Military Review

Dot №401: "mine" of the Kiev fortified area

33
On the basis of Order No. 90 of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council of 19 in March 1928, under the fortification program of state borders for war, in 1928, the construction of the first 13 fortified areas (URs) began, among which was the Kievsky fortified area (KiUR). Work on the design of defensive lines on the approaches to Kiev began in the same year, and from 1929 to 1932 years on the approaches to the capital of the Ukrainian SSR was built around 246 (according to the 1937 report of the year) of various long-term fortifications, most of which were machine gun the number of embrasures from one to four.


The bulk of the long-term defensive structures erected during this period belonged to type “B” (according to the 1931 classification of the year), and only a few structures belonged to type “M1”. At the same time, there were not so many significant differences between machine gun dots of type “B” and machine gun dots of type “M1”. Dots of the first type most often were two-story, and dots «М1» - only one-story. At the same time, in the “B” type pillboxes, the availability of ancillary facilities reached 9 plus the garrison rest room, whereas in the “M1” type pillboxes there were only 1-3. The thickness of the floor walls of these pillboxes was 150-155 cm, the rear wall was 80-85 cm, which provided their garrisons with protection against 152-mm projectiles and, possibly, single hits of 203-mm projectiles. The main armament of these dots were 3-4 heavy machine guns.

According to the classification adopted in 1931, all two-storey firing points equipped with a chemical shelter received the designation "B", and one-story without chemical shelter - the index "M". This system was approved by the USSR Revolutionary Military Council Commission for tactical and engineering solutions of the UR in the summer of 1931 (not earlier than 29 of June). At the same time, a classification was introduced to denote the resistance of structures. In this case, the subscript numeric index was used for the letter “M”, however, it was inconvenient to use it in the preparation of documents, therefore simpler spelling variants like M1 or the hyphen “M-1” are widely used. A total of three categories of resistance (shooting distance 6 km) were introduced: М1 (floor wall - 150 cm, one hit 203-mm howitzer and 152-mm gun), М2 (floor wall - 135 cm, one hit 152-mm howitzer and 152 -mm guns) and M3 (floor wall - 90 cm, single hit 122-mm howitzers and 76-mm guns). The overwhelming majority of the “B” type pillboxes had the “МХNUMX” persistence category.



After 1931, the reorientation towards the construction of mainly M1 and M2 type bunkers took place in the KiUR strip, with firing points designated as “MS”, which were built in 1932, served as an addition to them. In the same year, the last battalion areas of the fortified area were erected, located in Koncha-Zaspa (battalion No. XXUMX) and in the area of ​​Belogorodka (battalion No. XXUMX). The single-brass pillboxes of the MC were made in the resistance category МХNUMX, they were armed with one heavy machine gun and had only one room for the garrison (directly combat dungeon).

In addition to the firing points, facilities designed to shelter personnel and equipment, which were designated as “shelters”, were built at KiUR. To observe the battlefield, NPs were built — observation posts, the commanders of the divisions led the battle from the command posts — command posts or KNP — command and observation posts. And for the artillery spotters, the ANP was built - artillery observation posts.

In 1930-1931, experiments were conducted on the shelling of long-term structures from different-caliber guns in different tactical conditions. They demonstrated that the adopted thicknesses of the walls and coatings provide the appropriate type of protection for pillboxes. The experiments carried out demonstrated a very low probability of hitting heavy projectiles directly into firing points of a small cubic capacity ("М2" and "М3"). So, two batteries of 203-mm howitzers, firing from a distance of 3,5 kilometer and firing 90 shells, did not achieve a single direct hit in the firing point of the type "M2". And this despite the fact that the fire was carried out with an adjustment, the observer was in 800 meters from the protective structure, and the dispersion of shells was normal.



In August, 1937, when the KiUR combat readiness test was conducted, 246 structures were built in the fortified area. 35 769 cubic meters of reinforced concrete were spent on their construction. Together with the construction of household and auxiliary buildings, 13 117 000 rubles were spent on works at KiUR, a very impressive amount at that time.

