Harriers in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 4)
After a successful attack on the Sheffield on May 4, 1982, and until May 20, when the British launched the landing operation, there was a pause in the fighting. Not that they ceased altogether, but both sides did not seek a decisive battle, confining themselves to a small “bite” of the enemy. The British planes constantly did something - they shot a little at unarmed ships, carried out air patrols, however, without intercepting anyone, they bombarded various objects on the Falkland Islands without causing any noticeable damage ... From the point of view of analyzing the action of Harrier "British, this period could be omitted, but what happened in the period of May 5-20 well illustrates what distortions the fleet is forced to go, which does not have at its disposal an adequate deck aviation.
For three days, May 5-7, nothing special happened either at sea or in the air. British Atomarines after the sinking of the Belgrano received permission to engage in free hunting and went after the main forces of the Argentinean fleet to the continental coast. Nothing good came of this - within the radius of action of aircraft and land-based helicopters, the Argentines made a good PLO. As a result, the British did not find anyone, but on May 5, the Argentinean aircraft discovered and attacked one of their submarines, but to no avail. The next day, May 6, London recalled the submarines, assigning them patrol areas near the Falkland Islands. On the same day, the British lost 2 Sea Harriers, which probably collided in the air, and on May 7, the Argentines resumed supplying the islands with air - Hercules S-130 (call sign - Tiger) delivered cargo and an air defense unit with missiles "SAM-7." At the same time, Argentine scouts discovered two British ship groups, the route of one of them being within the range of strike aircraft, but the disgusting weather did not allow this chance to be taken.
The revival came on 8 in May, when the San Luis, hiding from Falkland, discovered a target located approximately 2700 meters from the Argentine submarine and moving at a speed of 8 nodes. On the "San Luis" could not identify the target, but attacked her anti-submarine torpedo Mk 37. After six seconds, the acoustics recorded a metal strike on the metal, but an explosion did not follow, and the contact was lost. What was it?
Perhaps it all just Argentine acoustics, it just happens. Suffice it to recall that the frigate “Yarmouth”, trying to help the wounded “Sheffield”, 9 (NINE) once heard the sound of torpedo screws, although in reality there were no torpedoes and could not be. But it is possible that the Argentines still fired at the real target and hit the nuclear submarine "Splendit". The British, of course, do not confirm anything of this, but there is information that after this incident the Splendit immediately left the combat area and went to the UK, and there were no other ships and vessels in the San Luis attack area. If the attack really took place, then we can say that the Argentine submariners touched the greatest success, because the destruction of "Splendit" would be a great response to the death of "Belgrano". Alas, poor quality weapon again let down the Argentines. Or is it all a matter of small distance, why the torpedo did not have time to start?
In general, 8 May gave lovers of naval stories another mystery, but in addition to the attack of “San Luis” something interesting happened. It was on this day that the destroyer Coventry and the frigate Broadsworth received an amazing order: they were obliged to provide an air blockade of the Falkland Islands.
On the one hand, an attempt to organize an air blockade by the ship patrol looks at least strange, if not to say absurd. After all, for this, the ships needed to get as close as possible to the coast, from where their radars would control the airspace over the Stanley airfield, and the C Dart missiles could shoot down cargo planes if they were announced there. But in this case, the British detachment will inevitably be discovered, and it will be found within the reach of the Argentine continental aviation. So, the British voluntarily asked for a repetition of the story with "Sheffield"? How could the command of the 317 operational connection think up such a suicidal tactic?
But in reality, the British had no choice - except to roll up the operation and, empty-handedly, go home. The 1-4 battles of May convinced the British that they could not control the airspace either over Falklands or even over their own compound. The hopes placed on VTOL airborne patrols and shipborne radar patrols, which included destroyers with their powerful radar and long-range C-Dart systems, did not materialize, and the British did not have any other means of monitoring the air situation. And what could be done here?
After the attack on Sheffield, the British command hit the most unbridled palliatives. The only fact testifies to what degree of despair the commanders are: the plan of sending British reconnaissance teams to the continent was seriously discussed, so that they, hiding in areas of Argentinean air bases, visually observed the take-off of combat aircraft and radioed about the ships. Fortunately, the implementation of this idea is not reached. Probably, someone nevertheless remembered that stationary observers with walkie-talkies were successfully detected and destroyed even during the Second World War, and since then radio engineering has stepped far forward. Then the command of the 317 th operational unit attracted to the conduct of aerial reconnaissance ... submarines.
