Military Review

Harriers in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 (part of 5)

62

Late in the evening of 18 on May 1982, the ships of the 317 of the operational formation welcomed the British amphibious group arriving in the battle area. Two large amphibious dock ships, six special-built amphibious ships and thirteen requisitioned transport ships (including the Atlantic Conveyor) were in the direct guard of the Entrym destroyer and three frigates. A special impression with its size and snow-white hull was made by a forty-four-thousand-one Canberra liner with 2400 military personnel on board.


Despite the losses, the grouping of the naval and air forces of England in the area of ​​conflict increased significantly. By April 30, the British 317's operational connection had 2 aircraft carriers, which had 20 Sea Harriers FRS 1, 4 destroyers, and 5 frigates on decks, and the three nuclear submarines formed the 324 operational connection, which was in command of the United States Army, which was in command of the United Kingdom, X-Numx, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX and XNUMX. and was driven directly from England.

Between 1 and 18 in May, the combat area left the Splendit nuclear submarine, the Sheffield destroyer died, one Sea Harrier was hit by anti-aircraft artillery fire, two more died under unexplained circumstances, most likely colliding with each other in the air. The destroyer "Glasgow", although it was damaged, was eliminated for several days, but was able to correct them on its own and by May 18 was in full combat readiness. At the same time, the submarine "Valiant" (the same type "Conqueror") and the diesel submarine Onyx arrived in the combat area, although it is not clear where the last 21 of May was when the landing took place. Together with the amphibious forces, a destroyer and three frigates approached, and the Atlantic Conveyor delivered 8 C Harriers FRS 1 and 6 Harriers GR 3, but a small comment is needed here.

By the time of the Falkland Conflict, the British fleet had 28 Sea Harrier combatant FRS 1 fighters, of which 20 immediately went to the combat area, and the remaining 8 were to arrive there later. But the British were well aware that neither 20 nor 28 cars would be enough to establish air supremacy. Then someone had a great idea - to throw the Harriers GR 3 into battle. These were the only planes, besides the Sea Harrier FRS 1, which could operate from the decks of British aircraft carriers, but there was a “small” problem: “Harriers” GR 3 was a pure attack aircraft, unable to conduct guided missiles "air-to-air" and to carry out air defense connections. The British tried to adapt the 10 Sidewinders prepared for shipment of this type, but nothing came of this venture. Although the media had repeatedly shown photographs of the GR 3 Harriers with air-to-air missiles suspended on the pylons, the planes did not have the proper electrical wiring, so they could only fight with an air enemy using 30 mm Aden cannons. However, sending even such aircraft was reasonable. Deck tasks aviation were not limited to air defense, respectively, striking at the coastal targets of the Harrier, GR 3 released the Sea Harrier FRS 1 for air patrols. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the sighting systems of the "Harriers" GR 3 for "work" on the ground were superior to those of the "Sea Harriers" FRS 1.



Thus, for in a combat zone the British 21 May possessed 3 nuclear submarines, and probably one of the diesel, 2 aircraft carriers with 31 aircraft on board (25 «Sea Harrier» FRS 1 and 6 «Harrier» GR 3) 4 destroyers and 8 frigates. And what about the Argentines?

By April 30, they had 80 Mirage, Skyhoek and Dagger, as well as eight Canberra old bomber bombers. One Mirage, one Dagger, two Skyhawks and one Canberra were shot down by the British, another Skyhawk crashed on its own, one Mirage and one Skyhawk destroyed excessively vigilant Argentine anti-aircraft gunners of the Falkland Islands. Thus, the total losses of Argentina amounted to 8 machines, but it should be borne in mind that during the war they managed to put into operation 9 Skyhawks, which at the beginning of the conflict were not on the wing. It is not known how many of them were commissioned by 21 in May, but it can still be assumed that to reflect the British troops, Argentina could put up an order of 84-86 machines from which, however, 6-7 were very old Canberras. So the strike power of the Argentines remained at about the same level as at the beginning of the conflict.

As for the aviation of the Falkland Islands, it is very difficult to deal with them. The 6 light attack aircraft of the Pukara and all the Mentors (which is mostly the result of a sabotage on Father Pebble) were completely destroyed, and at least three more of the Pukary were damaged on May 1, but perhaps they were brought into service? During the conflict in Falkland, Argentines transferred the 11 "Pukara", although again it is unclear how many of them arrived on the islands before landing. In general, it can be argued that the air power of Falkland did not suffer much - however, it initially aimed for near zero value and could not cause any serious damage to British ships. On the contrary, a single submarine, personifying the submarine fleet of Argentina, in the period of 1-10 in May at least twice (but probably still three times) attacked the British and only problems with weapons on letting her succeed. This proves how dangerous even a small diesel submarine can be if it operates in the area of ​​intensive enemy operations, but after May 10, the San Luis submarine went in for repair and the Argentines lost their only underwater trump card.