It should be noted that the artillery buildings were very poorly represented in KiUR, there were only 3 artillery polukaponiry in its composition, however, much more stationary artillery positions of the Taut type were prepared. Two artillery polukaponiry were built on the same project, and one was built on an individual. In the latter case, the long-term structure had two floors, as well as an additional machine gun casemate, the fire from which was directed in the direction opposite to the guns (as a result, this structure was, in fact, an artillery-machine gun polukaponir). All artillery installations of the Kiev UR were armed with 76,2-mm cannons of the 1900 model of the year on the caponier carriage of Durlächer.

At the same time, the most interesting, expensive and mysterious constructions of KiUR were the so-called “mines”, the greatest number of legends of the fortified area are associated with them today. At the same time, the “mine” type structures were the most labor-intensive in construction. Each such structure was a whole complex consisting of tips (from one to several), which were interconnected by a network of underground utilities. It should be noted that in the documentation of the 1920-s of the beginning of the 1930-s, both single firing points with underground communications and whole complexes with a common underground part were called “mine-type structures” or simply “mines”. This name is inextricably linked with the method of penetration is lost, which in military engineering has traditionally been called “mine”. At the end of the 1930s, they were also called "fire groups."

Bambo double cap №401


The use of dungeons, on the one hand, made it possible to minimize the size of the military installations themselves, which, in fact, were only combat dungeons, since all the auxiliary equipment and reserves were located underground. The developed network of underground structures allowed to significantly increase the stocks of food and ammunition, which provided an incomparable ability to conduct an autonomous battlefield compared to conventional pillboxes. On the other hand, an extensive network of dungeons made it possible to ensure an incomparable level of ordinary pillboxes with a level of safety and comfort for the “mine” garrison.

In total, there were four similar buildings in KiUR, three of which were fire, and the fourth united in a single dox complex of the МNNXX type and ANP of the B type. The dot number XXUMX, which is located in the area of ​​Belogorodka, has survived to the present day. In his case, there was a re-equipment of the two-story machine-gun of type “B” erected in 1, into a “mine” by retrofitting its system with one-framed casemates. The restructuring was done in 401. In order to communicate with the ground on the lower floor of the semicaponion, an opening was made and a shaft with ladders was equipped.

Dot №401 was the biggest "mine" in the composition of the whole KiUR. This fortification object has been preserved to our days, and it can still be seen near the village of Belogorodka in the Kiev-Svyatoshinsky district of the Kiev region. In 2006, the Ukrainian horror film “Adit” was filmed here, which made the object even more popular and popular. This “mine” combines three tips: one double-bricks dot and two single-facet casemates. The cap is almost a separate pillbox, the main difference of which is the presence of a mine or a passage that connect it to the general system of "mines". The single-brick roof dota No. XXUMX was embedded in the steep slope of the Irpen river bank, and the double-marble roof is located at a height, this dot had two floors, for this reason a “mine” and is considered today to be three-level. At the first level of the structure is a system of moves, or in the language of military engineers is lost. The total length of the pockets and pockets of this “mine” is approximately 401 meter, which is more than the far or near caves of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra. Thanks to the advanced network, not only his garrison, but also additional defenders could be hiding in this dota, which could be used to counterattack against attacking or bypassing enemy soldiers.



"Mina" near Belogorodka was laid at a depth of 9 meters, this depth provided reliable protection from shells and bombs. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls of the double-bore head was 150 cm, the thickness of the ceilings was 120 cm. This would provide the garrison with protection even if one 152 mm shell or 50-100 kilogram hit aviation the bombs. At the same time, the probability of hitting a bunker with an aerial bomb was even less than a direct hit by a heavy projectile, since it was a very difficult task to drop a bomb precisely onto a small, well-disguised tip of a plane flying at very high speed. The bunkers were camouflaged with metal nets with turf; a small parapet was built around the perimeter and on their roofs, which held a layer of land with grass. In the fields, the pillboxes tried to disguise themselves as farm and residential buildings. At the same time, for civilians, the areas where fortifications were located were a restricted area, they were surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by horse outfits.

