Myths of the American strategy of domination "Third Offset" in the dreams of the scout "genius" of James Hasik (part of 1)
On board the US nuclear aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) that participated in the Vietnam War, the "hangover" of the F / A-18C "Hornet" multi-purpose fighter-bombers fighters is loaded. In front of us is the controlled planning bomb of the AGM-154 JSOW family. A smart bomb is one of the most promising high-precision specimens. weapons aviation US Air Force and Navy. AGM-154C JSOW-ER is considered to be the most perfect version of the planning munition: thanks to a powerful solid-fuel rocket accelerator during the tests of 2009, a range of 482 km was obtained, which they plan to increase to 560 or more kilometers. The range of planning a bomb from the stratosphere even exceeded the 350-kilometer indicator of the first version of a tactical cruise missile with a turbojet engine AGM-158A JASSM. There is no doubt that the JSOW UAB is one of the tools of the American Third Offset strategy, based on the principles of network-centric combination of the WTO and advanced intelligence systems, but its use against our aircraft has a number of tactical limitations that will not allow the nomenclature of its warheads (cassette BLU-97B and penetrating "BROACH") prove themselves in the European theater of operations, in particular, thanks to the developed air defense system of the Western Military District. But a missile can be dangerous during combat operations in operational areas with weakened air defense. JSOW's versatility is confirmed by its unification with P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft, which are more often equipped with conventional Harpoon anti-aircraft missiles
Shortly after the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, and then the development of various geostrategic concepts of global confrontation between the USSR and the United States, summarized under the general term “cold war”, the European theater of operations became the subject of detailed modeling of the escalation of conflicts between the Soviet Union and NATO. Eastern Europe here had a special role of the hottest point, since it was precisely on its territory that the border between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact / USSR crossed. In Western Europe and the United States, not only the Strategic Command of NATO operations (SKO) has carried out such modeling, but also numerous alternative writers and publicists, often working in the genre of political-historical and technological thrillers, where a serious niche at one time occupied famous American novelist Tom Clancy.
In his 1986 best-selling novel Red Storm, in the first half hour of air confrontation, 11 NATO fighter-interceptor fighters and ground-based air defense systems managed to incapacitate more than 300 Soviet fighters, and non-existent F-19 - secretly get close to their neighbors air combat to the unique Russian DRLOI A-50 “Mainstay” aircraft, which were covered by MiG-25П interceptors. Both the first and second moments absolutely do not correspond to the realities of air combat: a squadron from 12 F-15A / C armed with AIM-7M Sparrow missiles would never be able to cope with even one MiG-25P regiment exactly like stealth fighters would detected by the Bumblebee radar complex (A-50 aircraft) at a distance of 50 — 70 km. There are adequate judgments in the novel by T. Clancy, but most of it is simply teeming with exaggerations and invented superpowers of NATO military equipment.
The myths of Clancy described in The Red Storm are well disproved by the modern Russian journalist, publicist and futurist writer Maxim Kalashnikov in his unique book The Broken Sword of Empire, where the level of combat qualities of the Russian military aviation is explained to the inexperienced reader in technological language, vehicles of the Navy, Air Defense and Land Forces of the Russian Federation participating in hypothetical military conflicts with the US Armed Forces at the European and Far Eastern theaters of military operations. But if, for example, Tom Clancy's novels are a person with prejudices already established for the USSR and all Russian, one can understand if they were written with a “blinding” pro-American bias, and did not take into account detailed comparisons of the characteristics of American technology with ours, which “hooked” even Ronald Reagan, the absolutely mindless judgments of more modern and highly qualified specialists of Western military-analytical institutes cannot cause anything but bewilderment.