The surface fleet, having lost the General Belgrano, retained the main forces: the aircraft carrier, the 4 destroyer and the 3 corvette, but now the prospects for its use were completely doubtful. The death of General Belgrano showed the Argentinean command the apparent vulnerability of their surface ships to enemy submarines. Then the fleet retreated to coastal areas, where it was reliably covered by ground-based PLO aircraft, but as a result, the opportunity to quickly attack British amphibious groups disappeared. Nevertheless, the Argentine ships could still be thrown into battle, with very unpleasant consequences for the British. In the end, the 780 kilometers separating Falkland from the mainland could be completed in less than a day, even on 20 nodes, and after all, the landing of a large-scale landing force, along with all its reserves, requires much more time. But the British command was well aware of the difficulties of Rear Admiral Woodworth, who simply did not have aerial reconnaissance means that would allow the Argentine fleet to approach Falklands in time (or even NOT in time). On the submarines also was not pinned on former hopes - whatever one may say, but 1-2 in May, they did not find the main forces of the Argentines. Therefore, the British decided to use the Nimrod radio reconnaissance aircraft for observation of Argentine ships, whose intelligence equipment was serviced by 23 operators and, according to the British, made it possible to survey the rectangle 1000 miles long and 400 miles wide in one flight. It looked like this - the plane took off from about. Ascension, approaching the Falkland Islands, not reaching approximately 150 km. Port Stanley turned around and walked to the coast of Argentina, scanning the ocean between the Falklands and the continent. Approximately in 60 miles from the coastline, Nimrod turned around again and flew along the Argentine coast, after which it returned to about. Ascension. Each such flight was a difficult operation - three refueling, 19 hours in the air, so it is not surprising that in the period from 15 to 21 in May there were only 7 of such sorties. The Argentines failed to intercept a single Nimrod, but they figured out that the position of their ships was becoming known to the British with a certain regularity.

At the same time, the Neptunes of the Argentines were completely out of order - the last flight took place on May 15 and no more of these specialized reconnaissance aircraft took off into the air. The consequence of this was the involvement of such vehicles as the Boeing 707 and C-130 in aerial reconnaissance. The problem was that the newly-minted “scouts” did not install any special equipment, i.e. the same Boeing was forced to search for the enemy using the avionics of an ordinary passenger airliner. Accordingly, the search capabilities of the Argentine Command declined sharply.

As a result of all this, the Argentines no longer hoped that they could establish and maintain contact with the British aircraft carrier group, as Neptune did on the day of the attack on Sheffield, but they believed that their ships moving from the coast of Argentina to the Falklands would be quickly discovered . Thus, the APA command could no longer count on surprise, and without it the weaker Argentine fleet could not count on success. As a result, a final decision was made - not to bring surface ships into battle.

In retrospect, we can conclude that the Argentines were too cautious: the attack by surface forces was not at all as hopeless as they thought. But they took exactly this decision and pushed them to this by two factors - the ability of the British to control the movements of their ships and the inability of the Argentines to find British aircraft carriers.

The British had their own difficulties. Shortly after the meeting, a meeting was held about the upcoming disembarking between the commanders of the amphibious group Clapp, the commander of the troops of the landing force Thompson and the commander of the 317 of the operational formation Woodworth. Nobody objected to the landing site proposed by Rear Admiral Woodworth, but by the time it was held a discussion arose. Clapp and Thompson insisted on disembarking in the early evening, shortly before sunset, in order to have maximum dark time of day for the bridgehead equipment. It was logical - even if the Argentines go to the counterattack, they will do it not earlier than in the morning, and having a night of preparation, you could meet them as expected. In addition, overnight, it was possible to deploy high-quality air defense, capable of covering the location of the landed troops.

But such a decision did not suit the commander of the 317 th operational connection. Rear Admiral Woodworth was well aware that he could not provide air defense of the amphibious unit either at the crossing or at the time of disembarkation, and therefore did the main rate on surprise, bad weather, which would limit the detection of British ships and at night. He, of course, long ago noticed that the Argentines never fly at night. Therefore, Woodworth insisted that the landing take place several hours after sunset: in this case, twilight would reliably cover his ships a few hours before reaching the landing site and would not allow the Argentine aviation to attack in the first hours of the landing. Apparently Clapp and Thompson were “slightly” surprised by this state of affairs. Woodworth himself describes this episode as follows:

“I believe that I clearly expressed my opinion to Mike Klapp and Julian Thompson. I did this without reminding them of the lessons of Sheffield and Glasgow. I did not need to utter the phrase: “Gentlemen, can you imagine what happens when a bomb or a cruise missile hits the warship?” And they, in turn, did not have to express the idea that was spinning in their heads: “We thought that the group until this time was to completely destroy the Argentine Air Force. What are you, ... who, have been doing all these past three weeks? ”There are times when I am very grateful to the refined, polite rituals of the discussion, with which we in the armed forces of Her Majesty settle our differences.”


