Military Review

Steel fallen sakura petal: the history and death of the battleship "Yamato"

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Steel fallen sakura petal: the history and death of the battleship "Yamato"

Yamato on trial



On the morning of April 7 1945, at about 10 hours with a small one, the pilots of two PBM Mariner flying patrol boats noticed a Japanese squadron heading for the island of Okinawa. In its center was a huge battleship, similar to the two that had already met the Americans during the battle in Leyte Gulf. Of the other significant targets, a cruiser was visible, the aircraft carrier was not visible - only the destroyers of the escort. So, intelligence data was correct. Initially, the submarines “Tredfin” and “Heklbak” patrolling in the area reported on the detection of an enemy squadron on the evening of April 6, and in the morning the ships were visually identified by the Corsairs of an Essex aircraft patrol, reporting their course. Now both “Mariners” have only to clarify who specifically is trying to intervene in the course of Operation Iceberg - the landing on the island of Okinawa. The observation was interrupted by flakes of tears of anti-aircraft shells, which became more and more. It was clear how the Japanese squadron changed course towards the patronized visitors. Both scouts quietly hid behind the clouds. After some time, Vice Admiral Seyichi Ito, who was in the battle room of the huge battleship Yamato, received a report that the American aircraft carrier unit was seen east of Okinawa, that is, 250 miles from his squadron. The radio interception service recorded a great deal of activity on the air - the intelligence officers were persistently transmitting data. 58-e carrier connection was preparing a hot meeting for his enemy.

Super Response Island Empire

Battleships of the Yamato type were late with their appearance. By the time of their entry into the Imperial Naval fleet the role of the trump card in ocean battles began to slowly but steadily move to aircraft carriers that had recently caused ironic grins. Created by colossal efforts comparable only to the nuclear program weapons or a man’s flight into space, a small and not very rich state, they did not justify the hopes placed on them and did not help the execution of the most ambitious ambitions. The path to the creation of superlinkers was long and thorny: how many projects, very carefully drawn on the drawing boards, became just another roll of paper in the military archive!

Back at the beginning of the 20's. Japan, who believed that the old members of the Great Powers Club were holding her as no more than servants at the table, at which the world pie was being eaten away with appetite, decided to change its image. For this purpose, it was not enough to change clothes from a traditional kimono to a respectable dress coat - this already happened at the end of the 19th century after the Meiji revolution. A demonstration of power was needed, and the power of the sea — after all, it was not for nothing that the Land of the Rising Sun was considered Pacific England. In 1920, the Japanese parliament adopts the impressive shipbuilding program "8 + 8", according to which the imperial fleet was to be replenished with eight new battleships and the same number of battle cruisers. The old-timers of the naval Olympus, the British, and the Americans who had recently moved to their brazen lines, were for some reason agitated. Execution, even partially, of these ideas would greatly disturb the balance and power balance in the Pacific basin. Another question would be if the Japanese economy was not too muscular. Of course, such a scale and a more developed state would force one to think hard about the conformity of desires and possibilities. But we must not forget that the Japanese people, unlike the Western people at that time stories was very patient, hardworking and had very limited needs. Who knows, there could have gone to extreme measures, right up to the rationing system, but the ships (most of them) would still be completed. Gentlemen with the cold gaze of professional players also understood this and took it into account and therefore gave a full swing to such a phenomenon as the International Washington Conference. To polite little people in immaculate tails, they kindly made it clear that the problems that the economy of their island state began to face may be somewhat aggravated. All this, of course, in a partnership, behind the scenes, under the melodious chime of ice cubes in glasses.

The islanders were not stupid - they were experts in history, philosophy and poetry, custodians of traditions and family swords. They signed a treaty: Japan actually renounced its naval claims, in effect recognizing the primacy of England and the United States. But courteous smiles and bows hid ideas and designs that were even colder than ice. 8 + 8 became history, only two ships from this program, the Nagato and Muttsu, were completed and put into operation. "Akagi" and "Kaga" continued their lives as aircraft carriers. "So what, - reasoned in the naval headquarters. “We have no opportunity to outrun the white barbarians quantitatively - we will find the strength and ability to surpass them qualitatively.” It should be noted that in the submission of the then Japanese, the places of residence of various barbarians began somewhere outside their own territorial waters.


Main caliber


Began long constructive and design research. The first project of the future ship was formed by Rear Admiral Yuzuru Hiraga. The promising battleship was in some way reminiscent of the first fruit of the Washington agreement - the British Nelson - but much more sophisticated and armed with 410-mm guns. In the subsequent Hiragi projects, the displacement of his creation grew smoothly, leaving behind the limit in 35 thousand tons. The idea was further developed from another author, 1 captain of the rank Kikuo Fujimoto, who replaced Hiragu as the chief builder of the fleet. It was at Fujimoto that the impressive 460 mm sounded about the caliber of the main artillery. Subsequent projects of this designer hit the concentration of weapons and the number of trunks of the main caliber. One option even provided for the deployment of aircraft on board 12. In the end, due to the tipping of the destroyer designed by Fujimoto, a shadow lay on the career of the main builder and part-time ideologue of future superlinkors. Not having experienced failures, 10 January 1934, he died suddenly.

His business continued and eventually turned into metal the rear admiral of the technical service, Keiji Fukuda. It was he who had the honor of leading the entire extensive complex of research works on future ships, whose dimensions will impress even on drawing boards. In the spring of 1934, the project was taken seriously - it was no longer a search for a concept or an idea; it was its faceting and polishing. Retired, but not losing weight and authority in the military-technical circles, Hiraga influenced the relatively young Fukuda and the whole course of the matter. Gradually, the battleship lost all the exoticism inherent in Fujimoto, and began to look more like a classic one. By 1937, the design idea, which passed successively through the 24 design options, tested on the 50 scale models, was finally close to design. Creation of the ship was replete with many ideas, successful and not very much. So, at a certain stage, the decision arose to equip the battleship with diesel engines because of their excellent economy. However, from a technical point of view, this was not feasible - the Japanese engines of such a system were even more raw and unfinished than the German ones. And after assessing the situation, they prudently returned to the turbines. Nevertheless, in the design there was, for example, a newfangled then bulbous nose. In the end, after numerous revisions and corrections of 20 in July 1936, the design version under the symbol “A-140-F5” was approved by the Maritime Ministry.

The birth of giants

Construction of ships did not lay off in the long box. 4 November 1937 in the dry dock of Kure officially laid the first ship of the series, the future Yamato. The construction site had to be upgraded literally on the move: the dock was deepened by a meter, and the lifting capacity of the bridge crane was brought to 100 tons. The second ship of the series, Musashi, was laid at the shipyard of Mitsubishi Corporation in Nagasaki 28 in March 1938. For the construction of such enormous battleships, a whole set of technical measures was required. Since the series was not limited to two units (the second pair was going to be laid in 1940), a sufficiently developed infrastructure for the maintenance and repair of ships of this displacement was required. In addition to the three existing dry docks (Kure, Nagasaki and Yokosuka), it was planned to build three more, capable of accepting 65 thousandth giants. For transporting towers, barbets and main-caliber guns, a special transport ship Casino was built, and a powerful tug Sukufu Maru was built to tow huge hulls.

Needless to say, unprecedented secrecy measures were taken during the construction of ships. Photos of all shipyard workers were placed in special albums and carefully compared when entering and exiting. The Yamato and Musashi corps themselves were sheltered from prying eyes with sisal mats (coarse agave fiber used to make ropes) in large quantities, which caused a shortage of this material throughout Japan, primarily among fishermen weaving it. network.

8 August 1940 was brought out of the dry dock in a solemn, but without excessive pompous atmosphere of the Yamato. Photography and filming of the case was not conducted. After the procedure, the ship was covered with camouflage nets, and its completion continued afloat. Such security measures bore fruit: although the first rumors about new ships became known overseas at the end of 1942, and the appearance of the appearance appeared after the battle of Leyte, the Americans managed to get exact characteristics of the superlinkors in full only after the war ended, when the Yamato, Musashi and converted into the aircraft carrier Shinano were sunk long ago. The commission signed the act of accepting Yamato into the 16 fleet of December 1941, but various finishing work on it was carried out for more than five months, and finally it was only on the 27 of May 1942.

Together with his Musachi sistership, he became the first in several categories: the largest battleship, the largest warship and the largest ship ever built. The total displacement of this giant reached 72 thousand tons. The longest length was 266 m, width - 38,9, draft - 10,4 m. The total capacity of the four turbo-tooth units at 12 boilers consisted of 150 thous. Hp and allowed to have maximum speed in 27 nodes. The Yamato's armament consisted of nine 460-mm guns in three main-turrets, twelve 155-mm auxiliary-caliber guns in four towers, and twelve 127-mm anti-aircraft artillery barrels. The ship was protected by the main armor belt of maximum thickness in 410 mm, the front of the towers was covered with 650-mm plates, and the conning tower was 500-mm. The crew of the battleship numbered 2400 people.

Yamato had many interesting design features. Its upper deck was not cluttered with ventilation shaft outlets, a large number of boats and other equipment. All this had to be minimized to the limit due to the monstrous pressure of muzzle gases produced by shots from 18-inch guns. For example, all fans only slightly protruded above the surface of the deck and were directed away from the towers. Instead of the commonly used imported tick as a deck flooring, a local resource was used - Japanese pine hinoki. Post-war testing by Americans of armor steel samples applied on the Yamato revealed its greater fragility in relation to the American and English. The gradual deterioration of relations between the former “best allies,” Japan and England, after World War I, had a negative impact on Japanese shipboard armor technology. Throughout the war, the anti-aircraft armament of the battleships gradually increased due to the installation of 25-mm anti-aircraft guns of the 96 type, which were, in fact, an improved version of the French system of the Hochchis company, which the Japanese acquired in the early 1930's. On the ship, these machines were placed in single and triple-barreled versions. At 1941, they provided fairly good protection against aerial targets, but by the middle of the war they were outdated. In the summer of 1943, the Yamato was equipped with a radar.