So, 10 in April, 2016 was all Western, and then our Internet spread around a very thoughtful, at first glance, publication by James Hasik regarding the development of the American strategy of countering Russia in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States “Third Offset”. In the article with the high-profile title “The Military Machine of the Russian Federation and the United States Third Offset Strategy: Who is Who?”, Senior officer and military analyst of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security D. Hasic expresses his concern about the military-strategic situation on the eastern borders of NATO - in the Baltic countries . He questions the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Alliance to contain our geopolitical ambitions in this region, using very harsh, aggressive, and made-up assessments of the activities of the Russian Federation in the western strategic direction. Such speeds as “Tallinn on fire”, “the pace of the invasion of Russia”, etc., are used, which in itself contradicts the real situation, and can occur only in case of an attack on our state from the outside.
The author absolutely rightly emphasizes the impossibility of the functioning of NATO air bases in the immediate vicinity of the Russian border, since they will regularly be subjected to the strongest blows of the Iskander-E / M OTRK, and also correctly asserts that the Russian Armed Forces have an important distinctive quality - suddenly and operatively appear at almost any point on the theater. Indeed, if the powerful superpower, which because of its fair ideology of “world multipolarity” has been attacked by “colleagues” from the western camp for decades, will be completely annoying, then the consequences will be: even Reagan was ready to see Russian paratroopers ” on the threshold of the White House. ”
But there is in the article Hasik and such statements, pearls, which can plunge not only the regulars of military Internet resources, but also ordinary readers.
His first statement is that in the event of a major military conflict in the European theater of operations, the surface and underwater components of the Baltic fleet The Russian Navy will not be able to maintain combat stability for a long time (literally, “they won’t stay for a long time”). Well, a bold statement!
Despite the fact that the Baltic Fleet is quantitatively commensurate with the German Navy alone (the 49 surface warships in Germany against 55 - in Russia, and the 4 DPL in Germany against 2 DEPL - in Russia), and the number of ships of the main classes is frigate destroyer 4 units. our against the German 10, our BF has significant advantages over the German fleet, and the Danish, Dutch and Swedish navies in terms of anti-ship capabilities.
The BF has 8 surface ships - carriers of supersonic anti-ship missiles 3М80 "Mosquito"; The 40 PKR “Moskit / Moskit-M” are located in two quadruple (2XNHXX) KT-4 launchers on the destroyers of 190 Ave (on 956x 2 16МXNNXX) in two twin (XNHXHHXXXXXXXXX) vehicles, in two dual (3XXXHUMX) 80XNXX ships in two twin (2XXXXXXX) 2 152 missile launches, in two twin (12411XXXXXXXX) 12421 6 24 launchers 7 / 10 (on 750 780 Mosquito boats). These anti-ship missiles can approach surface targets at an altitude of 2,6-12 meters at a speed of about 14-3 m / s (80М), making anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads near 100-3 units. Also, besides the standard modification of the anti-ship missile 80М120 with a range of about 3 km, there are versions 80М240Е (range - 40 km) and 2М3МВЕ (3 km due to the introduction of a low-high-low trajectory into the inertial navigation system software). A single massive anti-ship strike 80 "Mosquitoes" is able to send to the bottom of the 162, and even all 16 German class frigate "Saxony". It is not excluded that part of 162МXNUMX will be intercepted by highly maneuverable anti-aircraft missiles RIM-XNUMX ESSM, but even the XNUMX channel APRL MRLLS will not be enough for everyone to miss the “Mosquitoes”, because the high supersonic speed and energetic maneuvers will not allow RIM-XNUMX to be completely different. And the ship-borne air defense system “SeaRAM” and “Phalanxes” against “Mosquito” is the same as “Shilka” against “HARM”.
