So, on May 1, 1982, the Argentines became convinced of the imminent landing of the British and were preparing to throw their fleet into battle. The demonstration group TG-79.3, consisting of the cruiser General Belgrano and two old destroyers, was supposed to imitate an attack from the south and divert the attention of British commanders. At this time, the main forces of the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2, consisting of the Bentisinko de Mayo aircraft carrier, the modern destroyers Santisimo Trinidad and Hercules (type 42, an analogue of the unfortunate Sheffield) and three corvettes were supposed to inflict a strike by Skyhawks from a distance of 120 miles on British ships. Their attack was to be supported by a Super Etandar link with Exozet anti-ship missiles, a San Luis submarine, and, of course, attack aircraft from continental air bases. Argentine Commander fleet ordered the operation to begin on the morning of May 2, immediately after the deployment of tactical groups.
Interestingly, even if the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 succeeded, the Argentines did not plan to throw their light cruiser into battle. According to their plan, in the event that the British fleet is broken, the TG-79.3 ships should be engaged in piracy on the communications of the enemy. Thus, the Argentines very realistically assessed the capabilities of the old artillery ship, assigning him to the opponents single vehicles and supply vessels of the British.
The Argentine plan for the upcoming battle should be recognized as reasonable and had a good chance of success. If something could crush the British, it’s a concentrated blow aviation Navy (decked "Skyhawks" and "Super Ethandars") and the Air Force ("Skyhawks and" Daggers "from the continent). An attempt to attack the British by the fleet alone would be obvious madness, since the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 were twice as inferior to the British in the number of carrier-based aircraft, and their Skyhawks could neither defend themselves in the air nor provide air defense connections. At the same time, on six ships of the main forces of the Argentinean fleet there were only two air defense systems (Sea Dart), which was clearly not enough to fight even with such a short-haired air group as the British had. As for the ship-based Exocets, as noted earlier, the author does not know how many such missiles were in the possession of the Argentinean fleet, but it is known for sure that the idea of rapprochement with the British compound is 35-40 kilometers (MM38 flight range is 42 km ) followed by a massive salvo of anti-ship missiles, no one in the Argentine Navy did not consider. Although the English commander, Rear Admiral Woodworth, considered such an attack possible and feared it seriously.
So, by the morning of May 2, the Argentine fleet moved to the original, and the Air Force planes were only waiting for commands to take off. It seemed that the Argentinean commanders had calculated everything correctly: the air battles, the shelling of the coast and the landing of amphibious groups in the second half of the past day seemed to foreshadow a quick landing of British expeditionary forces. Contacts did not stop even at night - in 01.55 the destroyer “Santisimo Trinidad” found the patrol “Sea Harrier” and fired at it with the “Sea Dart” air defense system, but to no avail. So the dawn of 2 on May, the Argentines met in full readiness.
And what did the British fleet do at this time? In the same way as the Argentine, he was preparing for a general battle. The British 317's operational compound deployed its battle formations some 80 miles from Stanley: in the center of the military formation there were both aircraft carriers and their direct guard: the Brilliant and Frigates frigates. The near-ground air defense zone was created by the destroyer Glamorgan, frigates Alakriti, Yarmouth, and Arrow. Three more destroyers, deploying menacing directions in 30 miles from the main forces, formed a long-range radar patrol and, of course, the X Harrier air patrols were ahead of everyone.
The fleets were ready for a decisive battle. The distance between them was relatively small, around two nights, when the Sea Harrier and the Argentine destroyer saw each other, there were barely 200 miles between the squadrons. By dawn, this distance probably became even smaller. But, nevertheless, the battle did not happen. Why?
The command of Argentina, alas, did not take advantage of the opportunities presented to them. The plan called for a strike during the landing operation of the British, but it did not begin at all. While waiting for the British marines, the Argentines made a very annoying mistake - they were limited to air reconnaissance of possible landing sites and did not send their planes to the sea. As a result, the British fleet, which was not too far from the islands and (at least, part of the ships) within the reach of the Skyhawks and Daggers, was not detected. The Argentines lost a good chance to deliver a concentrated blow to the relatively small forces of the British. It’s hard to say what would happen, find and attack Argentinian 317, the operational connection of Rear Admiral Woodworth, but if the Argentinean command had a chance to defeat the British, they missed it on May 2.