In the "mine", or Dot No. XXUMX, there were three exits: two horizontal ones are lost and one of the double-faced cap. In this top of the "mines" led a vertical shaft with staple-ladder. It is worth noting that all the pillboxes with worn ones had two exits: the main and the spare one. At the same time, the main exit was protected by a metal grill and embrasure, behind which a fighter with a light machine gun could sit, while the emergency exit was closed only by a metal grill. In addition, from the ground of the bunker No.401 upward led a mine, over which a disguised observation post (NP) was supposed to be erected, from which the garrison commander could follow the surrounding terrain. It is known that the reinforced concrete NP was not built above the mine, although it was provided for by the inspection commission of the facility, but it was no longer possible to tell whether the tree-and-earth NP was built over it during the war years.

The main exit dota №401

Emergency exit dota №401


KiUR preparation and participation of dota in battles

The restoration of KiUR’s combat readiness began on June 24 of 1941, when MP Kirponos, commander of the Southwestern Front, issued a directive on the formation of parts of the fortified area, the restoration of weapons and equipment of the pillboxes, and the construction of field fortifications. The next day, arrangements were made for the construction of additional fortifications. The population of the capital of Ukraine was mobilized to carry out the necessary defense work, while the number of citizens mobilized was constantly increasing: 30 June 1941 of the year 50 thousand inhabitants were employed at the construction of defensive lines near Kiev, 2 of July 1941 of the year - already 160 thousand people, and in recent days to 200 thousands of Kiev residents. The civilian population of Kiev carried out a huge amount of work on the restoration of the pillboxes and the construction of field fortifications.

Since the construction of the Kiev fortified area did not provide any anti-tank barriers, 15 kilometers of escarpments were opened to eliminate this drawback, 30 kilometers of anti-tank ditches, hundreds of metal hedgehogs were installed. In addition, dozens of kilometers of wire fences were built, 16 kilometers of them were electrified. Minefields were also used in large quantities, in which about 100 thousands of mines were installed. Also, the population of the city opened a huge number of trenches, trenches, communication lines, built many artillery and machine-gun positions. To strengthen the line of defense KiUR was built approximately 750 bunkers.

One of the monofray caps overlooking the floodplain of the Irpen River


Also, in order to strengthen the first line of defense of the fortified area, a natural obstacle in the form of the Irpen River was used. It was on the bank of this river that Dot No. XXUMX was located. A dam was built at the mouth of the Irpin River, as a result of which the water level in the river rose by 401 meters. This led to the flooding of the river floodplain, its width reached 2-700 meters, and the depth along the riverbed was almost 1000 meters. At the same time, work was underway to create a second and third line of defense around Kiev, and the city itself was preparing for street battles. In the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, there was a formation of national militia units, by July 4 8, their number had already exceeded 1941 thousands of people. All defense works under the city, in addition to the local population, involved significant forces of the engineering troops, for example, the 29 demining and engineering battalions of the Red Army, as well as two electrorums, worked on the barrier system. 5 July 8, the work on the equipment and arrangement of the first line of defense was fully completed.

Very little is known about the participation of DotA No. 401 directly in the battles. With confidence we can only say that the first German soldiers appeared on the banks of the Irpen river on July 11, 1941 - these were representatives of the 1st tank group of General Ewald von Kleist. Its motorized and tank units were the "tip" of the wedge of the German Army Group "South", which was aimed at Kiev. There were still battles in the rear of Kleist’s tank group, and its advanced units attempted to force Irpen in the area of ​​the Zhytomyr-Kiev highway. And I understand the Irpen River, and the Germans tried to overcome the river itself in the place where the highway rested against it.

The view from the loopholes overlooking the river Irpen


The bridges across the river were blown up when German units approached them. For several days they tried to break through the bridge on the highway Zhytomyr-Kiev, but were stopped by heavy fire of pillboxes, artillery and field-filling forces of the fortified area. It was in these battles that Dot No. XXUMX, the so-called "mine", took part. Judging by the remaining traces of shells, this fortification was shelled by German artillery, but this did not cause serious damage to the dota. At the same time, the main battles in the Kiev fortified area did not unfold here, but on its southern face, where, from 401 July 31, the Germans made large-scale attempts to break through KiUR, with the aim to break through to Kiev and its bridges across the Dnieper.

