Military Review

Defending in transcendental heights

Defending in transcendental heights

Our southern neighbor, Georgia, has long and firmly been in the camp of the opponents of Russia. Recently, a motorized infantry company of the Georgian Armed Forces was incorporated into the NATO rapid reaction force. In the country, especially among young people, anti-Russian sentiments are strong. A NATO training center operates on the territory of Georgia on an ongoing basis. Since last year, joint military exercises of the units of the NATO and Georgian troops have acquired a periodic character. The last ones with the puffy name Noble Partner 2016 started as recently as May 11. President Georgy Margvelashvili from a high rostrum has repeatedly said that "Russia occupies a fifth of Georgia and Tbilisi will never accept this." During the opening of the Noble Partner 2016 military exercise, he announced Georgia’s desire for NATO. The North Atlantic organization is slowly but surely mastering a new Caucasian theater of military operations for itself. And there is no longer any doubt that in the event of a war against Russia, NATO will undoubtedly make an attempt to invade the Caucasus. And this time, the Russian army will have to fight not against the Georgian soldiers, who have once shown what they are on the battlefield, the enemy will be more serious. If we talk about the organization of the defense of the high-mountain part of the Main Caucasus Range (GKH), then first of all, it is worth paying attention to the Trans-Caucasian Mainline, the Military Ossetian and Georgian Military Highways. No less dangerous is the direction of the Sukhumi Military Road with gentle Klukhor and Marukh passes.

The section of the Georgian-Russian border, which runs along the Main Caucasus Range (GKH) from Gvandra Mountain to the summit of Geze-Tau (about 140 km in length) should also not be ignored. Here you have to defend the position at absolute heights 3000 – 3500 m and above - this is high mountains. I propose to consider some features of the organization of defense in this segment.


The fighters born and raised in the mountains are best suited to the war in the mountains. The irony of the situation is that with the defense of the Caucasus in 1942 – 1943, the Red Army was deployed front to the north, and now the likely enemy is threatening Russia from the south. In those years, residents of the mountainous regions of Georgia adjacent to the GKH from the south — the Svans provided invaluable assistance to the mountain troops of the Red Army and the NKVD. Many mountaineers fought against the alpine rangers of Germany and its allies (in fact, the troops of Western and Central Europe, but at that time united under the auspices of the Third Reich). Now Svans will fight against Russia. Among them there are a lot of great hunters, by the way, they almost destroyed all the game on their side and often visit the Russian territory in order to get a mountain goat or something else. The Balkars have long been jokingly saying that under any circumstances wild animals in the Caucasus do not cross the Russian-Georgian border in the southern direction. It should be borne in mind that Svans know the mountains like the back of their fingers, they know how to shoot, move around, triple ambushes, attack and defend themselves in the mountains. They are undisciplined, but they can successfully participate in sabotage and reconnaissance raids as part of small groups. In Soviet times, among the Svan there were many magnificent climbers. For example, the name of Svan Mikhail Khergiani, one of the strongest climbers of the Union, at one time was widely known in the USSR and in Europe.

But, frankly, Georgia cannot put serious forces on the battlefield. The main part of the NATO mountain infantry will be: German 23-I Mountain Brigade, French Alpine huntsmen (five reinforced battalions: 6, 7, 11,13, 27-i), 159-th mountain-infantry regiment, legionnaires; units of the US 10 Mountain Division and possibly the 86 Brigade, the Italian Alpini (two brigades and three separate regiments) and the Bersalieri (six regiments). It is impossible to completely exclude the possibility of the appearance in the Caucasian theater of operations of the Austrian 6 mountain brigade within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program.

Western countries have one serious problem, which concerns the ability to significantly replenish the number of mountain infantry forces through mobilization. In short, NATO does not have such an opportunity; all that the command of the North Atlantic organization can count on is reservists. For example, strong climbers from Western countries (and there are a lot more of them there than in Russia), a priori not connected with the army, are unlikely to be attracted to military operations because of their pacifist outlook.

From the former allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact, the 21-I Polish brigade of the Podhalyanskiy shooters and two Romanian mountain brigades - 2-I and 61-i can take part in the hostilities in the Caucasus. The remaining countries - members of NATO do not have any significant forces of the mountain infantry as part of their armies. But, based on past experience, it can be assumed that they will put small military contingents at the disposal of the joint command of the North Atlantic organization. Involvement of military contingents of the ANZUS bloc countries (Australia, New Zealand, USA) to the solution of military tasks in the Caucasus cannot be ruled out. In addition, it is possible to participate in hostilities units of non-NATO countries within the framework of the same Partnership for Peace program, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others. By the way, in Soviet times, the Ukrainian mountaineering clubs (in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk) were among the strongest in the Union.


What special troops, intended for war in the mountains, does Russia possess? As part of the Southern Military District of the Russian armed forces there are two mountain-rifle brigades. One brigade (33) is deployed in the Botlikh district of Dagestan, approximately 40 km from the Russian-Georgian border. This is the eastern Caucasus. This brigade consists of separate mountain battalions 838 and 839, separate reconnaissance battalion 1198, self-propelled howitzer division, anti-aircraft battery, communications battalion, engineering battalion company, electronic warfare company, supply company, repair company, a medical company, an RCBZ platoon and a commandant platoon.

Another mountain brigade (34-I), also a battalion, is deployed in the stanitsa of Storozheva-2 in Karachay-Cherkessia, approximately 60 km from the state border. True, this time on the other side is not hostile Georgia, but friendly Abkhazia. By its structure, the 34 Brigade is identical to the 33.

It is necessary to admit frankly, these forces are clearly not enough in case of possible military actions, which are discussed in the article. In contrast to NATO, the Russian mobilization system can significantly replenish the troops by reservists in a short time. But here we are talking about mountain specificity. Therefore, it is worth creating, in addition to the already existing real brigades (which, undoubtedly, have tasks according to the “M” plan) scaled mountain parts or compounds in the required quantity and quality and locate them in Staropole and the Kuban.