Unlike its "opponents", the British commander made every effort to detect the main forces of the Argentine fleet, but his searches were fruitless. Not having specialized aircraft, the British were forced to use for reconnaissance of VTOL aircraft with their limited radius and weak radar. And they suffered a fiasco at a distance from which aircraft carriers of the Second World War no-no, yes, and found the enemy.
But the British knew the direction from which the main forces of the Armada Republic of Argentina (ARA) should have been expected. Even 28 April, the Americans told their British allies the location of the TG-79.3, obtained according to space reconnaissance, and 30 on April of the Argentine tactical group "at the tail" of the village Atkarina "Concare". The commander of the English compound did not consider this compound to be the main threat, he believed that it was a bait, although he admitted that perhaps the Argentines were trying to take him in ticks. If the Argentines were aware of the location of his ships, they could try, moving at night and at full speed, to get close to the English squadron, so that at dawn to inflict a massive rocket attack on it. But in this case, the main threat, according to the British admiral, came from the northwest, it was from there that the destroyers and corvettes TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 were supposed to come, and from there the deck aircraft of the only Argentine aircraft carrier would strike. In confirmation of these arguments, "Sea Harrier", found out at night "Santisimo Trinidad" and reported on a group of Argentine ships in the north-west. Now Rear Admiral Woodworth was confident that he had figured out the Argentines' plan and knew where to look for their main forces, but the limited capabilities of the VTOL aircraft did not allow him to detect the enemy. An attempt to find the enemy with the help of the submarine Splendit (she was informed of the coordinates of the last contact with the Argentine ships) also led to nothing. Rear Admiral Woodworth found himself in a difficult situation. Not having the location of the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2, he also understood that they could be very close.
While the British were nervous, the Argentines were tired of waiting. Dawn passed long ago, morning was replaced by day, but no disembarkation followed. Rightly judging that the British would not attack today, Rear Admiral G. Allyar in 12.30 ordered all three tactical groups to return to the areas of the initial maneuver. The Argentines retreated in order to regain their original positions and advance for a concentrated strike, as soon as the British did decide on a landing operation. TG-79.3, led by General Belgrano, received this order and turned back without even entering the 200-mile combat zone. However, she was not allowed to leave.
It is hard to say what Rear Admiral Woodworth was guided by when requesting permission to attack Argentine ships outside the war zone. The retreating old cruiser and two military-style destroyers did not threaten him. On the other hand, they were still warships of a hostile country, and it was not in the best British maritime traditions to let them go in peace. The psychological impact of the death of the only one, but possessing a large crew of the Argentine cruiser, could have greatly demoralized (perhaps it did) the Argentine fleet. In addition, any energetic person (and we have no single reason to reproach Rear-Admiral Woodworth for lack of energy), having preferred to do anything in a difficult situation, rather than do nothing at all. Who knows, will not the death of the “Belgrano” push the enemy command to any rash actions, thereby allowing the British to discover and destroy the main forces of their fleet?
But, apart from the above, there were other considerations: from the point of view of high politics, the British extremely needed a victory at sea, and the sooner the better. Unfortunately, until now, the actions of the 317 compound didn’t even remotely claim anything of the kind. The departure of the TG-79.3 could have prompted the British admiral that the rest of the Argentine ships also lay down the opposite course, and there would be no general battle. This meant a complete failure of the British plan of operation - the air bases on the Falklands were not destroyed, air supremacy was not won, the Argentine fleet could not be destroyed ... And what to do next? Having achieved nothing, hang out from the Falklands, waiting for reinforcements? But what about British public opinion, accustomed to the fact that "where the fleet is, there is victory"? And how will perceive the apparent impotence of the Royal Navy in Argentina?
It is not known exactly which reasons made the British make a decision, but as soon as they came to the conclusion about the destruction of the Belgrano, they immediately changed the “rules of the game” established by themselves - the fleet was allowed to destroy the Argentine ships outside the 200-mile zone. Well, of course, why do we still need the rules, if not to break them?
At 15.57, Concauror struck a fatal blow, two of the three torpedoes hit the old cruiser, and ... it was all over in a matter of minutes. The lights went off on the Belgrano, the ship’s electrical network was irreversibly damaged, all stationary drainage systems and all pumps that could pump liquid cargo stopped working and straighten the list by using counter floods. The struggle for survivability became impossible, after 20 minutes after the strike, the list reached 21 degrees and the commander gave the only possible order - to leave the ship. I had to transmit it by voice - the ship communication also failed.