The garrisons of the Kiev fortified area pillboxes left their 18-19 September 1941 of the year. According to the order, the machine gun battalions occupying them were relegated to the Dnieper. By this time, the cauldron of the encirclement of the troops of the South-Western Front near Kiev had already slammed shut. When fighting for the city, part of the pillboxes was destroyed, another part was undermined during the withdrawal of parts of the Red Army, but the pillat No. XXUMX was left intact. Later, in the 401 year, the pillbox survived again, although the Germans then carried out a large-scale action to destroy the remaining structures of the Soviet fortified areas, fearing their use by partisans. Thus, this “mine” survived the war, battles on the approaches to Kiev and battles during its liberation in November 1942 of the year by Soviet troops, having survived to this day and attracting the attention of all lovers storiesbecoming a real object of pilgrimage. True, the wide popularity and convenient location played a pretty bad joke with the pillbox. This abandoned sample of the Soviet pre-war fortification today, unfortunately, is filled with debris, which its frequent guests bring with them.

Lossy and ramifications "mines"


Information sources:
Kuzyak A.G., Kaminsky V.V. Reinforced concrete structures of fortified regions of the USSR on the territory of Ukraine. 1928-1936 Fortress Russia. Issue 2. Vladivostok, 2005.
http://www.kaponir.ru/4ur/05/kiur/kiur/kiur.php
http://liniastalina.narod.ru/kiev/hist1.htm
http://warspot.ru/1545-pamyatnik-stalinskoy-fortifikatsii
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  1. igordok
    igordok 16 May 2016 07: 02
    +13
    Thanks. Sebezhsky, Ostrovsky and Pskov SD after the accession of the Baltic states remained in the understaffed form. Only the walls. Where possible, KA fighters used in defense. In 1943-1944, the Germans selectively began to destroy the bunkers of the Sebezh, Ostrovsky and Pskov SDs which in 1941 brought them problems.
    The destruction of the "Stalin Line" bunker before the war is the ravings of the rhizunoids. The bunker was blown up by the Germans.
    1. Leto
      Leto 16 May 2016 09: 56
      +5
      Quote: igordok
      The destruction of the "Stalin Line" bunker before the war is the ravings of the rhizunoids. The bunker was blown up by the Germans.

      It was not the pillboxes that were destroyed as such, but fortified areas. Rather, they were not destroyed, but disbanded, which is practically the same. The bunker itself is only a concrete box, there is little sense from it without a garrison, communication system, support band, etc.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 May 2016 10: 40
        +2
        Quote: Leto
        It was not the pillboxes that were destroyed as such, but fortified areas. Rather, they were not destroyed, but disbanded, which is practically the same.

        They were not disbanded, but reduced. Kievsky, Novograd-Volynsky, Izyaslavsky, Starokonstantinovsky, Shepetovsky, Ostropolsky, Sebezhsky Districts were left without garrisons on the "Stalin Line" ). In the rest of the SD, the old line of defense of the opabs has been preserved.
      2. igordok
        igordok 16 May 2016 10: 42
        +1
        Quote: Leto
        It was not the pillboxes that were destroyed as such, but fortified areas. Rather, they were not destroyed, but disbanded, which is practically the same. The bunker itself is only a concrete box, there is little sense from it without a garrison, communication system, support band, etc.

        Explain that you are about the destruction of UR by the Germans or ours?
        The Germans destroyed precisely the bunker. And as I said selectively. Near the detonated bunker, a whole-bunker bunker could be located.
        The formed SDs were under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces and were not disbanded before the war. Leave the bunker unattended, so the local population will quickly drag it away. For example, 25UR as a military unit was seconded to the Pskov and Ostrovsky UR. The unfinished (practically inoperative) Ostrovsky and obsolete Pskov SDs were not able to provide adequate resistance in 1941 and 25UR retreating was sent to form the Novgorod SD.
        Composition 25UR (fortified area)
        management (headquarters)
        separate machine gun and artillery battalion 25 ur
        153 Separate Machine Gun Battalion
        83 Separate Machine Gun Battalion
        57 Separate Artillery Division
        61 separate machine gun and artillery battalion
        152 separate machine gun and artillery battalion
        153 separate machine gun and artillery battalion
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Not disbanded, but contracted.