In the ranks

Formally commissioning in December 1941, the superlinker went not into battle, but into the Inland Sea, spending time in anchor, additional equipment and artillery exercises. The imperial fleet swept the deadly hurricane across the expanses of the Pacific Ocean, sweeping a few Allied forces from its most secluded corners with an iron broom. 27 May 1942, the next commission after a detailed inspection considered the battleship quite combat-ready. At this time, the Japanese Navy was in full swing preparing to carry out such an unhappily ended blow to the Midway Atoll. On the "Yamato" is located itself the commander of the United Fleet Yoroka Yamamoto. The ships of the line, in whose group the new ship went, played the role of power insurance in case the Americans risk their few battleships. The main forces of the 1 fleet, in which the Yamato was stationed, moved almost 300 miles away from Admiral Nagumo's carrier strike mix and the airborne detachment. On the one hand, the battleships were in relative safety, on the other, the commander was actually two days from his advanced forces.

Even before that, the powerful Yamato radio stations intercepted a message from the enemy submarine Cuttlefish, which reported an increased activity of the Japanese. A little later, the headquarters of the 6 fleet (Japanese) from the Kwajalein Atoll transmitted radio intercept data, according to which two American connections were operating in 170 miles north of Midway. Yamamoto planned to transfer this alarming information to the aircraft carrier Akagi, the flagship of Nagumo, but one of his officers dissuaded the admiral, arguing that this could break the radio silence. The fact that Americans have long been reading Japanese ciphers, and no radio silence will affect the situation in the Yamato conning tower, and nowhere else in the Imperial fleet, they had no idea. The outcome of the battle for Midway was the destruction of four aircraft carriers and the abandonment of the landing operation. At midnight 5 June 1942, the Japanese battleships went backwards, never making a single shot at the enemy.

After spending some time in Japan, 12 August 1942 Yamato, as part of a squadron of ships and under the flag of the commander, departed for the largest base of the Japanese fleet in the center of the Pacific Ocean - Truk Atoll. The battle for Guadalcanal began, and Yamamoto wanted to be closer to the front line. Sea and air battles boiled around the island of volcanic origin from the archipelago of the Solomon Islands, with varying success. Both sides threw all the new ships, airplanes and troops onto the scales of war. The Japanese "saved" by using only the old cruisers "Hiei" and "Kirishima" of pre-retirement age. Having met in the night battle with the newest American "Washington" and "South Dakota", the veterans were badly damaged and subsequently sank.


"Yamato" and "Musashi" in the parking lot atoll Truk


The newest Yamato and Musashi, which joined at the beginning of 1943, continued to calmly anchor inside the huge Truk lagoon, far from the passions and gushing blood that had broken out in the south. In May, Yamato departed for Japan to modernize and repair. Having been in the dry dock of Yokosuki consistently two times, in May and July, the battleship received a radar type 21. The number of 25-mm anti-aircraft guns was increased, and the power plant was prevented. Coming out of the dock, the battleship spent almost a month conducting planned combat training, after which he left for his former home base, Truk Atoll. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Japanese command commissioned the new ship to transport supplies and supplies to the personnel of the Japanese Singapore base. The crew was very dissatisfied that the huge warship was constantly used not in the case: either as a floating headquarters, or as an ordinary military transport. Arriving at Truk, "Yamato" again took place at the anchorage. A couple of times he went to sea in the squadron in connection with the possible attacks of the islands Enyvetok and Wake, but both times to no avail.

In December, the battleship 1943 did not find a better use for escorting a convoy to Japan, although deep in the Japanese defense perimeter, the main threat so far has come from an ever-increasing number of submarines. December 12 "Yamato" in the convoy left Truk. Having arrived safely in Yokosuka, after some time he took the infantry regiment on board and set off back. According to the plan, the route of the battleship, which was actually used as a high-speed armored troop transport, under the escort of two destroyers was supposed to run through Truk to the Admiralty Islands with a stop at Kavieng (New Ireland). However, it so happened that 25 December 1943 northeast of Truk squadron hit the radar screen of the Skate submarine patrolling in the area. Radio interception allowed the Americans to inform the submarine commander in advance about the enemy ships approaching. Going for reinsurance anti-submarine zigzag and performing the next turn, "Yamato" was in a convenient position for the Americans. "Skate" fired four torpedoes from aft vehicles. One of them landed the battleship in the starboard side near the aft tower of the main caliber. The explosion was so strong that the Japanese thought that the ship had received two, not just one hit. 3 thousand tons of water accumulated inside the hull, the cellar of the tower was flooded. The damage was not fatal, but very painful. Skate was attacked by depth charges, but to no avail. Yamato returned to Truk, where he was hastily repaired, and departed for repair in Japan.

Having gotten into dry dock, the battleship was not only repaired, but also upgraded: the two onboard 155-mm turrets were replaced with six 127-mm guns. The number of 25-mm anti-aircraft guns has been increased again, new radars and equipment have been installed that capture the radio emission, which is a copy of the German Metox instrument. The whole complex of works was completed by 18 in March 1944. After completing the planned exercises and taking on board the troops and supplies, 22 in April 1944 of Yamato went to the Philippines. After unloading in Manila, the battleship soon joined other Japanese ships stationed in the inconspicuous Tavi-Tavi Bay in the Sulu Sea near Singapore. Truk, after a series of strikes struck on him, was no longer a safe base, and the Japanese fleet was dispersed on the rear bases in relative proximity to oil fields, which facilitated the supply of fuel to ships. Soon, Musasi arrived in Tavi-Tavi, who also worked fruitfully in the field of military traffic.

Both ships finally succeeded in undergoing a full-fledged combat operation during the battle in the Philippine Sea on the 20th of June 1944. As part of the strike force (in addition to two superlinkers, they included the old Congo and Haruna, seven heavy cruisers and three light aircraft carriers with incomplete air groups) “Yamato” and “Musashi” walked 100 miles in front of the aircraft carriers of Admiral Ozawa, actually acting as a delicious bait for the enemy deck aviation. But the Americans did not peck at this simple trick - their primary concern was the sinking of aircraft carriers. In this battle, on June 19, 1944, Yamato first used its artillery in combat, firing returning Japanese fighters with shrapnel shells. Four Zeros were damaged. This participation in the operation and limited. The battered fleet retreated to Okinawa, and then to Japan.

The Yamato again increased the anti-aircraft armament and, after plunging an infantry regiment on it, sent it again to Okinawa. Having made another transport flight, Yamato and Musashi went to the rear anchorage in Ling Bay near Singapore. There both ships spent time in intensive combat training and joint firing. The battle in Leyte, the largest naval battle of the Pacific Company, was near. The threat of loss of the Philippines forced the Japanese command to put practically all combat-capable ships into the sea.

Battle of the Philippines

The plan of operation "Shyo" provided for the possible covert approach of three squadrons, and one of them (the aircraft carriers of Ozawa, the battleships Hyuga and Ise, etc.) played the role of a decoy duck and had to divert the attention of the American carrier-based aircraft. At this time, the 1 and 2 sabotage of Admirals Kurita and Nisimura would secretly force the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits, attacking the fleet in Leyte Bay. The Kurita connection, which included the Yamato and Musashi, was the strongest: total 5 battleships, 10 heavy, 2 light cruisers and 15 destroyers. The battleships of the battleships were repainted black to reduce visibility during the night break.

18 October 1944. The squadron left its quiet parking and headed to Brunei, where it was loaded with fuel. October 22 connection went to the Philippines, where the fellow "Yamato", "Musashi", will not return. Failures began to pursue sabotage from the very beginning. On October 23, an American submarine sank the flagship of Kurita, the heavy cruiser Atago, after which the flag had to be moved to Yamato. Soon the heavy cruiser “Maya” was lost from the torpedoes of the other boat.


Last shot of Musashi. Battleship sinking


October 24 for the Japanese already seriously undertook deck aircraft. Wave after wave of American torpedo bombers and dive bombers rolled on the connection Kurita. They were met by an avalanche of fire erupting from a hundred trunks, which did not prevent, however, a number of hits. Most of all went to "Musashi", received a few torpedoes and bombs in his huge body. Because of this, Kurita ordered the total speed to be reduced to 22 nodes. By the beginning of the second hour, the battleship was already badly damaged, flooding spreads on it, the trail of flowing fuel oil stretched behind the ship, and the speed dropped to 8 nodes. Under him, Kurita left two destroyers, unable to distract from the main combat mission. Caught by enemy aircraft, Musashi was dying slowly but surely. In 15 h. 30 min. Kurita nevertheless turned back and approached the perishing ship. The exact number of torpedo and bomb hits is still controversial, but it can be said with certainty that more than a dozen of them got the battleship. The trim on the nose reached already critical eight meters, the roll on the left side - 12 degrees. Water flooded the engine room, and soon the ship lost speed. In 19 h. 15 min. she received a command to get ready to leave the ship, the flag was lowered, the portrait of the Emperor was evacuated. In 19.36, the crippled, but musashi, which had fought to the last, went on its final journey to the bottom of the ocean. 1380 people were selected from the crew of the destroyers. In the battle that took place, Yamato was also damaged: at least five bombs hit it, it took about 3 thousand tons of water, but on the whole it remained operational because the attention of American aviation was concentrated on Musashi.

The next morning, the Yamato 460 guns finally opened fire on American escort aircraft carriers and destroyers off Samar Island, taken aback. The fact is that at this stage the Japanese plan began to work - part of the enemy forces threw against Ozawa aircraft carriers with half-empty hangars, and the old battleships covering the landing on the island of Leyte destroyed the 2 sabotage squadron of Nishimura during the night battle. Only escort aircraft carriers and destroyers remained near transports. American pilots reported to the authorities that the Japanese ships were either sunk or damaged, and that they turned back. In fact, having assessed the situation and received a suggestion from the command, Kurita returned to the previous course and in the morning collided with a group of escort aircraft carriers (six units) along with three destroyers and four destroyers.

