Advertising is known to be the engine of progress. It has always been in the whole world. Except Russia. Here in maritime rocket production is heavily advertised ... regress. Or, if you call things in your own words, propaganda has replaced advertising. Moreover, the propaganda of non-existent superpowers of the new intercontinental ballistic missile "Bulava" clearly surpasses it - either because of the incompetence of the propagandists themselves, or because of the underestimation of the competence of those to whom it is addressed. In the near future, mass media should have a mass stuffing about another victory of the Bulava - “salvo shooting from the depth of 50 m is expected on the move with sea waves with 6 – 7 points”.
The first and only salvo with full ammunition — 16 RSM-54 liquid-fuel missiles — was carried out 15 years ago by the strategic missile submarine Novomoskovsk. The tests were carried out in order to check the "behavior" of the cruiser after he was freed from almost 90 tons of "jet" cargo replaced by sea water within 645 seconds. And the cruiser behaved five plus, and all the mass-dimensional models of warheads successfully "hit" conditional targets. This shooting became the world military-technical record of Soviet submariners. American submariners on board the Ohio dared to launch only four Trident-2 missiles with a total weight of just over 236 tons. Before the start of the August events in Moscow and the collapse of the USSR that followed after them, 12 days remained. Today at the naval navy Russia's launch of two missiles is already considered a "salvo".
But back to the Bulava. Whoever does not believe in her victory is a step out of the reader's order! These notes are not for you.
MYTH FIRST: BULAVA WILL REPLACE BLUE AND LINER
Let's start with information about the unsuccessful launches of two Bulava missiles at the end of 2015, from the submarine Vladimir Monomakh. This means that the condition established by the Minister of Defense of Russia (in 2013) for five successful launches of the Bulava missile, which must precede their adoption, has not been fulfilled. This fact makes it premature to discuss the issue of full-scale salvo firing. And in general a discussion about the fighting virtues of the Bulava. To smooth out the negative impression of her unsuccessful trials, former generals who became venerable military experts, as it were, are showing everyone the dulu: nakos, take a bite, the PCM-54 had even more unsuccessful test launches than the Bulava, and for convincingly give fantastic figures .
The reality is as follows.
RSM-54: the number of test launches from the ground stand and submarine - 58, including 17 unsuccessful (29,3%).
RSM-54 (“Sineva” and “Liner”): five test launches, which were carried out after the resumption of serial production of RSM-54 missiles in the Russian conditions, all launches were successful.
Mace: 25 launches, including 11 unsuccessful (44%).
It is appropriate to note here that if the resumption of the production of RSM-54 rockets had not been realized, and the creation of the Bulava missile corresponded to today's reality, then for several years Russia would have completely lacked naval strategic nuclear forces.
11 years ago, the author of these lines in his article entitled “The 2020 Project: A Land Without Missiles?” Predicted the Bulava a long and difficult path of creation. Alas, the gloomiest predictions came true. Today it is known that the submarines of the 667BDRM project, armed with RSM-54 missiles, can carry combat duty up to 2025 – 2030 as part of the North-West group of naval strategic forces. And the existence of the Northeastern faction, starting with 2016, will depend on the actual completion of the development of the Bulava missiles.
Further, it is necessary to dwell on the statement (forecast) of the “fathers” of the Bulava that liquid ICBMs cannot compete with solid propellants “neither in the duration of the active section, nor in the survivability of the complex in a retaliatory strike, nor in resistance in the active section to the impact of damaging factors missile defense ". This, to put it mildly, is a great delusion.
In the contractual process of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons, the main controlled parameters of the missiles were taken: the number of deployed missiles, the number of warheads on the rocket and the throw-in weight delivered by the missile to the specified firing range or demonstrated in real launch. At the same time, the throw-in weight of modern missiles with a divided head is defined as the weight of the last stage of the missile, which delivers warheads (warheads, warheads) to various aiming points. The weight to be dropped includes: warheads, countermeasures (overcoming) of the missile defense, propulsion system, control system equipment and structural elements that are not separated from the last (often called - combat) stage of the rocket.
Novomoskovsk is still the world record holder in salvo firing with ballistic missiles.