How it is implemented - it remains a mystery, the British are not particularly spread about this. Probably, surface submarines patrolled in areas close to continental air bases in the hope that passive radio intelligence stations, or watchmen, would be able to detect Argentine aircraft taking off. The author of the article can not say for sure, but it is possible that the attack of the British submarine by the Argentine aviation PLO, which took place on May 5, is a consequence of such a “brilliant” strategy. Be that as it may, the idea obviously did not justify itself, and they gave it a wave of it.
All this, of course, is an oxymoron, but still you should not blame Rear-Admiral Woodworth for unprofessionalism. Such accusations must be made against those who sent the English sailors to the edge of geography with unsuitable means of modern sea war. The admiral was just trying to find some way out of the situation and win the war with what he had at his disposal.
Realizing that extravagant tactics would not lead to success, the British tried to look at the problem from the other side. The main task of the fleet was to provide the landing operation, but in order to land the landing it was necessary to provide air defense of the amphibious group and the landing sites. There was not much hope for Sea Harriers, so there were warships. Consequently, it was necessary to come up with the best tactics of their use, which would allow destroyers and frigates with chances of success to fight with the Argentine aircraft. And, of course, it is imperative to test this tactic in practice before the landing operation, because if all of a sudden tactics fail during the landing, the ocean around Falkland will turn red with the blood of British marines.
Despite the fiasco with Sheffield, the British continued to consider the 42 type destroyers and their Sea Dart air defense system a powerful anti-aircraft defense, and they were right about that. The presence of anti-aircraft missiles capable of attacking targets at a distance of tens of kilometers drove Argentine planes to the very crest of waves, which seriously limited their combat capabilities. The only problem was that, being able to drive Argentines to low altitudes, destroyers like the 42 could not fight with them there - if suddenly planes (or rockets) emerged from beyond the horizon, then the Sea Dart air defense system could not “work” on them, because it was not intended to intercept low-flying targets. In the course of the recent Super Etandarov attack, the destroyer Glasgow still managed to manufacture its Sea Dart for firing, but its radar fire control could not “hold” the target — the radar saw both the Ekoset anti-ship missiles, but in “flicker mode” ", I.e. they now and then disappeared from the screen and then appeared again. Because of this, the British equipment could not provide guidance for the Sea Dart missiles at the target.
But the latest, adopted in the 1979, the C-Wolfe air defense system was quite capable of withstanding the low-flying threat. Created to replace the C Cat air defense system, this complex was created to intercept anti-ship missiles, it had a short reaction time and a very high probability of hitting the target. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Woodworth, on tests of the “Sea Wolfe” missiles successfully hit 4,5-inch (114-mm) projectiles. Great hopes were placed on this complex, therefore the carriers of the “Sea Wolf”, the frigates “Broadsward” and “The Diamond”, were usually put in direct guard of British aircraft carriers. Of course, the “Sea Wolfe” was a typical short-range air defense missile system, whose missiles flew only 6 kilometers in a straight line, but paired with the Sea Dart air defense system could create (at least theoretically) a powerful and airborne defense. And so the British decided to combine powerful radar and long-range air defense systems "Sea Dart" destroyer project 42 with the latest air defense systems "Sea Wolf" frigates such as "Broadsward" - and see what happens. The whole operation was at stake, because in the event of a fiasco, Rear Admiral Woodworth was going to cancel the landing. This would have been a terrible blow to the prestige of the British, but still not so terrible as if the British amphibious forces were defeated by the Argentine Air Force.
And how could the effectiveness of the Sea Dart & Sea Wolf combination be tested without exposing the ships to the attack of the Argentine pilots? No way. And the first pair, the Broadsward and Coventry, were ordered to go to the Port Stanley area.
On the other hand, the admiral tried to minimize the risks: on May 8, the weather was very bad for flying, and the Argentines did not show the ability to organize massive air strikes. In addition, Sea Harriers were sent to the Falkland area. In other words, Rear Admiral Woodworth provided the Coventry and Broadsworth crews with the highest quality of air defense in conditions when Argentine aviation was difficult.