Woodworth's plan was accepted and ... fully justified. Late in the evening, on May 20, the British fleet, unnoticed, approached the Falkland Islands, and embarked on a landing operation and the 04.30 company "B" of the 2 battalion under the command of Major D. Crossland was the first to disembark. Of course, it wasn’t without overlays - at the most “right” moment, the pumps of the landing ship dock “Fairless” refused, so the landing craft, full of soldiers, could not leave the ship, then the landing boats safely stranded in the dark, and then the B companies "And" C "3-his paratroop battalion, starting the nomination from the bridgehead," not knowing their own "and for an hour they fired at each other, even with the support of armored vehicles (one of the companies had two BMP). To the credit of the British, they stoically overcame the obstacles that arose - the commander of “Fairless” made a risky decision, but for all the 100% justified decision - he opened the doors of the boat port, the water poured into the dock and the boats sailed. The paratroopers from stranded boats, with an 50-kilogram display on the shoulders of icy water (air temperature was + 3 degrees), reached the coast by foot, and the commander of the 3-second parachute parachute, after both companies had requested artillery support from him, guessed that something was going wrong and, by personal intervention, stopped the shootout. During the hour of war with each other, both companies did not suffer any losses ... Of course, one can only rejoice at the absence of meaningless deaths. But how can you fight with two companies for an hour without killing and wounding a single enemy?

There were practically no Argentine troops in the landing area. All that the Argentines possessed was an incomplete company "C" of the 12 Infantry Regiment, as many as two platoons (62 men) under the command of Senior Lieutenant K. Esteban, who had two 105-mm guns and two 81-mm mortars at his disposal. Naturally, this “army” was not obliged to reflect the large-scale English landing forces, their functions were to observe the throat of the Falkland Straits. Equipping the observation point at Fanning Head and sending a detachment of 21 fighter with two guns there, the lieutenant himself with the main forces of the company settled in the Port-San-Carlos settlement, 8 km from the entrance to the strait.

Fighters with Fanning Head lasted about half an hour. Finding British ships, they opened artillery fire, and their commander tried to notify Lieutenant Esteban of the incursion that had begun, but ... the radio was broken. Immediately, British special forces landed earlier, by the time Argentines opened fire at some 500 meters from their positions, with the support of 60-mm mortars and the Antrim destroyer cannon (which, in the "best" traditions of 114-mm units, began to attack at the beginning of the attack out of action, but was promptly introduced into it) attacked the defenders. Their situation was hopeless, and, having suffered losses, they with a fight broke away from the British and tried to get out to their own, heading for Stanley. But it was not succeeded by Argentines and 14 June, on the verge of exhaustion, the soldiers surrendered to the British patrol.

Lieutenant Esteban, with four dozens of soldiers, received news of the landing only on 08.30 in the morning of May 21 and immediately made the only sensible decision - to retreat. But this decision was belatedly - two companies of British paratroopers were already advancing on his heels, having entered Port-San-Carlos some 15 minutes after the Argentines left. In order to "resolve the issue" for sure, a helicopter assault was sent to the rear of Lieutenant Esteban and called attack helicopters ... Nevertheless, forty Argentines demonstrated excellent training, giving an exemplary battle at departure. Despite at least fivefold (!) British superiority in forces and support of the latter by helicopters and ship artillery, the detachment under the command of Lieutenant Esteban could not only break away from the pursuit, but also destroy three British helicopters from small arms (including two shock) .

Forced to repeat: Argentines, fearing the invasion of Chile, sent far from the best land forces to the Falkland Islands. And one can only guess what difficulties the British landing force would have faced, stand up against the British in the Falklands elite of the Argentine army. Fortunately (for the British) this did not happen.

No more military operations took place in the area where an amphibious assault operation took place on the night of 20 on 21 in May, it is worth noting that English special forces and ships "made some noise" in other areas to divert the attention of the Argentines, but all this was nothing more than demonstration actions, in serious battles, the British did not get involved.

Deck Aviation also participated: in all, 4 "Harrier GR.3" was attracted for strikes against ground targets. Special Forces reported on the transfer of Argentine helicopters to the area of ​​Mount Kent, from where they could be used to transfer troops to San Carlos, to the area of ​​one of the British bridgeheads. The GR.3 Harrier pair worked perfectly, finding the landing site and destroying the enemy's 3 helicopter. But the second pair, sent to attack the positions of the Argentine 5 Infantry Regiment in Portgovard, were not lucky: one VTOL for technical reasons could not take off at all, and the second was shot down by the Bloupip missile during the second approach.

Harriers in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 (part of 5)


In general, it can be stated that the British landing began and continued extremely successfully (as far as possible for operations of this magnitude). However, the dawn of 21 in May, the British met with mixed feelings: it was clear to everyone that now the Argentines would throw into the battle everything they had, and the main threat to the British was aviation from continental airfields. So it happened, but before we proceed to the description of the battles, let's try to figure out how the British built their air defense.

The amphibious group, entering the throat of the Falkland Channel and concentrating around the entrance to San Carlos Water Bay, turned out, if one can put it this way, in such a square box about 10 on 10 miles, and the walls of this box formed the coastal mountains of the West and East Falkland islands . This put both the English sailors and the Argentine pilots under very peculiar conditions: on the one hand, the Argentines had nothing to sneak up on the English ships closely, taking advantage of the mountainous terrain of the coast. On the other hand, by jumping out of the mountains and dropping speeds even up to 750 km / h, Argentines crossed the British amphibious group in just 90 seconds - with relatively low horizontal visibility (of the order of 3 miles), the Argentinian pilot could visually detect the British ship for 27 seconds before his plane, roaring with engines, sweeps over the deck of this ship. In such conditions, it was very difficult to coordinate air attacks, and besides the presence of many reflective surfaces (all the same mountains) interfered with the work of the GOS “Exocet”. On the other hand, the British still had very little time to activate the fire assets of their ships on the suddenly emerging from nowhere planes.