Throw weight is the most important parameter characterizing the combat effectiveness of the rocket, as well as its energy capabilities. The ratio of the missile throwing weight delivered to the 10 thousandth of a kilometer range to the launching weight of the rocket by intersectoral documents (in the USSR and in Russia) is called the technical level of the rocket.
For missiles with a "bus scheme" of serial dilution of warheads at sighting points, the weight (mass) of the breeding system, the onboard control system is determined during design and for a particular missile can be assumed constant. In this regard, the task is to determine the rational weight (power) of the warhead and the rational weight of countermeasures for the breakthrough of missile defense. It is clear that for missiles with limited throwing weight it is necessary to find a rational combination of the power of the warhead and the weight of countermeasures. And the implementation of enhanced countermeasures on such missiles leads either to a reduction in the number of warheads, or to a reduction in their power and weight.
MYTH SECOND: POSSIBILITIES TO OVERCOME ANY PRO
Let us consider how the task of equipping modern Russian strategic missiles with anti-missile defenses is solved or is being solved.
The Sinev and Liner marine liquid missiles with a predictable service life of up to 2030 provided the opportunity to re-equip by the number of warheads: from four middle-class power with anti-missile defenses to small-class power with different sets of countermeasures (false goals). The cast weight (mass) of these missiles is about 8 thousand kg.
For modern solid-state offshore missiles "Bulava", the start of combat duty of which was to be held in 2014 – 2015 (actually in 2016 – 2017), the predicted service life is up to 2050 – 2060. It should be expected to carry out modernization work, including on countermeasures. At the same time, the possibilities of modernization will be limited by the size of the drop weight (mass) - 1150 kg and the possibility of its increase. Most likely, this means that an increase in breakthrough qualities will be possible only by reducing the number of warheads, since warheads of a small power class have already been used.
For modern land-based liquid rockets - “Voyevoda” with a cast weight of 8800 kg and “Stiletto” with a cast weight of 4350 kg - the predicted service life of 2020 – 2022 years. In this connection, no work should be done to modernize the combat equipment of these missiles.
For land solid-fuel missiles with a monoblock head part "Topol M", as well as "Yars" with a split head part, modern means of countering are provided. However, the implementation of a more effective counter-missile defense in subsequent upgrades will be limited to a small throwing weight (mass) - about 1200 – 1300 kg and will lead either to a reduction in the number of warheads of a small power class, or to the use of a (monoblock) unit of the middle power class.
Mine-based Sarmat missiles (of the “Voevoda” type) with 8-ton, for example, a drop weight, can provide effective protection against missile defense, provided that from 2 to 4 tons of drop weight are allocated for 10 protection means of increased or medium warheads power classes.
The main results of these considerations are summarized in the table “Information on strategic nuclear deterrent forces”.
These circumstances lead to the conclusion that in the future, guaranteed strategic deterrence can be achieved if there are missiles with increased drop weight in the composition of strategic nuclear forces. Such missiles are able to adequately counteract projected missile defense options. The survivability of such missiles in the stationary base-to-launch variant can be ensured by a twofold increase in fortification resistance when upgrading existing stationary mines, as well as anti-missile defense of the starting positions and positional areas with existing or known means.
As for the mobile home-based strategic detergents, their ability to counter missile defense is less due to the low weight of solid-fuel missiles (less than 1,5 tons). This may require the cost of additional deployment of missiles and exit from the process of contractual limitations of strategic offensive arms.
In this regard, the ongoing transition to solid-fuel offshore rockets has the disadvantage associated with a decrease in the drop weight, which is illustrated by the table of characteristics of Russian and American naval missiles.
The main and very sad conclusion from this table is the fact that the Russian solid-fuel offshore missile industry is lagging behind the American one by almost 40 years, which follows from a comparison of the Trident-1 and Bulava missiles, which have comparable tactical and technical characteristics and almost identical conventional level , inferior to the modern American technical level (“Trident-2”) by about 20%, and the Russian liquid sea missile RSM-54 (including the “Blue” and “Liner” versions) - one and a half times.