England was elated, the newspapers were full of headlines "Throw the Argentines into the sea", "Give them heat", "Received" and even: "Final score: Britain 6, Argentina 0". The British man in the street got his victory ... Argentina, on the contrary, was grieving - thousands of rallies, half-mast flags.
In general, the situation with the sinking of the “Belgrano” painfully recalls the death of the German armored cruiser “Blucher” in the First World War. Then, because of the misunderstood signal, the squadron of Admiral Beatty, instead of finishing the retreating German battlecruisers, attacked a heavily beaten ship, which without it would not go away from the British. “Everyone thinks that we have achieved tremendous success, but in reality we suffered a terrible defeat,” Beatty wrote about this case. The valiant (the author writes this without a hint of malice) the British admiral knew how to face the truth and understood that he had missed an excellent chance to inflict a sensitive defeat on the Germans, but instead “defeated” the worthless, in general, ship. But if during the First World War, only an annoying mistake prevented Beatty from achieving success, in 1982, Rear Admiral Woodworth could not detect and defeat the main forces of Armada Republic of Argentina due to the inability to conduct any effective air reconnaissance - he had there was simply no aircraft capable of producing it. As a result, having failed to achieve a true victory, the British commander was forced to be content with an imaginary victory.
However, the psychological victory (and this is also quite a lot!) Went to the British: after the death of General Belgrano, the Argentine fleet no longer felt destiny, and the APA surface ships retreated to the coast of Argentina without trying to intervene in the conflict anymore. Most likely, the Argentines realized how vulnerable their tactical groups, maneuvering in the "walking distance" from the Falkland Islands to modern submarines, although it is possible that Rear-Admiral Allyaru was forced to "mutate the fleet into cotton" by Argentine politicians.
But all this was later, but for now the British were raising airplanes and helicopters in the air, in unsuccessful searches for Argentine ships in the north. However, the main forces of the APA fleet had already left, and as a consolation prize, the British only got two small ships with a displacement of 700 tons each. At the same time carrying mines "Comodoro Sameller" exploded, hit from a helicopter "Sea King" rocket "Sea Squay" and died along with the entire crew, and "Alferes Sobraal", having received two such missiles, still managed to return to his native port. The British pilots, watching the explosions of their missiles and the flaming fire, considered it destroyed, but the crew managed to save themselves and the ship. Nothing more interesting about either 2 or May 3.
Having won a "victory" over the unfortunate "General Belgrano," the British had many reasons for thought. Public opinion rejoices - that's fine, but what to do next? After all, not a single task facing the British expeditionary forces was ever solved. The massive hull of a sinking Argentine cruiser successfully retouched the fact that the British operation failed on all counts: the airfields are not destroyed, air supremacy can only be dreamed of, the Argentine fleet is not broken, therefore, not a single prerequisite for a successful landing of the landing forces has been created. The British command rose the shadow of Chernyshevsky with his eternal question: "What should I do?"
Alas, the gloomy British staff genius did not think of anything better than to repeat all the events of the just completed operation up to the point! On the night of 3 on May 4, the British again sent two Vulcan strategic bombs to crush the Malvinas Islands base (Port Stanley airfield). Again, 10 Victor flying tankers had to be sent to support two combat aircraft. The operation, without further ado, was called the "Black Bac 2" and the only difference from the "Black Bac 1" was only that this time both bomber could fly to the target. But not a single bomb hit the runway of the airfield again, so it didn’t affect the final result.
On the morning of May 4, the 317-e task force re-deployed to attack the Condor and Malvinas Islands airbases with the help of its few “Sea Harriers”. But if the last time the British VTOL fell on the Argentines with a bolt from the blue, now the British decided to be imposing: first they had a pair of Sea Harriers at 08.00 who were supposed to fly and watch the effects of Vulkans and only then, closer to dinner , planned air strike. The evening was supposed to land small reconnaissance groups.
Of course, a true British gentleman must demonstrate a commitment to tradition and be distinguished by a burden to a measured way of life, but such inclinations are categorically contraindicated for the planning of military operations. This time the Argentines, who were taught by bitter experience, were not at all going to play giveaway with the British, but acted completely differently.