The British commanders of the 317th operational compound had considerable disagreements on the question of how to cover the amphibious compound. 1st-rank captain John Coward proposed to advance both of the Project 42 destroyer available to the west of West Falkland (i.e. between the Falkland Islands and Argentina) in order to detect Argentine aircraft before they even reach the islands. According to his plan, for the attack of these aircraft it was necessary to provide an air patrol directly over the destroyers, which would also strengthen their own air defense. The aircraft carriers Coward offered to keep 50 miles behind the amphibious compound, from where they could provide air patrols both over the destroyers and over the landing forces. The commander of the aircraft carrier “Invincible” went even further - agreeing to the need to intercept enemy aircraft before they even approached the amphibious compound, he proposed to deploy not only destroyers, but also both aircraft carriers with their direct protection between the Falklands and the continent. Of course, to stand in the way of the enemy, covering the landing transports with his chest, would be in the best traditions of the Royal fleetbut Rear Admiral Woodworth did not dare to do so. He was confused not only by the danger of air attacks, but also by the fact that in this case the main forces of his formation would have to maneuver in the area of ​​operation of the Argentinean submarines. Therefore, the British commander divided the fleet into 2 parts - an amphibious group with a sufficiently powerful cover had to go forward and land, while aircraft carriers with their direct protection were kept in the distance. An amphibious group was covered by 7 British ships, including one destroyer of the County type (Entrim), two old men of the frigate type 12 (Yarmouth and Plymouth), and a frigate of the Linder type (Argonot) , frigate type 21 (Ardent), and finally frigates of type 22 Broadsword and Brilliant are the only ships of Rear Admiral Woodworth that carried Sea Wolf air defense systems and were therefore the most dangerous ships for attackers at low altitude Argentines. Because of the qualities of their air defense systems, they were to become deadly weapons in the conditions of the “box” of the Falkland Strait. The aircraft carriers were far removed from the amphibious forces, and with them remained two destroyers of type 42 (Glasgow and Coventry), a destroyer of type County (Glamorgan) and two frigates of type 21 (Arrow and Alacrity) )

This plan certainly had many drawbacks. With such an order in the most dangerous position turned out to be transports and ships covering amphibious forces, which, in fact, became the main target for the Argentine Air Force. At the same time, the aircraft carriers were far enough away to provide any numerous air patrol over the amphibious group, but not far enough to go beyond the reach of the Super Endandar with the Exocsets. The only ships that had good chances to intercept the Exocets, the 22 frigates, Broadsworth and Brilliant, left with the amphibious vehicles, leaving the aircraft carriers extremely vulnerable to a rocket attack. In fact, the only chance for the British to defend their own aircraft carriers was to detect the attacking group in advance and have time to bring their “Sea Harriers” to them. Only, so far, the VTOLP did not demonstrate anything of the kind and there were no prerequisites for it to turn out in the future. Chances could be increased by increasing the number of air patrols - but, again, at the cost of weakening the air defense of an amphibious unit. As a result, both the amphibious and aircraft carrier groups proved to be very vulnerable to the enemy.

In support of Rear Admiral Woodworth, I would like to note that even in retrospect, in hindsight, it is very difficult to understand whether the British had any reasonable alternative to this plan.

Be that as it may, the decisions were made, so that, starting from 21 in May and for the next few days, the task of the British carrier aviation came down to providing air defense of the aircraft carrier group and covering the compactly located amphibious group. At the same time, Rear Admiral Woodworth, in order to avoid “friendly fire”, introduced the following order of air patrols of the amphibious assault: 10 zone of width, 10 of length of length and approximately 3 of kilometer height, where the transports and cover ships were located, closed for flights “X Harriers” ". Accordingly, any aircraft that suddenly appeared before an English ship could only be an enemy. The "Harriers" should have prevented the enemy from flying into this zone or chasing him out of it. The plan seemed to be good, but ...

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 1)
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 2)
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 3)
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 4)
62 comments
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  1. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack 27 May 2016 07: 08
    +3
    Very nice loop - thanks Andrew. Easy to write and capacious.
    1. DrVintorez
      DrVintorez 27 May 2016 13: 44
      +6
      I will join the previous speaker. I’ll print a series of articles (I hope the author doesn’t mind), I’ll go up and put it on the shelf of my library.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 May 2016 17: 44
      +3
      Thanks for your kind words!
  2. mav1971
    mav1971 27 May 2016 09: 16
    +2
    Thank you!
    I read with pleasure!
  3. Verdun
    Verdun 27 May 2016 10: 45
    +4
    And one can only guess what difficulties the British landing would have faced if the elite of the Argentine army stood up against the British in the Falklands.
    The actions of the Armed Forces of Argentina in the Falkland conflict look extremely unstable. Either they violently rush into battle and carry out successful attacks, then they act as if they didn’t really need the islands. It is difficult to say, with the plague it is connected. Either with the specifics of the command, or with the weakness of technical equipment.
    but not far enough to go beyond the reach of the Super Ethandars with the Exosets.
    I don't really understand why there are always references to Exocet rockets. After all, as far as I understand, the available stock was spent by the Argentines, and France froze further supplies by agreement with England. But in general, it is interesting to read a detailed analysis of events, for which the author can only be thanked again.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 27 May 2016 11: 15
      +7
      Quote: Verdun
      I don't really understand why there are always references to Exocet rockets. After all, as far as I understand, the available stock was spent by the Argentines, and France froze further supplies by agreement with England.