We must pay tribute to the crews of these ships - they did not become confused under enemy fire, and having developed the maximum speed, they began to lift planes on which everything that only came to hand was hung. Destroyers put a smoke screen. For some reason, the Japanese, which started the fight, did not have full information about the enemy as a fight with a full-fledged aircraft carrier connection, which, as we know, does not go without a linear cover. This was one of the reasons for Kurita caution. After a brief battle, sinking an escort aircraft carrier and two destroyers, the admiral ordered the retreat. He had no idea that the group of small ships was the only obstacle between his squadron and the crowd of defenseless transports. One way or another, the 1-I sabotage group left, just like it did, through the Strait of San Bernardino. The battle was completely lost, and the Japanese fleet ceased to exist as an organized fighting force. Wounded, Yamato went to Japan to heal wounds. In November 1944, it went through a recent upgrade. The situation at the front deteriorated more and more - the Japanese islands began to be exposed directly to air raids.


The Yamato scheme at the start of 1945.


Doomed

All winter 1944 – 1945 "Yamato" changes parking and holds exercises. What use to find a huge ship, the command had a vague idea. The Americans helped to make a decision by launching Operation Iceberg - a landing on the island of Okinawa. In late March, the battleship received full ammunition and was fueled. He felt a complete shortage, and therefore had to scrape the bottom of the barrel. 3 of April was announced the order of Admiral Toeda: as part of a special strike force (light cruiser Yakagi and eight destroyers) at high speed to advance to Okinawa, where to strike at transports and other ships of the enemy. How this was accomplished under the conditions of the complete domination of the enemy at sea and in the air was not specified. In fact, the squadron was a suicide bomber. Vice-Admiral Ito, Commander of the Special Shock Squad, objected to such a venture, believing that it was a waste of ships and resources. But the order was approved at the top.

The battleship received 3400 tons of fuel - all that could be found was that the sailors of older age and the sick got off the shore, all the wood was dismantled - even chairs and tables. In the evening of April 5, the commander of Yamato, Captain 1 of rank Kosaku Ariga, gathered the entire crew on deck and read the order for the march. The answer was a deafening “Banzai!”. 6 April at 15 h. 20 min. A special strike force left the Inland Sea accompanied by three escort ships, which soon turned back. Air cover was carried out by two seaplanes - that was all that the once powerful naval aviation could put out. The Americans already had evidence that the enemy was preparing a sortie to Okinawa. The Japanese ships were by this time (February evening 6) detected by submarines. According to the survivors, the mood on board the battleship was both solemn and doomed: the sailors prayed in the ship’s Shinto temple, wrote farewell letters.

On the morning of April 7, the ships were fixed first by deck Helket and then by flying Mariner boats. It became clear that the last battle was coming. In 11 h. 7 min. An onboard radar found a large group of aircraft in 60 miles from the ship. The combat alarm was already announced long ago - the crew was at combat positions. In 11.15, the first group of "Helkets" appeared above the squadron and began to describe circles above it. The stroke has been increased to 25 nodes. Soon after the reconnaissance, the main forces of the attackers appeared - in total, 227 of American aircraft took part in the strike on the Japanese Special Detachment (most of them were dive bombers and torpedo bombers).


The explosion of the battleship "Yamato"


The first wave of 150 aircraft was seen with the naked eye at 12.32, and in 12.34, anti-aircraft guns erupted the first batch of steel and fire. Soon, the first hits of armor-piercing bombs occurred - the deck superstructures were damaged and several 127-mm guns were destroyed. In 12.43, "Evengers" from the aircraft carrier "Hornet" were able to put one torpedo into the port side. As soon as the first wave, having worked, retired, in 13 hours it was followed by 50 airplanes, mostly dive bombers. No respite was given to the Japanese. This time the attacks were carried out from different directions. The aircraft processed the deck and superstructures from machine guns, making it difficult to carry out aimed fire to anti-aircraft guns. New bombs hit - the calculation was to weaken the defense of the ship. The third wave was not long in coming - it appeared in 13 h. 33 min. First three, and in 13 h. 44 min. two more torpedoes hit the Yamato in the port side. Two boiler rooms were flooded, the auxiliary steering wheel (ships of the Yamato type had two steering wheels) was stuck in the right-to-board position. Several thousand tons of water fell inside, creating a heel to 7 degrees. The counter flood has so far managed to straighten it out. The battleship's speed dropped to 18 nodes; the centralized fire control system was no longer there.

In 13 h. 45 min. the last attack began, during which at least four more torpedoes and several bombs hit the ship. Anti-aircraft fire "Yamato" began to weaken. In 14 h. 5 min. the light cruiser Yahagi sank from torpedo hits. Yamato speed dropped to 12 nodes, in 14 hours. 17 minutes another torpedo caused flooding of all remaining boiler sections. The dying but not surviving survival service reported on the bridge in flames that she could no longer control the sinking of the ship. Yamato lost its turn - the list reached 16 – 17 degrees. The position of the ship was hopeless. One after another, the equipment nodes failed, communications did not work, the central part of the ship was engulfed in flames.

In the conning tower, keeping the samurai calm, sat Admiral Ito, who had not uttered a single word since the beginning of the battle, leaving the commander Ariga to lead the battle. After hearing the report of the senior officer, Ariga told the commander that he considered it necessary to leave the ship. Ito did not mind. The crew began to concentrate on the deck and rush overboard. Yamato began to slowly fall on board. When the roll reached 80 degrees, there was an enormous explosion - it was even seen on American ships near Okinawa. Flames shot out at 2 km. Rode cellars main caliber.

In 14 h. 23 min. The world's largest battleship ended his combat career. 3061 people died on it, including Vice Admiral Ito and the battleship commander. 269 people raised from the water. A light cruiser and four destroyers were sunk. Americans lost 10 aircraft that killed 12 people - that was the price for sinking a whole squadron of ships. Officially, 12 August 1945 was expelled from the fleet Yamato and Musashi.


Shot from the film "Yamato". Crew read out orders to follow to Okinawa


1 August 1985, the deep-water unit "Paisis-3" of an international research expedition discovered the remains of a battleship in the East China Sea at a depth of 450 meters. At the beginning of the 2000's The Japanese shot a colorful and realistic, not alien to naturalism, the feature film Yamato, for which a full-size 190-meter model of the bow of the battleship was specially made. After the end of filming before dismantling, it was open for some time to visitors. The Yamato is still the largest battleship ever built.
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  1. 89067359490
    89067359490 April 8 2016 06: 27
    +11
    "Yamato" is the largest of the built. And of the projected ships like this were conceived by the Germans. 150 tons.
    1. Santa Fe
      Santa Fe April 8 2016 07: 52
      +13
      Ships were going to raid
      Powerful shells loaded aboard
      We knew, somewhere there, in the sea distance,
      Where we will not see our land
      Terrible armada await us

      Solemnly I left my home bay
      My stem is caressed by tender coolness
      In greeting at the raid, the fleet froze
      In silence, the banners are lowered
      He gave honor to the battle of the departing squad

      So that the samurai perform the rite
      I brought a squad into the sea
      Creeped low morning fog
      The great ocean was calm
      ___________________

      So two days in tension passed
      But the enemy did not betray himself
      The sun shone in the spring warmth
      And everyone deep down dreamed
      About getting home lucky
      Where barefoot childhood passed
      Where I met first love once
      From where he was called to the battleship Yamato.

      1. Santa Fe
        Santa Fe April 8 2016 08: 05
        +4
        The alarm bell sounded
        Immediately bristled guns and machine guns
        And it became clear - the hour of battle had come
        Airplanes appeared on the horizon ...
      2. 11 black
        11 black April 8 2016 18: 52
        +6
        So here - like Pearl Harbor showed the Japanese who was the master of the sea - it is not clear why it was built, even on the slipway it was doomed - alas.
      3. proud
        proud April 9 2016 00: 13
        +1
        Dear tell me who is the author of this poem?
      4. Alex
        Alex April 10 2016 13: 46
        +2
        And here's another impossible thing: the meeting of "Yamato" and "Musashi" with "Bismarck" and "Tirpitz".
        1. Ustinov 055 055
          Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 23
          0
          Due to the fears of the Command of Japan and Germany, unfortunately these GIANTS were destroyed quite easily. And they could have brought such a strong rascal
        2. Ustinov 055 055
          Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 23
          0
          Due to the fears of the Command of Japan and Germany, unfortunately these GIANTS were destroyed quite easily. And they could have brought such a strong rascal
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 April 8 2016 09: 02
      +3
      But nevertheless, it was the Yamato and its sister ship Musashi that for a long time held the palm of the largest surface warships in the world. A little about the death of Yamato:
      At 14:05 on April 7, 1945, in the East China Sea, southeast of Kyushu Island, having received direct hits from at least nine American torpedoes and seventeen air bombs, the Yamato battleship, the largest warship of its time, began to tip over. Within 15 minutes, he rolled over and began to sink. At 14:23 ammunition detonated from fires on board, resulting in a massive explosion (about 500 tons of TNT equivalent). The sound of the explosion was heard over 200 kilometers, and the mushroom cloud rose more than 6 kilometers.

      and a photo of this explosion:
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 09: 04
      +9
      Quote: 89067359490
      And from the projected

      What did not come up, so as not to go to the Eastern Front laughing
  2. Alceers
    Alceers April 8 2016 06: 38
    +15
    Oh! Now we will call Kaptsov such an article. And let the srach begin ...
    1. Santa Fe
      Santa Fe April 8 2016 08: 00
      +13
      Death from on high was his fate,
      Traces of torpedoes
      The sky is black from planes.
      The Iron Giant
      Fell before the depth
      Debt by doing.
      The cool of blue darkness
      Hissed his hot armor.
      Not shut up yet
      Shots of destroyers
      Not yet flashed
      fatal fire ...
      Hieroglyph "loyalty"
      Not burned on the flag
      But - the battle ended ...
      Exhausted, boarding
      Downed ...
      He did everything
      What could.
      He accepted death
      Hope not thaw.
      For the emperor,
      In the name of Fleet honor.
      Admiral's Shadow
      I waited for him.
      In the last turn
      Towers - Farewell.
      Goodbye,
      Nobody defeated knight.
      Let your body
      Tortured by explosives
      Lies at the bottom
      But still there
      Where soared above the waves
      Funeral pillar of smoke -
      The golden flower is burning,
      On the ghost metal.
  3. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack April 8 2016 06: 50
    +13
    The steel giant ........ a masterpiece of that time - the aviation has already signed a sentence ........ Thanks for the article.
  4. qwert
    qwert April 8 2016 06: 51
    +3
    Shot from the movie "Yamato". The crew is read out the order to follow to Okinawa.
    Of course, I understand that there is a crew of at least 1500 people. But even more on deck. You can’t get carried away with computer graphics, they paved the whole deck and are satisfied. But I would have watched the film. In Russian translation. No one found it on the net?