The experiment began: on the night of 8 on the 9, the British indicated their presence, the frigate Alakriti fired at the coast in the area of Stanley, and the frigate Brilliant went to the entrance to the Falkland Channel, hoping to catch the Argentine supply lines . By morning, both of these ships retreated to the main forces, but the Coventry and Broadsworth approached Port Stanley. At the same time, Sea Harriers developed a booming activity, flying both to cover the British ships and to bomb the Port Stanley airfield. All this did not give a special effect, but on one of these cruises, Sea Harriers discovered the Narval - an 350-ton Argentine trawler, which was used as an auxiliary reconnaissance ship. He did not carry weapons, so it was not difficult to defeat him - after refusing to lie down in the drift the ship first fired, then the helicopters landed British troops on him ... Argentines, believing that the British sank "Narval", sent to rescue the crew of Puma army helicopter , and here the Coventry Sea Dart system said its weighty word - 40 minutes after takeoff, the helicopter was destroyed. However, the Argentine aviation did not appear.
On the night of 9 on 10 on May 9, 24 hours after the start of the patrols, the Coventry and Broadsward retreated, and the next pair, consisting of the destroyer Glasgow and the frigate Brilliant, took their place. Rear Admiral Woodworth believed that the experiment needed to be completed, and he was absolutely right in that, but now he had to take another very difficult decision.
The lack of a full-fledged aircraft carrier was a huge problem for the British, but not the only one. The best place for disembarking, according to the British, was located in the Falkland Strait, where a very narrow channel led, which would have been so easy to block with minefields ... Of course, several minesweepers would easily solve this issue, but Rear Admiral Woodward did not have minesweepers. And the admiral had no right to send amphibious ships full of people to where the horned death might have been waiting for his hour. Circumstances did not leave him a choice - he had to send one of his ships so that he could see for himself that there were no mines on his own skin. Or ... in their presence.
Woodward could not send to death a ship with "Sea Darts" or "Sea Wolves" - the success of the future operation depended on them. And sending a large "Type" destroyer with a crew to 471 is also a man. It was necessary to send a small ship that was easy to replace ... The choice fell on the frigate Alakriti.
The admiral could not give such an order directly, but he described this episode without notes in his memoirs:
"Now I had a difficult mission to invite Christopher Craig, the captain of 2 rank, to say," I would like you to go tonight and see if you can drown after blowing up a mine in the Falklands "... ... But I didn’t do anything like that, I just called X-NUMX rank captain Craig through a closed channel and said: “Uh, Christopher, I would like you to cycle around East Falkland tonight, rounding it from the south, and then through the Falkland Channel by the Cape Fanning north where you meet You’re from Arrow. I also told him that I needed to go through the strait with a lot of noise, firing several lighting shells to scare Argentines, and added: “If you see something moving, then drown it. But get out of the strait with With the expectation of returning before dawn, walk away from the coast before they can fly. ”After a short silence, he replied:
- Yes, Admiral, I suppose you want me to enter and exit the northern entrance of the strait several times, and to make a few zigzags?
"Oh," I said, pretending to be surprised and feeling two inches taller, "why are you asking that?"
"I suppose you want me to find out if there are any mines there," he said calmly.
I do not remember exactly what I said, I remember only what I felt. I noticed that it would be quite helpful. Christopher replied with great self-esteem: “Very well, sir,” and left to prepare his ship and crew as best as possible for possible death. "
- Yes, Admiral, I suppose you want me to enter and exit the northern entrance of the strait several times, and to make a few zigzags?
"Oh," I said, pretending to be surprised and feeling two inches taller, "why are you asking that?"
"I suppose you want me to find out if there are any mines there," he said calmly.
I do not remember exactly what I said, I remember only what I felt. I noticed that it would be quite helpful. Christopher replied with great self-esteem: “Very well, sir,” and left to prepare his ship and crew as best as possible for possible death. "
Alakriti went into the night. For a ship in 2750 tons of standard displacement, a collision with a mine, even during the Second World War, is fraught with a quick demise, and the night darkness also guaranteed a minimum of people who escaped from the crew in 175 ...
(in the photo - the same type "Alakriti" frigate "Amazon")
Interestingly, in the overwhelming majority of the Falkland Conflict reviews, this episode is shunned by silence. Due to the inability of the UK to ensure the presence of minesweepers in the conflict zone, 175 people were forced to risk their own lives, but ... the history is written by the winners, so why not retouch some, even if they have heroic but uncomfortable aspects?
Of course, the British sailors executed the order of the commander with absolute precision. “Alakriti” entered the Falkland Strait, and not only followed the fairway to the Strait of San Carlos, but also looked like tacks (I mean zigzags) in order to be sure that there were no mines. And so that the Argentines did not guess anything like that, he fired upon the transport (which later sank) that was found in the Strait of San Carlos. In order not to be substituted in the morning by the attack of Argentine aviation, Alakriti left the strait in the dark and, meeting with Aerrow, who was waiting for him, returned to the main forces.