In Russia, there are from whom to form the mountain-infantry units for conducting combat operations in the conditions of high mountains. The mass enthusiasm of young people for mountaineering and mountain tourism contributes to this. The question is whether the military registration and enlistment offices take into account the enthusiasm of potential conscripts and reservists, which is so useful for the defense of the country. In Soviet times, when mountaineering and mountain tourism were more widespread than they are now, military registration and enlistment offices did not conduct such accounting, and in the Soviet armed forces there was virtually no mountain infantry at all. We do not speak about formally declared, as mountain, military units and formations.


Once again I want to return to the question of the inconsistency of the recommendations that are spelled out in the Combat Regulations "for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat" (BU) with the realities that troops in the mountains will meet. This time we are talking about defensive fighting.

Let's see what is written in the 198 article of the 2 BU part: "The main efforts are focused on the defense of tank-dangerous areas, mountain passes, road junctions, dominant heights and important objects." It seems to be all right, but this is only a quick glance, and if you think about it, then this very general recommendation is essentially a dummy. And it is worth mentioning that tank-dangerous directions in high mountains are mainly roads, sometimes it is the bottom of flat-bottomed valleys or gorges or gentle slopes free of large stones, very rarely these are plateaus with a smooth surface, which you need to drive up along serpentines and then move down. Here, perhaps, that's all. But this “all” concerns only the low mountains and some part of the middle mountains. In the highlands, there are no tank-dangerous areas at all.

When it comes to dominant heights, you need clarification. If you mean the tops of the mountains, then the recommendation is a mistake: the fact is that from the tops of the valley are not viewed at all, with very few exceptions. To survey the valley bottom, one cannot leave above the lower shoulder of the ridge slope, as soon as he has gone beyond the bend, only the slope of the opposite ridge will be in sight. The higher you go, the smaller part of what happens in the gorge, you see. From some points can be viewed remote areas of the valley. Obviously, there is no point in defending heights in the mountains, as is done in the plain. The point is not to indiscriminately position one’s position as high as possible, but to be higher than the enemy, while not losing sight of him and being at a distance from him that will allow you to effectively use all available fire weapons.

I propose to look at the 199 article: “The most densely all kinds of fire in combination with barriers should cover roads, exits from gorges, tunnels, mountain valleys, narrows, convenient river crossings and canyon crossings, and directions that can be used by the enemy for bypass. "

First, the notion of “exits from the gorges” confuses. It turns out that heights are deliberately given to the enemy, and lowlands must be defended, since the gorges (valleys) are always located "exits" down. The article is confusing between the terms "valley" and "gorge". I want to clarify for the reader one detail: gorges and valleys, in essence, is one and the same and it is not necessary to include these terms in one chain of transfers. It is believed that the former are considerably narrower and somewhat shorter than the latter. Example: Tunkinskaya valley has more than 160 km in length and 30 km in the widest place, and the Baksan gorge is about 96 km in length and in the widest place it is slightly more than 1km. But in the special literature, these two terms have no distinction when it comes to valleys, which often means gorges. Secondly, they are embarrassed by the “transitions through canyons”, the impression is that the author of the article did not see anything other than plain ravines, and believes that the canyons are so small that it is a trifle to build a passage through them. It is difficult to comment on these "transitions" because they are clearly from the realm of fiction, which has nothing to do with reality.

Further in the same article it is written: "... by organizing defense in a narrow valley (gorge), firing means should be placed on the adjacent mountain slopes so that the chamber of the valley (gorge) is provided with crossfire." The word "lumbago" implies that the gorge should be swept to its full length. Let us take as an example the very small Adyl-su gorge in the Elbrus region. It is about xNUMX km long, has many kinks and a significant difference in height, and it is unlikely that it can be “shot through” it to its full length using the whole arsenal of a motorized rifle battalion. It is not a problem to block any part of it across the entire width of the gorge with dense fire, but we are talking about a “shot”.

I return again to the article: “The heights that form the entrance to the valley are most strongly fortified. The approaches to the commanding heights are covered with artillery and grenade launcher units and anti-tank weapons. Artillery is widely used for direct fire shooting. "

If we mean the main valley, which starts from the foothills and goes all the way to the main ridge, then the heights at its entrance can be very low and insignificant so that a maximum of them can be equipped only with a machine gun nest, one position without spare ones, or to lay there for sniper or NP. Why cover the approaches to such a summit is also unclear. If we are talking about one of the side valleys near the main ridge, then there is no point in defending such a peak, because, as a rule, the valley is not visible from it at all. In this case, the position is better to prepare on the lowest shoulder on the side of a mountain. In this case, we are not talking about the placement of cannon artillery there (especially MLRS). Let's try to imagine how you can prepare a position for a cannon on the slope of 30 – 35 degrees for firing direct fire in the direction of the foot of the mountain (otherwise, how to understand the requirement of the charter).

The article 201 says: "The circumventing enemy is destroyed by artillery fire and other means, as well as by decisive actions of the units of the second echelon (reserve) or the battalion armored group (company)." The trouble is that far from everywhere, even in the midlands, you can drag up artillery, especially armored vehicles, and it’s not about doing something like that in the highlands. There everything that mountain infantry can have, it is able to carry on itself, at best, to use pack animals.