    Quote: Alceers
    Oh! Now we will call Kaptsov such an article. And let the srach begin ...
    Kaptsov is nonsense. The main thing is not to wake mina. And then the author will break.
    1. ICT
      ICT April 8 2016 07: 02
      +17
      Quote: qwert
      that there is a crew of at least 1500 people



      3061 people died, including Vice Admiral Ito and the battleship commander. 269 people were lifted from the water.
      ,

      excerpt


      film
      https://my-hit.org/film/413885/
      1. Ustinov 055 055
        Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 25
        0
        Thanks for the shots, as the officer of the Russian Navy is very informative, although they lied to the little guy in the film. Post more interesting facts or just a video. Thank you again
      2. Ustinov 055 055
        Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 25
        0
        Thanks for the shots, as the officer of the Russian Navy is very informative, although they lied to the little guy in the film. Post more interesting facts or just a video. Thank you again
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. alexej123
      alexej123 April 8 2016 15: 39
      0
      Yes, I watched.
    4. Apt13
      Apt13 April 8 2016 19: 21
      0
      the movie is great
  5. Cartalon
    Cartalon April 8 2016 07: 02
    0
    Only under Gaudakanal could benefit
  6. Urfin
    Urfin April 8 2016 07: 06
    +16
    The Japanese are interesting people (at least at that time). Hypertrophic national FAC and perfectionism speak of deep national uncertainty and a sense of inferiority. The first time it didn’t work out and everything seemed to drop their hands and didn’t even really try to seriously change everything. They did not even try to rethink either the ciphers or the concept and goals of the war as a whole. They waved a hand and waited for the end.

    The same Kurita. Fr. Samar ordered to turn away, in fact, refusing even a tactical victory. Somewhere I met the opinion that he wanted to save lives. But he understood that all the sailors whom he "rescued" later would still be sent to a suicidal attack.
    I think that he just decided to bring the end closer.

    The Japanese are not a nation of war anyway, no matter how beautiful their samurai and traditions were. This is a culture of hard workers and killers on the battlefield.

    Article plus. It was interesting)
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon April 8 2016 07: 27
      +3
      Kurita acted normally and it was necessary to be brilliant
      1. Urfin
        Urfin April 8 2016 07: 43
        +6
        No, it's different. If the Germans were, for example, in place of the Japanese, then yes - normal. But against the background of suicidal actions, stereotyped behavior, which in an incredible way is combined with excellent planning (after all, in Leyte Gulf they managed to deceive the Americans!), The actions of Kurita are strange.
        Then it would be logical to throw a miracle linkor into a suicidal attack.
      2. saturn.mmm
        saturn.mmm April 8 2016 09: 18
        +3
        Quote: Cartalon
        Kurita acted normally and it was necessary to be brilliant

        Quite rightly noticed.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 8 2016 10: 39
      +2
      Quote: Urfin
      The same Kurita. About. Samar ordered to turn it away, in fact having refused even a tactical, but victory.

      What tactical victory? Exchange battleships for a couple of "jeeps" and a dozen empty landing ships? Such a victory cannot even be called Pyrrhic.

      If Kurita had continued the battle, he would have had to go to the landing zone under the blows of the 7th fleet with AVE sliding down to the place of the battle "Taffy". Yes, Sprague's companions were not formidable Essekes, but slow-moving "jeeps" based on transports and tankers with small air groups. But on the other hand, there were quite a few of them and they were close.

      And most importantly, when Kurita would have reached the landing zone, he would have found that he was late: the American landing party had already moved ashore long ago. Plus, from the north there would have been raids from AV Halsey, hurrying to help.
    3. Cro-Magnon
      Cro-Magnon April 8 2016 14: 27
      +2
      It's just that the Japanese are excellent, well-trained professional sailors ... but only to the level of captain of the 1st rank, commander of the ship, i.e. maximum operational tactical level! But above ... at the operational and especially strategic level, complete seams ... mediocrity, indecision, illogical decisions! And the demonstration is, of course, Pearl Harbor ... the feast of the Japanese Navy ... a tactical masterpiece and stratigical stupidity! Refusal of the second raid, refusal to search for aircraft carrier formations, no landing force intended for capture at all ... did not drop a single bomb on the US Navy's fuel storage facilities ... the reserve for several years of the war was NOT DAMAGED! Docks are intact, art warehouses are intact, arsenals ... a retreat from the islands is comparable to flight! With such leadership, they held out for a long time, only American caution saved them ...
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon April 8 2016 14: 54
        +1
        It’s rare that one of the senior people’s officers who is already capable of drawing operations with the Japanese had Ozawa and Tanaka capable of masterpiece operations, but it’s impossible to demand such a level from the entire fleet, and strategically for Japan the war was not won, except to capture Hawaii, but it was beyond their means
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 15: 04
        +6
        Quote: Cro-Magnon
        mediocrity, indecision, illogical decisions! And the show is, of course, Pearl Harbor ...

        Indeed, it’s indicative, only exactly the opposite - it’s indicative of decisiveness and logical decisions.
        Quote: Cro-Magnon
        tactical masterpiece and stratigical stupidity

        You just don’t understand how bold, breaking the foundations and not corresponding to the traditional views on naval warfare, this operation was. The Pearl Harbor attack is a masterpiece, and a masterpiece of strategic planning, moreover, brilliantly executed. The Japanese were able to decide to attack the most powerful naval base of the fleet with the most powerful forces of carrier-based aviation, and even located almost half the world. The Japanese were able, in the strictest confidence, to prepare people and equipment for such an attack, to conduct their connection unnoticed.
        You are now arguing from the point of view of afterglow, you KNOW that yes, you could do this and that. But the Japanese did not know anything about this. And no one in the world knew that the role of the main strike force passed to aircraft carriers. No one could have imagined that the Nagumo compound alone and without the support of battleships would be able to defeat the main forces of the US Pacific Fleet.
        The task of the Japanese was to ensure that the American fleet did not go to the Philippines until the Japanese seized the territories of interest to them. And for this alone (temporary weakening of the US fleet) they were ready to pay with their aircraft carriers and planes. But they managed to weaken the US fleet and exclude its immediate access to the sea, retaining their aircraft carriers for a decisive battle. That the attack of Pearl Harbor MAY become this most decisive battle in those years, no one could have guessed at all, because the decisive role of carrier-based aviation was realized much later.
        The Japanese planned a very daring and the largest ambitious raid in the history of the navies. And they brilliantly carried it out. And you blame them that they didn’t carry troops with them laughing This is the same as discussing the inertness of the Novgorodians - with swords and spears they came out against the knight dogs, although they could easily think of a Kalashnikov assault rifle
        1. Urfin
          Urfin April 8 2016 15: 52
          +5
          The Japanese made some strange miscalculation in purpose.
          It would be typical for an ordinary person to destroy large ships at the base in the first place. But the admiral must understand what the fleet needs.
          I am not a specialist, and by no means do not blame the stupidity of the Japanese. But I can’t understand why they began to bomb linocors ... After all, the logic of using the fleet by the Japanese themselves led to the following priority: aircraft carriers - infrastructure - other warships. and they did not find the aircraft carriers began to bomb the battleships, forgetting about everything else.
          The only thing that comes to mind is a template. Pearl Hrabor was a naval battle for Japanese admirals, not a strategic operation. And they, as befitting in battle, tried to destroy the enemy ships.

          Yes, a brilliant "sabotage", at an operational level at best. Although it could have been a strategic victory.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 17: 00
            +5
            Quote: Urfin
            But I can’t understand why they began to bomb linocors ...

            Because they were considered the main force of the fleet
            Quote: Urfin
            After all, the logic of the use of the fleet by the Japanese themselves led to the following priority: aircraft carriers - infrastructure - other warships

            No :))) Their logic was exactly the opposite.
            According to their pre-war concept, the base of the fleet was the battleship. But there was no parity in battleships with the United States, so the Japanese were looking for tactics in which aircraft carriers, cruisers and light fleet forces could weaken the squadron of US battleships, so that Japanese LCs had a chance to defeat them in a general battlefield.
            Their plan was to wait for the invasion of the U.S. Navy, attack it with airplanes during the day, torpedoes of destroyers and heavy cruisers (under the guise of battlecruisers) at night, and the next day, when part of the U.S. battleships would be sunk / disabled, give a classic linear battle. BUT!
            At the beginning of the war, the Japanese needed to capture many targets in the shortest possible time (Singapore, Java, Philippines, etc., etc.) - they needed oil and they had to squeeze the British / Dutch / Americans from their bases, from where they could hinder the Japanese produce oil and other minerals. It wasn’t too difficult (there weren’t big forces there), but to counter the upcoming invasion of the US Navy, the Japanese would need to keep all available forces in their fist, which would extremely tighten the capture of everything that the Japanese wanted to capture.
            Therefore, a plan was born - to strike with aviation not when the American battleships came to Japanese waters, but when they still stood in their base :)
            The main goal of the Japanese in the raid on Pearl Harbor is battleships and nothing else. And they did not use their battleships, considering them the main forces and cherished for the decisive battle.
            You just understand that the Japanese drove the carriers of Nagumo back and forth, not because they saw the main striking force of the fleet in them, but because they considered the carriers to be consumables (like the LKR like Congo), but battleships were saved for the Main Battle :))
            Quote: Urfin
            Yes, a brilliant "sabotage", operational level at best

            Is it okay that as a result of "operational" sabotage the STRATEGIC plan of the war at sea of ​​the USA (Rainbow) was disrupted?
            1. Urfin
              Urfin April 8 2016 20: 38
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              No :))) Their logic was exactly the opposite.
              According to their pre-war concept, the base of the fleet was the battleship. But there was no parity in battleships with the United States, so the Japanese were looking for tactics in which aircraft carriers, cruisers and light fleet forces could weaken the squadron of US battleships, so that Japanese LCs had a chance to defeat them in a general battlefield.