      For the time described in the article, the supply of "exosets" has not yet been used up. After all, "Atlantic Conveyor" is still afloat. smile
      1. Verdun
        Verdun 27 May 2016 12: 13
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        For the time described in the article, the supply of "exosets" has not yet been used up. After all, "Atlantic Conveyor" is still afloat.

        To blame! I lost sight of this moment!))
    2. Blackmokona
      Blackmokona 27 May 2016 15: 34
      0
      Quote: Verdun
      The actions of the Armed Forces of Argentina in the Falkland conflict look extremely unstable. Either they violently rush into battle and carry out successful attacks, then they act as if they didn’t really need the islands. It is difficult to say, with the plague it is connected. Either with the specifics of the command, or with the weakness of technical equipment.

      Rather, with political confrontation. It is unlikely that such an adventure had total support in the government.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 May 2016 17: 59
      +2
      Quote: Verdun
      I don't really understand why there are always references to Exocet rockets. After all, as far as I understand, the available stock was spent by the Argentines

      No, they used 2 on Sheffield and there were three more rockets left
    4. Stas57
      Stas57 27 May 2016 19: 57
      +1
      Quote: Verdun
      I don't really understand why there are always references to Exocet rockets. After all, as far as I understand, the available stock was spent by the Argentines, and France froze further supplies by agreement with England. But in general, it is interesting to read a detailed analysis of events, for which the author can only be thanked again.

      6 pieces are - AM-39 - air-to-ship missile;
      and then there was the MM-38, a ship-to-ship missile; they were started in manual mode.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        28 May 2016 00: 14
        0
        Quote: Stas57
        6 pieces are - AM-39 - air-to-ship missile;

        No, there were only 5
        Quote: Stas57
        and then there was the MM-38, a ship-to-ship missile; they were started in manual mode

        And they generally do not know how many were. They tried to launch 4 pcs, that's for sure, but not all of them started.
        1. bubalik
          bubalik 28 May 2016 00: 33
          +1
          '' why didn't you start?
        2. Stas57
          Stas57 28 May 2016 00: 35
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          And they generally do not know how many were. They tried to launch 4 pcs, that's for sure, but not all of them started.

          HMS Glamorgan was enough, this is when they are manually hovering

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          No, there were only 5

          6 memory, I remember it for sure, but I won’t
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            28 May 2016 01: 06
            0
            Quote: Stas57
            6 memory, I remember it for sure, but I won’t

            Yes, arguing is not forbidden at all, but very welcome :)))
            Quote: Stas57
            HMS Glamorgan was enough, this is when they are manually hovering

            In fact of the matter. Enough, but how?
            2 launchers were removed from the corvette. For the first time, both missiles were launched, but one did not want to leave the guides at all, the second flew off somewhere in the wrong direction. The Argentines deployed a couple more Exocets MM38. And from the second time one of the missiles fired hit the Glamorgan.
            Quote: Stas57
            6 memory, I remember it for sure, but I won’t

            you remember exactly, but alas - wrong. It is simply absolutely known where 5 Exosets were spent (2 - Sheffield, 2 - Atlantic Conveyor and 1 - an unsuccessful attack on Invincible + it is known that Exoset got into Glamorgan - so they write about allegedly 6 anti-ship missiles. In fact, MM-40 was 5, plus some MM38
            1. Stas57
              Stas57 28 May 2016 01: 14
              +3
              The Argentines deployed a couple more Exocets MM38. And from the second time, one of the missiles fired did hit the Glamorgan.

              '' why didn't you start?

              oh, this is phenomenal, my favorite story is that not only Russians can,)
              There was such an electronics specialist Julio Perez, he was not only able to install ship systems on wheels, remove protection from the fool, alter electronics, etc., but also create a system that made it possible, according to the data of absolutely any radar, after manual (!) recalculation of the data, to load the full data into the rocket manually. According to special tables, the sequences of signals that determined the flight of the rocket were established. The launcher was delivered with great difficulty and risk by air to the blocked islands, and immediately went into combat use, which at the same time became a test. At first (it happened in the first week of June 1982) it didn't work out. The rocket just did not fly from the first kick, some blockage was not bypassed, I went to check the circuit and a little later, on the second attempt to launch, the rocket flew. True, due to the fact that they were shooting without actual data (while they were figuring out what's what - they were corny out of date, and new ones did not arrive) - they slightly "missed", the rocket went "into milk".