On 05.33 in the morning, a hail of Vulcan bombs struck the Stanley airfield, causing no harm to anyone, but warning the Argentines that the British fleet was again seeking battle. The response of the Argentinean command was both sensible and tactically literate - instead of useless attempts to cover airfields with fighter aircraft from continental bases, the Argentines sent their planes to search for British ships that were supposed to attack Falkland. Approximately between 08.00 and 09.00, the Neptune reconnaissance aircraft revealed the location of the British warrant and the Super Endandar duty team rose in the 09.00, each of which carried one Exocset anti-ship missiles. In 09.30, Neptune passed the coordinates of two British ship groups to the Super Etandar pilots.
The Argentine operation was wonderfully conceived and wonderfully executed. The targeting received from Neptune allowed the Super Etandars to pave the optimal combat course - attacking planes came from the south, from which the British expected the least attack. Moreover, in this area, flights of rescue aircraft and multiple radio communications between ships and aircraft (the search for the “General Belgrano” crew continued) made it extremely difficult to detect the Argentinean combat group. The Super Etandars themselves went at a low altitude, with the radar turned off and in radio silence mode, which again was possible due to target designation from the Neptune. In addition, a distracting maneuver was undertaken - from the Rio Grande airbase (coast of Argentina) in order to imitate an attack from the west and distract attention of the air defense, the airliner Liar Jet 35A-L was raised. Two pairs of Daggers were on duty in the air to cover the Super Etandars and Neptune. In 10.30 "Neptune" once again clarified the coordinates and composition of the selected group of ships for the attack: three surface targets, one large, and the other two smaller. Approaching 46 km to the British ships, the Super Etandars rose to 150 m and switched on their Agaves (RLS), but did not find the enemy, and then immediately went down. A few minutes later, the Argentine pilots repeated their maneuver and in about 30 seconds of radar operation they detected the enemy. True, the radio intelligence station of the destroyer Glasgow also spotted the radiation of the Agave, which saved the ship from great trouble. The Argentines attacked, but the Glasgow, warned of the presence of unknown planes nearby, managed to interfere, thereby rejecting the Exochet aiming at it. Sheffield was much less fortunate: the attacking rocket was found only six seconds before it crashed into the ship's hull.
Further well known. The struggle for the survivability of Sheffield did not lead to anything, the crew had to be evacuated, the burning ship drifted for a while until the fire, devouring everything it could reach, 5 on May did not die down by itself. The ship with burnt-out central compartments and (partly) the superstructure was decided to be taken to New Georgia. On May 8, the frigate “Yarmouth” began towing, but the raging storm did not leave the British hopes for success, and 10 May Sheffield went to the bottom.
About an hour after the successful attack on Sheffield, three Sea Harriers attacked Goose Green airfield (Condor airbase). The meaning of this action is not quite clear. Rear Admiral Woodworth writes in his memoirs that the purpose of this raid was to "destroy several airplanes," but was it worth the cost of a game? The British did not disable the airfield, for this the outfit was obviously insufficient, while the attack on the British ships clearly indicated that the Argentines were aware of the presence of the British and were ready for battle. The VTOLP troika did not have the ability to suppress the air defense of the airfield, respectively, the attack turned out to be very risky, but even if successful, the British destroyed only a few screw aircraft ... In general, the motives of this action are unclear, and the result, alas, is logical: one "Sea Harrier" was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, the rest returned with nothing. After that, the 317 th operational connection interrupted the operation and retreated to the TRALA zone. The second attempt by the British to establish control over the water area and the airspace of the Falkland Islands suffered a crushing fiasco. Having lost the destroyer and VTOL, the 317-e operational connection was forced to withdraw, and until May 8, its surface ships did not undertake any activity.
What conclusions can we draw from all this?
Even the most cursory analysis of the 1-4 of May 1982 of the year shows the complete inconsistency of the concept of aircraft-carrier groups built around the carriers of vertical take-off and landing aircraft. These days, British carrier-based aircraft consistently failed absolutely all the tasks facing it.
Despite the fact that the Falkland airbases were not destroyed, and air superiority over the islands was not conquered, according to one point of the plan, the British succeeded: they lured the Argentine fleet, forcing his command to believe in the inevitability of the British landing. Now the British had to destroy the main forces of the APA in battle, and that was entirely within their power. All that Rear Admiral Woodworth needed was to find the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 ships, after which the use of atomarines in conjunction with the attacks of Sea Harriers would leave no chance to the Argentines.
