Chinese miracle of the Soviet assembly
Well then charge, exclaimed Zhou Enlai
The colossal assistance of the Soviet Union to China in the 50-s has led to the creation of an industrial, scientific-technical and personnel base, with which the country made a stunning breakthrough into the 21st century.
This fully applies to the nuclear industry, the creation of which allowed the People's Republic of China to join the club of nuclear-missile powers - albeit not on an equal footing with the USSR and the USA, but still with serious combat potential.
Today it is no secret that right up until the sharp deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations at the turn of 50 – 60-s, Moscow provided Beijing with access to critical information. It began with a secondment of a team of specialists from Arzamas-1958 to China in June of 16. It was headed by one of the leading weapons scientists Minsredmash Evgeny Negin, who soon became the chief designer of nuclear warheads at KB-11. The Chinese decided to devote to the wisdom of the device of a nuclear bomb of the 1951 model of the year - apparently, the plutonium type RDS-2 (power - about 40 kilotons), which was an improved version of the first domestic atomic RDS-1. It was a compromise solution. On the one hand, the attempt to "present" the outdated RDS-1 to Beijing could turn into Mao Zedong's dissatisfaction, but on the other hand, the secrets of more modern designs bombs than the RDS-2 did not want to give even such a reliable ally as the People's Republic of China.
True, further verbal, although very valuable information provided by the seconded Soviet specialists to colleagues from the Third Ministry of Mechanical Engineering (Minsredmash in Peking), the matter did not go. Sending a nuclear bomb, a set of documentation for it, and samples of test equipment and technological equipment to China was canceled almost at the very last moment. But everything was immersed in sealed-up cars and, under security, waited in the wings in Arzamas-16. But then, already in June of 1959, Khrushchev and Mao held a meeting at an elevated tone, which resolutely canceled plans for the earliest possible supply of China’s People’s Liberation Army with nuclear weapons. weapons Soviet-style. However, the scientific and technical groundwork created in the PRC with our support (including training specialists in the best universities of the USSR) allowed the Chinese to independently create and test the first uranium charge with a power of 16 kilotons (it was installed on a special tower) on October 1964. He was called “22-59” with an unambiguous hint of a disastrous meeting date for Mao, when Nikita Sergeevich refused his counterpart to provide nuclear weapons. They say, "China can and itself" (by analogy with one of the transcripts of the abbreviation RDS - "Russia makes itself").
Kiloton "East Wind"
If the Chinese themselves did not receive the nuclear weapons from the USSR, the delivery vehicles were in time. First of all, we are talking about ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. In 1960, China began the deployment of operational-tactical Dunfen-1 (Dunfeng - East Wind), which were Chinese copies of the Soviet Р-2 adopted by the Soviet army in 1952. Samples in a small amount was transferred to the PRC and then mastered Chinese defense industry. Almost simultaneously, the deployment of more advanced missiles of the same class, the P-11, began. The party P-11 was supplied from the USSR in an amount sufficient to equip several missile regiments.
While P-2 was considered obsolete, then P-11 was modern at the time. In the USSR, both for the former and for the latter, both conventional and nuclear equipment were provided. The experience gained in the operation of the P-2 and P-11 rockets, however, without nuclear stuffing, allowed the Chinese to create in 1966 a new type of their armed forces - the Second Artillery, that is, the rocket forces. The conspiracy name "Second Artillery" ("dier paobin") was coined by Premier of the PRC Zhou Enlai.
The transfer of documentation to the first Soviet medium-range strategic missile P-5M played a particularly important role in the appearance of the "dier paobin". She served as a prototype for Dunfen-2. This is the first sample of Chinese nuclear missiles. 27 October 1966, the combat crew of the Second Artillery, launched a Dunfyn-2 rocket in nuclear equipment, which, flying a kilometer 894, struck a conventional areal target at the test site near Lake Lobnor. The power of the explosion was 12 kilotons. In the same year, the rocket was put into service, but the Second Artillery was able to launch its operational deployment only in the 1970. Serial missiles carried nuclear warheads with 15 – 25 kilotons. The Dunfyn-2 missiles were intended mainly to destroy targets in the territory of the Soviet Far East and American military bases in Japan. They served until the end of the 80-s, after which they were removed from combat duty and stockpiled.