Speaking about the anti-ship capabilities of the Baltic Fleet, I would also like to mention the 4 Corvette 20380 Ave. (Guarding, Intelligent, Boky and Steady) and 2 of the 11540 Ave. (Fearless) and Yaroslav the Wise). This shipborne strike group is armed with the URAN PKNK 3K24 with 24х4 PCR X-35 / X-35У launchers, the total number of which is 96. Numerous coastal SCRK K300P "Bastion-P" (mobile version on MZKT-7930 wheeled chassis), high-security mine version of K300С "Bastion-S", and also BCPRK "Ball" (coastal version of "Uranus") are also taken into account. These systems can be tightened to the Baltic States in the shortest possible time and in the number of dozens of launchers. And the radius of their defeat (260 - 300 km) in a small pool of the Baltic Sea turns tactical anti-ship missiles into strategic missile weapons. Bastions installed near Kaliningrad are capable of hitting any NATO frigate right up to the Swedish island of Gotland, and the deployment of complexes in the Leningrad region will stop NATO surface naval ships at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, over which Russian tactical aviation with hundreds of X-25MPU anti-radar missiles will successfully operate , X-58 and tactical X-59МК.
But we know very well that the US Air Force has been practicing the use of DRLO E-3C and RC-135V / W "Rivet Joint" airborne reconnaissance aircraft in the Baltic States who can detect the coordinates of anti-ship missile launch points and pass them on board. E-8C "J-STARS" for further observation and destruction of launchers using low-profile "JSSM-ER" or other missiles. It is the same with surface ships, which will be detected by the same "AWACS" and "Poseidon", and will definitely be attacked by the anti-ship harpoon, "LRASM". But here too, let us hasten to disappoint Mr. Hasik, since he really miscalculated.
Today, the Baltic ON, including the Kaliningrad region, the Gulf of Finland and the Leningrad region, is reliably defended by a dozen divisions of anti-aircraft missile systems of the C-300 family. The radii of detection and destruction of the "Three Hundreds", like a thick "web", intertwine absolutely all of the airspace over Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, parts of Poland and Finland, as well as directly over the Baltic Sea. In addition, near St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, quite recently, several C-400 “Triumph” batteries were deployed, with a “dead zone” covered by “Pantsiry”. Now about the "Three Hundreds".
The main tasks of air defense and missile defense in the region are assigned to the well-equipped 2 th division of the air defense of the 6 of the Leningrad Red Banner Army of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Air Defense Force. The 5 armament of the anti-aircraft missile regiments of the division is represented by: 10 divisions ZRK C-300PS, 4 divisions C-300PM, 2 divisions PRO C-300В and one auxiliary division "Buk-M1". Together with the “Chetyrehsotkami”, they will be able to defend both the coastal facilities of the Baltic Fleet and the naval forces of the Baltic Fleet in the sea, forming for them a kind of anti-missile “umbrella” (long-range air defense). The air defense missile systems of the 2 air defense division, if necessary, will not allow any “Typhoon” or F-16C, operating from the Lithuanian airbase Zokniai, to take to the air. If they (NATO SARS) try to “sneak up” to our strategic targets of the Baltic Fleet in low-altitude mode ". The Flanker and Foxhound will receive information on the tactical situation from the A-790U, so that NATO fighters will not be able to go unnoticed.
Hasik could operate with such moments as the use of the whole air wing suppression F-15E c hundred PRLR AGM-88 "HARM" on the suspensions operating under the cover of the squadron F-22A, which would have opened our air defense under Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, and then intercepted most of the fighter aircraft of the Western Military District, but even here he would be deeply mistaken. First, the Russian Armed Forces have impressive “bins” in which more than a dozen of C-300PT / PS battalions may be in conservation, capable of fighting both anti-radar missiles and stealth aircraft. All these systems, upon reaching the "yellow" level of threat, can be quickly re-maintained and put on combat duty at the western borders of our country. Secondly, in view of the enormous strategic depth of the territory of Russia (Hasik in her work calls it “legendary”), the Air Force can significantly increase the combat potential of the ZVO by transferring a large number of tactical aircraft from the air bases of the Central Military District. The Central Military District is in relative safety from NATO tactical aviation, and the attacks of the Tomahawks and ALCMs from the Arctic ON can be reflected by Triumphs and Favorites, who are on duty at strategic cities and facilities of the Urals, the Tyumen Region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory. If you think more broadly: from the southern strategic direction, the Central Military District will be protected by a powerful echeloned air defense line of Kazakhstan, and from the northern SN by the structures of the “Arctic forces” being formed, within which the restored Tiksi air base will operate. The huge area of our state can allow the Air Force to carry out various kinds of "packaging" aimed at strengthening one direction or another.