But the reconnaissance capabilities of the 317 operational connection did not at all correspond to the tasks before it. The British did not have long-range radar detection aircraft, there were no aircraft capable of performing electronic reconnaissance. What can I say: the British did not have any reconnaissance aircraft at all, as a result of which they were forced to send in search of Argentines absolutely not intended for this “Sea Harrier”. The presence of a fairly primitive radar in the latter led to the fact that the pilots for the most part had to rely on their eyes, which was badly enough in bad weather conditions (typical of this area of the Atlantic). The small combat radius of the VTOL aircraft limited the search time for the enemy, and all this together reduced the search capabilities of the British aircraft carrier group to the level of World War II aircraft carriers, or rather even its first half, at best.
The British pilots were well prepared, and their aircraft (at the expense of more modern weapons) turned out to be individually stronger than the fighters of the Argentine Air Force. This allowed the British pilots to gain air victories, but none of the above did not allow them to detect the enemy in time and control his (or his) airspace. As a result, of the three Argentine task forces, the British were able to find only one (TG-79.3 led by General Belgrano), and thanks to the data of American satellite intelligence. It is very likely that if the Americans did not provide the British with the location of the TG-79.3 ships, the ConCair could not be taken to escort General Belgrano.
If we are talking about submarines, it should be noted that their ability to detect the enemy also turned out to be very far from desired. The atarins Spartan and Splendit, deployed along the paths of possible movement of the main forces of the ARA, could not find the enemy. Moreover, the Splendit was unable to find the TG-79.1 ships even after it was “prompted” by the location of the Argentines (the night contact of the Sea Harrier with the Santisimo Trinidad).
But back to the actions of aviation. This time, Argentina sent to reconnaissance the best that she had - the Neptune patrol aircraft SP-2H. The prototype of the Neptune first flew 17 in May 1945, its operation began in the US Navy in March 1947. For its time, the plane turned out to be extremely successful, but, of course, by the year 1982 was very outdated. But on it was installed decimeter radar AN / APS-20. Created by the Cadillac program in 1944, this system was installed on the deck forex torpedo bomber, the Avenger, turning it into an ARLO aircraft, and this modification of the Evenges even managed to fight for, having received a baptism of 1945 in the Battle of Okinawa. The capabilities of AN / APS-20 in 1982 were no longer amazing, but it was impossible to call them miserable. A compact group of aircraft, or a single large aircraft flying at a high altitude, it could detect approximately 160-180 km, but the detection range of low-flying targets was presumably lower because decimeter radars did not work very well against the background of the underlying surface (with The Americans collided during the operation of the Idjis radar AN / SPY-1). To the deepest regret, the author could not find the detection range of surface targets by AN / APS-20.
The technical condition of "Neptune" was terrifying. The radar was periodically turned off, and the plane itself had just not collapsed in the air. By the beginning of the Falklands conflict, Argentina had 4 machines of this type, but 2 of them could not get into the air. The rest still made 51 sorties at the beginning of hostilities, but on May X, the Argentines were forced to put their best scouts on the joke forever - the life of the machines was finalized.
In no case can you blame the commander of the British forces, Rear Admiral Woodworth in rotostey. He did everything in his power. He echeloned 317-e operational connection, pushing three ships of the radar patrol in the most threatening direction. In the 18 miles behind them, a second line of defense passed, consisting of a destroyer and three frigates, immediately followed by three auxiliary vessels and only then - both aircraft carriers with direct protection. The British commander also organized air duty. Regarding the organization of the air defense of the connection entrusted to him, he did everything correctly, but ...
Many people, just starting to study the Falklands conflict, have one and the same question: why did they miss the attack on the destroyer? Why did the Super Endandar radar notice the British ship, and the Sheffield radar did not see any Argentine aircraft or a rocket attacking it? After all, shipborne radar, in theory, is much more powerful than aircraft radar. The answer to this question is known long ago - the Sheffield radar was turned off in connection with a communication session with the headquarters of the Naval Forces in Northwood, so that the radiation of radars did not interfere with the operation of satellite equipment. Quite understandable and explanatory answer: the British ship was unlucky, Destiny decided that this way ...
But in reality, the question is not why the Sheffield radar did not see the Exocet missile flying towards it. The question is, how did the old “Neptune” manage to track the movements of the British squadrons for several hours and it wasn’t discovered by them ?!