MYTH THREE: ADVANTAGES OF SOLID FUEL MISSILES
Next, we will dwell on the statement about the advantage of solid-fuel missiles in the duration of the active segment, survivability in retaliation, stamina on the active section. Most likely, such an assertion is intended for non-rocket science specialists. There is no doubt that the duration of the active site for solid-fuel rockets is traditionally less than that for liquid rockets. But when can this factor be decisive? For example, after the appearance of space echelons of missile defense ("Star Wars"). However, in this case, liquid rockets can fend off "space" interceptions, for example, at the expense of dashed trajectories (turned off - turned on the cruise engine), at the expense of trajectories that maneuver in an arbitrary direction, as well as by reducing the time of the active section during new design.
With regard to resistance in the active area to damaging factors, today all customer requirements are accepted and implemented by developers. If these requirements will increase, the increased energy of liquid-propellant rockets will help their implementation.
The resumption of the serial production of the upgraded RSM-54 missiles made it possible to preserve the combat potential of the Russian NSNF. Photos from the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
In conclusion of my notes I will appeal for support to the indisputable authority of the only “Marshal for Industry” defense minister Dmitry Ustinov. In 2013, the Stolichnaya Encyclopedia publishing house published the book Russian Tales of Missiles. In 2005, Assistant Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, Igor Vyacheslavovich Illarionov, told the author of this book the following history. “Shortly before Ustinov’s death, Illarionov visited him in the hospital. Talked about current affairs. Suddenly the minister said:
- You know, and after all Vitya was right.
- What are you talking about, Dmitry Fedorovich? Asked Illarionov in surprise.
- I say, Vitya Makeev was right when he rested with all his might and did not want to build a solid-fuel machine. I am here in the House about a lot of thought. We then bent it cool. And in vain ...
Ustinov thought. Illarionov broke the silence.
- But why, Dmitry Fedorovich? You always believed in solid fuel technology!
- I still believe. Only to the Americans we do not grow. And there was nothing to push. Our destiny is liquid fuel. With our capabilities, you can’t do anything better.
Ustinov again thought.
- And you and I, Igor, have driven solid fuel. They almost burst out. Vitya and Misha Yangel did great cars. And for industry, and for the army, and for the fleet ... "
FORECAST AND REALITY
The creation of the RT-2 rocket (under the START Treaty - PC-12, according to the NATO classification - SS-13 mod. 1 Savage), which was in service with the Strategic Missile Forces from 1969 to 1994 a year, led to an increase in transported weights. Liquid missiles of that time were transported to the starting position without fuel and refueled after loading into the mine. The RT-2 (RT-2P) missile was delivered separately to the combat launch position: in one container the first stage (weight about 35 tons), and in the other - the coupled second and third stages. Technical solutions to the problem were found, but for delivery to the starting position, improved roads and corresponding transport units were required.
Creation of an offshore solid-fuel rocket P-39 (according to the START Treaty - PCM-52, according to the NATO classification - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) with a launch mass of 90 t required the construction of a new basing system, the transition from "wheel" to "railway" missile transportation, New crane equipment for loading heavy rockets and more. The work was delayed and was not completed during the Soviet era. In the Russian period, the operation of the P-39 missiles was stopped ahead of time, and its carriers — five heavy submarine cruisers of the Typhoon system’s 941 project — were disposed of or being prepared for recycling, another one, Dmitry Donskoy, was re-equipped for the Bulava test platform.
Of course, all the problems of exploitation of both sea and land, stationary and mobile solid-fuel missiles were solved by domestic developers, but they demanded both increased costs and increased terms of creation. One of the findings of the developers of the first domestic intercontinental ballistic missiles is that the solid-propellant rocket engine is a luxury that is available only to rich countries with highly developed science and economics. But here's the trick: even such a rich country as the USA buys its liquid-propellant rocket engines from Russia and installs them on its rockets.
Recently at a congressional hearing, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Procurement and Technology Frank Kendall warned that a premature US failure to use the Russian rocket engine RD-180 would cost the Pentagon more than 1 billion dollars, and American companies could create their own engine 2021 of the year . So do we need to chase after the American fashion for solid-fuel missiles, if our liquid ones are just as good, and in some cases even better? Of course, this is a rhetorical question also because the government has invested billions of rubles in the development of the Bulava and the creation of a carrier for it - the strategic submarines of the Borey 955 project.
It can be stated that today in Russia there are different opinions, different approaches, different possibilities, but, unfortunately, there is no competent, fair and unbiased arbiter on strategic rocket production.