There were Elahs - “Huns” became
In 50, China received from the USSR, near 500, IL-28 front-line jet bombers, and in 1967, it began an independent serial production of these obsolete but simple and reliable aircraft. In China, they are called "Hun-5" (H-5). The first Chinese IL-28 was built on the basis of Soviet documentation and with the help of equipment supplied by the USSR as early as 1962, however, the “cultural revolution” significantly delayed the introduction of machines into the series. Among the several hundred "Hun-5" were the carriers of the nuclear weapon "Hun-5" - analogues of our IL-28A. On board the “Hun-5” 27 on December 1968, the 3 megaton hydrogen bomb was tested.
An even more serious Soviet contribution to the creation of Chinese nuclear power was the receipt in 1957 by China of a license for the production of the Tu-16 long-range bomber, which entered service with the Soviet Air Force in 1953. The aircraft was given the national name "Hong-6" (H-6). The first Chinese-built aircraft from Soviet parts was transferred to the army in 1959. It was he who dropped on May 14, 1965, the first Chinese military nuclear bomb with a charge of 35 kilotons over the Lobnorsky test site. And on June 17, 1967, with the help of Khun-6, a Chinese thermonuclear 3,3-megaton bomb was tested, which had a two-phase charge based on uranium-235, uranium-238, lithium-6 and deuterium. But the large-scale production of the Khun-6 bombers, due to the troubles of the "cultural revolution," was only possible to organize in 1968. And today, these aircraft, having undergone a number of original upgrades and received cruise missiles for equipment, make up 100 percent of the strategic fleet (up to 120 pieces of H-6H, H-6M and H-6K), as well as naval missile carrier (30 H-6G) aviation PLA.
Chinese aircraft designers managed to turn even the Soviet MiG-19 fighter aircraft (produced in thousands) under license in the PRC into a carrier of nuclear weapons. True, under the atomic bomb he “went” not in its original form, but as the attack aircraft “Qiang-5” (Q-5) created on its basis. This aircraft was put into mass production at the end of 1969. Deliveries of attack aircraft "Tsian-5" to the troops began in 1970, and aviation units deployed near the border with the USSR began to receive them urgently. Among the “Qiang-5” were the small-scale nuclear weapons carriers “Qiang-5A” with the deployment of a tactical nuclear bomb with a capacity of up to 20 kilotons in the bomb bay (in a semi-submerged state). Such a bomb in the eight-kiloton version was dropped at the Lobnor test site 7 on January 1972.
Where did the "wave" come from?
Totally exotic in stories World military-technical cooperation looked like the transfer of the PRC submarines - carriers of ballistic missiles. We are talking about the diesel submarines of the 629 project (according to the NATO nomenclature - Golf), the documentation for which was donated to China in the 1959. Relations between Moscow and Beijing were already “sparkling” with might and all, when in 1960 the shipyard in Dalian completed the first Chinese submarine of this type received from the USSR (according to some data, sank in 1980). The second one was also assembled from Soviet units and sections, having been commissioned in the 1964 year.
China was given six combat and one training ballistic missile of the R-11FM surface launch for these submarines. The P-11FM was a naval modification of the P-11 ground tactical missile of the ground forces and was equipped with a 10 kiloton nuclear warhead in the Soviet Navy. However, China has not received YABC for these missiles.
Submarines of the 629 project were used in China for testing submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The remaining submarine in 1982 was refitted, during which three mines under the P-11FM were replaced by two for Junlan-1 (Juelan - Big Wave), and then by one for Juan-2.
At the end of the 50-s, the possibility of transferring the 659 nuclear submarine to China — our first atomicines with cruise missiles — was considered, in parallel with their entry into the USSR Navy (the Pacific Fleet received the K-45 in 1961). However, this was not destined to come true, and the Chinese had to build their own nuclear submarines, which appeared much later, with the support of French technology.