The brave men are lucky - both frigates have flown on the ubiquitous Argentine submarine "San Luis". The British walked between the boat and the shore, the position for the torpedo strike was perfect, but ... the shooting control system was out of order on the boat. Then the commander of the "San Luis" personally calculated the torpedo triangle and gave a two-torpedo salvo from a distance of less than 3 miles. The result ... is logical for Argentine weapons. One torpedo did not come out of the torpedo tube at all, while the second after two and a half minutes cut off the telecontrol cable and went “into the milk”. Due to the high speed of the frigates, it was no longer possible to repeat the attack, and the British avoided deadly danger without even noticing it. You can imagine what feelings experienced, of course, the brave and skillful, but unlucky Argentine submariners, whose legitimate prey escaped from the hands for the third time. The regular failures of the San Luis equipment led to the fact that the only submarine did not take part in the hostilities anymore - after the incident described above, the submarine returned to Mar del Plata and stood up for repairs.
11 May began with the shelling of the coast of Glasgow and Brilliant, and ended with the anti-aircraft artillery covering the Condor airbase drove a pair of Sea Harriers unsuccessfully trying to bomb its airfield. But the Argentines are tired of enduring the British ships "right at the Falklands' capital", and on May 12 a major air operation began to destroy them.
The first wave was to consist of 8 "Skyhocks" from the Rio Gallegos airbase and 6 "Daggers" from the Rio Grande, and two "flying tankers" were allocated to refuel these aircraft. The second wave of the same number (8 Skyhocks 6 Daggers) from the San Julian airbase was to develop success. These were impressive forces, but in order to confuse the British, 30 auxiliary aircraft of various types were sent to the Falkland Islands zone (this information is mentioned only in one source and seems somewhat doubtful. It is likely that the Argentines did send some the number of aircraft, but three dozen? !!). Their task was to confuse the British and divert their air patrols. At the same time, some Argentinean planes (such as Liar Jet) almost did not risk anything - exceeding the speed of the Sea Harriers, they could always tear themselves away from the latter.
The British discovered the first four Skyhocks in 18 miles from their ships, and when they got close to 15 miles, the Sea Dart operators were ready to open fire, but ... "All this would be funny if it were not so sad": the battle the main opponent of the British were not Argentine planes, but their own software.
The fireman presses the button to launch a series of rockets, which corresponds to the rules of shooting at a group target. Both rockets are already on rails, but the microswitch on one of them has failed, as a result, the computer does not see the rocket and reports: “Fault on the left rail!”. This is unpleasant, but not fatal - after all, the right guide is okay and you can fire at the planes going into the attack, launching missiles from it, but ... the Start a Series of Missiles command has already been entered into the computer and now he doesn’t want to fire at any missile and you cannot cancel this command before. So, because of the "wise" software, the British lost their air defense system at the moment when it was most needed. Glasgow opened the attack from its 114-mm gun mounts.
However, two C-Wolff airplanes “Brilliant” said their weighty word - 2 Skyhawk was shot down by them during the launch of the attack, the third one, who rushed to perform an anti-missile maneuver, touched the wing with a wing and fell into the ocean. It was at that moment that the Glasgow art installation was stuck, and the destroyer was left completely defenseless against enemy aircraft. The fourth Skyhawk attacked the destroyer, but its bombs did not get anywhere, although one of them ricocheted from the water and flew over the Glasgow. This last Skyhawk returned to the base unscathed.
After some five minutes, the second four Skyhocks appeared. The Glasgow artillery unit was unblocked by that time, but from the Brilliant they were asked to cut down the fire - it turns out that 114-mm projectiles, affecting the radar of the FCS, prevented the targeting of the Sea Wolf. And in vain, because this time the British air defense system was not up to par, although the reasons are not all clear. On the one hand, the Argentine pilots instantly drew conclusions and attacked the ships, carrying out an anti-missile maneuver: they walked, randomly changing course and altitude. But the British claim that at the very moment of the Skyhawks attack they had to ... restart the suddenly “hung” fire control program. And this is clearly not fiction - the British immediately contacted representatives of the manufacturer "Sea Wolfe", especially since one of its representatives was just present at the "Diamond" in order to eliminate the "hiccups of the homing system" Sea Wolfe "" (so said about this episode Rear Admiral Woodworth). Be that as it may, not a single Skyhawk of the second wave was shot down, but all four were able to go on the attack. This time the Glasgow did not escape the strike - the bomb pierces the board amidships about a meter above the waterline, pierces the ship through and flies away without breaking off. Nevertheless, this strike put the ship on the brink of destruction - two turbines failed, the only electric generator (there was a second one, but it broke earlier) was badly damaged, so the ship lost speed for some time and lost its electric power. Fortunately, everything was restored fairly quickly. But after 15 minutes after the second attack, the Brilliant radar saw the third wave of Argentine planes, but they did not attack. The British decided that their pilots were afraid to attack because of the death of the aircraft of the first wave. But in fact, no third wave existed - from the Dagger 6 of the first wave, three showed malfunctions, so the command canceled all six, and the Argentines did not raise the second wave (8 Skyhawks and 6 Daggers) as the British ships had already departed from the islands. Most likely, the "Brilliant" saw the very same auxiliary aircraft, which were aimed at diverting British air patrols.
