS-65, 9 executed special layouts. For these products, a simplified first-stage solid fuel engine, 3D65B, was developed, featuring a lower fuel charge. Such a product could completely simulate the operation of the 3D65 engine for eight seconds, after which the mock-up had to fall into the water. The throwing tests of the P-39 layouts ended at the end of 1978, and passed without comment.

In December, the submarine K-1978 of the 153 project joined the test. This boat was built on the project 619, but later underwent modernization. In the central compartment of the case, one launcher of a new type was installed. The crew of the K-629 performed seven test launches of mockups. The shooting from the test submarine continued until the autumn of the 153.

At the very beginning of 1980, the second stage of testing was launched using the NSC-65 ground test bench at the Nenoks site. From January to December, five test launches of full-fledged missiles were carried out, but all of them ended in accidents. According to the results of these checks, the rocket underwent some changes, and in addition, production technologies were improved. 27 December 1980 of the year was the first successful launch of the P-39 from the ground stand.

Trials at the Nenox site continued until the summer of 1982. 17 launches were performed, mainly at intermediate ranges. Due to the lack of perfection of the design of the new rocket, only half of the starts were successful. According to the test results, a new stage of the rocket and the whole complex modifications began.


Submarine project 941. Photo of Wikimedia Commons


In 1972, the development of the future carrier of new missiles began. The creation of the nuclear submarine "941" (code "Shark") was entrusted to TsKBMT "Rubin" led by S.N. Kovalev. The main requirements for the new submarine were associated with the peculiarities of the P-39 missiles, which were distinguished by large dimensions. In addition, the customer required to equip the boat with two dozen launch shafts. As a result, the world's largest submarine was created. In June, the construction of a new type of head cruiser, the TK-1976 (later Dmitry Donskoy), was launched on 208. In September, the 1980 th submarine was launched.

In December, the 1981 of the TK-208 nuclear submarine first entered the sea for testing the D-19 complex with the P-39 rocket. Over the year, 13 tests were completed, of which 11 was successful. 12 December 1982, the joint testing of the submarine and the rocket ended in salvo firing four missiles. Tests recognized successful.

In May, the 1983 of the D-9 / P-39 missile complex officially adopted as the main weapons strategic missile submarines of the 941 "Shark" project. Until the end of the eighties, the Navy received six "Sharks", each of which could carry on 20 P-39 missiles. Thus, on board each submarine could be placed on 200 warheads or 1200 in total on all submarines of the project.

To support the combat operation of the submarines of the 941 project, a special 11570 rocket-propelled transport-rocket launcher was designed and built. Onboard the vessel “Alexander Brykin” with a displacement of more than 11 thousand tons there were 16 containers for the transport of P-39. To transfer this weapon to the submarines, the ship was equipped with a 125 tonne lifting crane. According to some sources, the crew of the Alexander Brykin could reload the Shark launchers in the open sea.


Shark launchers with open lids. Photo Rbase.new-factoria.ru


Already in the spring of 1984, the development of an improved D-19U complex with a P-39U rocket began. The objective of this project was to improve the performance through the use of new control systems and a modernized combat unit. The latter was developed in parallel for use in new versions of the P-39 and P-29РM missiles. The development of an updated missile system and subsequent tests took several years. In 1988, the D-19U / P-39U complex was put into service. The new rocket in terms of accuracy close to the similar land-based systems.

Another missile modernization project using the new control systems received the designation P-39M and the cipher "Grom". The development of this project was carried out during the nineties. After testing, the new system was put into service in 2003. It was the latest version of the D-19 complex, which has come down to adoption.

Since 1986, the P-XNUMHUTTH Bark project has been developed. It was required to bring the maximum firing range to 39 thousand. Km with the possibility of delivery to the targets of ten warheads. It was assumed that the existing complex will receive the existing submarine type "Shark". In addition, promising submarines of the Borey 10 project were to become carriers of the P-39UTTH.

The rocket received a new system for launching from the submerged position of the carrier with the passage through the ice, and was also equipped with an upgraded control equipment with a mode of flight along a flat trajectory. The type of solid fuel used by engines of all stages has also changed. Such changes allowed to improve the main technical and operational characteristics of the rocket.


Loading missile P-39 on the submarine cruiser type "Shark". Photo Militaryrussia.ru


The first draft of the D-19UTTH / P-39UTTH project was completed in 1991, but new improvements were needed soon. In connection with the collapse of the USSR, the project had to be reworked, taking into account the use of only domestic components. This fact, as well as a sharp reduction in funding led to a delay in work. Checks of the updated rocket managed to start only in 1996 year.

In 1998, the Ministry of Defense decided to abandon the further development of the Bark project. Such a decision was due to both the technical problems of the project, which required further work, and a lack of funding. According to the estimates of the project developers, at the time of the work stoppage, at least eight test launches were required. However, insufficient funding led to an unacceptable increase in the period for assembling products: one rocket was built for about three years. In connection with such a difficult situation, the customer decided to abandon the further development of the P-39UTTH rocket. Soon, a new solid propellant missile project for submarines was launched, called the Bulava.

During the testing of a new missile system and rocket operation fleet Almost 70 launches of the mock-up and full-fledged military products were completed. After testing and testing new missiles were completed, the vast majority of launches ended with the successful completion of the assigned tasks. During the operation of the missiles, the crews of Project 941 submarines repeatedly fired in volleys. In addition, in March and December 1997, two salvo firing took place using the entire ammunition. They were performed by the crews of the cruisers TK-20 and TK-208.

The last launch of the P-39 rocket took place on 11 on December 2003 of the year. By this time, the situation with the D-19 complex and its carriers has seriously deteriorated. Production of serial missiles was discontinued, and their warranty periods were coming to an end. Because of this, in 2004, the exploitation of the P-39 missiles of all modifications was stopped. Simultaneously with the reduction in the number of available rockets, due to the need to reduce costs, the “Shark” type submarines were brought to the reserve. In 2004, the last representatives of this project came out of service.


Submarine TK-202 shortly before disposal, 1999 g. Photo by Wikimedia Commons


State Rocket Center. V.P. Makeeva attempted to extend the life of existing missiles, but this work did not end in success. In addition, as part of the implementation of existing international treaties, the disposal of the remaining rockets began. The latest P-39 products were disposed of in 2012. The further fate of submarines without weapons was a topic for discussion at various levels.

At the beginning of the two thousandth, modernization of the nuclear submarine TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy" for a special project 941UM. The submarine was repaired and received equipment for the use of new missiles "Bulava". During the two thousand years, the submarine took an active part in the testing of a new missile system. The TK-208 served as a platform for testing until the completion of the new 955 "Borey" submarine project.

The D-19 / P-39 missile system can be considered the most successful domestic development of its class. The result of long-term research and design work was the emergence of a number of new original ideas of various kinds, which were combined in the design of a new solid-fuel rocket. In 1983, the P-39 rocket officially became the weapon of the submarine fleet, and over the next few years a relatively large group of such missiles and their carriers was deployed. However, the long-term operation of the D-19 complex was hindered by numerous economic, political and other problems of the past decades. They did not allow to complete the modernization of the project "Bark".

As a result, the exploitation of the P-39 missiles has now been completely stopped. Three of its carriers were disposed of, one (TK-208) is used as an experimental submarine for new projects, and two more (TK-17 Arkhangelsk and TK-20 Severstal) are in reserve. Prospects for cruisers from the reserve look pessimistic. Further operation of these submarines is impossible, because of what is expected to make a decision on their disposal. Nevertheless, the submarine of the 941 project still retains the honorary title of the largest submarines in the world, and the P-39 product can deservedly be considered one of the best domestic ballistic missiles of submarines.