              But then I still do not understand. They with the help of aircraft carriers attacked the enemy fleet, believing that the main force is the battleships ...
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 21: 35
                +1
                Quote: Urfin
                They with the help of aircraft carriers attacked the enemy fleet, believing that the main force is the battleships ...

                That's right. They attacked the fleet of battleships in the harbor, hoping that they would take the Americans by surprise and destroy ships unprepared for battle (the Japanese ambassadors in the United States were to declare war on the Americans for 40 minutes before the raid, for the remaining time, notify the Pacific Fleet and take measures to repel the massive air attacks are not possible). In fact, a lot of mistakes led to the fact that the ambassadors declared war after the raid on Pearl Harbor
                1. Operator
                  Operator April 8 2016 23: 16
                  -3
                  Not a bunch of mistakes, but a pattern in the form of Operation Snow of the NKVD of the USSR with the participation of the agent of influence Harry Dexter White.
                2. Urfin
                  Urfin April 9 2016 09: 20
                  -1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  That's right. They attacked the fleet of battleships in the harbor, hoping that they would catch the Americans by surprise and destroy the ships unprepared for battle

                  That's what I'm talking about.
                  The Japanese planned and carried out the operation thousands of kilometers from their bases. Used against the enemy aircraft carriers and submarines. And while they continued to consider the battleships the basis of the fleet. The explanation for this combination is conservative thinking at the level of the entire culture of command.

                  Yes, they expected to be taken by surprise. But they were opposed not only by unprepared ships, but also by land defense and aviation. It is not difficult to conclude that once aviation is effective here, then in ordinary combat, with minor features, it will be effective. But it was not done, or done, but for some reason was not accepted. This is precisely the question. My opinion is that the answer lies in their culture and worldview
          2. Alex
            Alex April 10 2016 14: 07
            +2
            Quote: Urfin
            But I can’t understand why they began to bomb linocors ... After all, the logic of using the fleet by the Japanese themselves led to the following priority: aircraft carriers - infrastructure - other warships. and they did not find the aircraft carriers began to bomb the battleships, forgetting about everything else.

            As far as I remember, battleships were the main goal. There was even a famous story with armor-piercing shells turned into air bombs capable of breaking through the deck of battleships.
        2. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich April 8 2016 19: 14
          +2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          You are now arguing from the point of view of afterglow, you KNOW that yes, you could do this and that. But the Japanese did not know anything about this. And no one in the world knew that the role of the main strike force passed to aircraft carriers.

          I with you, namesake, absolutely agree hi In everything. It's easy to say now when you know the result. I doubt that in those real conditions, in which the Japanese were, modern "sofa" strategists would have shown better results winked
        3. Cro-Magnon
          Cro-Magnon April 8 2016 22: 39
          0
          I agree that it’s now easier for us to argue a hundred times how and what to do, but the rest can be argued! The Japanese built their plan on the basis of the British experience in Lepanto, their agent in the Consulate General of Honolulu clearly fixed the graphics of the ships based in the pearl harbor and especially the aircraft carriers, they created a shock fist again from AB ... i.e. they understood that AB was the main striking force ... why, knowing that 2 US carrier formations were no more than 3-4 days from the base, they didn’t look for them, because there was no one to hunt them, opponents? ! Why didn’t they conquer the islands then they didn’t destroy the fleet’s infrastructure ?! A third American aircraft carrier would not have approached Midway if after the battle in the Coral Sea it hadn’t been repaired / refueled / replenished with ammunition at Pearl Harbor ... Several ninja saboteurs who destroyed fuel storage in Hawaii would have kept the US fleet from moving to the Philippines better than destroying 10 battleships ... well, there is no strategic thinking there! There are abstruse, thorough, multi-way plans ... but as soon as something is wrong, everything begins to pour in ... I also don’t agree about decisiveness ... it’s the decisiveness of a rat driven into a corner by the American policy of containment, sanctions and provocations ... and there are grounded theories about what the White House knew about the impending attack and framed ... to enter the war as a victim of aggression and persuade the American people to take up arms, which he stubbornly did not want to do!
      3. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA April 8 2016 15: 51
        +3
        Quote: Cro-Magnon
        And the demonstration is, of course, Pearl Harbor ... the feast of the Japanese Navy ... tactical masterpiece and stratigical stupidity! Refusal from the second raid, refusal to search for aircraft carrier formations, no landing force intended to be captured at all ... did not drop a single bomb on the US Navy's fuel storage facilities

        Do you know a way to secretly transfer across half the ocean and land 3 divisions (120 transports + 25 tankers) on a hostile coast? And cash IJN? There she has the task of replenishing the BC in the sea for 1941 no longer has a solution. And the nearest harbor in which you can do this is on the edge of MOT.

        Oh yes, in parallel with this, you will need to capture Southeast Asia. Because there are no other sources of oil in the volumes required by the Empire.

        As for the second strike, this issue was considered at Tsushima. Taking into account the time for landing, rearmament. taking off, gathering the group and flying to the target, it turned out that the Japanese, according to the most optimistic scenario, would have to return to AB after the second strike during sunset. And "on average" - after sunset. Night landing on AB is a roulette wheel.

        On the other hand, the total losses after the return of all the first-strike aircraft amounted to as many as 55 aircraft irrevocably and about 90 for repairs (almost 2 air groups). At the same time, the combat losses of the first wave of the first strike - 9 aircraft, and the second wave - already 20. The air defense of the base woke up. The second strike in 5 hours will be greeted even more hotly: no longer by ship's anti-aircraft guns with manual supply of BP and aiming "by eye", but by a working coastal and naval air defense system with all deployed guns, standard calculations and included radar and PUAZO / MPUAZO. Oh yes, and 27 combat-ready "axes" in the air.

        Let me remind you that almost all cash pilots of aircraft carriers IJN took part in the raid on П-Х. And the Japanese would not have others in the near future. Moreover, the use of AB has already been scheduled for six months in advance. Want to ditch the color of Japan’s aircraft carrier aircraft and jeopardize the mastery of oil - forward, the second strike on PX.
        Quote: Cro-Magnon
        stock for several years of war
        Fuel stock in PX was equal to US weekly production. Do not forget that until the 60s the United States was the largest oil producer in the world.
        Storage is also not a question - after the United States withdrew Japan from the allowance (80% of the oil that went to the tankers chartered by the Allies), they had enough old TN for temporary storage of fuel. And in 1942, the Red Hill Storage underground storage facility was commissioned in PX.
        Quote: Cro-Magnon
        Docks are intact, art warehouses are intact, arsenals ... a retreat from the islands is comparable to flight!

        At the dock there was a "Pennsylvania", the crews of which were shooting at everything that flies nearby. By the way, that morning, even at the LK docked, a quarter of the ZA crews were at the guns, and the rest were in the cockpits.
        And before the arsenals still need to be dodged - the Yankees used rock storage. And Japanese intelligence provided only approximate data on the coastal infrastructure.
        1. Cro-Magnon
          Cro-Magnon April 8 2016 23: 06
          0
          The Japanese at the same time as the attack on PX disguised large and large operations in the Philippines, Indonesia and under Singapore in the Malaysia stealthily and expeditiously! What was missing a pair of divisions from 3 million army ?! Capturing Southeast Asia and Australia is much easier to destroy and capture the MAIN BASE OF US TF ...
          What prevented the second strike from being carried over to the next morning and from a closer approach distance? And perhaps the fear is that, by pike, all destroyed base planes will be restored, will find an operational connection at night, and without fighter cover themselves will destroy it themselves in the morning !?
          Spare pilots say nebylo ... so kolega wrote above that for yap. Admirals AB - consumables, especially pilots!
          I don’t know how much oil there was extracted in the United States for sure, but I know for sure that the reserves in Hawaii were created for many years in peacetime ... agree that operating from San Jose and Losangeles throughout the Pacific Ocean is no easier than attacking and capturing Hawaii ...
          As for the dock ... I didn’t know that the Yankees are so stingy ... one dock on the entire main base and it was occupied by Pennsylvania ... ;-) do you know the story about the crane’s feat of this dock?
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 11 2016 10: 40
            0
            Quote: Cro-Magnon
            The Japanese at the same time as the attack on PX disguised large and large operations in the Philippines, Indonesia and under Singapore in the Malaysia stealthily and expeditiously! What was missing a pair of divisions from 3 million army ?! Capturing Southeast Asia and Australia is much easier to destroy and capture the MAIN BASE OF US TF ...

            Camard, are you aware that for the campaign against the Allies, the Army was able to allocate only 11 divisions? Eleven! And this was the maximum that could be landed and supply at the first stage of the battles.
            I have not in vain mentioned 100-120 transports. That is how much you had to find from somewhere for the landing in PX. And this despite the fact that even in the Republic of Ingushetia, without landing on Oahu, the mobilization of the transport fleet in the 1941 campaign left Japan 25% of the tonnage of the minimum needs of peacetime. Island nation, yes ...
            And this is only for the landing - and you still have to organize the supply of the ship's support group for the landing. For a pair of "Congo" is not enough here ...
            Quote: Cro-Magnon
            What prevented the second strike from being carried over to the next morning and from a closer approach distance? And perhaps the fear is that, by pike, all destroyed base planes will be restored, will find an operational connection at night, and without fighter cover themselves will destroy it themselves in the morning !?