The colossal assistance of the Soviet Union to China in the 50-s has led to the creation of an industrial, scientific-technical and personnel base, with which the country made a stunning breakthrough into the 21st century.
This fully applies to the nuclear industry, the creation of which allowed the People's Republic of China to join the club of nuclear-missile powers - albeit not on an equal footing with the USSR and the USA, but still with serious combat potential.
Today it is no secret that right up until the sharp deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations at the turn of 50 – 60-s, Moscow provided Beijing with access to critical information. It began with a secondment of a team of specialists from Arzamas-1958 to China in June of 16. It was headed by one of the leading weapons scientists Minsredmash Evgeny Negin, who soon became the chief designer of nuclear warheads at KB-11. The Chinese decided to devote to the wisdom of the device of a nuclear bomb of the 1951 model of the year - apparently, the plutonium type RDS-2 (power - about 40 kilotons), which was an improved version of the first domestic atomic RDS-1. It was a compromise solution. On the one hand, the attempt to "present" the outdated RDS-1 to Beijing could turn into Mao Zedong's dissatisfaction, but on the other hand, the secrets of more modern designs bombs than the RDS-2 did not want to give even such a reliable ally as the People's Republic of China.
True, further verbal, although very valuable information provided by the seconded Soviet specialists to colleagues from the Third Ministry of Mechanical Engineering (Minsredmash in Peking), the matter did not go. Sending a nuclear bomb, a set of documentation for it, and samples of test equipment and technological equipment to China was canceled almost at the very last moment. But everything was immersed in sealed-up cars and, under security, waited in the wings in Arzamas-16. But then, already in June of 1959, Khrushchev and Mao held a meeting at an elevated tone, which resolutely canceled plans for the earliest possible supply of China’s People’s Liberation Army with nuclear weapons. weapons Soviet-style. However, the scientific and technical groundwork created in the PRC with our support (including training specialists in the best universities of the USSR) allowed the Chinese to independently create and test the first uranium charge with a power of 16 kilotons (it was installed on a special tower) on October 1964. He was called “22-59” with an unambiguous hint of a disastrous meeting date for Mao, when Nikita Sergeevich refused his counterpart to provide nuclear weapons. They say, "China can and itself" (by analogy with one of the transcripts of the abbreviation RDS - "Russia makes itself").
Kiloton "East Wind"
If the Chinese themselves did not receive the nuclear weapons from the USSR, the delivery vehicles were in time. First of all, we are talking about ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. In 1960, China began the deployment of operational-tactical Dunfen-1 (Dunfeng - East Wind), which were Chinese copies of the Soviet Р-2 adopted by the Soviet army in 1952. Samples in a small amount was transferred to the PRC and then mastered Chinese defense industry. Almost simultaneously, the deployment of more advanced missiles of the same class, the P-11, began. The party P-11 was supplied from the USSR in an amount sufficient to equip several missile regiments.While P-2 was considered obsolete, then P-11 was modern at the time. In the USSR, both for the former and for the latter, both conventional and nuclear equipment were provided. The experience gained in the operation of the P-2 and P-11 rockets, however, without nuclear stuffing, allowed the Chinese to create in 1966 a new type of their armed forces - the Second Artillery, that is, the rocket forces. The conspiracy name "Second Artillery" ("dier paobin") was coined by Premier of the PRC Zhou Enlai.
The transfer of documentation to the first Soviet medium-range strategic missile P-5M played a particularly important role in the appearance of the "dier paobin". She served as a prototype for Dunfen-2. This is the first sample of Chinese nuclear missiles. 27 October 1966, the combat crew of the Second Artillery, launched a Dunfyn-2 rocket in nuclear equipment, which, flying a kilometer 894, struck a conventional areal target at the test site near Lake Lobnor. The power of the explosion was 12 kilotons. In the same year, the rocket was put into service, but the Second Artillery was able to launch its operational deployment only in the 1970. Serial missiles carried nuclear warheads with 15 – 25 kilotons. The Dunfyn-2 missiles were intended mainly to destroy targets in the territory of the Soviet Far East and American military bases in Japan. They served until the end of the 80-s, after which they were removed from combat duty and stockpiled.