Based on:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/
http://makeyev.ru/
http://nevskii-bastion.ru/
http://deepstorm.ru/
http://submarines.narod.ru/
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-671.html
Apalkov Yu.V. Submarines of the Soviet Navy 1945-1991 Volume III: - M: Morkniga, 2012
Shirokorad A.B. Weapons of the domestic fleet. 1945-2000. - Minsk: “Harvest”, 2001
104 comments
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  1. 677
    +3
    31 May 2016 06: 49
    As Joseph Vissarionovich said: "Lenin left us a great inheritance, and we asked for it!"
    1. +14
      31 May 2016 07: 15
      But Ulyanov and Dzhugashvili are out of business here. This missile system with a unique carrier was created in Brezhnev era. So to speak, the swan song of socialism.

      Respect to the author for his colossal work and an interesting series of articles. good
      1. 677
        +4
        31 May 2016 07: 46
        But Ulyanov and Dzhugashvili are out of business here. This missile system with a unique carrier was created in Brezhnev era.

        And I thought SLBMs under Ilyich began to build), if seriously I meant how ineptly the Soviet technical heritage was squandered.
        1. +3
          31 May 2016 07: 55
          Quote: 677
          how ineptly the Soviet technical heritage was squandered.

          The economy did not pull the defense industry and the national economy. It was necessary to choose either one or the other. Either the largest nuclear submarines in the world or the food program. And there still the damned oil fell in price and there was nothing to eat. Nothing so much that they began to buy wheat from the enemies. And then everything is downhill. Not for me to tell you. It was impossible not to squander. Some enterprises suddenly remained abroad and there were not in demand there. Specialists went where they could earn a living. Etc.
          1. +2
            1 June 2016 03: 01
            Quote: professor
            The economy did not pull the defense industry and the national economy.

            Please do not tell us the history of the USSR from abroad. We used to live poorly, and then we were robbed. But they managed to fix who pulled where and how much.
            But the problem still remains. Now, to solve it, it is necessary to rob the population of the EU and the USA. The population will react, which means either war (where to find a country that is not a pity), or civil war.
            1. -1
              1 June 2016 08: 01
              Quote: iouris
              We used to live poorly, and then we were robbed.

              The poor have nothing to steal except chains.

              Quote: iouris
              But the problem still remains. Now, to solve it, it is necessary to rob the population of the EU and the USA.

              You need to work in the sweat of your face, not to rob and you will be happy.
      2. +3
        31 May 2016 08: 02
        Quote: professor
        Respect to the author for his colossal work and an interesting series of articles.

        Indeed, the author has a plus and more than one, for a series of articles on marine ballistic missile systems. The history of the creation of sea-based missiles in SKB-385 named after Makeev was practically written. Only one complex, D-11 with the R-31 missile, was created by another design bureau. 7 Peter Tyurin. And let the professor disagree with you, Dzhugashvili still had an indirect relation to the creation of nuclear missile carriers. He signed the documents for the development of the first nuclear submarine 627 of the project.
    2. +1
      1 June 2016 00: 08
      Where did he say that? Reference please. "Otherwise FFFFFFFFFFFsad!" (C)
    3. 0
      1 June 2016 00: 08
      Where did he say that? Reference please. "Otherwise FFFFFFFFFFFsad!" (C)
  2. 0
    31 May 2016 09: 58
    R-39 can rightfully be considered one of the best domestic ballistic missile submarines.
    Controversial statement. Rather, this complex was a failure, not an achievement. Despite its gigantic size, the rocket was significantly inferior to its American counterparts, although the cost of its development was three times more expensive than the previous complex. Makeev's design bureau should not be blamed solely. the parallel railway complex, which was being created, was also unsuccessful. The railway complex was quickly decommissioned, and they still struggle with the Akula submarines. The film is certainly terrible, but it gives a good idea of ​​the scale of the complex.
  3. +2
    31 May 2016 10: 00
    The D-19 missile system was a failure of the Russian military-industrial complex - in the presence of unparalleled technology, ballistic missiles with liquid propellant rocket engines plunged into an ineffective BR technology with solid propellant rocket engines (more than two times heavier with equal cast weight).

    The same is with the Bulava - the sooner the Borei are converted into carriers of the Sineva SLBM, the better.
    1. +2
      31 May 2016 11: 03
      September 27, 1991 a rocket exploded in a mine submarine. As a result, the boat was not damaged. The mine was simply brewed and the boat continued to serve. This is the best evidence that missiles in a submarine should be solid fuel.
      The issue with “Boreas” has long been closed. Nobody will alter them. Now the question of what will happen after "Boreyev" is being decided. The design of a new generation of submarines and missiles begins. Selected by KB. I think this series of articles is devoted to this topic.
    2. +4
      31 May 2016 15: 15
      Quote: ism_ek
      Rather, this complex was a failure, not an achievement.

      Quote: Operator
      The D-19 missile system was a failure of the domestic defense industry

      Why was it a failure?
      The author of the article.
      In addition, in March and December 1997, two salvo firing took place using the entire ammunition. They were performed by the crews of the cruisers TK-20 and TK-208.

      Where is the failure?
      1. -3
        31 May 2016 17: 36
        Failure in the performance characteristics of the R-39 missiles (compared to the R-29) and the project 941 submarine (a twin-screw "roaring cow" with a range of 8000 km of weapons - outside the range of its own anti-submarine defense).
        1. +3
          31 May 2016 18: 32
          Quote: Operator
          Failure in performance characteristics of R-39 missiles (compared to R-29)

          Are you kidding me? Okay, they’d still be compared with the R-29RM
          Quote: Operator
          and a project 941 submarine (twin-screw "roaring cow"

          Give the parameters of noise "Ohio" and "Sharks" at the time of adoption and compare them so as not to be unfounded, and we will see how right you are.
          At the expense of the cow, the nuclear submarine pr.941 was better in maneuverability of all modifications of the nuclear submarine pr.667.
          1. -1
            31 May 2016 19: 18
            Comparison of TTX P-39 and P-29РМ:
            adoption, year 1984 / 1986
            starting weight, tons 90 / 40
            thrown weight, kg 2550 / 2800
            range, km 8250 / 8300

            As for comparing the noisiness of "Ohio" and "Shark" - it is enough to know the number of propellers of the first and the second.
            1. 0
              31 May 2016 22: 45
              Quote: Operator
              Comparison of TTX P-39 and P-29РМ:

              This is closer to the truth.
              Quote: Operator
              As for comparing the noisiness of "Ohio" and "Shark" - it is enough to know the number of propellers of the first and the second.

              And if there are 2 of them, but they work at a quarter of the capacity?
              1. -1
                1 June 2016 01: 05
                And if the same in a quarter of the power?
          2. +2
            1 June 2016 00: 27
            A citizen loves to drive unproven snowstorm. ka about Rsd-10, and about the noise of our and amersky submarines.
  4. +6
    31 May 2016 10: 37
    Good review.
    I shot a training film on this rocket at one time, I had the appropriate clearance.
    This complex cannot be called a "success" of domestic rocketry - not only did they fail to fit into the dimensions and weight, they also did not meet those tasks in terms of range.
    The reasons are weak chemistry - our industry could not make appropriate solid fuels.
    Weak materials science - could not make light composite cases as on a trident.

    As a result, the monster-like giant is 90 tons, and under it the corresponding monster-like carrier.