            That is, do you propose to leave for a day next to the main base of the AUG fleet, which has already lost an air group of one AB irretrievably and one more - for repair? Apparently, so that the next day it would be attacked by the unknown American aircraft, base aircraft and Pacific Fleet forces that survived the attack. And to jeopardize the continued use of AB in the main operation. For the attack on the PX, for all its entertainment, was just for the sake of an auxiliary operation, the purpose of which was to ensure the landing in the SEA from attacks from the US Pacific Fleet.
            By the way, why without fighter cover? 27 combat-ready "axes" survived the first blow. Another 30 were listed as damaged. Plus the Enetrprise air group.
            Quote: Cro-Magnon
            Spare pilots say nebylo ... so kolega wrote above that for yap. Admirals AB - consumables, especially pilots!

            You do not confuse 1944 and 1941. In 1941, no one would put Kido Butai at extra risk. Because the participation of AB is already spelled out in the plans for future operations - and without them, their implementation may be in jeopardy.
            Quote: Cro-Magnon
            I don’t know how much oil there was extracted in the United States for sure, but I know for sure that the reserves in Hawaii were created for many years in peacetime ... agree that operating from San Jose and Losangeles throughout the Pacific Ocean is no easier than attacking and capturing Hawaii ...

            How many years is it? Especially when you consider that the main base of the fleet П-Х became just 1,5 years before the war. To do this, they even had to change the fleet commander - the previous one did not want to leave the coast of the Metropolis and in every possible way sabotaged the decision to relocate the warhead.
            Quote: Cro-Magnon
            Do you know the story about the feat of the crane operator of this dock?

            I read the Lord. smile
  7. bionik
    bionik April 8 2016 07: 33
    +5
    Japanese battleship "Yamato" on completion in the naval base of Kure. View from the stern. The main guns (460 mm) and medium-sized guns (155 mm) are clearly visible behind them.

    In the water area of ​​the base on the right you can see the light aircraft carrier Hosho, in the background - the supply ship Mamiya.
  8. bionik
    bionik April 8 2016 07: 40
    +5
    The battleship "Yamato" under the bombs of American carrier-based aircraft October 24, 1944
    The photo captures one of two (according to four others) bombs entering the battleship. In this raid (the fifth attack on the Japanese compound at 13.30), aircraft from the Essex and Lexington aircraft carriers with 500 fn. bombs, so the damage was relatively small. Of the hits in the Yamato, the most serious hit was in the bow - in the anchor rooms of the port side. The ship took 2000 tons of water and received a noticeable roll, which was quickly eliminated.
    At this very time, the battleship Musashi was already doomed, it was going alone at a speed of about 16 knots, and sank after the sixth attack at 19.35.
  9. parusnik
    parusnik April 8 2016 07: 40
    +9
    Even during the war in Japan, there was a gloomy saying: "There are three useless things in the world - the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China and the battleship Yamato ... Thank you, Denis .. good article ..
    1. Amurets
      Amurets April 8 2016 07: 51
      +6
      Quote: parusnik
      Even during the war in Japan, there was a gloomy saying: "There are three useless things in the world - the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China and the battleship Yamato ... Thank you, Denis .. good article ..

      For the first time I read this saying in V. Efimenko's book "Wind of the Gods", an art book about kamikaze. By the way, the author knew the topic well because he worked with Japanese prisoners of war.
    2. Proxima
      Proxima April 8 2016 12: 48
      +3
      Quote: parusnik
      Even during the war in Japan, there was a gloomy saying: "There are three useless things in the world - the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China and the battleship Yamato ... Thank you, Denis .. good article ..

      It is worth paying tribute to the author. The article is made in literary execution, this is especially noticeable in its first half, and the technical specifications are written unobtrusively and out of place. Once again, THANKS FOR THE ARTICLE.
  10. bionik
    bionik April 8 2016 07: 42
    +3
    Physical exercises of Japanese sailors on the deck of the battleship Musashi.
  11. sevtrash
    sevtrash April 8 2016 08: 34
    +1
    The possibilities of Japanese industry of those times are impressive. Apparently the second most powerful fleet since the Second World War. How independent are their development of 460 mm guns, engines for both ships and aircraft? Of course, in terms of technological level, they were inferior to their ally to the Germans, like the Americans and possibly the British, maybe the USSR too, but not sure. How, interestingly, Japan was able to achieve such impressive results in the creation of an industrial society? And without the social upheaval of the Russian Empire. What is the defining difference? Samurai spirit?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 09: 40
      +2
      Quote: sevtrash
      How, interestingly, Japan was able to achieve such impressive results in the creation of an industrial society? And without the social upheaval of the Russian Empire

      Read what was happening in Japan in the pre-war period - compared to their "On the General Mobilization of the Nation", our industrialization looks very innocent, humanitarian and socially oriented laughing
      A good (but short) review article is here http://freebooks.site/uchebnik-istoriya-ekonomiki/ekonomicheskoe-razvitie-yaponi

      i-1919.html
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash April 8 2016 10: 10
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Read what was happening in Japan in the pre-war period - compared to their "On the General Mobilization of the Nation", our industrialization looks very innocent, humanitarian and socially oriented

        I read it, thanks for the link.
        Yes, the law is tough. But can it be compared with the upheavals of the Russian Empire after the revolutions, the civil war, the change of ownership to an ineffective type, and repression? Yes - 15-16 hours is too much, but the execution and the Gulag? And, most importantly, what is the result? Despite the lost war, Japan is a great economic power, although it imports raw materials, and most importantly, the standard of living.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 10: 52
          +6
          Quote: sevtrash
          Yes, the law is tough. But can it be compared with the upheavals of the Russian Empire after the revolutions, the civil war, the change of ownership to an ineffective type, and repression?

          The fact is that the February and October revolutions with the subsequent civil war hit the economy of the former Russian Empire / the young USSR and began its industrialization of the USSR from a lower start than Japan. At the same time, one cannot say that the revolution was obligatory for industrialization; in principle, one could do without it completely.
          Quote: sevtrash
          Yes - 15-16 hours is too much, but shooting and GULAG?

          But how many of these executions and gulags were there? There were repressions, who argues, but their size is usually greatly exaggerated.
          Quote: sevtrash
          And, most importantly, what is the result?

          The USSR is the second most powerful power and one of the two superpowers of the planet, Japan is the territory occupied by the USA, and what? :)
          The successful transformation of Japan into a major economic power occurred later, already in the post-war period. In the 1939 year, Japan was inferior in GDP to France, having a population almost twice as large (71 million versus 41 million), and although Italy was superior in GDP (184 versus 151 billion dollars), it was inferior to GDP by more than 30% - and this despite the fact that Italy, by no means, was listed among the highly industrialized powers :)
          1. sevtrash
            sevtrash April 8 2016 11: 19
            -1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But how many of these executions and gulags were there? There were repressions, who argues, but their size is usually greatly exaggerated.

            Yes, but "... According to the data provided by the archival department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in 1992, for the period 1917-1990, 3 people were convicted on charges of state crimes, of which 853 were sentenced to the highest degree ...", " ... for the period 900-827, up to 995 million people passed through the GULAG, its number in 1921 amounted to 1953 thousand people; the maximum number of the GULAG, for the entire period of its existence, was reached in 10, and amounted to 1938 thousand people ... "
            Not so little.
            What about the atmosphere? Of the aircraft designers who did not sit? Yakovlev only? Is restricting freedom equivalent to creative freedom?
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            The USSR is the second most powerful power and one of the two superpowers of the planet, Japan is the territory occupied by the USA, and what? :)

            As a result of all the upheavals, the Russian Empire / RF lost its territory, population, the previous formation proved to be ineffective, in fact, the economy starts anew, and even in adverse conditions.
            Regarding pre-war and military Japan, I talked about the possibilities of its industry in terms of building such impressive models of military equipment as Yamato. It is clear that the leader was not, and the fleet, nevertheless, the second in power.
            Well, the result for Japan, despite the loss in the war, is favorable. Today, it’s clear.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA April 8 2016 11: 45
              +2
              Quote: sevtrash
              What about the atmosphere? Of the aircraft designers who did not sit? Yakovlev only? Is restricting freedom equivalent to creative freedom?

              Heh heh heh ... the history of the Liberty motor kind of hints that in order to get real results, the freedom of creativity of designers still needs to be limited.
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash April 8 2016 12: 21
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Heh heh heh ... the history of the Liberty motor kind of hints that in order to get real results, the freedom of creativity of designers still needs to be limited.

                I don't think it can be compared with a "sharashka", especially a GULAG. Moreover, they did it in a month.
                The main thing, of course, is not in restricting freedom, but in proper motivation. The motivation for the life of the designer or his relatives is certainly strong, but how effective is it? What is harmonious - the freedom of the individual and the freedom of creativity or a prisoner and the freedom of creativity?
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA April 8 2016 13: 17
                  +1
                  Quote: sevtrash
                  What is harmonious - the freedom of the individual and the freedom of creativity or a prisoner and the freedom of creativity?

                  Freedom of creativity and harmonious development of personality - it is, of course, good and bala arodno. (with)
                  But the trouble is: all this is good to do in a toothless peace time. And not in the situation of 1937-1938 (aggravation in the Far East, regular graters with Poland, Anschluss of Austria, Czechoslovak crisis, etc.) when the country and the army need new cars, and designers instead spend time traveling abroad to buy refrigerators and cars (without spending half of the funds allocated to them for the purchase of new products) or spend government money and their own time on a project whose failure they know a priori.
                  And most importantly, the country has no other designers.
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 12: 14
              +6
              Quote: sevtrash
              in the period 1921-1953, up to 10 million people passed through the GULAG, its number in 1938 amounted to 1 thousand people; the maximum number of the Gulag, for the entire time of its existence, was reached in 882, and amounted to 1950 thousand people ... "Not so little.