There were Elahs - “Huns” became
In 50, China received from the USSR, near 500, IL-28 front-line jet bombers, and in 1967, it began an independent serial production of these obsolete but simple and reliable aircraft. In China, they are called "Hun-5" (H-5). The first Chinese IL-28 was built on the basis of Soviet documentation and with the help of equipment supplied by the USSR as early as 1962, however, the “cultural revolution” significantly delayed the introduction of machines into the series. Among the several hundred "Hun-5" were the carriers of the nuclear weapon "Hun-5" - analogues of our IL-28A. On board the “Hun-5” 27 on December 1968, the 3 megaton hydrogen bomb was tested.
An even more serious Soviet contribution to the creation of Chinese nuclear power was the receipt in 1957 by China of a license for the production of the Tu-16 long-range bomber, which entered service with the Soviet Air Force in 1953. The aircraft was given the national name "Hong-6" (H-6). The first Chinese-built aircraft from Soviet parts was transferred to the army in 1959. It was he who dropped on May 14, 1965, the first Chinese military nuclear bomb with a charge of 35 kilotons over the Lobnorsky test site. And on June 17, 1967, with the help of Khun-6, a Chinese thermonuclear 3,3-megaton bomb was tested, which had a two-phase charge based on uranium-235, uranium-238, lithium-6 and deuterium. But the large-scale production of the Khun-6 bombers, due to the troubles of the "cultural revolution," was only possible to organize in 1968. And today, these aircraft, having undergone a number of original upgrades and received cruise missiles for equipment, make up 100 percent of the strategic fleet (up to 120 pieces of H-6H, H-6M and H-6K), as well as naval missile carrier (30 H-6G) aviation PLA.
Chinese aircraft designers managed to turn even the Soviet MiG-19 fighter aircraft (produced in thousands) under license in the PRC into a carrier of nuclear weapons. True, under the atomic bomb he “went” not in its original form, but as the attack aircraft “Qiang-5” (Q-5) created on its basis. This aircraft was put into mass production at the end of 1969. Deliveries of attack aircraft "Tsian-5" to the troops began in 1970, and aviation units deployed near the border with the USSR began to receive them urgently. Among the “Qiang-5” were the small-scale nuclear weapons carriers “Qiang-5A” with the deployment of a tactical nuclear bomb with a capacity of up to 20 kilotons in the bomb bay (in a semi-submerged state). Such a bomb in the eight-kiloton version was dropped at the Lobnor test site 7 on January 1972.
Where did the "wave" come from?
Totally exotic in stories World military-technical cooperation looked like the transfer of the PRC submarines - carriers of ballistic missiles. We are talking about the diesel submarines of the 629 project (according to the NATO nomenclature - Golf), the documentation for which was donated to China in the 1959. Relations between Moscow and Beijing were already “sparkling” with might and all, when in 1960 the shipyard in Dalian completed the first Chinese submarine of this type received from the USSR (according to some data, sank in 1980). The second one was also assembled from Soviet units and sections, having been commissioned in the 1964 year.
China was given six combat and one training ballistic missile of the R-11FM surface launch for these submarines. The P-11FM was a naval modification of the P-11 ground tactical missile of the ground forces and was equipped with a 10 kiloton nuclear warhead in the Soviet Navy. However, China has not received YABC for these missiles.
Submarines of the 629 project were used in China for testing submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The remaining submarine in 1982 was refitted, during which three mines under the P-11FM were replaced by two for Junlan-1 (Juelan - Big Wave), and then by one for Juan-2.
At the end of the 50-s, the possibility of transferring the 659 nuclear submarine to China — our first atomicines with cruise missiles — was considered, in parallel with their entry into the USSR Navy (the Pacific Fleet received the K-45 in 1961). However, this was not destined to come true, and the Chinese had to build their own nuclear submarines, which appeared much later, with the support of French technology.
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