    The Trident-1 bar was reached at the cost of an increase in the size and weight of SLBMs, but the Trident-II bar has remained unsurpassed to this day.
    For example, through the use of a telescopic aerodynamic needle on Trident 2, the Americans managed to increase the firing range by about 1200 km.

    Well, the product itself was very expensive - for example, the control nozzle channel was made of tungsten - one nozzle weighed under 40 kg there were 8 of them! The shells in diameter were fastened with titanium studs - the cost of each 3,50 Soviet rubles, 240 studs went to mount one shell, a total of 4 mounts. The shells in flight were separated by detonating cord charges.

    In general, the first solid-fuel product of Makeev Design Bureau turned out how it turned out. It happens - the accumulation of experience. But they did not have time to improve it.
    In general, the theme of the development of solid fuel accelerators, including large-diameter components (such as TT space shuttle accelerators, Delta), turned out to be promising, and could reduce the cost and simplify commercial launches. Moreover, the technological process of winding composite shells has been mastered.
    1. 0
      31 May 2016 11: 09
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      This complex cannot be called a "success" of domestic rocketry - not only did they fail to fit into the dimensions and weight, they also did not meet those tasks in terms of range.
      The reasons are weak chemistry - our industry could not make appropriate solid fuels.
      Weak materials science - could not make light composite cases as on a trident.

      In the film about R-29RM, V.P. Makeev's notes were given, where he considered this complex to be his failure. Because of the dimensions and mass of the rocket. which went into the movie about his rockets.
      1. +5
        31 May 2016 13: 23
        Quote: Amurets
        In the film about R-29RM, V.P. Makeev's notes were given, where he considered this complex to be his failure. Because of the dimensions and mass of the rocket. which went into the movie about his rockets.


        He did not say "his work" - behind the name Makeev stands a design bureau with hundreds of scientists and engineers with high scientific degrees. Makeev is an excellent engineer and organizer!
        As related to the KBM - I must note that none of the employees, professors and associate professors ever called the R-39 a success. The KBM set the task - the designers completed it with the reserve of materials that was investigated and available at that time.
        Everyone understood - we were not able to catch up with the Americans at that time in the development of science in the USSR, unfortunately this is true now.
        1. +1
          31 May 2016 14: 17
          Quote: DimerVladimer

          He did not say "his work" - behind the name Makeev stands a design bureau with hundreds of scientists and engineers with high scientific degrees. Makeev is an excellent engineer and organizer!

          Sorry if I offended. I understand perfectly well that behind each product there is a COLLECTIVE, at least military, at least civilian. It just happened in our country that all the merits and failures hang on one person, the LEADER, belittling the role of the collective. And Viktor Petrovich Makeev is really an outstanding personality .
          1. +3
            31 May 2016 15: 58
            Quote: Amurets
            And Viktor Petrovich Makeev is really an outstanding personality.


            Without a doubt!
            A brilliant scientist and activist.
        2. +1
          31 May 2016 14: 19
          This is an incorrect conclusion - it was not possible to catch up with the United States at that time only in terms of solid-fuel SLBMs.

          In terms of liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, we are then and now ahead of the entire planet. Well, it's also useful not to forget about the solid-propellant RSD "Pioneer" (aka SS-20), which in all respects made Pershing II.

          We are only talking about the inappropriateness of ape apathy - what for did you make a sloppy pro-American P-39 with the advanced pro-Soviet P-29? But this is a question for political leadership.
          1. +1
            31 May 2016 16: 13
            Quote: Operator
            it’s an incorrect conclusion - to catch up with the United States at that time, it was not possible only in terms of solid-fuel SLBMs.

            In terms of liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, we are then and now ahead of the entire planet. Well, it's also useful not to forget about the solid-propellant RSD "Pioneer" (aka SS-20), which in all respects made Pershing II.

            We are only talking about the inappropriateness of ape apathy - what for did you make a sloppy pro-American P-39 with the advanced pro-Soviet P-29? But this is a question for political leadership.


            Are you trying to dispute the opinion of Makeev himself and the KB experts (which I just voiced)?

            No one claimed that we were not the first in the field of SLBMs with LRE - the Americans simply stopped developing this direction (there is a good reason for this - the safety of TT carriers), so we are now the first in LRE.

            The opinion that the SS-20 did "beat" Pershing is highly controversial.
            In technical terms, maybe. Because the Americans were on a drum the deployment of SS-20 in Europe - the United States did not threaten them, but at the same time pershing 2 from Europe reached Moscow, which led to an agreement to limit these missiles. As a result, we do not have medium-range missiles, and potential opponents have.

            As for MIT, the Bulava also did not come close in terms of parameters to Trident-2.
            1. +1
              31 May 2016 18: 00
              In fact, all types of missiles are dangerous in their own way - the United States simply could not develop a technology for the production of relatively safe liquid-based SLBMs, but the USSR was able to. Does it bother you?

              I was talking about the technical "making" of Pershing-2 by the Pioneer.

              As for the current state of Russian medium-range and near-range missiles, you forgot about the presence of the Kalibr missile launcher (2500 km with special warheads) and the Rubezh ballistic missile (5500 km, essentially the same Pioner RSD with 5000 km).

              It is also worth recalling the weight of the conventional warhead of the single-stage Iskander-M RMD - 480 kg, which, as it were, hints at the possibility of upgrading the missile to a two-stage IRD if necessary (the weight of a 100-kt special warhead is at the level of 100 kg).

              "Bulava" does not need to approach anyone, it is Trident-2 that needs to catch up with "Sineva" laughing
              1. +3
                1 June 2016 15: 20
                Quote: Operator
                In fact, all types of missiles are dangerous in their own way - the United States simply could not develop a technology for the production of relatively safe liquid-based SLBMs, but the USSR was able to. Does it bother you?


                It doesn’t bother.
                Do not forget that I had a relation to KBM and I did not just know all the KBM missiles, but studied them. And they knew the pros and cons of their own and enemy missiles by the teeth, because they tried not for money, but for conscience.

                As for safety, I bet - it will NEVER be SAFE storing a rocket with liquid propellant rocket engines on self-igniting toxic components in a closed submarine volume that is under pressure in a submerged state - ask the submariners.
                The ampouled refueling at the plant eliminated the storage of components inside a solid submarine case (imagine what it was like to walk under water at a floating gas station!), But did not add storage safety, damage to tanks from impacts, deformations from excessive pressure, etc.
                A series of errors led to the crushing of SLBM tanks, which led to explosions, fires and the loss of nuclear submarines (K-219).

                SLBM with TTRD has liquid components only in the third stage or in the dilution stage. This amount is scanty, compared with the volumes of even a single-stage rocket with a rocket engine. That is, mixing these components is not enough to destroy even the cover of the rocket compartment, not to mention the launcher.
                Well, to set fire to solid fuel in a rocket, only a high-temperature initiator can, you can’t set it on a blowtorch :)
                1. +1
                  1 June 2016 16: 04
                  As for the P-29 accidents on board the submarine, I am in the know. But all of them occurred during the development of the production and operation of the rocket on UDMG + AT.

                  The problem with this fuel is only one - the low boiling point of the oxidizer (21 degrees Celsius), but it is solved by thermostating the launcher or (in the case of the Voevoda ICBM) the transport and launch container.

                  Since fuel leaks (due to amplification), oxidizer boiling (due to thermostating) and mechanical damage (due to the sturdy shell of the PU shaft) are eliminated, the only danger is crushing of the rocket body by external pressure - in terms of interstage volumes not filled with liquid fuel.