Let's look at another position and finish it. So, the statute says: "It is advisable to conduct counter attacks from top to bottom along ridges, valleys, roads with extensive use of detours and envelopes." This is another empty recommendation. First, if we move along the ridges and valleys, taking into account their great length, then this combat action does not fit into the term “attack”, then we must speak about a counterattack. Secondly, if we are talking about midlands and high mountains, the ridges are crowned with rock ridges, and in winter - snow pressures and cornices. The relief of the ridges itself is often such that it does not unfold on it. Sometimes it is necessary to attack even not into the column one at a time, but simply one at a time, and the fighters will in some places have to crawl through difficult areas where they cannot physically fire at the enemy. Along the valleys will have to counterattack the enemy in the forehead. Therefore, if we are talking about a counterattack, we must, first of all, pay attention to the slopes of the ridges, wide couloirs, folds in the mountain relief, which allow secretly maneuver to occupy advantageous positions, from where you can counterattack, and it is better to hit the enemy with destructive fire from top to bottom , with medium distances.


The fighter of the 34 Brigade demonstrates skills that are useless in real combat. Photos from the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Not to be unfounded, I propose to consider the option of organizing defense with a specific example. Take not the whole highland section of the GKH from the top of Gvandra to the top of the Gese-tau, but only its center. Let's confine ourselves to the regimental defense area (PO), from the top of Chiper-Azau-bashi (3862 m) to Cheget-tau peak (4109) - along the front (about 40 km long) and to the village of Elbrus in depth (inclusively approximately 16,5 km without taking into account the height difference). This RO closes the exit to the Baksan gorge with its developed infrastructure and operational directions to Nalchik and Minvody. The essence of the organization of defense is to take a small part of the forces on the GKH line, and leave the main forces to maneuver, which is the main component of active defense. Reserves must be placed so that there is an opportunity to transfer troops ahead of the enemy to particularly dangerous areas during the fighting.

On the right flank of this RO, the main attention will have to be paid to the Donguz-Orun pass, through which the load route from the Baksan gorge to the Inguri valley in Svaneti goes. This pass is located at an altitude of 3180 m above sea level. The slope that leads to it from the Baksansky Gorge is flat, but not passable for technology. Light artillery, ammunition, and material resources will have to be lifted here for pack animals or, as they say, manually. It is possible to use helicopters, naturally, without their landing. The slopes on the Georgian side, leading to the pass from the valley of the Nakra River, are steep, wide and open. The length of the ascent is 3,5 km, on which the infantry has nowhere to hide. There is work for mortars, large-caliber machine guns and long-range sniper rifles. In addition, in the upper part of this climb to the pass leads a rather narrow couloir, which is sufficient to block with a single machine gun. A light mortar battery can be placed on the northern slope of the pass, not far from the ridge. Snipers can be located in the rocks just below the pass on the south side, on the very pass, along the adjacent ridges of the Nakra-tau and Donguz-Orun-bashi peaks. In addition, the pass can be placed before the platoon of shooters. The position is strong, but reliable air and missile defense and means are needed to combat high-precision weapons.

The company reserve will be located at the lake Donguz-Orun-Kel and partly in the North shelter. Calculations of MANPADS will take up positions on the ridges closer to the peaks of Nakra-tau and Donguz-Orun-bashi. At the neighboring Chiper passes (3400 m), Chiper-Azau (3263 m) and on the jumper (3700 m) between the Nakra-tau and Donguz-Orun-Bashi peaks, it is necessary to put barriers, one maneuverable group should be placed on the Big Azau glacier.

When preparing positions, it is imperative to provide for laying of bombs for the collapse of rockfalls, ice falls and avalanches on the enemy’s battle formations in an explosive manner. This weapon is sometimes more effective than machine guns, rifles and artillery.

The reserve of the battalion, intended for the rotation of personnel occupying positions in the high mountains, should be located at the Cheget Hotel. The senior commander can deploy heavy cannon and rocket artillery and air defense forces near the Cheget, Terskol, Itkol hotels, in the Narzan glade and deeper down the valley. At the same time, fire and technical equipment should be dispersed. EW systems and air defense systems can be deployed on the southern slope of Elbrus, the roads here lead to Mir station (3500 m) and to the ice base (3800 m), with the help of ratrak the equipment can be raised to the jumper between the tops of Elbrus (5300 m). For visual communication with the neighbor on the right place the NP on the Hotyu-Tau Pass.

In the center of the forward position of the RO, the most “hottest” place will undoubtedly be the Becho Pass (3375 m). In this area, the second echelon and support facilities will be located below the pass in the Yusengi river valley, since this valley is impassable for vehicles and can be carried out by cartage and transport helicopters. The approach to the Becho Pass from the Georgian side is simpler than from the Baksan Gorge, but the terrain for technology is impassable, the enemy will have to attack on foot. The road from Svaneti approaches close to the foot of the pass, the enemy has the ability to deploy artillery on the approaches to it.

The left flank of our RO will cover the Adyl-su valley and the lateral valleys extending from it towards the GKH. Here, the main efforts will be directed to the defense of the passes of the Jan-Tugan (3483 m) and Kashkatash (3730 m). In addition, at least four barriers will have to be set up to cover the passes: Ushbinsky (4100 m), Chalaat (4200 m), Double (3950 m), Bashkar (3754 m). In the valley of the Adyl-su river, heavy self-propelled artillery and equipment can reach the camp of Gian-Tougan, and this is 5 – 6km from the GKH (without taking into account the height difference). Reserve groups can be located on German overnight stays, on the glade of Shkhelda’s smile, next to the Jan-Tugan a / l, at the Yellow Stones bivouac (lateral moraine of the Kashkatash glacier), on the Green Hotel glade (at the Bashkarinsky glacier). For visual communication with the neighbor on the left, the NP can be placed on the top of Viatau (3742 m). The headquarters, reserve and rear regiment is best located in the forest at the confluence of the Baksan and Adyl-su rivers, near the village of Elbrus.

In the course of hostilities due to the proximity of hostilities of the warring parties aviation the enemy will not be able to strike at the front line of defense. But it’s still necessary to prepare shelters for positions. When organizing the circular defense of strong points located on the watershed line of the Main Range, the main attention should be paid to the ridges and long regiments passing below them.