        Absolutely.
  2. svp67
    svp67 16 May 2016 07: 09
    +4
    KiUR played a very significant role in 1941. Without it, the Germans could have taken Kiev on the move.
    1. Leto
      Leto 16 May 2016 10: 02
      -2
      Quote: svp67
      KiUR played a very significant role in 1941. Without it, the Germans could have taken Kiev on the move.

      Useless then. Kiev surrendered without a fight, almost a million-strong group in a matter of days turned into a crowd of prisoners of war. This despite the fact that in Kiev there were supplies for the entire southern front, food, weapons. It was possible for more than one month to sit surrounded, not particularly saving ammunition.
      1. igordok
        igordok 16 May 2016 10: 47
        +2
        Quote: Leto
        Useless then.

        Hand over Kiev in July or September. The difference is very big. Kiev riveted large resources of the Wehrmacht, weakening other areas.
        1. Leto
          Leto 16 May 2016 12: 09
          +1
          Quote: igordok
          Hand over Kiev in July or September. The difference is very big. Kiev riveted large resources of the Wehrmacht, weakening other areas.

          This is because Hitler is loshara. Guderian was right, he didn’t give a damn about Kiev, most importantly Moscow. Potapov’s 5th Army posed no threat.
          1. svp67
            svp67 16 May 2016 14: 31
            +2
            Quote: Leto
            Potapov’s 5th Army posed no threat.

            Well, the 5th army may not, although the issue is controversial, but did the SWZ pose a threat to Guderian’s tank wedges going to Moscow bypassing Kiev?
      2. creak
        creak 16 May 2016 10: 53
        +4
        Quote: Leto
        It was possible for more than one month to sit surrounded, not particularly saving ammunition.


        What are you speaking about? Is it with such a commander, by the way, of the Southwestern (and not South) front like Kirponos?
        The troops must be commanded - and he allowed the worst thing that could happen to the military commander - he lost control of the troops entrusted to him (in 1940, this burden was beyond the command of the division.)
        But instead of trying to at least somehow improve the situation, without thinking up anything better, he decided to leave the encirclement himself, only with a group of front-line officers and guards (about 1 people in total).
        How this adventure ended is well known - it’s a pity he just paid for it not only with his life, but also with the lives of tens of thousands of his subordinates ...
        PS At one time I had a chance to live and study at a school in the Poltava region where my father served (these are the places where the ring of the German circle closed) - what the locals told me - eyewitnesses of the tragedy of the South-West front, it is difficult to describe in words (such as the fate of the wounded in dozens of hospitals that were not evacuated ..)
        1. Leto
          Leto 16 May 2016 11: 53
          -4
          Quote: ranger
          Is it with such a commander, by the way, of the Southwestern (and not South) front like Kirponos?

          And this is the same. Suppose you would command there who the other outcome would be different? Take all the coppers of 1941. are there cases where competent command had an effect?
          Quote: ranger
          difficult to describe in words (such as the fate of the wounded in dozens of hospitals that were not evacuated ..)

          How many such cases were ... The same Sevastopol ...
          1. BAI
            BAI 16 May 2016 12: 57
            +4
            Comcor Petrovsky, General Lukin.
          2. The comment was deleted.
          3. creak
            creak 16 May 2016 13: 43
            +7
            Quote: Leto
            How many such cases were ... The same Sevastopol ...


            That's exactly the same Sevastopol and the same story - the garrison was left to its own devices - and the command of the SOR (Admiral Oktyabrsky and General Petrov) is safely evacuated from the city ...
            But there was still the commander of 33 gen. Efremov, who did not fly away on the plane sent for him, but chose to fight to the end and share the fate of his subordinates ... Even the Germans buried him with military honors ..
            So there were such cases and boilers also because, unfortunately, not all commanders understood their military duty as General Efremov.
          4. The comment was deleted.
      3. svp67
        svp67 16 May 2016 16: 49
        +1
        Quote: Leto
        Useless then.