              Then, for several agonizing days, the British did not enter the zone of normal reach of the radar at the disposal of Perez's team, but on the night of June 11-12, 1982 (about 3 a.m.), Perez and his colleagues, technicians-lieutenants Adabal and Rodriguez successfully danced their shamanic dance around the consoles, where the parameters of the flight task were entered into the missiles, calculated practically by hand (by Hewlett-Packard pocket calculators, on the basis of the information "organoleptically" taken from the radar screen !!). So successfully that after about a minute and a half, from a distance of 29600 meters, the missile they fired entered the British destroyer HMS Glamorgan (D19). The rocket struck the stern, destroying the hangar deck and provoking an explosion of fuel and ammunition in a fully equipped helicopter in the hangar. A great fire broke out.


              you remember something exactly, but alas - it’s wrong.

              let 5 not so important, how important)
    5. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 30 May 2016 16: 20
      +1
      Quote: Verdun
      The actions of the Armed Forces of Argentina in the Falkland conflict look extremely unstable. Either they violently rush into battle and carry out successful attacks, then they act as if they didn’t really need the islands. It is difficult to say, with the plague it is connected. Either with the specifics of the command, or with the weakness of technical equipment.


      If there is intelligence, they rush into battle.
      The task was to wait for the landing operation and hit the landing, which they generally succeeded. If all the air bombs that had fallen into the British ships were triggered, then the losses in the ships forced the British to pick up their husbands by covering the landing and covering the carrier group.
    6. nemoXX
      nemoXX 4 June 2016 14: 35
      0
      The answer is obvious: URO is considered the most modern and a big bet is made on it in a war at sea.
      Therefore, each launch of Exoset is carefully monitored and studied. Moreover, there were only 6 of them: 5 air and 1 ground. About ship Exocets of Argentina, I, like the author, have not heard anything.
  4. PPD
    PPD 27 May 2016 10: 57
    +5
    Quote: anodonta
    political adventurism.
    the fact remains - None of their political calculations were justified! The Soviet army would say this: political level = 0! yes And this is with the generals! belay

    To the very point. Start a war with England while having Chile’s opponents ?! They did not send troops because they feared Chile. Why did they start a war? fool
    1. 0255
      0255 27 May 2016 11: 16
      +2
      Quote: PPD
      Quote: anodonta
      political adventurism.
      the fact remains - None of their political calculations were justified! The Soviet army would say this: political level = 0! yes And this is with the generals! belay

      To the very point. Start a war with England while having Chile’s opponents ?! They did not send troops because they feared Chile. Why did they start a war? fool

      The Argentine authorities wanted to raise their rating with a small victorious war, hoping that England "is not the same" and will not fight for the Falklands.
      1. venik
        venik 27 May 2016 12: 28
        +5
        Everything is perfect!
        The then Argentine dictator (Gatilleri seems) counted, on the one hand, on the support of the US establishment, with whom he had very warm and friendly relations (including personally with Reagan), and on the other, on the absence of heavy aircraft carriers from Britain and the Royal Navy conduct combat operations at a great distance from its bases.
        (Both that and another - did not work out!). In addition, within the country, its popularity was sharply falling (the economy was "slipping", the standard of living was rapidly declining, etc.) - so an urgently small but lightning-fast victorious war was required!
        By the way, a surge of patriotism and national jubilation really took place in Argentina (though this did not last long.
        The reality turned out to be different - Washington sharply bowed to the UK side and began to threaten, and the British mobilized as soon as possible everything that was possible and sent the squadron ...
        The result is complete confusion and "hysterical", chaotic actions.
        We add here, in general, the low level of training of the bulk of the army and command personnel, organization, communications and management (i.e., ABILITY in general), which in general is characteristic of most Latin American armies (we will not detract from the skill and courage of individual soldiers and officers).
        Here is the result !! It is quite natural!
        1. Simpsonian
          Simpsonian 28 May 2016 02: 28
          0
          The Thatcher government was even less popular in the UK.
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 27 May 2016 16: 54
      +2
      Why did they start a war?

      then England is not the same, tetcherism, austerity regime, strikes and the very peak of the recession, the islands are far away, until then, they will be repelled, then it will shut itself off, perhaps it will become washed away.
      Well, it turned out that England was still the same, and could quickly move its pistons.
      And the junta thought to solve its problems.

      here Isaev said well
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4-GhLL00NY
  5. Doctor Evil
    Doctor Evil 27 May 2016 12: 17
    +4
    Fly away, a falcon. Argentines pick fly-lieutenant Jeffrey Glover out of the water, shot down over Port Howard on May 21.
  6. Operator
    Operator 27 May 2016 12: 18
    -1
    Where is the title "Harriers in Battle"? laughing
    Helicopters, artillery and naval air defense fully ensured the British landing operation.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 27 May 2016 13: 36
      +3
      Quote: Operator
      Where is the title "Harriers in Battle"? laughing
      Helicopters, artillery and naval air defense fully ensured the British landing operation.