There are a few rules to follow when you are in the highlands. Sunglasses on snowfields or closed glaciers prevent the aimed fire from small arms (especially for snipers), but in no case should they be removed: after an hour of battle with unprotected eyes in bright sun, the fighter will get a sunburn of his eyes, and after a whole day - at best, losing sight for a short time. It is necessary to protect all exposed skin areas from the sun, especially the face, otherwise severe sunburn cannot be avoided. In case of low clouds, dark glasses are also not allowed, because this will cause eye burns.

It is always necessary to provide insurance (self-insurance) in the highlands, in positions and during movement over the relief, even for latrines.

With a long stay in the highland zone (for the Caucasus, this is the absolute height of 3000 – 3500 m and above) the human body loses a lot of moisture, which must be constantly replenished, if not done, the blood will thicken and there is a danger of “earning” thrombophlebitis and as a result - heart attack or stroke. In combat, a situation may arise when the fighter does not have the water at hand. If there is snow or to suck on ice, the larynx and tongue become inflamed and swollen. When drinking melt water, firstly, thirst is not quenched, and secondly, vital minerals are flushed out of the body, even if the water is heated. Cold water can provoke inflammation in the larynx and is harmful to the teeth. To avoid trouble, it is necessary to supply the fighters who are at war in the highlands with aspirin tablets to thin the blood (which must be consumed constantly, between drinking) and special aqua-salt complexes to enrich drinking water with minerals. In case of emergency, each fighter should have a flexible plastic tube of length 20 – 25 cm, from 5 to 7mm in diameter, which is necessary so that there is no contact of cold water with the teeth while drinking from a stream (in this case you should drink in small sips, warming water in the mouth).

If a unit defends positions located in a high mountain zone, a snow cave is the best structure for the rest of personnel. It does not bother the wind and precipitation, protection is more reliable in case of thunderstorms and storms, snow is a good heat insulator. When constructing snow caves it is very important to ensure the outflow of carbon dioxide that a person exhales (carbon dioxide is heavy, therefore it accumulates below, the niche for outflow must go below the floor of the cave), if the outflow is not ensured, everyone in the cave may die.

If it is not possible to stand on the bivouac (to warm up food) during the march in the conditions of high mountains during the winter season, in order to maintain vitality in dry rations, there must be chocolate. Other products freeze in the frost to the state of bottle ice and are not suitable for consumption as food, and even frozen chocolate is easily dissolved in the mouth. The flask with water should be transferred in such conditions under the down jacket, closer to the body, in the backpack the water will surely freeze.

If you experience acute symptoms of mountain sickness (hypoxia), the victim must be given alcohol inhalation, this will support him for a while. Ideally, of course, you need a portable oxygen breathing apparatus, if it is not there - the patient must be immediately lowered down, and he should not go by himself, he must be carried. Otherwise, mountain sickness can develop in pulmonary edema, brain or heart attack.

During an attack (counterattack) while skiing down a slope with a deep cover of fresh snow (from 1,5 m and more), in order not to cut the slope (this happens during the traverse of the slope) and not to cause an avalanche to descend, all fighters should move strictly downwards with shallow , smooth arcs (godil). It is quite difficult to fire on the move (with sufficient skills it is possible, but it will not work precisely), it is undesirable to stop for shooting (since the skier plunges deep into the snow when stopped, he does not have a view, and then it is very difficult to start the movement). It’s easier to get close to the enemy and destroy it with fire point-blank. In this case, it is difficult for the enemy to conduct aimed fire at the rapidly approaching combat order of the attackers.

If the enemy decides to attack the attackers with mortar fire, firstly, due to the quick movement of the skiers, it is difficult to attack him, secondly, the mortar fire can cause an avalanche, but even if the enemy decides to do so, the effect of the mortar fire will be insignificant ( that the avalanche will come down) - deep snow will extinguish the blast wave and will not allow the fragments of the drowned mine to scatter.

It is difficult to carry out an attack on skis, if deep snow is covered with a thin crust that cannot withstand the weight of a person. In this case, skiers require excellent preparation in order not to lose balance during the descent.


Observation posts or positions for shooters that are distant from the base should also be equipped with shelters in case of a thunderstorm storm. For example, on the slopes of Elbrus at altitudes above 4500 m during a storm, the temperature may drop to –20 (sometimes lower) degrees Celsius, but it will snow. A fighter who is in an open space will be covered with a crust of ice in the blink of an eye, he will have to fight this phenomenon, and there will be no time for the enemy.

Lightning during the storm hit the slope tightly (like a machine gun fire) and randomly, static electricity just fills all the space around, in the dark all objects jutting up light up and buzz. In combination with a strong wind, dense, harsh, and even wet snow and other delights, a storm in the highlands is an absolute hell. A fighter must be prepared to perform a combat mission in such an environment.

For lifting high-altitude positions of heavy loads, such as mortars, ammunition, building materials for the construction of shelters and fortifications, etc., you can use pack animals. Where they will be powerless, fighters will have to haul cargo by themselves, but not by the same method as was done in 1942 – 1943 in Afghanistan. Polyspast is a universal system that will help soldiers to raise mortars and other gravity to a height without losing a lot of strength. And for this it is necessary that the fighters knit a tackle “on the machine”.

Storage sites for ammunition, especially artillery shells and grenades, should be reliably covered from lightning in case of a thunderstorm.