              Certainly a lot. But the question is that not all 10 million who passed through the Gulag were innocently repressed, i.e. generally speaking, in these 10 million there is an ordinary criminal, and those who were really repressed, but for the cause. And there were also many of them, because far from all the repressed were innocent (although, alas, there were a lot of those too)
              Quote: sevtrash
              What about the atmosphere? Of the aircraft designers who did not sit?

              Well, you remember what happened before the sharash went. Design offices stamped a huge number of inoperative projects, received benefits for this and continued to stamp them further. With the light hand of Tukhachevsky, fantasizing on military subjects reached enormous proportions, despite the fact that the army and the Air Force did not get anything decent from this.
              I do not condone Vissarionych, but he really had an extremely difficult situation and, I repeat, VERY many repressed were not at all white sheep.
              Quote: sevtrash
              Regarding pre-war and military Japan, I talked about the possibilities of its industry in terms of building such impressive models of military equipment as Yamato

              Well, we also had all kinds of Dnieper hydroelectric stations there, and we riveted the tanks in crazy quantities, in general, we had a lot of achievements, just not in those areas
              Quote: sevtrash
              It is clear that the leader was not, and the fleet, nevertheless, the second in power.

              With a worthless army, mind you. Yes, and the Air Force did not differ anything special (not taking into account naval aviation, but it is not the Air Force)
              Quote: sevtrash
              Well, the result for Japan, despite the loss in the war, is favorable. Today, it’s clear.

              It’s hard to say, but in any case, at the moment, a huge number of factors that are no longer related to pre-war industrialization have influenced
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA April 8 2016 13: 53
                +3
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Yes, and the Air Force did not differ anything special (not taking into account naval aviation, but it is not the Air Force)

                PMSM, the naval aviation of Japan was mostly based not on technology, but on pilots. As long as there were specialists of the pre-war issue, who were able to see the stars in the sky during the day and make the Zero fly for 12 hours, everything was fine. Their training and experience was enough to make the most of the strengths of Japanese vehicles and prevent the enemy from taking advantage of their weaknesses.

                But the price was too high: the machines, which were fully opened only in the hands of "100 pilots a year", became "flying coffins" for pilots of military production. For these pilots frankly lacked experience - and they immediately got out all the shortcomings and lags in the performance characteristics of the cars, which the elite compensated for with training and tactics. Where an elite pilot will walk along the blade of a knife in the firing sectors of the onboard installations of the same "fortress" and give a burst exactly to the vulnerable point, the pilots of the military edition will "shove with bare chests on the Browning, shooting" at the silhouette "- and then unprotected tanks will come out, and the lightness of the structure, and a small ammo cannon.

                And what’s worst for the Japanese is that their adversary relied on a mass pilot, whose TTX saved the not very experienced skin: if that - separation in dive and climb to a height - the machine itself will tear itself away from the enemy.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 8 2016 14: 37
                  +2
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  PMSM, Japanese naval aviation, for the most part, was not piloted, but piloted

                  How can I say? In the first half of WWII, "Zero" is something with something. The car is really outstanding, of course, with its own shortcomings, but in terms of the totality of qualities among the carrier-based aircraft of other nations, it is at least one of the best.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  But the price was too high: the machines, which were fully opened only in the hands of "100 pilots a year", became "flying coffins" for pilots of military production.

                  It depends on what is meant by a military release pilot. Americans and the Teutons of their schools or as they should. Japanese graduates took off with difficulty. This at least plant on the Su-27, there will be no sense
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  And worst of all for the Japanese - their adversary relied on a mass pilot whose TTX was saved by the not-so-skilled pilot

                  Yes, of course, the U.S. pilot training system was the first to win the war in the air (in the Pacific Ocean) when the sons of Yamato did not have one :) And the Japanese lost their experienced pilots very quickly - no matter how you twist them, there were too few. In essence, the quality of the pilots was equal during the battles on Guadalcanal, and then the Japanese simply failed in quality.
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA April 8 2016 16: 25
                    +2
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    How can I say? In the first half of WWII, "Zero" is something with something. The car is really outstanding, of course, with its own shortcomings, but in terms of the totality of qualities among the carrier-based aircraft of other nations, it is at least one of the best.

                    Exactly until they fought with him on his field. While the Yankees stupidly climbed into dogfight, "zero" reigned in the air. As soon as they switched to scissors and a pattern, without getting involved in "miracles on bends" - the situation immediately leveled off. Actually, the battle of Thatch against "zero" at Midway is already indicative: 4 Thatch's cars pulled over (from the covered torpers) two dozen "zero" - half of the fighter cover of the Japanese AUG - and left, losing 1 shot down "cat" for 3 or 4 shot down "zero".

                    If the enemy does not play with "zero" in giveaway, then low structural strength and other disadvantages immediately come out:
                    insufficient roll speed at high speeds and failures of its engine under negative overload conditions [the result of using a float carburetor and, at the same time, an explanation of the "slide effect"].

                    At speeds above three hundred (300) miles per hour on the speedometer, it becomes almost impossible to change the direction of the turn.
              2. Cro-Magnon
                Cro-Magnon April 8 2016 23: 36
                0
                I agree completely! I’ll add about the law on three spikelets ... the theft of state property in the early 30s reached alarming proportions, commodity trains could not pass through some regions without armed guards — the locals robbed! The people reasoned like this: since everything state belongs to all people, then ... I will take my share of this state property to myself! In the first year of law enforcement, more than 300 tons passed in court. cases of more than 1 million facts of theft and robbery ... several thousand were shot ... after 5 years, only a few thousand people were tried ... especially stupid, which it takes a long time to reach! They put things in order quickly ... this is not current liberalism ...
              3. cdznjckfd
                cdznjckfd 7 May 2016 01: 14
                0
                Yes, and the Air Force did not differ anything special (not taking into account naval aviation, but it is not the Air Force)
                And with what let me know, the technological level of the BB C and naval aviation is different? MA was simply distinguished by elite training and coherence of air groups. Remember why the cranes did not participate in the Midway battle.
            3. 97110
              97110 April 8 2016 13: 14
              +1
              Quote: sevtrash
              Well, the result for Japan, despite the loss in the war, is favorable.

              The explosion of 2 atomic bombs in cities would need to be entered into the book of records. No one else has such an achievement.
  12. EvilLion
    EvilLion April 8 2016 08: 34
    -1
    What was to be drowned was drowned correctly.
  13. kapitan281271
    kapitan281271 April 8 2016 08: 53
    -1
    Where Oleg will be srach drinks
  14. Dwarfik
    Dwarfik April 8 2016 09: 01
    +1
    Thank you for the article! It is read in 1 breath.
  15. Sargaras
    Sargaras April 8 2016 10: 03
    -1
    Battleships in the Second World War generally showed their failure. On the one hand, they were feared, on the other, they were protected until the last moment. The same story with Bismarck and Tirpitz. Thanks to the author. It would be interesting to read about the "Germans" too.
    1. alovrov
      alovrov April 8 2016 13: 24
      0
      Bismarck then what side ???
    2. The comment was deleted.
  16. Plombirator
    April 8 2016 10: 32
    +2
    Quote: anodonta
    That's just for this phrase, the article deserves a minus, which, I repeat, did not put. First, the ships of the "Congo" class before the war underwent a very serious modernization, which significantly increased their combat capabilities. In terms of basic performance characteristics, they could successfully equal, despite their "pre-retirement age", with almost all large cruisers built or designed at that time.

    Yes, dear colleague, they passed it, but in terms of combat capabilities, they were clearly inferior to the newest American battleships, which are in the ranks of nothing that they had to face. First of all, in terms of booking, which was excellent for the period of the First World War, but was already insufficient for the Second. But of course, the main caliber. Instead of putting even the Nagato and Mutsu (not to mention the newest) on the scales, obviously outdated ships went into action.
    Quote: anodonta
    How seriously the Japanese approached the matter is evidenced by the fact that in order to fight the BKR of the "Congo" type, the Americans had to build four famous "Iowa"

    Compare the years of construction of these two series of ships.
    Yes, the article, of course, looks faded against the background of monographs and other things, but after all, it is not intended for experts, which you, no doubt, are, but for people who are interested and curious. One mature engineer just proved to me that the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tavrichesky" was built in France, brought some sources "and hit himself in the chest" smile .A you - monographs ... monographs. wink
  17. Dark mol
    Dark mol April 8 2016 11: 43
    -1
    Everyone is talking about some kind of "samurai spirit". I immediately remember the fate of Yamato and Musashi, who decided to use the "samurai" in the serious battles of 1942-1944. For which they paid. If freshmen were in command of them, then, in my opinion, there would be more decisiveness and craving for battles.

    Total disgrace.
    1. Ustinov 055 055
      Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 04
      0
      Remember TIRIPITS and everything will fall into place
    2. Ustinov 055 055
      Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 04
      0
      Remember TIRIPITS and everything will fall into place
  18. alovrov
    alovrov April 8 2016 13: 21
    +4
    When the frigate Pallas arrived in Japan in 1855, the Japanese went to sea in small boats with chopped stern, so that there was no temptation to escape to the mainland. Pallas for them was like an aircraft carrier now for some guinea. And half a century later there was Tsushima, and another half a century later Pearl Harbor. Progress is impressive, however, as is the current subordinate position. In my opinion, one of the most correct actions of the Japanese was the expulsion of Catholic missionaries. Otherwise, they would move along the path of modern Philippines.
  19. Warrior2015
    Warrior2015 April 8 2016 13: 30
    +2
    The article turned out to be of quite high quality, thanks to the Author! :)

    But even at one Military Review there were two similar ones:

    http://topwar.ru/4832-gibel-linkora-yamato.html

    http://topwar.ru/32921-stal-i-ogon-luchshie-linkory-vtoroy-mirovoy.html

    And so it can be noted that the Japanese made a quality film. BUT - partly fantasy, too many American planes were crushed - let me remind you that only 5 (FIVE!) Planes from the attacking unit were shot down by the Japanese from the Yamato (despite the fact that other ships of their small squadron also had five).