      As where?
      Deck Aviation also participated: in all, 4 "Harrier GR.3" was attracted for strikes against ground targets. Special Forces reported on the transfer of Argentine helicopters to the area of ​​Mount Kent, from where they could be used to transfer troops to San Carlos, to the area of ​​one of the British bridgeheads. The GR.3 Harrier pair worked perfectly, finding the landing site and destroying the enemy's 3 helicopter. But the second pair, sent to attack the positions of the Argentine 5 Infantry Regiment in Portgovard, were not lucky: one VTOL for technical reasons could not take off at all, and the second was shot down by the Bloupip missile during the second approach.

      Ironically, however: the British plane was shot down by the British MANPADS. smile
      1. Operator
        Operator 27 May 2016 14: 33
        -1
        Over the entire landing, a crowd of shock Harriers was able to inflict as much one strike on a ground target not protected by air defense and not involved in battles with the British.

        Given the small distances between British ships and Argentinean military installations on the islands, attack helicopters could well handle the attack on the helipad.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 May 2016 18: 01
          0
          Quote: Operator
          During the entire landing, a crowd of shock Harriers was able to strike as much as one blow at a ground target that was not protected by air defense and was not involved in battles with the British.

          Absolutely.
        2. Simpsonian
          Simpsonian 28 May 2016 02: 32
          0
          Helicopters fly too slowly. Harrier was originally made specifically for CAS.
        3. The comment was deleted.
  7. Taoist
    Taoist 27 May 2016 14: 50
    0
    I like the shaves in this operation - their war with Argentina resembled a conversation between "dumb and deaf" ... it seems that the army and the Navy have degraded so much that, in principle, they have forgotten how to fight. The only ones who deserve a "good word" are logisticians ... Everything else is not just through "F" but with invention ...
    1. Blackmokona
      Blackmokona 27 May 2016 15: 36
      +3
      Quote: Taoist
      I like the shaves in this operation - their war with Argentina resembled a conversation between "dumb and deaf" ... it seems that the army and the Navy have degraded so much that, in principle, they have forgotten how to fight. The only ones who deserve a "good word" are logisticians ... Everything else is not just through "F" but with invention ...

      It’s just that everything is described in detail, any military conflict looks like this, if you discard propaganda
      1. Taoist
        Taoist 27 May 2016 17: 56
        +2
        Well, what does war look like in real life, I still know ... Do not multiply entities. The traditional army madhouse is still not worth comparing with this picture. Okay, they shot at each other for an hour ... it happens .... But nobody got in an hour ...
        1. Blackmokona
          Blackmokona 27 May 2016 20: 02
          0
          Read reports from Ukraine and Syria all the time for many days of fierce battles with similar losses.
        2. Blackmokona
          Blackmokona 27 May 2016 20: 03
          0
          Read reports from Ukraine and Syria all the time for many days of fierce battles with similar losses.
        3. Blackmokona
          Blackmokona 27 May 2016 20: 03
          0
          Read reports from Ukraine and Syria all the time for many days of fierce battles with similar losses.
        4. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 27 May 2016 21: 46
          +3
          "Okay, they shot at each other for an hour ... it happens ... But no one hit in an hour ..." ////

          Easy. And I myself was in such a "friendly" shootout.
          When both units lie down (both of them are on the defensive), and the distance exceeds the distance
          effective fire, then no hits (fortunately).
      2. Simpsonian
        Simpsonian 28 May 2016 03: 37
        +1
        It’s just that everything is described in detail, any military conflict looks like this, if you discard propaganda

        They rarely write the truth about war

        Most of the VTOL aircraft were involved in guarding the landing and processing the landing zone. Argentina submarines somehow reached south Georgia
    2. Tigr
      Tigr 27 May 2016 15: 57
      +2
      Quote: Taoist
      I like the shaves in this operation - their war with Argentina was like talking "dumb with deaf" ...

      I would call this war a race of disabled people.
    3. Stas57
      Stas57 27 May 2016 17: 08
      +2
      logisticians yes ...On June 8, the RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram landing ships were unloaded at Port Fitzroy, however, due to equipment breakdowns, unloading was slow. On this day, the weather improved significantly and the Argentines, from an observation post at Harriet's height, noticed English ships. The command of the Argentine Air Force Task Force South decided to organize a massive airstrike on the British ships.

      The operation involved eight Skyhawk A-4 [17] and five Dagger M-5. HMS Plymouth frigate was attacked near Cape Changcho by Daggers, four out of ten bombs hit the ship, but none of them exploded. However, due to the detonation of ammunition on the ship, a fire broke out, which was later put out, 5 crew members died. The frigate HMS Plymouth, due to the damage received, was no longer able to participate in the hostilities.