NATO WILL NOT ANSWER ANYTHING PRINCIPLELY NEW TO NATO, BUT THE UNDERWATER WILL BE PRESERVED
As we found out, the shipboard strike group of the Baltic Fleet, contrary to the opinion of James Hasik, will be able to maintain combat stability for a long time thanks to the successfully organized air defense over the southeastern part of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, as well as due to the decent Redut, Dagger and "Dirk" installed on corvettes pr. 20380 and SC pr. 11540.
No unique anti-ship means of air attack, which we could not intercept, NATO can not use against us at the moment. Submarine anti-ship missiles of the AGM-84 “Harpoon” family can be easily detected and destroyed by ship-based air defense systems, especially given the arrival in the Baltic Fleet of prospective patrol ships of the far sea zone of 22160 Ave. (class “Vasily Bykov”), which will be equipped with “Shtil- 1 ”with a radically new AFLS antenna post based on AFAR, the Norwegian NSM anti-ship missiles, the coastal versions of which were recently ordered by the Polish Navy, will also be intercepted. The only question remains with the Harpoon Block II + AGM / RGM-84N version of Harpoon. New missiles will receive a group action mode with a comprehensive approach to one target, which may complicate their interception for such ships as Fearless, where only one one-sided Dagger antenna post is installed, and Dirk can be diverted by other flying targets. But this issue will also be resolved over time, because the fleet will be replenished with Redoubts, where the basis of the basics is active radar homing.
A much greater threat may come from the NATO naval submarine fleet, which today is far ahead of the submarine component of the Baltic Fleet, at least quantitatively. The Baltic Fleet comprises the entire 2 diesel-electric submarines of the 877 / 877EKM Avenue “Halibut” B-227 “Vyborg” and B-806 “Dmitrov” (1983 and 1986 of the fleet). Even being distinguished by a uniquely low noise figure, two submarines are absolutely not enough to carry out large-scale submarine missions against the fleets of the Baltic countries-members of NATO. The only thing that the submarines will be able to perform is to hunt by Swedish super-quiet anaerobic Gotland-type DSELS in a “quiet” mode to prevent them from entering the Gulf of Finland or approaching Kaliningrad. But even in this task there are a lot of “pitfalls”, since 3 Gotland-type submarines are one of the most quiet non-nuclear submarines in the world. The coefficient of their noise is either on the same step as the “Halibut” or even lower than that of it, and an air-independent diesel-stirling-electric power unit does not force the crew to periodically (approximately once a day) float to the surface to replenish oxygen tanks. The extremely demagnetized hull creates enormous difficulties in detecting a submarine with the help of magnetic anomaly detectors installed on patrol anti-submarine aircraft and warships. The hunt for “Gotland” can turn into a real game “mouse cats” for only our two “Halibus”, especially since they are not anaerobic. And an example of this already exists during the 10 years, when in December 2005, the head submarine "Gotland" during the exercises in the Pacific Ocean near the US West Coast "Joint Task Force Exercise" was able to overcome the anti-submarine defense and conditionally "destroy" almost the entire AUG headed with the atomic aircraft carrier CVN-76 "Ronald Reagan". What is very important, the Swedish submarine could not be found not only by the GAK multi-purpose accompanying Los Angeles-class submarines, but also by the powerful AN / SQQ-89 hydroacoustic complexes of Ticonderog missile cruisers and Arley Burk destroyers. These GAK are considered one of the most advanced sonar systems: they have a high sensitivity and network-centric capabilities of avionics due to integration into the Aegis BIUS.
To be continued ...
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