Needless to say that on this day the “Sea Harriers” could not detect (let alone intercept) a single Argentine plane? This air operation by the Argentines against the British ships was completed far less successfully than the previous one (the Sheffield attack), they could not destroy the Glasgow, the ship was able to be returned to the crew by the crew in just a few days. But for this rather modest success, the Argentines paid 4 Skayhokes - two of them were shot down by “Sy Wolfs” by “Brilliant”, the third one crashed on the water, and the fourth, the one that managed to effectively bomb out Glasgow, was shot down by super-alert Falkland anti-aircraft gunners islands, which again could not distinguish their aircraft from the enemy.
Rear Admiral Woodworth was quite satisfied with the results of the battle. He rightly considered that if the Sea Dart didn’t break at the most inopportune moment, its missiles could knock down the 1-2 of enemy aircraft, which probably would completely derail the attack of the first wave and could affect the results of the second. And if it were not for the reloading of the “C. Wolf” fire control program at the most inopportune moment, then only “horns and legs” could also remain from the second wave.
So, the fundamental decision to land was made, but now the commander of the 317-th operational connection was worried about the auxiliary Argentine airfield "Kildin" on Pebl Island. The island was small, but it was some 10 miles from the "throat" of the Falklands Bay, and a dozen attack aircraft based there could strike the landing infantry. The consideration is quite fair, because at the time of the landing the troops are extremely vulnerable, and even light aircraft could well cause a fair amount of damage.
What is the "Kildin"? Two unpaved runways on 700 meters each, 11 of open-air planes (5 light attack aircraft Pukara and 6 antediluvian screw Mentors, yes, yes, the same ones weighing about 2 tons and speed in 400 km / h), several technical buildings assignment yes platoon of infantry. Whether this airfield had at least some air defense, sources do not report, but it is possible that there were several anti-aircraft guns. Although it is doubtful - the Argentines considered this airfield as auxiliary, but since the British "Sea Harriers" still did not pay attention to it, they believed that the British did not know anything about Kildin and did not seem to take measures to strengthen his defense capability. In any case, Kildin was not only an easy, but an archilecive goal, even by the standards of the Second World War. For modern aircraft, the destruction of such an “airbase” should not have been a problem at all.
The British have explored the various possibilities of destroying the Kildin. Shelling of ship artillery or a massive airstrike was considered, but both of these options were considered inexpedient due to the risk of loss and low efficiency. In other words, the British found their "Sea Harriers" unable to cope with the most elementary ground target! How so?
The problem of "Sea Harriers" was that on their own they absolutely could not fight the ground defense. The reason was, again, in the absence of specialized aircraft aboard the British VTOL aircraft carrier aircraft. As Vietnam and the series of Arab-Israeli conflicts have shown, aviation is quite capable of fighting even with powerful and layered ground defense with good chances of victory, but this requires first finding out the location of enemy air defense assets, and then conducting an operation to destroy them by means of electronic warfare combat and destruction of anti-radar and cruise missiles. Even if the location of an air defense of some target, say, an airfield, has not been opened, it is still possible to strike at it by sending a small demonstration group “to the attack” and thereby causing the “air defense” to “turn on” and then attack them. And if the strike group is covered with EW planes ready to “jam” enemy radars, and some strike planes are ready to “work” with anti-radar missiles and other high-precision means, then the chances of success will be quite large (although the risk of running into losses is also).