                  Therefore, these volumes must be equipped with knock-out covers that operate inwardly under external pressure that exceeds the water pressure at the depth of the underwater launch of the rocket. Most likely, this is already implemented in P-29.

                  In an extreme case, in case of emergency spontaneous combustion of fuel (manufacturing defects, hidden damage during operation, failure of the temperature control system), the shaft cover should automatically open to burn fuel and eject parts of the rocket.

                  Therefore, it can be argued that the UDMG + AT-based missile in the mine does not pose a danger to the crew and submarine.
                2. The comment was deleted.
                  1. +2
                    2 June 2016 10: 48
                    Quote from rudolf
                    Sorry, why TPK?

                    And where did you see the TPK for SLBMs? Transport - maybe.
                    In general, loading missiles into the mines with a crane didn’t give you an idea about the absence of TPK in the design of SLBMs? There is a launcher - of a mine type, there was no TPK for SLBMs - this is not a cruise missile for you.
                3. The comment was deleted.
                  1. +1
                    2 June 2016 10: 55
                    Quote from rudolf
                    And Makeev does not need to be referenced, he didn’t consider R-39 a failure, he was against it from the very beginning. But he did it like no one would be better.

                    Thank you for recalling the known facts - it will be useful for the audience.
                    This does not negate the fact that the product turned out - how it turned out. Deliberately did not call it "success". Once again, I repeat - the product turned out to correspond to the development of chemistry and materials science for the TTRD at that time in the USSR, period.
                4. +4
                  1 June 2016 18: 06
                  Hello Rudolph! We also bother with thermostatting and humidity, but not very troublesome. About the "knock-out things" and the production marriage smiled.

                  Dmitry Vladimirovich! As a submariner, I answer. During the entire operation of the D-9RM complex, there was not a single incident or accident with products. In order to ignite solid fuel, the combustion temperature of the liquid components is sufficient. In the only accident where the third stage was given, my classmate was the culprit, he died in February this year. Lucky for them then that did not go further. There is no big difference which product to bang, both are dangerous. If you knew the details of the K-219 accident, you would understand that carelessness can lead to anything. In 1989, with a megohmmeter in Litsa from the 949th project, a cruise missile was launched towards the headquarters during the schedule, and in the mid-80s in Severomorsk, just solid-fuel products "showed" fireworks during an explosion at RTB in Okolnaya. And the product was torn at unloading due to improper actions of the personnel. Just think, they forgot to disconnect the pads at the bottom and began to pull out the product. We had fewer accidents with "solid" cars on boats only because there were several times fewer of them. One "alteration" of the K-140 and 6 "tails" of the 941 project, while how long have they been in operation? Now calculate how many there were and are azukh, bukah, BDshek, BDRs and BDRMs. Add here 629, 658 and other projects and take the share of accidents for everything. By the way, we also don't know how the guys have the mattress color under the flag. And they will not say.

                  Quote: DimerVladimer
                  but did not add storage safety, damage to tanks from impacts, deformations from excessive pressure, etc.

                  Try to hit, mash or warp the product in the mine. Tormented. The mine was invented in such a way as to withstand external influences, including explosions of depth charges, etc.

                  About maneuverability - 941 projects were equipped with retractable thrusters, which is why the maneuverability in the database is excellent. 667 projects do not have this.

                  This fuel has only one problem - the low boiling point of the oxidizing agent (21 degrees Celsius)

                  In a sealed container, as the temperature rises, the pressure rises, and the boiling point rises accordingly. But there is always a thermostating. By the way, for "solid" these things are even tougher, but there are other reasons.
                  In an extreme case, in case of emergency spontaneous combustion of fuel (manufacturing defects, hidden damage during operation, failure of the temperature control system), the shaft cover should automatically open to burn fuel and eject parts of the rocket.

                  Do not invent. Everyone has already come up with us. smile These questions are worked out to automatism. In those cases when there were explosions of products in the mine (K-219 and K-84), the mine cover simply came off. The first accident - illiterate actions l / s, the second - abnormal experimental products.

                  I believe that 941 projects could continue to live. It was possible to remake it into the carrier of special submarines, and not to destroy the K-64 combat unit. Between the buildings, instead of shafts, several units can be stuffed with equipment.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                  2. 0
                    1 June 2016 19: 22
                    I am aware that the lid of the Sineva mine is opened manually (remotely) in the event of a fuel fire.

                    Production defect - the estimated value, which must be taken into account when designing and implement countermeasures.

                    In a sealed container with AT, when the temperature rises to 21 degrees, the pressure increases very slightly, then the boiling point rises in parallel with the increase in pressure from the gasification of AT. Sineva's tanks hold a pressure of over 11 atmospheres, then burst.

                    Natural safety features are heat removal during boiling of AT and thermal capacity of the mass of fuel and oxidizer. But everything has a limit. Therefore, the emergency valve (manhole cover with automatic opening) would not hurt.
                    1. +3
                      1 June 2016 20: 16
                      Andrei, I have already said that everything was invented long ago.
                      A constant watch is carried out at the corresponding posts. Pressure, temperature, humidity, gas composition and much more are monitored. Any contingency starts small. If there is a suspicion of something, the personnel will not sleep for days until they figure it out. Our case was anecdotal. The sensor began to work on the entry of component vapors into the compartment, and a special control tape actually changed color. We have already checked all the mines, and nothing. But it turned out that. When loading food in one of the cardboard boxes, there was a rat, which quickly darted behind the casing. To catch her, they brought in a cat. This cat got into the habit of shitting in our compartment behind one of the shafts, passing from "its" compartment, right under the inlet of the shut-off gas analysis system. And for the living creatures (birds, fish, etc.) on the boat, the political officer with the doctor is responsible. So the doctor cleaned up after the cat, and poured hydrogen peroxide over the place, and the pig didn't tell us anything. Peroxide on the tape acted as one of the components. And we all broke our heads ... The rat, by the way, was caught by the commander of the radio reconnaissance group on some biscuit, and the cat was then shaken off somewhere.

                      The temperature at which the microclimate is turned on for cooling is much higher than +21 degrees.

                      To avoid marriage, there is a system of military representations, which is now being restored after Serdyukovism. For example, a batch of components is made with operational control. Then several products are taken from the batch for testing for tightness, destructive, X-ray, etc. If something has not passed, they begin to look at this parameter for all products of the batch. Then the same happens with subsequent assembly units and assemblies up to the final product. Where did you get the figure of 11 "points"?

                      Try to open the shaft cover at a depth without boosting the product and without equalizing the pressure. Disable hydraulics. All such accidents are fought in the water. And you can open both remotely and from local posts.
                      1. 0
                        2 June 2016 00: 51
                        So no one argues that automation requires a human eye (and vice versa) - this is the standard solution of a human-machine system. It was about the automatic opening of the shaft cover in only one emergency case - a supercritical increase in pressure as a result of spontaneous combustion of rocket fuel.

                        When designing explosive and fire hazardous products, the presence of military acceptance in production is ignored. Decisions to deal with explosions / fires of any nature (industrial or operational) are laid down in the design itself, such as automation, sensors, controlled destruction, emergency valves, fire extinguishing, neutralization, etc.

