Expert Aleksey Khlopotov: on the Syrian war, BMPT and BAM based on the Armata platform
The war in Syria has once again demonstrated that armored vehicles and Tanksin particular, they remain the main striking force of the ground forces. No matter how much it works aviationno matter how high precision weapons she didn’t handle the enemy’s positions; it’s too early to talk about victory until infantry with the support of tanks passed through the ground. We talk about the Syrian experience with the military expert Alexey Khlopotov, who told us how this experience can be useful for the modernization of our tanks.
- As for the "iron", then, first of all, it is the need to strengthen the protection, which should be all-round. It is also necessary to ensure the protection of the crew commander. In this case, it is not enough to have just closed or remotely controlled machine gun installations — the commander should have not just good, but excellent visibility. This is one of the problems. Tanks in urban areas it is vital to have combat support vehicles - fire support. Moreover, both with automatic guns of small and medium caliber, and with large-caliber gun howitzer ballistics.
It is strange that this need is perfectly seen and understood by the Russian defense industry, but does not want to point out the Defense Ministry. So, we have developed and are ready for mass production two versions of fire support machines: BMPT and BMPT-72. Moreover, the BMPT was developed for money and for a technical assignment MO. This machine successfully passed state tests and was recommended for mass production. But, in 2010, the decision of the Serdyukov team, instead of adopting it, was closed. The money was thrown to the wind! At the same time, three such machines purchased Kazakhstan. On the basis of the Alma-Ata Military Academy, studies were conducted to study the possibilities of using this machine. Interesting results were obtained. Thus, on the basis of BMPT and TOC-1A, it is possible to form shock groups for the destruction of various gangs, including in terms of their use of powerful field fortification.
It works as follows - TOC is suitable for the minimum possible distance and inflicts massive fire damage. This ensures the accuracy and localization of the affected area. Then they enter the BMPT and make a sweep.
But the Russian MO does not see it at close range. I can not understand why. In the meantime, a cheaper version of the fire support machine, the BMPT-72, was developed. It can be obtained by converting the old "seventy doubles". Moreover, at present, the Petrel Research Institute is conducting a great deal of work on the development of a remotely controlled Baikal combat module with an 57-mm automatic cannon. BM "Baikal" has repeatedly appeared at exhibitions of weapons, both abroad and here in Russia. At an exhibition in Nizhny Tagil last year, it was posted on the BMP-3. This module allows you to successfully hit infantrymen with grenade launchers, armored vehicles of any class, up to and including the tank. Naturally, the tank this gun can hit only in the side or from the stern. But even having fired at a modern tank in its frontal part, even if it did not achieve penetration, it guaranteedly takes the tank out of operation, depriving it of all aiming optics, disabling the armament and crew.
Much more effectively such a gun operates on targets in urban areas. If the 30-mm automaton is often not able to pierce the concrete wall, the brickwork is painted brick by brick, then the 57-mm projectile needs just one hit.
Now Uralvagonzavod proposes to create such a machine on the Armata platform, but so far the Defense Ministry does not want to hear the proposals of the industrialists.
The creation of another interesting escort vehicle is under consideration: the BAM is a combat artillery vehicle based on the Armata platform. It should have protection at the tank level, but be armed with a powerful rifled 152-mm gun with howitzer ballistics. In fact, the proposed reincarnation of the famous "Hypericum" - self-propelled guns of the ISU-152 times of the Second World War. Let us recall how effectively these self-propelled guns stormed the fortifications of Koenigsberg and Berlin. Unfortunately, after their removal from service in the 1960-ies, the replacement was never created. In principle, this was explainable by the changed conditions - we then planned to fight with massive use of a nuclear weapon. Now everything is back to normal, and the need for such machines is enormous. No need to track down the window in which the sniper or the grenade thrower is hiding. A single shot of such an instrument is enough to completely form the entrance of the house.
The Syrian experience also speaks of the need to reform approaches to the operation of equipment - the maintenance of a modern tank by the forces of the crew in combat conditions is simply unrealistic. This leads to fatigue and, as a result, to unjustified losses. It is necessary to learn from the Syrians. There they have special technical teams involved in technical maintenance of equipment and its preparation for battle. The crew either fights or rests. I would venture to go even further - to have interchangeable crews on tanks. While one crew rests after the battle, his shift officers, waiting for the machine to finish servicing, go into battle again - this is a more rational and efficient use of technology.
I am very afraid of the repetition of the situation 1941 year. Then, after successful campaigns against the Japanese on Hassan and Khalkhin-gol, the Polish campaign, the war with Finland, everyone was complacent and considered the Soviet army "indestructible." This delusion eventually turned into a lot of blood. We had to re-arm literally on the move when the enemy was standing under the walls of Moscow.
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