Fighters of mountain troops must be able to work reliably with a lack of safety material. In the absence of Zhumar, shunts or clamping blocks (devices for moving up the rope), you should be able to use special assemblies in combination with carbines: prusik, UIAA knot, guard loop, etc. If there is no descender, you can do with a carbine. By the way, in Russia, not all eminent climbers know what a “carbine brake” is and how to knit it. There are popular knots: the eight and the simple conductor, which are better to replace with the boulene for the simple reason that the latter does not tighten tightly under load and, if absolutely necessary, it can always be dissolved. There are many such “minor tricks”, they need to be known, because they can save lives.
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  1. Spartanez300
    Spartanez300 22 May 2016 07: 28
    Yes, it’s for sure that Georgia has firmly established itself in the ranks of the enemies of Russia, but once it was friends.
    1. max702
      max702 22 May 2016 12: 42
      The author will say so, consider tactics and it’s really difficult to fight in the mountains .. But the war is not organized and sent from passes and mountain villages, but from other more civilized places .. Destroy the top (at least locally) and the war will stop, who is it sets Georgians on Russia? It’s clear the Washington case BUT it’s directly Tbilisi and other suburbs with real geographic coordinates and officials, so if you don’t chew on the snot, but after two or three such actions, no one wants to fight, not to mention the destruction of logistics training camps and so on .. the main thing is to look less at all sorts of international rights and obligations .. Catch the characters responsible for 2008 and hang on the lanterns of Tskhinval and there would be no current problems .. Could this be done in 2008? It’s quite .. So you can fight in different ways ..
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. fif21
        fif21 22 May 2016 13: 18
        Quote: max702
        Destroy the top (at least at the local level) and the war will end, who is setting the Georgians on Russia there?
        Send Georgian "thieves in law" to their historical homeland and immediately hear choral singing about love for Russia wassat
  2. ovod84
    ovod84 22 May 2016 07: 28
    The article is interesting and entertaining, I hope until
    War will not come.
    1. razmik72
      razmik72 22 May 2016 12: 25
      Quote: ovod84
      The article is interesting and entertaining, I hope until
      War will not come.

      The article is interesting, but the author made several inaccuracies. I say so because in my youth I had to fight in the mountains and lose my health there. When the author writes that it is not the mountain peak itself that needs to be defended, but the slope that directly dominates the enemy, he is absolutely right. but I think it’s not right to leave the top of the mountain without military guard, since the enemy can easily circumvent your positions in the mountains and be higher than your positions, no matter how much you monitor him.
      1. HERMES
        HERMES 22 May 2016 13: 41
        In the mountains, in principle, it is difficult to fight ... especially if there is a plain in front of the rise that is controlled by the enemy. It would seem that in this case the mountain is a more advantageous position ... but I was told how one single "Shilka" smashed an enemy company that had settled at a height in ten minutes from 3km away from enemy fire ...
        1. razmik72
          razmik72 22 May 2016 15: 58
          Hermes, follow each other wink . The range of fire of "Shilka" on ground targets is no more than 2000 meters, so it is unlikely to reach from 3 km. It all depends on the conditions, if the enemy managed to dig trenches in full profile, if the enemy has not only light small arms. depends on many different factors, dear Hermes.
          1. HERMES
            HERMES 22 May 2016 17: 33
            Quote: razmik72
            Hermes, follow each other wink


            Quote: razmik72
            . The range of fire of "Shilka" on ground targets is no more than 2000 meters, so from 3 km it hardly reached.

            Well, that means I mixed something up) It was a long time ago. Shilka by the way was not easy ... An Afghan woman without a radar ... was ground on ground targets. I don’t know where she came from)

            Quote: razmik72
            It all depends on the conditions, if the enemy managed to dig trenches in full profile, if the enemy has not only light small arms.

            Well, knowing which hail of shells suits Shilka and even the scatter from such a distance ... and even if there were trenches ... under such fire no one would dare to raise his head and shoot in response)
  3. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack 22 May 2016 07: 31
    Fighting in the mountains has a number of features and is very difficult ..... - He studies military affairs in the present way, the quote, despite who said it, is still relevant!
  4. Thunderbolt
    Thunderbolt 22 May 2016 07: 34
    If the enemy decides to subject the attackers with mortar fire, firstly, because of the fast movement of skiers it is difficult to aim it, and secondly, mortar fire can cause an avalanche, but even if the enemy decides to do this, the effect of mortar fire will be negligible (unless an avalanche will come down) - deep snow will extinguish the blast wave and will not allow the fragments of the mines drowned in it to fly apart.
    Wow, an insignificant effect! In the Great Patriotic War, both ours and the Germans sometimes beat higher than the enemy to cover with an avalanche or rockfall. It did not showers on mortars, but I emphasize on attackers.
  5. Nonna
    Nonna 22 May 2016 07: 35
    It’s time for the Georgians to forget about South Ossetia and Abkhazia and generally sit quietly and not protrude. They will be more practical.
  6. pigkiller
    pigkiller 22 May 2016 09: 08
    One question: Georgia’s anti-Russian youth is ready to develop
    in bloody mess for the interests of the kindest empire? In 2008, Georgian mothers
    they took their sons who had surrendered and changed into tracksuits from Abkhazians
    and drove home by bus.
    1. Thunderbolt
      Thunderbolt 22 May 2016 09: 46
      But who when asked the soldiers what they want? Where they will drive to the drums there and will fight. And from there they’ll already have a shield or a tracksuit, but those who are lucky to return are left in another mess where politicians could not agree and went into action like in stone century, stones and batons. A man is an aggressive creature. Religion and public morality muffle root instincts, and liberates. Yes, the Georgians were defeated in that war. But the causes of the war are not uprooted, but even worse, aggravated. Therefore, the army should prepare in all sorts of scenarios to repeat and even surpass. And politicians are obliged to prevent and resolve the issue peacefully. But politicians are more difficult. To fight Western influence by peaceful means, our politicians are worse off than our army men. We have to work on this.
  7. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 22 May 2016 10: 29
    The mountain brigades of Russia are undoubtedly needed. And very much so.
    But hardly against Georgia, and certainly not against NATO.