      I’ll add that the failure of the RFA equipment Sir Galahad is when the dudes were unloaded by crane because the ramp broke, and the first in the list of logisticians for unloading was ... a hospital, and a crowd of Welsh guardsmen was sitting in the hold.
      eventually 50 corpses.
      1. Simpsonian
        Simpsonian 28 May 2016 02: 37
        0
        The ramp is needed for unloading equipment
  8. Operator
    Operator 27 May 2016 17: 53
    -1
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Marines Westland Scout AH.1 suitable for the role of drums? ATGMs were on them - and they used them in that war

    Moreover, one Scout hung ATGM SS-11 more than the number of Argentine helicopters destroyed on the ground during the landing of the British landing.
  9. Denimax
    Denimax 27 May 2016 21: 40
    +2
    It seems to me that the Argentines were lucky that the fuses were "of the wrong system." All the ammunition would have worked properly, having melted most of the British fleet, then it would have been impossible to avoid an escalation of the conflict. The British would not have left with their tail between their legs like a beaten dog. It would be a big slap in the face of the entire NATO bloc, in particular the United States.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 28 May 2016 00: 26
      0
      fantasies.
      there would be nothing
  10. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 27 May 2016 22: 01
    0
    "I have to repeat myself: the Argentines, fearing the invasion of Chile, sent to the Falkland
    the islands are far from the best land units "////

    This is a pretty funny excuse of the junta - is it worth it to refer to? They started a real mess in one place,
    do they keep troops in another? belay Drive such generals.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 May 2016 00: 05
      +2
      Quote: voyaka uh
      This is a pretty funny excuse of the junta - is it worth it to refer to?

      Worth it.
      Quote: voyaka uh
      They started a real mess in one place,
      do they keep troops in another?

      Apparently the junta plan looked like this
      1) England will not enter the war.
      2) If England nevertheless enters the war, it will be necessary, taking advantage of the superiority in the Air Force, to prevent a large-scale landing on the Falkland Islands
      3) By virtue of clause 2. on the Falklands to land such a contingent that it could be "kicked out" from there only by a large landing force.
      Those. battles directly on the islands were not specifically considered by the Argentines, it was about making the British carry out a large-scale operation, which the Air Force was supposed to disrupt.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 30 May 2016 16: 04
        +2
        ...
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        the battles directly on the islands were not specifically considered by the Argentines, it was about making the British carry out a large-scale operation, which the Air Force was supposed to disrupt.


        ... The Argentinean Air Force practically thwarted the landing operation, if not for the failure of the bombs, Woodford would have lost some of the destroyers and he would have to choose whether to cover the landing or cover the aircraft carriers, because there were not enough forces to solve both tasks. But what happened happened - the bombs did not explode, the ships remained afloat.
    2. Simpsonian
      Simpsonian 28 May 2016 02: 25
      +1
      It's harder to fight in the mountains
    3. mav1971
      mav1971 28 May 2016 09: 14
      -1
      Quote: voyaka uh

      This is a pretty funny excuse of the junta - is it worth it to refer to? They started a real mess in one place,
      do they keep troops in another? belay Drive such generals.


      In the history of the Soviet Union during WWII - it was also.
      And they also held a large group in the Far East, even when the enemy rushed towards Moscow like a rink.
      About one and a half million military men were always in the Far East during the war.
      On average 50 divisions. Rifle, tank. aviation.

      For at any moment there could be a stab in the back.
      The history of mankind knows such examples more than one hundred or a thousand.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 28 May 2016 12: 12
        0
        Nevertheless, the Far Easterners were transferred. Very quickly, and at a gigantic distance.
        It was they who saved Moscow in December.
        As early as September, the Sorge scout said the Japanese had decided to attack America,
        and the General Staff did not hesitate. Well done!

        The Argentines would also have had time for sure, but “manyana” (tomorrow, not now) won ...
        In general, you are right. There have been examples in history.
        1. Simpsonian
          Simpsonian 28 May 2016 12: 57
          +1
          They transferred but not all - there was no oil in the Far East, Japan could not have been at war with the USSR without it for a long time.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 29 May 2016 01: 14
            0
            Heh, you noticed a curious thing.
            Until Japan captured Indonesia and Burma (where is the oil),
            as if there’s nothing to climb on the USSR, but having captured - it was against
            the entire English-speaking gang with its 60% of world industry ...
            Japanese militarists had a hopeless situation belay
            But Indonesia didn’t really help either: by the end of the 44th Kwantung
            the army was already sitting without a drop of gasoline - dry tanks.
            But we went into the dead off top ... another time ....
            1. Simpsonian
              Simpsonian 29 May 2016 11: 04
              0
              Quote: voyaka uh
              towards the end of the 44th Kwantung
              the army was already sitting without a drop of gasoline - dry tanks.

              They bombed the Far East ... Not all - they were probably not pedal-powered planes.
              Not entirely hopeless, otherwise they would not have decided to fight.
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 29 May 2016 12: 47
                0
                "They bombed the Far East"

                Did not know. When?
                1. Simpsonian
                  Simpsonian 30 May 2016 12: 01
                  0
                  However, in 1945 there was a war, because big cities were quite close to the border.
                2. The comment was deleted.
        2. mav1971
          mav1971 29 May 2016 21: 58
          -1
          Quote: voyaka uh
          Nevertheless, the Far Easterners were transferred. Very quickly, and at a gigantic distance.
          It was they who saved Moscow in December.
          As early as September, the Sorge scout said the Japanese had decided to attack America,
          and the General Staff did not hesitate. Well done!


          Believe me, the minimum number of divisions that were on the Far East is 32.
          Maximum under 55.
          They sent to Moscow and from them a huge help was
          But ...
          30 divisions have always stood in the Far East.
          Regardless of the situation.
          The average numbers from 41 to 45 years I gave.