    Yes, "Yamato" is both a monument to samurai valor and Japanese stupidity. When he could help, they kept him in the rear, and then threw him into apparent death.

    And in the film the explosion of "Yamato" is shown as UNDERWATER while it was on the surface, here is a unique photo of the explosion itself.
  20. Taoist
    Taoist April 8 2016 14: 06
    +1
    By the way, the fate of these Japanese "wunderwaves" is another graphic illustration of the thesis that it is at least stupid to count on success when designing and building "ultimate ships". (The same applies to other equipment). The gain in real fighting qualities is not as great as it seems, but the costs and complexity are growing exponentially ... As a result, all these "yamats", "mouses" and other "rattes" become exclusively curiosities of design thought and monuments of irrepressible ambition ...
    1. barbiturate
      barbiturate April 8 2016 16: 51
      +2
      Why Yamato is a "wunderwaffe"? I think you are wrong. A good battleship with excellent characteristics in a number of parameters, but there is nothing so extraordinary or stupid as in the designs of the "mouse" or "ratte". It's just that in those conditions, any ship could no longer do anything, the kingdom of aviation and aircraft carriers at sea began, but the Yamato (and sisterships) could prove themselves perfectly in what they were intended for - artillery combat with large enemy ships.
      The Japanese, of course, already understood everything in the 1945 year (that aviation would not be drowning them yet) and chose the path of honor - to die in battle, as befits the Bushido code. It is worthy of respect.
      1. Taoist
        Taoist April 8 2016 17: 36
        0
        Because this is the "ultimate ship" - in itself an attempt to make "the most", hoping that it will give some "technological advantage". It is on this premise that all attempts to create a "wunderwolf" are based. But even the existing advantage (if we assume that such a ship would actually act in accordance with its purpose) was not so great that it would withstand a duel, for example, with two "Carolina" ...
        1. barbiturate
          barbiturate April 9 2016 11: 05
          0
          Why do you consider battleships of the Yamato class to be "ultimate ships"? The displacement of battleships almost constantly grew and the Yamato-class LK was just another step in development and an attempt to surpass the LK of a potential enemy in quality. Everything is like everyone else, a step and an answer. In turn, the Americans, having learned about the Yamato and its characteristics, began to make Montana, other nations also designed battleships of larger displacement, just the aircraft carriers stopped this battleship race.
          The Japanese tried to qualitatively surpass the Americans in the LC, I think - temporarily it turned out, just saving the Americans would quickly give an answer
        2. barbiturate
          barbiturate April 9 2016 11: 05
          0
          Why do you consider battleships of the Yamato class to be "ultimate ships"? The displacement of battleships almost constantly grew and the Yamato-class LK was just another step in development and an attempt to surpass the LK of a potential enemy in quality. Everything is like everyone else, a step and an answer. In turn, the Americans, having learned about the Yamato and its characteristics, began to make Montana, other nations also designed battleships of larger displacement, just the aircraft carriers stopped this battleship race.
          The Japanese tried to qualitatively surpass the Americans in the LC, I think - temporarily it turned out, just saving the Americans would quickly give an answer
  21. xomaNN
    xomaNN April 8 2016 14: 09
    +1
    Two seaplanes carried out the air cover - this is all that the once mighty naval aviation could exhibit.

    And the superdreadnought "I" with dozens of anti-aircraft guns was doomed in advance. This is to the question of the combat stability of the NK without aviation cover at the present time.
  22. Warrior2015
    Warrior2015 April 8 2016 17: 11
    0
    Quote: Taoist
    By the way, the fate of these Japanese "wunderwaves" is another graphic illustration of the thesis that it is at least stupid to count on success when designing and building "ultimate ships".

    They built superlinkors and supercarriers precisely relying on their doctrine of a naval general battle - after a victory in which the enemy can be forced to conclude a peace favorable to Japan. And for 40 years before this, Tsushima showed that in general they are somehow right.

    Another thing is that in the war with the United States there were several such "general" battles - both in the main one (Midway), and in the rest, the Japanese traditionally "merged in full".

    Quote: barbiturate
    The Japanese, of course, already understood everything in the 1945 year (that aviation would not be drowning them yet) and chose the path of honor - to die in battle, as befits the Bushido code. It is worthy of respect.
    With the "efficiency" with which Yamato died, it would have been easier for the entire crew, or at least the officers, to simply commit hara-kiri, and turn the battleship itself into a floating air defense battery. laughing You look, and the fuel that had already become precious to the Japanese would be saved for more useful air battles on the defense of Japan.
    1. Taoist
      Taoist April 8 2016 17: 37
      +1
      Quote: Warrior2015
      And for 40 years before this, Tsushima showed that in general they are somehow right.


      It was Tsushima that showed that the victory is brought not by a couple of "supers" but by a balanced fleet in terms of composition and performance characteristics.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 8 2016 18: 07
      +1
      Quote: Warrior2015
      With the "efficiency" with which Yamato died, it would have been easier for the entire crew, or at least the officers, to simply commit hara-kiri, and turn the battleship itself into a floating air defense battery.

      So he went to Okinawa to become a floating battery.
      But Kristobal Hozevich managed earlier ... (C) smile
  23. proud
    proud April 9 2016 00: 57
    +1
    An interesting article, written in a simple, understandable language, many thanks to the author, I hope he has this article not the last on this site! In a word, Denis-You Molodchaga, I am waiting for new articles!
  24. Warrior2015
    Warrior2015 April 9 2016 01: 32
    +3
    Quote: Taoist
    The gain in real fighting qualities is not as great as it seems, but the costs and complexity are growing exponentially ..

    At the same time, let's not forget that specialization too. Out of the third corps according to the Yamato project, it was not even possible to build a normal aircraft carrier - the Shinano, having a monstrous displacement of 60.000 brt, had an air group with a maximum filling ... as much as 47 aircraft! laughing

    Quote: Taoist
    It was Tsushima that showed that the victory is brought not by a couple of "supers" but by a balanced fleet in terms of composition and performance characteristics.
    I agree with you, only the Japanese apparently made the wrong conclusions and built their doctrine on super-ships.

    Quote: Alexey RA
    But Kristobal Hosevich managed earlier ... (c)
    That's for sure ! laughing

    By the way, this is what the Yamato wreckage looks like at the bottom according to the data of the Japanese Oceanographic Expedition. It's not just that its explosion - see above - is considered one of the strongest non-nuclear in the history of the planet.
  25. Verdun
    Verdun April 10 2016 12: 09
    -1
    It was the Japanese admirals who realized the importance of using naval aviation. This is evidenced by all their operations at the beginning of the war. Battleships of the Yamato series were laid down and built when Japan still had high-quality aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft. This superiority has been lost. Largely - by chance, and by no means because of the talent of American military leaders. The descendants of Amaterasu understood well that without aircraft carriers, battleships were too vulnerable. The last ship of the series - "Shinano" - was completed as an aircraft carrier. The history of the Yamato is another illustration of the fact that even though very perfect, but single samples of weapons are not capable of changing the course of a big war. Although the characteristics of the ship are certainly impressive.
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon April 10 2016 12: 28
      0
      Accidents are not accidental, the Japanese scattered forces and in general their strategy, a defensive perimeter could not lead to anything good, and the Americans acted quite intelligently
  26. Jääkorppi
    Jääkorppi April 10 2016 15: 24
    0
    The ship is handsome, and the Japanese think very stereotyped! When planning, they proceed from the anticipated actions of the enemy (taking into account the mental superiority of the Japanese) and are absolutely unable to respond quickly with their non-standard (in their understanding) behavior!
  27. Ustinov 055 055
    Ustinov 055 055 April 19 2016 11: 01
    0
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Quote: Urfin
    The same Kurita. About. Samar ordered to turn it away, in fact having refused even a tactical, but victory.

    What tactical victory? Exchange battleships for a couple of "jeeps" and a dozen empty landing ships? Such a victory cannot even be called Pyrrhic.

    If Kurita had continued the battle, he would have had to go to the landing zone under the blows of the 7th fleet with AVE sliding down to the place of the battle "Taffy". Yes, Sprague's companions were not formidable Essekes, but slow-moving "jeeps" based on transports and tankers with small air groups. But on the other hand, there were quite a few of them and they were close.

    And most importantly, when Kurita would have reached the landing zone, he would have found that he was late: the American landing party had already moved ashore long ago. Plus, from the north there would have been raids from AV Halsey, hurrying to help.



    History does not know the subjunctive moods) HE as a result did not receive ANYTHING, and LINCOR was given for 5 kopecks, as YOU do not see the obvious. That the GERMANS with Tirpitz that the Japanese with Yamato were the toys of the great admirals and politicians, so everything was as it was. But imagine TIRIPITS against convoys under the protection of a 5 pl pair of cruisers, etc. No matter how many convoys other than the 17th would still be destroyed. ALL SAVED YES UNSET
  28. Nepenin
    Nepenin 12 July 2016 12: 38
    0
    Yamato concept from Main Guns.
  29. Narak-zempo
    Narak-zempo 10 March 2019 23: 15
    0
    The Japanese concealed the performance characteristics of these battleships so well that they did not even have a moral influence, like the Tirpitz. It is unlikely that Admiral Lee would have acted so decisively at Guadalcanal with his new battleships, if he had taken into account the possibility of a battle with such a ship.
  30. Armenian hegemon
    Armenian hegemon 16 December 2019 02: 27
    0
    The ship inspires respect and firepower equal to 9 Bertam minimum. It’s scary to imagine how 9 shells from the Japanese Mitsubishi Galant say 1700 kg each fly at a target along the shore or ship. There certainly will not seem enough, although it is difficult to imagine what kind of appetite for fuel consumption. For example, Tirpitz spent 7000 tons of oil per cruise, for every day you can definitely go bankrupt. This is the sunset of large ships, Sunday Yamato in the 21st century would have sank it anyway as 75 years ago. Even taking into account the air defense of the 21st century, from anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, even the most powerful defense against them would not have saved him. Even the fact that he survived 9 direct hit torpedoes! Honorable Seppuku but useless.