    Likely Opponents:
    1) Chechens (Kadyrov is not eternal, as he turns
    further unknown).
    2) Dagestanis (IS propaganda, a bunch of young people in Syria)
    3) the mountains of Central Asia - anyone, a la Taliban, IS, Al Qaeda
    1. Thunderbolt
      Thunderbolt 22 May 2016 11: 28
      I’ll also add our military base in Armenia with its high mountain range. This is where the troops learn to fight in the mountains and this experience can always be useful. As in the fight against an external enemy, so with an internal one. A well-equipped and trained contingent is able to stop the aggression even by planning stages. Yes, and the Carpathians should not be forgotten. Transnistria is nearby and this card can be played sometime. But of course you have the most likely scenarios. That the Caucasus, that the Pamirs are narrow gates to Russian open spaces.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  8. Who said
    Who said 22 May 2016 11: 24
    No need to wait. You need to beat the first time since at 08 they didn’t.
  9. gendir.grifon
    gendir.grifon 22 May 2016 12: 27
    It is necessary to take care not only of the development of mountain rifle units, but also mobrezrev in general. We practically do not have a mobile reserve as such. In the event of a real war, who, besides the army and other power structures, will go to defend their homeland in any direction? Youth, which in the bulk, respects and appreciates only loot? And this is so, the state itself has tried so hard. Or are the mobile reserves those who have served a year? What can you learn in 1 year? Yes, practically nothing. We have a mobile reserve on paper, but not in life. A typical example of a paper mobility reserve is mobilization activities on the outskirts during the ATO period.
  10. Humpty
    Humpty 22 May 2016 12: 56
    "one must be able to use special knots in combination with carbines: prusik, UIAA knot, guard loop, etc."

    Well, yes, well, yes, babdam, badam - an iron hook. "I'm late for the session, in the mountains rappelling" (from an explanatory student).
    We will teach a bear to knit a polyspast, and a grapevine behind a participant's back. There is no need to frighten people with the UIAA symbols, otherwise the brains will boil, and you even before the heap about the Garda knot (this is not a "guard loop" by the way), in practice I have never used it in my life, so at once you can accidentally shove your neck into a local loop ...
    Why fence a garden? The second sports category in mountaineering for soldiers of mountain units and questions on mountain training have been removed. For an ordinary draftee, this is intermittent, then 3-4 months in time. The second category (only in mountaineering, other mountain sports are not suitable) removes issues with movement on the terrain, knowledge of the dangers in the mountains and violation of the criminal code.
    The vast majority of lowland people, except obviously sick, do not have any problems for a long stay at heights of 3-4 thousand meters. The mineral balance easily and cheaply makes up for rehydron and its analogues. People do not drink aspirin to relieve the slide syndrome of goodness below 5000. But this is a voluntary matter, it is possible for 3000, or better at home.
    If there is no rehydron, then a pinch of ordinary salt in a mug of water. If there is no dry salt, then it’s always a sin for a person to hide salt, at least on sweaty clothes. I didn’t get to this, but once in mittens with Who in the subject, he will understand why.
    Train draftees to the second category, this removes the contradictions from the Criminal Code and the main issues. The rest of those who are preparing to fight in the high mountains may require more serious mountain training.
    1. aiw
      aiw 22 May 2016 13: 39
      > Second grade (mountaineering only, other mountain sports are not suitable)

      Depends on the tasks for which the fighters are prepared. Mountain tourism (an autonomous ring of 10 days) will better teach survival and proper nutrition.

      Ski tourism (skiing), in the mountains - it will best teach you how to do things in winter.

      Ski training is also unreasonable.

      IMNO should be a balanced complex, while of course the second highest in mountaineering is highly desirable as a base - but this is only the beginning.
      1. Humpty
        Humpty 22 May 2016 14: 18
        Quote: aiw
        Depends on the tasks for which the fighters are prepared.

        Come on, to "you" like your own, and your own ... Listed in your comments, it is useful and, in principle, necessary. But I wrote about conscripts. Imagine that it is useful for recruits to know self-rescue in a deuce, but when to teach it? And after SP-2, they will take an exam for this - they will be killed!
        There is an expression - "bursting like tourists", i.e. no idea at all. That is why the soldiers do not think as tourists, therefore they are trained by quite serious comrades in "And at the Bezengi's hut." And not by sentimental bearded uncles with a guitar behind a backpack by a fire in the bushes.
        1. aiw
          aiw 22 May 2016 14: 28
          You know, your opinion about the mountaineers is, to say the least, not true. As a person who has become obsessed with this and that, I can say that working with handrails in GT is not worse than putting in alpism. If you compare SP1 and mountain schools of primary / secondary tourist training, it’s still not known where they cook better ... perhaps that of mountaineers.

          The line between GT and alpism has long been blurred; in the sworn west, it doesn’t exist at all.

          But some climbers have some kind of snobbery ... that’s exactly what you’re talking about. This is really stupid.

          And if we talk about the training of fighters, then perhaps the GT is much closer to the conduct of hostilities in the mountains than mountaineering. Well, you will not be fully working and with a machine gun behind you to work on a complex terrain at the same time. And your main task will not be to crawl through the wall, but to pass from point A to point B. And in mountaineering, the question is the layout and all the BZUs there, the bivouac device in an unprepared place, etc., doesn’t get taken away not to SP2.
          1. Humpty
            Humpty 22 May 2016 14: 52
            Quote: aiw
            You know, your opinion about the mountaineers is, to say the least, not true.

            There are remarkable exceptions, for example, the company of Tolyan Julia, there are others. They blurred the artificial line.
            Quote: aiw
            The line between GT and alpism has long been blurred; in the sworn west, it doesn’t exist at all.