                        The value of the pressurization pressure of the first-stage tanks of 11 atmospheres ("points" in your opinion) was previously named at my request by one of the topwar.ru participants.
                      2. +2
                        2 June 2016 06: 02
                        Andrey, here you are again starting to think out something. Everything that is possible has already been invented before us. About 11 "points" I told you then, and you have already figured out that after it will break. It will not rip (although it will someday rip, and even depending on which order to blow). Try to ignore military acceptance and customer. Before the supercritical pressure build-up begins, component leakage, water or air or nitrogen leakage begins first. Sensors will immediately work and the crew will begin to fight this case. On the mains of water, air and nitrogen, there is a bunch of redundant locking devices. There is no need to run anywhere, the cabins are located between the silos in the missile compartments. On K-219, they first began to trick with non-standard schemes, and then they got an explosion. And when the rocket comes out, there is not much noise, a hiss for a couple of seconds, a small jolt with a sway and that's it. I'm not talking about the operation of systems. This is what is happening on ships with "solid" missiles, I don't know, the pressure accumulator is also working there, but somehow I didn't ask about feelings. And the pressurization is there too. I do not consider myself to be some kind of specialist in this matter, it just so happened that I slipped through the cycle from operation to production, and that was a long time ago. There are comrades here on the forum that are much smarter and more competent. And I will add more. Here Lev Nikolayevich Rolin, leaving the side of the second Behemoth in his cap and raincoat, saw the guarantors and factory workers there, but "simply related to KBM" somehow was not there.
                      3. +3
                        2 June 2016 10: 00
                        Quote: Andrey NM
                        And I will add more. Here Lev Nikolayevich Rolin, leaving the side of the second Behemoth in his cap and raincoat, saw the guarantors and factory workers there, but "just related to KBM" somehow was not there.


                        Everyone has their own responsibilities :)
                        Therefore, I wrote that I "had a relationship" - "I worked at KBM" I cannot write.
                        Therefore - the point was related :))
                      4. 0
                        2 June 2016 09: 54
                        Quote: Andrey NM
                        ... This cat got into the habit of shitting in our compartment behind one of the shafts, passing from "his" compartment, right under the inlet of the shut-off gas analysis system


                        Funny case :)
                    2. +2
                      2 June 2016 13: 20
                      Quote: Operator
                      insignificantly, then the boiling point rises in parallel with the pressure increase from AT gasification. Sineva's tanks hold a pressure of over 11 atmospheres, then burst.


                      In general, I will write a common truth - pressurization of tanks is needed so that the thin-walled shell does not crumple from overloads, under the weight of the payload and upper stages.
                      All carrier shells with LRE are considered unstable for compression, pressurization provides stability of the shells of rotation mainly under longitudinal loads - this allows you to make shells much thinner.
                      1. -1
                        2 June 2016 13: 30
                        Indeed, boosting tanks is primarily intended to increase the bearing capacity of the rocket body.
                        But it also carries out the initial supply of fuel to the engine, compensates for the decrease in fuel volume in the tanks, and also perceives (up to a certain limit) in case of accidents, external pressure from the water environment during loss of tightness of the mine and from emergency fuel ignition during spills.
                  3. +2
                    2 June 2016 10: 35
                    Quote: Andrey NM
                    Try to hit, mash or warp the product in the mine. Tormented. The mine was invented in such a way as to withstand external influences, including explosions of depth charges, etc.


                    Launchers, "considers" the PU department, as well as depreciation between the PU shaft and the product.
                    When calculating the PU for LRE, peak pressures and temperatures are laid in case of depressurization of the tanks of the combustible oxidizer, and of course the outboard pressure of the water.
                    Accordingly, other parameters are laid for CTs with CTs - usually with less requirements for peak parameters - the reason is a safer product - at least argue.

                    The mine is not "invented", but is designed for certain loads.
                    The main problem of SLBMs with LRE - depreciation can hold back some lateral overloads - for example, an explosion of a depth bomb at some distance from the submarine’s hull.
                    Crumple the tanks? How do you like the collision with an underwater object (bottom, another submarine)? Underwater nuclear explosion? Under certain factors, the load will exceed the amortization potential inherent in the project and depressurization of the products will occur, leaving no chance for the crew to save. Therefore, a large gap between the shaft and the product is laid in the launch project with the LRE.
                    A much smaller gap between the shaft and the product is laid in the design of a launch device with a turbojet engine, since the solid fuel itself is an "obstacle" for transverse deformations of the product body.
                    Still there are those who want to argue about the equal danger of the rocket engine and the engine?
                    1. 0
                      2 June 2016 11: 25
                      Plus, in the event of a rapid increase in pressure in excess of the calculated peak value in the mine launcher (for example, as a result of crushing the liquid rocket body and self-ignition of the fuel), the launcher lid should automatically open / fire — I don’t know how much this is implemented.
                      1. +1
                        2 June 2016 14: 35
                        How do you imagine the shooting of covers weighing 2 tons at a depth of, say, 150 meters?
                      2. -1
                        2 June 2016 15: 18
                        In an accident, it’s easy: you wait when the pressure in the mine exceeds the outside pressure by the value of the weight of the cover, and you open / destroy the lock.
                      3. +1
                        2 June 2016 16: 53
                        Quote: Operator
                        In an accident - easy:

                        Oh, if everything was so easy ... And at working or extreme depth, too?
                      4. -1
                        2 June 2016 18: 01
                        The maximum depth of automatic opening of the shaft cover is determined by the ability of the shaft walls to withstand internal pressure - with 50-60 atmospheres, the cover can open at the working / maximum depth.

                        One condition is that the interstage volumes of the rocket hull must have weakened sections (due to the strengthening of other sections) with windows extruded inward to equalize the pressure inside and outside the body (slight compression of the refueling fuel tanks can be neglected).
                      5. +2
                        2 June 2016 18: 19
                        Quote: Operator
                        at 50-60 atmospheres, the lid can open at the working / maximum depth.

                        Such pressure where should be? If overboard, then it is 600 meters deep. I'm afraid for submariners this will be the last thing they do. And this one smiled:
                        easy: you wait when the pressure in the mine exceeds the outboard pressure by the value of the cover weight, and you open / destroy the lock.

                        I presented a picture of how the personnel in the compartment are sitting in the IDA and SRP or SDA and are staring at the pressure gauge needle or the mnemonic diagram of the sensors, holding the handles of the REGs ... But she still does not jerk in the right direction. Andrey, everything has already been invented and worked out. By the way, and you ask Dmitry Vladimirovich, he will tell you why you didn’t do this :).
                      6. -1
                        2 June 2016 19: 36
                        So you yourself voiced the parameter of the working / maximum depth of the submarine. In response, I indicated the required parameter of the wall thickness of mine PUs - at the level of a solid submarine hull.

                        We are talking about the automatic opening of the shaft cover in the event of an emergency ignition of UDMH + AT when the boat is at the calculated / maximum depth. Now this is definitely the Khan of the submarine.

                        The combustion process is fleeting, self-sustaining, so there will not be enough time, not just to stare at the gauge needle, but even to put on an IDA. Therefore, the system of automatic emergency opening of the covers of the shafts does not even hurt.
                      7. +2
                        3 June 2016 06: 46
                        Oh, Andrey, I’d take you to the boat for a week on a control exit with working out measures to combat survivability, many questions themselves would have disappeared. In an explosion in a mine, the lid itself flies off over a weakened section. On the K-407 it actually happened. If you managed to emerge and open the lid, then pumping with water is turned on, the oxidizer is drained, etc. There are many options, the decision is made according to the situation. By the way, the oxidizing agent in solution at low concentrations (and in the end it happens in the sea) its harmfulness loses and turns into a kind of nitrogen fertilizer.
                        Depths for pl are working, limiting and calculated. For different projects of their own. It never plunges into the calculated one, to the limit - only during tests before putting it into operation, but it happens on the working one.
                        I don’t remember something that I voiced overboard pressure and depths. Dressing up the IDA takes a few seconds, but first puts on the remote control, it’s enough for 15 minutes.
                      8. +1
                        3 June 2016 10: 04
                        Quote: Andrey NM
                        In an explosion in a mine, the lid itself flies off over a weakened section. On the K-407 it actually happened


                        I confirm.
                        There is no reason to control the increase in pressure due to leakage of components - mixing of components is almost an instantaneous peak increase in pressure, explosion, disruption of the shaft cover, and, as a result, the release of nuclear charges overboard ...
                      9. -1
                        3 June 2016 11: 26
                        I’ve talked about this - manual tracking of the pressure gauge will not work (which in the remote control + IDA, which without).