After all, the SP-2H "Neptune" is not the B-2 "Spirit" and not the F-22 "Raptor". This is a flying barn with a wing span of over thirty meters, whose glider was designed at a time when invisibility passed exclusively on the office of HG Wells (meaning his novel Invisible Man). And this glider was supposed to shine on the screens of the British radar as a garland of a New Year tree. Well, order me to think that the English ph from 09.00 to 11.00 turned off all its radar stations, and enthusiastically chatted over satellite communications with Northwood ?! Well, let's imagine for a moment that, due to some kind of cosmic fluctuation, all the British radars were suddenly blind. Or the sea god Neptune endowed his Argentine "namesake" with temporary radar invisibility. But what about the passive radio intelligence stations? Radiation of the onboard radar "Neptune" the British had to detect!
On the destroyer "Glasgow" recorded the radiation of the "Agave" - the standard radar "Super Etandara", on the "Sheffield" - failed, and this most sources explain the "questions to the level of crew training." But you should face it - on a single ship of the 317 of the operational connection could not detect the work of the radar station of the Argentine "Neptune". Well, did the entire British fleet suddenly lose its shape? In fact, no matter how sad it is to admit, but in the 1982 year, the British fleet, despite the presence of many locators, radio intelligence stations, and others, simply did not have the means to reliably detect an enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Even if this plane was equipped with equipment of the era of the Second World War.
Once upon a time, the famous British admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham remarked: "The best way to fight air is in the air." But the British carrier aircraft could not help their ships. The British had two dozen "Sea Harriers". The Argentines opposed them to a pair of "Super Etandarov", two flying tankers, a scout "Neptune" and an airliner "Liar Jet 35A-L", which was to divert the attention of the British to themselves. And the airliner became that day the only plane of the Argentines who could not cope with their task, because the British did not think to notice it. Moreover, for some time, it was possible to ensure the duty in the air of two twos of “Daggers”, covering the above forces. Total in the combat zone attended a maximum of Argentine 10 aircraft, of which no more than six combat. But twenty British aircraft, each of which was not particularly difficult to deal one on one with the “Super Etandard”, even with the “Dagger”, could not do anything.
The actions of the Argentines 4 May clearly demonstrated: information plays no less, and even more important than the actual means of destruction (although, of course, we should not forget about them). The Argentines sent into the battle half the size of the air force than those possessed by the British, and this does not take into account the ships of the fleet of His Majesty. And they succeeded, because the only antediluvian Argentinean intelligence officer turned out to be more valuable than both the British VTOL aircraft carriers with their air groups combined.
You can, of course, ask: What did the British think about, creating VTOL carriers, instead of building full-fledged aircraft carriers? Really no one realized the value of early warning airplanes and radio intelligence, which needed catapults for takeoff and which could not be based on ships like the British Invincible? Nobody could have foreseen the extremely weak ability of Sea Harriers to reconnoit and control the airspace? Of course, they guessed and foresaw, but Britain decided to save on the construction of full-fledged aircraft carriers, which seemed too costly to the sirs and peers. The English admirals found themselves in a situation where it was necessary to choose: either to abandon deck-based aviation in general, or to receive “stubs” - “Invincibles” with VTOL. The command of the Royal Navy cannot be blamed for preferring a bird in the hands of a crane in the sky. Moreover, the British admirals were well aware that in a real battle, without the means of reconnaissance and target designation, such a tit would turn into a duck under the bed, if not a dove on a tombstone. And, in order to avoid such a radical finale, they developed the appropriate tactics for using aircraft-carriers of VTOL aircraft, according to which these ships and aircraft should be used exclusively in areas controlled by British AWACS and Newrod AEW or by NATO AWACS E-ZA Sentry. .
The British created their post-war fleet to counteract the underwater threat, to prevent the Soviet nuclear submarines from breaking through to the Atlantic, while the anti-aircraft defense of anti-submarine formations should have been able to withstand only single aircraft. Massive aviation attacks were not expected, due to the absence of aircraft carriers from the USSR. It was logical, but, alas, being has a peculiar sense of humor, so the English fleet had to fight not at all with that adversary and not where it was supposed. That once again shows the inferiority of the naval forces, "sharpened" to solve a limited range of tasks, and speaks of the need to build a fleet, whose capabilities will allow to answer any challenge.
Their lordships, sirs, and peers “optimized” the costs of the military budget, but the sailors of the Royal Navy had to pay for this savings.
To be continued ...