            There was never a GT there as such. But there guides (instructors, as we understand it, are not there) are not criminally responsible for ..., you yourself understand why. If we have a body, a case will be started automatically, with all the associated procedures and formalities . And the authorities say to the followers - why haven’t you been to the scene so far?
            And with us, if you are a guide and have missed, then you will most likely pass by as a witness, and if you work as an instructor and God forbid that you will definitely go to the accused.
            Regards! And not any snobbery.
            1. aiw
              aiw 22 May 2016 15: 57
              > There are remarkable exceptions, for example, Tolyan Julia's company, there are others. They blurred the artificial line.

              Ghm ... well, look what goes to the State Customs Committee of Moscow State University every year. Or Vestra. Every normal GT club every year raises the fees for 100-150 people. Pre-season training from February - general physical education, lectures, practical exercises, including with overnight stays, incl. night rescues (for beginners including), in very few AKs there is such a thing.

              Yes, in the mountaineering for beginners, the emphasis is more on climbing - so it didn’t really work out in tourism, you’ll still be railing with a backpack. Well, you can’t just get 8 snouts with even preparation.

              Here we recall TACT - there are generally wild animals, and they are not divided into climbers / tourists ;-)

              For me, it’s like to cancel all these cells to the figs, as Messner didn’t interfere with the absence of an alpine book hi
  11. aiw
    aiw 22 May 2016 13: 29
    Mdya ... I am far from the Army and can not appreciate the author's recommendations regarding the organization of defense. But as a person who has been going to the Mountains for a quarter of a century, I can say that the author's recommendations regarding behavior in the mountains are a lot of nonsense.

    > It is necessary to protect all exposed areas of the skin, especially the face, from sunlight, otherwise severe sunburn cannot be avoided.

    Sunscreens with a factor of 100 or more are quite effective.

    > In the highlands, in positions and during movement on the terrain, it is always necessary to provide insurance (self-belay), even for latrines.

    Insurance (including for latrine) is provided where accidental failure can lead to a long fall. In the highlands this is far from always the case. Excess insurance slows down mobility, which is very cumbersome when fighting. But such places are found for example on the cliffs of Crimea, which by no means can be attributed to the highlands.

    > When drinking melt water, firstly, thirst is not quenched, and secondly, vital minerals are flushed out of the body, even if the water is heated.

    For the past 15 years I haven’t salt anything, including in the mountains. WHAT? Melt water (glacial, etc.) perfectly quenches thirst. In addition, there are isotonic, in the extreme case, banal rehydron.

    > To avoid trouble, supply highland warriors with aspirin blood thinners (which must be consumed constantly between drinks)

    belay daily use of NSAIDs "just like that" is harmful to health.

    > If the unit is defending positions located in a high-altitude zone, a snow cave is the best structure for personnel to rest.

    Not always, a cave is a specific thing and you can’t dig it out everywhere. According to the recommendations of the author, in places where it is important to deploy positions in the Caucasus, there is nowhere to dig caves in the summer. A good tent + windproof walls made of snow or stones are much more practical.

    > There must be chocolate in the ration to maintain pot life.

    Dried fruits and nuts are much more practical than repeatedly melted and frozen chocolate.

    > A flask of water must be carried under such conditions under a down jacket, closer to the body, the water in a backpack will probably freeze.

    Thermal flasks? Actually, very rarely you move in a puff coat, and only move with a flask under a down jacket ... And the author forgot about hydrators. I don’t remember the problems with frozen drinking, and with drinking in general - with rare exceptions (a purely rocky wall or a dry gorge) there are always either streams or snow, which is perfectly heated by gas, with current burners (MSR reactor or jet boy) ...

    > If acute symptoms of altitude sickness (hypoxia) occur, the victim should be given alcohol inhalation, this will support him for a while.

    Dear Author, such recommendations can give only a doctor whom you obviously are not. Alcohol inhalation is used to endow breathing with pulmonary edema (when the bloody foam flooded).

    > Ideally, of course, a portable oxygen breathing apparatus is needed, if it is not there, the patient must be lowered immediately, and he must not walk on his own, he must be carried. Otherwise, altitude sickness may develop into pulmonary, cerebral, or heart attack.

    Oxygen is not used in the Caucasus. In any case, the patient must urgently be lowered down. About a heart attack - fool
  12. aiw
    aiw 22 May 2016 13: 29
    > During an attack (counterattack) while skiing down a slope with a deep cover of freshly fallen snow (from 1,5 m or more), so as not to cut the slope (this happens when the slope traverse) and not cause an avalanche,

    Avalanches also come off with a significantly less thick cover, especially from freshly fallen snow.

    > It is undesirable to stop for shooting (since the skier dives deep into the snow when stopping, he has no vision, and then it is very difficult to start moving).

    depends on the ski.

    > It's easier to get close to the enemy and destroy him with point-blank fire. In this case, it is difficult for the enemy to conduct aimed fire at the rapidly approaching battle formations of the attackers.

    belay some kind of mountain cavalry ... more like a suicide attack.

    > Polyspast is a versatile system that will help soldiers to lift mortars and other weights to a height without losing a lot of strength. And for this it is necessary that the soldiers knit the chain hoist "on the machine".

    Mortars? In the age of mortars? When climbing a large block talus, the chain hoist will not help. You will need a polyspast when lifting goods to places where, in the opinion of the Author himself, deploying positions is pointless.

    > in Russia, not all eminent climbers know what a "carbine brake" is and how to knit it.

    By and large, it is not needed, the IAIA is much more practical.

    > There are popular knots: figure eight and a simple conductor, which are better to replace with a bowline for the simple reason that the latter does not tighten tightly under load and, if urgently needed, can always be dissolved.

    Apologists at the Canadian school do not agree with you.

    What kind of technique is shown by the photo fighter (apparently moving along holding the railing) and why exactly this technique is not applicable in battle - let the author remain on his conscience.

    Rumors about Georgia’s anti-Russian youth are greatly exaggerated.