                        Since there is a weakened section in the lid fastening, then you can be calm about the self-actuation (foreign automatism) of this "emergency valve", and at any depth, including the calculated one.

                        For a submarine, the main discharge is not overhead charges (which are in the head of the rocket), but more than a dozen tons of AT oxidizer (which are in the tail), since the result of its chemical reaction with water is nitric acid, and the mine’s purge / pumping system may fail.
                      10. -1
                        3 June 2016 13: 14
                        Correction - the weakened section in the lid fastening also does not roll at a depth (the pressure in the mine for its destruction can exceed the strength of the mine itself).

                        Therefore, nevertheless, a mechanical self-working design is required for emergency opening of the lid lock, configured for a certain interval of external and internal pressures.

                        You will not drink intuition laughing
                    2. +1
                      2 June 2016 14: 33
                      Quote: DimerVladimer
                      Crumple the tanks? How do you like the collision with an underwater object (bottom, another submarine)? Underwater nuclear explosion?

                      How do you like the collision of K-407 with the American submarine SSN-646 "Grayling" in 1993? And the numerous collisions with ice floes? Are the RMA R-39 and R-29RM belts very different in clearance? Yes, with a difference in weight of 50 tons per product, you can lay as many security systems! And how many chances does the crew have if the submarine lies on the bottom two hundred meters in the Barents Sea, 500 miles from the coast with "collapsed" life support systems and energy?
                      First, the boost solves the issue of strength when opening the covers of the shafts, then the normal operation of the pumps. The mine withstood the K-84, the actions of the personnel were literate. Products are not stored in the compartment.
                      Launchers, "considers" the PU department, as well as depreciation between the PU shaft and the product.

                      "We didn't sew the sleeves. Do you have any complaints about the buttons?"
                      "Invented" or "designed" does not change the essence within the local framework, a simple clinging to words. If I start clinging to words about "crew chances of salvation", about which department thinks it will be difficult to dialogue. Have you ever been to SSBNs? What about RTB? And in production like KRASMASH? If not, what are you going to argue about in general?
                      1. +1
                        3 June 2016 10: 29
                        Quote: Andrey NM
                        Are the RMA R-39 and R-29RM belts very different in terms of clearance?


                        They are very different: RMA (rubber-metal shock absorbers) on SLBMs with LRE, almost twice as many belts, the height of RMA on SLBMs with TREs is much lower - accordingly, the shaft clearance is less.

                        Quote: Andrey NM
                        "We didn't sew the sleeves. Do you have any complaints about the buttons?"

                        Here you are absolutely right :)
                        All design bureaus are divided into departments (that of aviation, that of rockets, that of artillery or tanks). Each department designs its own piece. These are dvigatelisty, PU, ​​durable, management, etc. and all this brings together the layout department or the design department - they call it differently everywhere, there is only one sense - the design of the entire product is carried out in parallel for all the main components and mechanisms - this is the fundamental method of work of all design bureaus from the 30s. Moreover, a lot of tasks are performed by related design organizations (institutes) - especially in management systems.
                        As an example, the main tank can be cited: roughly - 50% of the cost is the transmission engine body, and 50% of the cost is armament, FCS - that is, allies.
  5. +1
    31 May 2016 12: 24
    According to the form, the rocket had: length 16,05, weight 96 t plus or minus 600 kg.

    Division + A. Brykin, 1993
  6. +1
    31 May 2016 12: 28
    After mentioning the nuclear missile system L.I. Brezhnev at the congress, fired at full range
  7. +3
    31 May 2016 12: 37
    The complex included the Aiming System, incl. control elements (in simple terms, precision mirrors). One of them is installed at ARSS. When loading the rocket, there was always a stop, the casing was removed from the mirror, and everyone began to look for the commander of the missile warhead, and patiently waited for him. The procedure was called "Haircut Fix". KR BCH-2 approached, took off his cap, straightened his hair while looking in the mirror, that's all, you can continue loading. Otherwise, expect trouble: o)
    1. +4
      31 May 2016 13: 35
      These are the control points for centering - they are not precision mirrors.
      The astrocorrection system had precision equipment - you would see the quality of work - the Swiss watch is nervously smoking! Having such a production culture, it was a sin not to produce watches that were an order of magnitude superior to Swiss brands.
      But the electronics were - just a misfortune, the weight of the instrument compartment was three times - four times the weight of a similar device on the Trident - and this was how the "mass of useless load" was gained, which led to the weighting of the entire complex
      1. 0
        31 May 2016 23: 50
        Swiss watches are no different from German or Japanese-except for the brand. As a brandy, Armenians make it no worse than the French, but they even have no right to seize their goods with brandy.
        an order of magnitude superior to Swiss brands.
        Technically, there’s nothing superior to them — the amphibian (watch) was no worse than the brand promotion. And even in the Middle Ages they put gold lining.
        1. +2
          1 June 2016 15: 33
          Quote: Anglorussian
          Swiss watches are no different from German or Japanese-except for the brand. As a brandy, Armenians make it no worse than the French, but they even have no right to seize their goods with brandy.


          It must be imagined that the clock should work in space - a vacuum, with a temperature difference of hundreds of degrees.
          Yes, not a single watch can.
          And here the system of optics, gyroscopes, precision mechanics with high accuracy raises the blocks along the trajectories.
          I say - Swiss and Japanese and Germans smoke nervously with them.
  8. +1
    31 May 2016 15: 30
    Many thanks to the author for a series of interesting articles!
  9. +1
    31 May 2016 19: 17
    Quote: Operator
    The same is with the Bulava - the sooner the Borei are converted into carriers of the Sineva SLBM, the better.

    Forget about this idea. Have to rebuild boats - and this is still billions and years

    Quote: saturn.mmm
    Why was it a failure? The author of the article.

    The fact that R-39 was a failure was considered by Makeev himself
    1. +1
      31 May 2016 23: 14
      Quote: Old26
      The fact that R-39 was a failure was considered by Makeev himself

      And what could he say if they did not meet the technical requirements?
  10. 0
    31 May 2016 19: 26
    Quote: Old26
    Have to rebuild boats - and this is still billions and years

    The goal is to get submarines with SLBMs at the level of a potential adversary.
    Why do we need the worst weapon?
  11. +3
    31 May 2016 21: 59
    Quote: Operator
    Well, it's also useful not to forget about the solid-propellant RSD "Pioneer" (aka SS-20), which in all respects made Pershing II.

    Yes, well, have you really paid in all respects? Comparison is completely incorrect
    - By weight "Pioneer" surpassed "Pershing-2" by 4,9 times
    - The length of the "Pioneer" was superior to the "Pershing-2" by 1,5 times
    - The diameter of the "Pioneer" was 2 times larger than the "Pershing-1,75"
    - In terms of range, "Pioneer" was superior to "Pershing-2" by only 2,8 times
    - The Pershing-2 was superior in accuracy to the Pioneer by only 15-18 times

    So in almost all characteristics, alas, the Pershing is superior to the Pioneer, losing only in range

    Quote: Operator
    The goal is to get submarines with SLBMs at the level of a potential adversary. Why do we need the worst weapons?