        Then every day had its own sense.
        Quote: Leto
        Kiev surrendered without a fight, almost a million-strong group in a matter of days turned into a crowd of prisoners of war.

        The Germans were the best at that time and we "learned" from our mistakes. And at the expense of a million, do not exaggerate, the numbers are really huge, but not a million.
        Quote: Leto
        This despite the fact that in Kiev there were supplies for the entire southern front, food, weapons.

        Kiev belonged to the Southwest Front, that is, to the South-Western Front, the South Front is a different direction. And again, do not exaggerate, there were NOT ALL SOZF reserves in Kiev.
        Quote: Leto
        It was possible for more than one month to sit surrounded, not particularly saving ammunition.

        Yes ... You somehow imagine it as a child. The integrity of the front collapsed. The controllability of large formations, formations and units was lost, the rear was destroyed and supply routes were cut ... and how, in that situation, were they going to "sit out for months"? There was no longer a single military organization subordinate to one directorate, our units were beating one by one. And ammunition is not the most important thing, we need more fuel, food, medicine and much more.
        In short, after "waving your fists in a fight" is not a gratifying thing, but to sort out the mistakes so that they do not repeat them, of course it is necessary. And the conclusion is that the Red Army in 1941 was a very poorly controlled and not agile "colossus", not adapted to the conduct of highly mobile war.
        1. Shadowcat
          Shadowcat 16 May 2016 19: 44
          +1
          Quote: svp67
          And the conclusion is that the Red Army in 1941 was a very poorly controlled and not agile "colossus", not adapted to the conduct of highly mobile war.

          I do not agree with you here. Rather, the fact that in the first month and a half of the war the blitzkrieg worked for the Germans with a bang, as well as a well-planned moment of impact. Yes, with slipping, but it worked. But in this regard, they did not take into account the resistance and resilience of the Soviet troops.
          For example, from Halder’s diary, you can see (albeit with caution. For example, I can’t understand how sick there can be as many as wounded (approx. 50k). Is it that they had massive flu?) That by the end of the second month the losses were greater than Western company of the Wehrmacht.
  3. Gray 43
    Gray 43 16 May 2016 08: 07
    0
    I found out about the KUR in the program "Searchers" - they tried to find traces of either a command bunker, or one of the pillboxes, I don't remember already, but the scale of the building was impressive!
    1. Red_Hamer
      Red_Hamer 16 May 2016 09: 40
      0
      And I, from the stories of my grandfather, when I was little, saw his medal "For the Defense of Kiev".
  4. Moore
    Moore 16 May 2016 09: 38
    0
    The restoration of the combat readiness of KiUR began already on June 24, 1941, when M.P. Kirponos, the commander of the Southwestern Front, gave a directive on the formation of parts of the fortified area, the restoration of armament and equipment of the pillboxes, as well as the construction of field fortifications.

    It turns out that the units were not initially provided for the fortified area with pre-war plans, since they had to be re-formed?
    And how does this all fit in with the GK telegram dated 18.06/XNUMX. about bringing troops on full alert?
    1. Red_Hamer
      Red_Hamer 16 May 2016 09: 58
      +1
      Just to the west, along the border of 40-41, new fortifications were urgently being built, no one thought that the enemy would approach Kiev, (it was a deep rear) That's all the equipment, and the attached troops were sent west, to still, often not equipped places. They dragged everything to Western Ukraine, and did not have time to completely rebuild. Https: //www.youtube.com/watch? V = b1EFNQWduhw
      look, I think it will be interesting.
    2. Amurets
      Amurets 16 May 2016 16: 29
      +1
      Quote: Moore

      It turns out that the units were not initially provided for the fortified area with pre-war plans, since they had to be re-formed?
      And how does this all fit in with the GK telegram dated 18.06/XNUMX. about bringing troops on full alert?