    With regard to the preparation of mountain-rifle units, such preparation is actively conducted under the auspices of the Russian Mountaineering Federation, under the guidance of highly competent instructors (from the CCM level and above), in particular, on the basis of the Bezengi AUSB. Bezengi is generally one of the most difficult and interesting mountain regions in the world ...

    As a result, the Author is negative for the article - Mountains do not tolerate amateurish reasoning, and all the more unacceptable are such recommendations in a public field.
    1. Humpty
      Humpty 22 May 2016 14: 00
      Quote: aiw
      in Russia, not all eminent climbers know what a “carabiner brake” is and how to knit it.

      They know of course, when participants are examined at an SP-2 at improvised means, where the ascent and descent of the victim with the knot being pulled, then during the descent it is easiest to crank the knot if you use a carabiner brake from a carbine and a chopper. You do two in a row. Knocked out, held out, inserted. Also then with the second - lower.
      Quote: aiw
      If acute symptoms of mountain sickness (hypoxia) occur, the victim must have alcohol inhalation, this will support him for a while.

      Dear Author, only a doctor whom you obviously are not can give such recommendations. Alcohol inhalation is used to endow breathing with pulmonary edema (when the bloody foam flooded).

      We hammer "Dex" for a start, then you yourself know where and what, only if you wait for someone to gurgle, then usually this is a jamb. But all the same, it's more of a problem sometimes occurring above 5000, colleague hi .
      1. aiw
        aiw 22 May 2016 14: 35
        Well, I HZ whom the Author had in mind by eminent climbers. But the karabiner brake is really a specific thing, the author IMNO had in mind his use for the rappel ... I would not do that.

        As for alcohol. Inhalations - I would remove this altogether from the article. Where is the guarantee that what thread young talent after reading this text will not suit inhalation (ml commercials for 200) to his friend with cerebral edema? The author will then come to the grave of the victim, comfort the family?

        At the instructors' school, we were told a test bike about how a medic passed out on the trail from overheating. The group gathered, let's help, someone reached into the first-aid kit - and there was ammonia in ampoules, and it was signed "from fainting." Well, they injected, it's good that i / m ...
        1. Humpty
          Humpty 22 May 2016 15: 15
          Quote: aiw
          At the instructors' school, we were told a test bike about how a medic passed out on the trail from overheating. The group gathered, let's help, someone reached into the first-aid kit - and there was ammonia in ampoules, and it was signed "from fainting." Well, they injected, it's good that i / m ...

          My neighbor is the former most harmful beginner. student AUSB Ala-Archa. And Lyakh himself was the head of the KSP for many years, he was a slaughterer from the Bezzubkin team.
          We graduated from them when it was all quite strict, and without passing the corresponding exam or without having the right to exit, no one went anywhere.
          If he had both, but did not inspire confidence, then they also found reasons not to release them. I had no problems with the exit, but not everything was counted, according to my mood.
          They took medicine seriously. And then someone, there was a case, smeared the burnt muzzle with an apizatron, this is not a bike.
    2. creak
      creak 22 May 2016 16: 02
      Quote: aiw
      As a result, the author for the article minus - Mountains do not tolerate amateurish reasoning,

      I support ..
      On a very impressive list of our potential opponents, I was particularly impressed by the possible participation of mountain shooters not only from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, but also from Moldova, Azerbaijan, New Zealand ... Only the states of Oceania are missing ... laughing
      The author himself understood what he had written - Saudi huntsmen in the mountains of the Caucasus are something like submarines in the steppes of Ukraine ... what
      How can one not remember the immortal "And then Ostap suffered" - the same New Vasyuki, only a side view ...
  13. Kenneth
    Kenneth 22 May 2016 14: 47
    It seems to me that war in difficult mountain conditions should be based on the destruction of the opponent’s logistics. For example, in the Crimea, Soviet partisans were actually dying of hunger and not from German huntsmen. Just because supply issues were not worked out, and the local population held pro-German positions.
  14. jurikberlin
    jurikberlin 22 May 2016 17: 55
    better than mountains, these are mountains! the best mountains, these are mountains without war!
  15. Old warrior
    Old warrior 22 May 2016 17: 56
    I believe that the battle charter was written by stupid people. The author seems to be trying to comprehend his articles from his civilian point of view
  16. Vladimir61
    Vladimir61 23 May 2016 03: 38
    Something is self explanatory. Why in the calculation of forces and means, on this theater, only 33 and 34 mountain brigades are taken into account? And where is the 7th Guards (Mountain) Airborne Assault Division (Krasnodar, Stavropol)? Where is the place of the 8th separate mountain motorized rifle brigade (Chechen Republic)?
    Why, on the other side, are "wonderful Svan hunters", and on this side ... that the Dagestanis, Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Balkars, Kabardians and other peoples of the Caucasus do not live in the mountains, do not know the mountains, are bad "hunters" or warriors?
    1. kush62
      kush62 23 May 2016 04: 39
      Vladimir61 Today, 03:38 AM New
      Something is self explanatory. Why in the calculation of forces and means, on this theater, only 33 and 34 mountain brigades are taken into account? And where is the 7th Guards (Mountain) Airborne Assault Division (Krasnodar, Stavropol)? Where is the place of the 8th separate mountain motorized rifle brigade (Chechen Republic)?
      Why, on the other side, are "wonderful Svan hunters", and on this side ... that the Dagestanis, Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Balkars, Kabardians and other peoples of the Caucasus do not live in the mountains, do not know the mountains, are bad "hunters" or warriors?

      The article may be partially and correct, but lekbez is useless. Professionals themselves know what and why. And everything else is for amateurs and is unlikely to be needed.
  17. Bersaglieri
    Bersaglieri 23 May 2016 22: 02
    Why cross the mountains, if you can "clean up" a bridgehead of 200-300 km with the help of OTR and aviation, and then land from the air? The author of the material was 70 years late ...