    Are you sure that "Bulava" does not satisfy the given performance characteristics, what the military needs. And to catch up in the field of naval missiles with solid propellants, where we are lagging behind is stupid, We have the basis - the Strategic Missile Forces, not the NSNF
    1. 0
      31 May 2016 22: 20
      Well, count how much the starting mass of Pershing-2 should increase so that it can cast the weight of the Pioneer warhead over the range of the Pioneer.

      The larger KVO "Pioneer" (16 times) was fully compensated by the greater power of its warhead (up to 200 times). In addition, we are talking about the perfection of the launch vehicle, and not the dropped cargo, whether or not equipped with an active seeker.

      And to hell with someone to distill someone in the field of horse-drawn vehicles (SLBMs with solid propellant rocket engines) when we are ahead of the rest in the field of air (SLBMs with rocket engines)?
      1. -1
        1 June 2016 00: 23
        When a torpedo board is drawn to you, and there is a rocket with self-igniting fuel components, then you will understand that bitumen with additives is somehow better than .... in general, it should be clear if the topic.
    2. +1
      31 May 2016 22: 47
      Quote: Old26

      So in almost all characteristics, alas, the Pershing is superior to the Pioneer, losing only in range

      Are we still far behind Americans on solid fuel formulations?
      I have known for a long time that "Cybernetics is the corrupt girl of imperialism". What has resulted in the lag in the component base? This led to an increase in the mass, a decrease in the accuracy of the CEP, and an increase in the size of the carriers.
    3. +1
      1 June 2016 00: 18
      What are all smart and without references to materials ... already takes laughter! There were so many tales about Pershing-2 about his super-intelligent warhead ... but none of them were confirmed. All these jokes about the terrain in relation to the tomahawks turned out to be bullshit without air controllers installing radio beacons or laser "flashlights" in the suburbs of Baghdad.
  12. +3
    1 June 2016 00: 21
    Quote: Operator
    Well, count how much the starting mass of Pershing-2 should increase so that it can cast the weight of the Pioneer warhead over the range of the Pioneer.

    В 4,3 times. In this case, the starting mass reached would be 32 tons against 37 tons from the "Pioneer".
    And with its starting weight, it would throw 30 ct warhead instead of 80 ct.

    Quote: Operator
    The larger KVO "Pioneer" (16 times) was fully compensated by the greater power of its warhead (up to 200 times). In addition, we are talking about the perfection of the launch vehicle, and not the dropped cargo, whether or not equipped with an active seeker.


    Do not screw up nonsense about the excess of the power of the "Pioneer" BG over the "Pershing" 200 times... The power (total) of the three goals of "Pioneer" was 5,625 times moresince power W-85 is 80 ct, but by no means the lower limit of adjustment of 5 ct.
    About the perfection of the rocket. Coefficient of technical excellence Pershing-2 had 53, at "Pioneer" - 46... Without reduction to one range. With the reduction to the range of the Pioneer, the Pershing is, of course, lower, almost 2,5 times. It's about perfection.

    And in this case, Pershing's extremely small CEP made it even more perfect. There is an EMNIP empirical formula that a twofold increase in accuracy is equivalent to a three-fold increase in power.

    Pershing Accuracy at least 15 times higher "Pioneer", then an elementary calculation shows that such an increase in accuracy is equivalent to 22,5x power increase, i.e. equivalent 1,8 mt... For reference. The power of the monoblock at the "Pioneer" - 1 mt, the power of three goals - 450 ct.

    Quote: Operator
    And to hell with someone to distill someone in the field of horse-drawn vehicles (SLBMs with solid propellant rocket engines) when we are ahead of the rest in the field of air (SLBMs with rocket engines)?

    And we do not overtake. Although in operation, SLBMs with solid propellant rocket propulsion superior to SLBMs with rocket engines.

    Quote: Amurets
    Are we still far behind Americans on solid fuel formulations?

    It's hard to say, Kolya. The topic is closed, but most likely we are still lagging behind (IMHO). Still, no "breakthrough" in this area has yet been heard
    There is information that for new missile systems, such as "Yars-M", "Petrel" and "Bedouin-8" a new fuel has been developed, but what exactly is it and what characteristics it has is unknown
    1. 0
      1 June 2016 01: 12
      Fooling around is your prerogative: according to the physics course for high school, in order to increase the range by 3 times, and the cast weight by an order of magnitude, you need to increase the starting mass of the rocket at least 30 times, i.e. in the case of Pershing-2 it will be 225 tons from a bush.

      It is not necessary to mix God's gift (coefficient of technical perfection of the RN) with scrambled eggs (KVO warhead). It is structurally unchanged for each LV model, the latter can be easily changed with the help of an Iskander-M type seeker. The given KTS "Pioneer" drives.
      1. +3
        1 June 2016 15: 49
        Quote: Operator
        Rotating rubbish is your prerogative: according to the physics course for high school, in order to increase the range by 3 times, and the cast weight by an order of magnitude, you need to increase the starting mass of the rocket at least 30 times, i.e. in the case of Pershing-2 it will be 225 tons from a bush.

        It is not necessary to mix God's gift (coefficient of technical perfection of the RN) with scrambled eggs (KVO warhead). It is structurally unchanged for each LV model, the latter can be easily changed with the help of an Iskander-M type seeker. The given KTS "Pioneer" drives.


        It’s you rubbish nonsense - do not count missiles at the school course - do not fly far ...
        I studied this for 6 years at a specialized faculty where they taught the leading figures of rocket science WORLD LEVEL! It’s not for you 30 times from the bulldozer.
        Out of a stream of 600 people, 120 graduates were graduated before graduation, the rest were dropped out or left where it was easier to study.
        1. 0
          1 June 2016 16: 13
          You probably got a credit for calculating the launch weight of a rocket automatically, if you still do not know about the linear dependence of this indicator on the amount of weight thrown.
          1. +1
            2 June 2016 11: 05
            Quote: Operator
            You probably got a credit for calculating the launch weight of a rocket automatically, if you still do not know about the linear dependence of this indicator on the amount of weight thrown.


            For a single-stage rocket - the cutest. For multi-stage missiles, their dependencies - but you apparently did not surrender?
            1. -2
              2 June 2016 11: 31
              Pioneer and Pershing-2 have an equal number of steps.
              I did not pass the test for calculating the starting weight of the rocket, since I studied KLA at the university.
              1. +3
                2 June 2016 13: 29
                Quote: Operator

                I did not pass the test for calculating the starting weight of the rocket, since I studied KLA at the university.

                I suggest stopping a colleague to dive - this is of little interest to anyone.
  13. +2
    1 June 2016 00: 27
    Quote: zombirusrev
    What are all smart and without references to materials ... already takes laughter! There were so many tales about Pershing-2 about his super-intelligent warhead ... but none of them were confirmed. All these jokes about the terrain in relation to the tomahawks turned out to be bullshit without air controllers installing radio beacons or laser "flashlights" in the suburbs of Baghdad.

    Of course bullshit. These are American weapons. About ours, we would write that it "flies" into the window and has no analogues. Although the guidance system is built on the same principles
  14. 0
    1 June 2016 07: 23
    Quote: Operator
    Throwing nonsense is your prerogative: according to the physics course for high school, in order to increase the range by 3 times, and the throw weight by an order of magnitude, you need to increase the launch mass of the rocket at least 30 times, i.e. in the case of Pershing-2, it will be 225 tons as from a bush. There is no need to mix God's gift (the coefficient of technical perfection of the RN) with scrambled eggs (KVO warhead). It is structurally unchanged for each LV model, the latter can be easily changed with the help of an Iskander-M type seeker. The given KTS "Pioneer" drives.