      Read Vinichenko.Runov. * Stalin's line in battle * .A. Metla. * Stalin's line. The truth and memory of history. * And through the link you will find generally shocking materials. Http://tsar-ivan.livejournal.com/26293.html
      Especially look at the memos in NGOs.
      1. Aleksander
        Aleksander 17 May 2016 11: 00
        0
        Quote: Amurets
        .http: //tsar-ivan.livejournal.com/26293.html Especially look at the memos in NGOs


        Thank you, an interesting article, namely memos. I knew, in principle, about the state of UR, but the primary sources are real witnesses ....
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 16 May 2016 10: 54
    +5
    In August, 1937, when the KiUR combat readiness test was conducted, 246 structures were built in the fortified area. 35 769 cubic meters of reinforced concrete were spent on their construction. Together with the construction of household and auxiliary buildings, 13 117 000 rubles were spent on works at KiUR, a very impressive amount at that time.

    Hehe hehe ... and then she came bloody gebnya - And the benevolent picture of the combat-ready SD turned into a combination of strategic, tactical and technical failures:
    In the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine

    On the state of KiUR
    11th of January 1939

    ... Kiev fortified area today represents only the skeleton of a local position, consisting mainly of machine-gun structures ... and is completely not provided with the necessary equipment.
    Of the 257 structures available in the area, only 5 are ready for combat ... The left and right flanks are not protected and have free passage for the enemy (left - 4 km, right - 7 km).
    In the center of the UR zone ... a bag has been formed (a gap of 7 km), through which the enemy has free access directly to Kiev.
    The front edge of the long-term strip is only 15 km from the center of Kiev, which makes it possible to fire at the enemy of Kiev without invading the fortified area ...

    From 257 facilities, 175 lacks the necessary horizon of shelling due to the terrain (mounds, mountains, large forest and bushes).
    Planning work on SD, despite the instructions of the government, is delayed by the implementation of wartime, while these works must be carried out immediately. Only on the 3rd site it is necessary to remove more than 15 cubic meters of land for planning work, and this is at least 000 months of work ... All in all ... in the fortified area, it is necessary to remove at least 4 cubic meters of land and cut down to 300 hectares of forest and shrubs.
    ... 140 fire installations are equipped with machine-gun gates arr. 1930, which, when fired, close automatically and contribute to the defeat of fighters from their own machine guns with ricocheted bullets.
    About the disability of KiUR and the failure of the commandant of KiUR, the Special Department of the KOVO repeatedly informed the command of the KOVO, but despite this, nothing has been done so far ...

    Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
    B. Kobulov
    1. Amurets
      Amurets 16 May 2016 16: 47
      +1
      Quote: Alexey RA

      Hehehehe ... and then the bloody gebnya came - and the gracious picture of the combat-ready UR turned into a combination of strategic, tactical and technical failures:

      These are trifles from the fact that I will drop the link to you. http://tank.uw.ru/ms/poligon/ur1/
      But I think you have a lot of materials without me.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 May 2016 17: 58
        +1
        Quote: Amurets
        These are trifles from the fact that I will drop the link to you. http://tank.uw.ru/ms/poligon/ur1/

        Duc ... Well this is a basic article on the topic "LS" - "Why did Stalin destroyed the" STALIN LINE "" authorship of uv. M.N. Svirin. smile

        Recently, Shein or Ulanov posted several full texts of the same NKVD docks on the UR "Stalin's Line", which Svirin quoted. And if abbreviated versions of these docks read "well yes! well, horror!"then full is"horror horror horror !!!".
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. Amurets
          Amurets 17 May 2016 00: 37
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Recently, Shein or Ulanov posted several full texts of the same NKVD docks on the UR "Stalin's Line", which Svirin quoted. And if the abbreviated versions of these docks read as "well, yes! Well, horror!", Then the full ones are "horror-horror-horror !!!".