The Argentine air defense of the Falkland Islands can not be called any serious. But the British lack of reconnaissance aircraft, EW aircraft and the inability of the Sea Harriers to use anti-radar missiles led to the fact that even a few rapid-fire cannons (controlled by a simple radar) were an unsolvable problem for them. As a result, the British were forced to approach the target at low altitudes, then, approximately 5 km before the goal, to rise sharply, drop bombs and leave. Such tactics made it possible to avoid entering the zone of artillery fire, but the accuracy of the bombing, naturally, turned out to be insignificant. Thus, the strike power of the British carrier-based aviation turned out to be near zero.
As a result, the fighters of the British special forces SAS had to destroy the Argentine aviation. On May 14, a group of three British ships (including the aircraft carrier Hermes) moved to Pebble Island, and an attack began on the night from 14 to May 15. This raid is usually considered as a great success of the British special operations forces, but still we will be objective. Yes, the sabotage detachment in 45 man, with the support of the artillery of the destroyer “Glemmorgan”, managed to block the platoon (30 soldier and officer) of the Argentinean infantry, disable all 11 aircraft, undermine the fuel depot, mine the runways and other structures. And retreat, costing with only two light wounded. There can be no complaints about the SAS warriors - they performed absolutely all the tasks of the operation perfectly. But I can’t get rid of the obsessive thought that if the special forces of the USSR were in place of the British, who, like the British, had a one and a half superiority in numbers, surprise, and even artillery support from the ship, then ... well, the island probably would have survived. But at least something alive on it - very unlikely.
The departure of British ships 15 May covered the aircraft with "Invincible", which on three occasions (12: 30, 15: 47 and 16: 26) attacked the airport in Port Stanley, in order to prevent the take-off of Argentine aviation, which could detect British naval group on departure. In this case, Skyhawks and Dagghers from continental airfields would have a good chance of retaliation. It is difficult to say how effective the British bombing proved. As before, the bombs dropped from a high altitude could not put the Argentine airfield out of operation, but nevertheless the Pukar Malvinas squadron did not make any sorties and the British ships were not attacked - so, quite possibly, for the first time from 1. May “Sea Harriers” managed to do something really useful.
The success of this operation prompted the British to attempt to destroy the SAS and the most terrible enemy of the British ships - the Super Etandard attack aircraft, along with the stocks of Exoset missiles at the Rio Grande continental air base. To this end, the 16 of May, the Invincible aircraft carrier, having made a breakthrough, came close to the territorial waters of Argentina. But this time the sabotage operation failed - the helicopter with the special forces was spotted in 20 km from the target, as a result the British decided to interrupt the operation and land the helicopter in Chile, which they carried out. The helicopter was destroyed, its pilots surrendered to the Chilean authorities, and the special forces, of course, did not capitulate, and a few days later they were evacuated by a submarine from Tierra del Fuego.
In general, after the attack on the ill-fated "Sheffield" and before the landing of the British landing, held on 21 in May, the "Sea Harriers" did not gain success. The asset of the British carrier-based aircraft can be recorded except for participation in the destruction of the Narwhal and two more ships, the Rio-Karakan, the Baja Buen Suseso. About "Narvale" has already been said above. The Rio Karakan was attacked by 16 in May, and despite the bombing and fire from 30-mm cannons, the ship remained afloat, and was brought to Fox Bay, where it sank a few days later. The effectiveness of the "Sea Harriers" does not amaze the imagination, since such a goal (single and unarmed transport) was destroyed by deck aircraft of the Second World War in a matter of minutes. But nevertheless, it should be taken into account that the Rio-Karakan carried the cargo to the Falkland Islands, and as a result of the British attack, the Argentines were unable to unload it onto the land. As for the “Baia Buen Susseso”, this auxiliary ship was fired upon by “Sea Harriers” with cannons, after which the Argentine crew left it.
On air domination, it has long been gone. The British operational connection could not interrupt the air communication of Argentina with the islands it captured. It could not interrupt the sea, although a couple of transports were still able to be destroyed. Falkland airfields remained operational (except for the unfortunate Kildin on Pebble Island, which the Argentines evacuated after the SAS raid), island aviation was not destroyed, air defense systems and air coverage were not suppressed. The Argentine fleet retreated and was not found by the British, forced to take into account the probability of its appearance during the landing operation. The only relatively large air operation of the Argentines (the attack of the "Brilliant" and "Glasgow") remained unnoticed by the British British carrier aircraft. In essence, all that Sea Harriers have been capable of is unnerving the Argentines with their ineffectual, but regular raids.
Продолжение следует ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- "Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 1)
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 2)
"Harriers" in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 3)
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