    Can use not just a physics course for high school, but also an arithmetic course for elementary grades. You can count whatever your heart desires. And get the data that you personally need, such as 225 tons for Pershing. And, in my opinion, that the given CTS is higher for Pioneer than for Pershing. Moreover, one was created as an MRBM from the very beginning ("Pershing"), and the second was an alteration with an ICBM ("Pioneer"). But at the same time to say that the Pioneer is doing Pershing in all respects is sorry, the lot of the "hurray-patriots", for whom only our weapons are the best, who sometimes cannot understand that others can have something better than ours

    And where does the launch vehicles? But for combat missiles, such a coefficient does not exist in nature? For some reason, speaking about the perfection of the R-29RM, everyone mentions this particular coefficient
    1. -1
      1 June 2016 09: 41
      Others may have better weapons besides nuclear missile am
      On that stand.
  15. +3
    1 June 2016 16: 14
    Quote: Operator
    thrown weight by an order of magnitude, it is necessary to increase the starting mass of the rocket at least 30 times, i.e. in the case of Pershing-2 it will be 225 tons from a bush.


    I had a case in my third year (funny).
    I counted the course "rocket" on a computer according to the KBM program, then I choose the engine - liquid-propellant engine, fuel with the highest impulse, I choose the number of stages - one, the margin of safety is minimal, I push the most advanced technologies with the highest coefficient. those perfection (recessed engine, waffle shell, etc.), I fit the project into the required starting weight and dimensions - well, I "shoot" (calculated of course) at the maximum range and ... the "pile" flies 5700 km - one-stage ! A breakthrough, however, I naively believe, and I hurry to the boss, in anticipation.
    Like - professor, look how good I am - my project - a single-stage one flies to a two-stage range ... and he patiently tells me to a green student that in life, son and fuel are not perfect, you need to take tanks with a margin, and the materials are not perfect, safety margin increase and the final result will shoot at a normal 3000 km as expected.
    So, for each case, its own approximating coefficient is put and you can’t attach anywhere 30 times from the textbook ...
    Moreover, I would not undertake to compare two different missiles on the knee and bring them to the same range.
  16. 0
    1 June 2016 17: 16
    You are right - the method I used to bring the starting weight of Pershing-2 to the starting weight of the Pioneer was very conditional in order to clearly demonstrate to the opponent (Old26) the qualitative advantage of the construction of the second missile over the first.
    Really hesitated fans of the western prodigies.
    1. +3
      2 June 2016 11: 25
      Quote: Operator
      Really hesitated fans of the western prodigies.


      Dear colleague. Let's not be like "hurray for the patriotic media", so as not to get a repeat of 1941.
      Excessive self-confidence, complacency - did not lead to good. The average person can think anything, the media can lie anything - appropriate to the flow of information - trust in such media. But scientists in the military-industrial complex, engineers, the military, the country's leadership should not indulge in narcissism.
      1. 0
        2 June 2016 12: 31
        Now the situation is different - in the era of the Internet, it has become possible to conduct information wars on public venues aimed at suppressing the enemy’s will to resist, including by undermining confidence in the domestic military potential.

        So from time to time it’s very useful to block the disu and remind of our military-technical level.

        Moreover, adherents of the opposite side have recently suffered serious losses in the information war - F-35 Penguin, KR Caliber, KR X-101 / 102, KR Zircon, IFI Su-35С, C-400, SLBM Leader, ICBM Frontier, ICBM Sarmat, ZGRLS Container plus platforms for testing technical solutions of MFI T-50 (super maneuverability + stealth), MBT T-15 (uninhabited BO + KAZ) and Husky nuclear submarines (universal submarine).

        Of these, Su-35С, Zircon, Leader, Rubezh, Sarmat and Container have no analogues.

        It's expensive to see.
        1. +3
          2 June 2016 13: 55
          Quote: Operator
          at public venues it became possible to wage information wars


          I will not argue - "information wars" are simmering - but may the civilian audience forgive me - as they say in our army - "With words in F .. not E .." (they do not like).

          And how will a young person have a desire to develop something new if "we are already ahead of the rest of the planet?"
          While drones of a potential partner are exploring Mars, ours are swimming in the oceans (hello Lavochkin!)?
          Personnel policy is quite striking - to oversee the military-industrial complex, defense orders, national defense, mobilization training, maritime policy, nuclear and rocket and space, shipbuilding, aviation, radio-electronic industry, export control, military-technical cooperation, civil defense, border policy, the Arctic, as well as the construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome - they put the philologist Rogozin - it will work out, what happened with the first launch in Vostochny. In my opinion, the manager should understand the task and delve into it, and not yell "work better!"
          Wait for breakthroughs when philologists come to the most difficult technical branches?
          1. -1
            2 June 2016 14: 26
            The desire to develop must be stimulated by information about the real, not imaginary, achievements of the opposite side in the military-technical sphere.

            I consider the issues of administering the military-industrial complex in topics like this for myself offtopic.
  17. +1
    1 June 2016 19: 48
    Quote: Operator
    Really hesitated fans of the western prodigies.

    Of course "fans", how could it be otherwise, since I doubted your calculations and statements. But for some reason, MIT, which was conducting theoretical research work on the creation of an "analogue" of the American Pershing-2, considered it superior in many respects to the Pioneer. But I will not argue with you (despite 20 years of experience in this system), consider everything that you think is necessary, remain in the dark if this shabby-handed position is convenient for you ...
  18. -1
    1 June 2016 19: 54
    Quote: Old26
    MIT, which carried out theoretical research work to create an analogue of the American Pershing-2, considered it to be superior in many respects to the Pioneer

    Links, of course, no.
    Which of MIT's developments is an analogue of Pershing-2: Speed ​​or Courier?
  19. +2
    1 June 2016 21: 31
    Quote: Operator
    Which of MIT's developments is an analogue of Pershing-2: Speed ​​or Courier?

    Are you unable to read? Research THEORETICALwork to create an analogue of "Pershing". It was this work that showed the inconsistency of the Politburo's assertion about the Pershing-2's firing range of 2500 km (then it reached Moscow).

    As for the drawings ...
    The drawing of MIT products is far from complete. For example, there is no Bulava, no Topol-MR, no Topol-E, no Baikal, no Agat and Agata-1, no Elbrus. Not to mention "Yars-M" and "Pioneer-4" (the latter can be ignored)
    1. 0
      2 June 2016 01: 12
      This picture is from the open material of MIT published in 1992 year. At that time, some of the products you listed were not even in the project, and some for some reason decided not to light up.

      I don’t know what about the theory, but in practice it was like this:
      ICBM "Courier" / ICBM Midgetman / RSD Pershing II
      length, m 11,2 / 14 / 10,6
      starting weight, tons 17 / 13,6 / 7,5
      thrown weight, kg 500 / 300 / 200
      range, km 10000 / 11000 / 1770
      Which means that Pershing 2 sucked.
  20. 0
    2 June 2016 14: 53
    For lovers of antiquity, I propose a walk through the virtual museum of the Strategic Missile Forces

    http://wikimapia.org/external_link?url=http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/m
    useums / vlasiha.htm
    1. -1
      2 June 2016 15: 34
      A working link from the site of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
      encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/m useums / vlasiha.htm