          Thank you for the hint. I was always interested in Urams, because the structures of the 101st URa are located throughout the city. On the opposite, the Chinese coast, there are structures of Sakhalyan, Japanese, UR. According to the memoirs of those who fought with the Japanese in 1945, and to the extent that the Chinese discovered the secrets of the Sakhalyan UR there are still a lot. The Japanese, in order to preserve the secrets of Ur, destroyed its Chinese builders.
  7. nivander
    nivander 16 May 2016 11: 29
    +1
    During the Finnish War, a 203-mm howitzer, having fired 90 shots from a distance of 600m, simply ground the bunker at an altitude of 65,0, and most of the hits fell into a circle with a diameter of 1 m (i.e., one point), by the way, this particular howitzer was served by the listeners academy (not lower than the captain), and the data for shooting and adjustments were made by Mr. Strelbitsky (the future general and commander of the breakthrough corps art). PySy Germans during the assault on the Mozhino line with two howitzers from a distance of 2500 m achieved 45 hits in one point
    1. Leto
      Leto 16 May 2016 11: 56
      +1
      Quote: nivasander
      during the Finnish War, a 203-mm howitzer, after firing 90 rounds at a distance of 600m, simply crushed a bunker at a height of 65,0, most of which came in a circle 1 m in diameter

      This is possible only when enemy artillery is suppressed. When under artillery cap sits art. gunner, and in the near rear hiding a battery of howitzers such twists are impossible. They won’t have time to roll out the gun, not just to deliver a shell ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 May 2016 12: 51
      +1
      Quote: nivasander
      during the Finnish war a 203 mm howitzer, firing 90 shots from a distance of 600m , just grind the bunker at a height of 65,0, with most of the hits falling into a circle with a diameter of 1 m (i.e., at one point),

      The key is highlighted. The distance of 600 meters for the B-4 is direct fire. Moreover, when firing from such a distance, the calculation of the howitzer is in the zone of not only mortar, but rifle-machine gun fire. Without any cover. A pair of well-aimed shooters or an unsuppressed machine gun - and a furry animal to trained fighters and commanders.

      Actually, it was precisely according to the Finnish experience that, in addition to traditional artillery, ours began to make large-caliber artillery tanks / assault SAUs - because you can get horseradish from a PDO at a point of interest like a firing point (a hundred shells per one direct hit), and when working with direct fire, the gun will quickly remain without calculation (or it is necessary to attract disproportionate forces to ensure one gun).
  8. moskowit
    moskowit 16 May 2016 19: 47
    0
    Thank you interesting. For those who are interested, I propose to additionally get acquainted with similar and no less interesting material on the site of Yuri Veremeyev "Anatomy of the Army" ... http: //army.armor.kiev.ua/fort/linia-stalin.php
  9. Pelican
    Pelican 16 May 2016 20: 37
    +2
    Want to add. The fortifications and pillboxes of the "Stalin's Line" were not adapted to a perimeter defense. They were only an additional component to cover the field troops. 1941 script. when the garrisons of the pillboxes will be kept alone in complete encirclement, their creators could not have dreamed in a nightmare.
    1. svp67
      svp67 16 May 2016 20: 59
      +1
      Quote: Pelican
      The fortifications and pillboxes of the "Stalin Line" were not adapted to a perimeter defense.

      Yes? Well, judging by this scheme, you are wrong. Mozyr fortified area: fire group No. 232
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 17 May 2016 10: 41
        +1
        Quote: svp67
        Yes? Well, judging by this scheme, you are wrong. Mozyr fortified area: fire group No. 232

        So this is a "mine". The "mines" were distinguished by their all-round defense.
        But the usual BRO UR, built before the introduction of the "UR System" in 1938, often did not have a circular defense. Maximum fire - along the front, plus covering the flanks with neighbors.

        In part, the situation was saved by the separation of DOS and BRO + wide sectors of the shelling of multi-machine-gun machine-gun blockhouses (but for this they had to pay for their vulnerability because of the loopholes clearly visible from the field).
        It was accepted in 1938 that:
        The defense unit is the basis of the fortified area and should in all cases have a circular defense of the unit as a whole, as well as its strong points.
  10. Reptiloid
    Reptiloid 17 May 2016 21: 27
    0
    Thank you very much for the article. Regards.