Military Review

Anti-aircraft gunners in the defense of Sevastopol. By airplanes, tanks and manpower to the last shell

25



Before World War II, the cover of the Main Naval Base of the Black Sea fleet (ГВМБ ЧФ) - Sevastopol from an air attack was carried out by the 61st anti-aircraft artillery regiment (zap) with machine-gun and searchlight battalions. It consisted of four divisions. Three of them, armed with medium-caliber artillery systems (SZA), were equipped with the latest at that time, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and semi-automatic anti-aircraft guns of 76,2 mm caliber. The fourth division of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) had 16 automatic guns of 37 mm caliber. The machine gun battalion consisted of 46 machine guns (28 quad M-4 units and 18 single-barrel M-1s). There were 27 stations in the searchlight battalion.

At the request of the regiment commander, fighters of the 62 th fighter air brigade (commander colonel G. Dzyuba) could be called in, who promptly obeyed the head of the air defense of the fleet, colonel I. Zhilin, and were based on four Crimean airfields. It included airplanes of outdated designs: I-15, I-16 and I-153. The 61 zap served the 11 th air observation, warning and communication battalion (VNOS) of a three-manned roster, which had a 54 visual observation post and two radar detection stations РУС-1. The battalion was also at the disposal of the air defense chief.

The air group left for the defense of Sevastopol consisted of a 51 wheeled fighter and a fleet 31 seaplane, to which a detachment of airborne balloons, equipped 23 co-located balloons, also subordinated. The 1 battalion's anti-aircraft batteries were deployed in the north of Sevastopol and covered objects from the north. The batteries of the 2 division were located in the southwest, and the 3 division in the south-eastern parts of the city.

MZA battalion batteries were located on the shores of the North Bay with the task of destroying low-flying air targets. Anti-aircraft gun systems were located directly at the defended objects. The ships of the fleet had their own anti-aircraft artillery, which, during the stay of ships in the bay, was part of the anti-aircraft defense system. With this arrangement, anti-aircraft weapons cover ships provided a three-layer anti-aircraft artillery fire.

The personnel of the air defense units and subunits were well prepared, many privates and sergeants were completing their 4 year of service. The units maintained a high degree of combat readiness. 20 June The Black Sea Fleet returned from the exercises and received an order to remain in readiness number XXUMX. Command posts were deployed, a limited number of crew members were sent ashore. One-third of anti-aircraft weapons were on duty (operational) on duty around the clock; one of the batteries SZA was in three minutes ready to open fire. These circumstances contributed to the fact that the surprise attack of the fascist aircraft on Sevastopol in the morning of 2 on June 22 did not catch the Sevastopol anti-aircraft gunners by surprise, they managed to open fire in a timely and orderly manner.



It is widely known that the first German bombers did not drop bombs, but magnetic bottom mines on parachutes. These mines were fairly new and well classified. weapons. With their help, the Nazis planned to block the exit from the Sevastopol Bay, after which with blows aviation destroy the ships of our fleet. The air defense forces did not allow the Germans to fulfill this plan. As for the magnetic mines themselves, one of them fell into shallow water and did not explode. A rank 3 military engineer M. Ivanov neutralized a mine, after which it was carefully studied. Thanks to this, the new weapon ceased to be a secret.

Until November, 1941, the enemy aircraft continued to produce day and night raids on Sevastopol, single vehicles and small groups of bomber 2-3, with the aim of conducting exploration and mining of fairways. During this period, coastal and shipborne anti-aircraft artillery, as well as fighter aircraft, destroyed 17 enemy aircraft.

During the raids, the fascists used a variety of tactics. For example, reconnaissance aircraft, when approaching the GVMB, gained altitude more than 6800 meters and reached the targets from the side of the sun, which made it difficult to track them with the help of optical instruments. To mask the enemy pilots used the clouds. As soon as the aircraft began shelling anti-aircraft weapons, he immediately went into the clouds, and then appeared in the “cloud-free” windows and made reconnaissance. Soviet anti-aircraft gunners quickly learned the enemy’s tactics and began to take countermeasures. In cases where an enemy aircraft was landing from the side of the sun, protective glasses were worn on the optical sights of the air defense systems. If the German pilots went into the clouds, the anti-aircraft gunners continued to accompany them with sight, rotating the aiming flywheels with the same speeds as with visual observation. When the plane appeared in the “window”, it was in the field of view of the PUAZO sights.

However, the command and headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet the first battles with German aircraft criticized. There have been cases of conducting chaotic, unorganized fire, when one enemy aircraft was fired on with several (sometimes up to 10) batteries. Some commanders were agitated and confused, too hastily issued data for the shooting. This was due to the fact that it was not easy for the commanding staff to immediately gain confidence by hitting from a peaceful situation into a combat one. Also, in the first days there were no remote observation posts in the maritime sector, and in fact German aircraft during this period made raids just from the sea, and our anti-aircraft gunners were under stress and without a normal rest from guns and instruments, up to 18 hours a day.



Before the winter of 1941, the fleet command adopted a series of measures to strengthen air defense in the maritime sector. Balloon balloons were set up at a distance of 4-6 km from the coastline. KP 62-th air raid was transferred to the KP air defense of the Black Sea Fleet, and the fighter regiments were partially deployed at the airfields of Sevastopol. The newly formed SZA batteries were deployed along the coastal edge in the area of ​​Konstantinovsky Ravelin (each battery was reinforced by a MPA platoon to deal with flying, low-altitude and diving planes). The ship repair plant manufactured, using the compartments of the old ship, a floating anti-aircraft battery, which was equipped with 7-th anti-aircraft guns (four - 76 mm guns and three - 37 mm caliber), 2 machine guns with DShK and 2 searchlights. It was located in 6 km from the coast, on the traverse of the Chersonesus lighthouse.

For more operational management of air defense weapons around Sevastopol, six defense sectors were created. In two of them (in the area of ​​Kachi and the Chersonesus lighthouse), the commanders of fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery units had the right to act independently in repelling enemy air raids. The fighters were sent to distant approaches to the base by decision of the air defense chief of the Black Sea Fleet. Shipboard anti-aircraft artillery had its sectors for firing. By the beginning of autumn 1941, more advanced radar installations РУС-2 were received, which detected enemy planes for 15-20 minutes before their approach to the base. This made it possible for fighter aircraft to switch from continuous airborne bombering to a system of rotations at aerodromes.

At the end of October, German troops broke into Crimea: Manstein’s 11 Army rushed to Sevastopol, the number of antiaircraft artillery increased by this point: from Nikolaev, Sarabuz, Evpatoria and other cities temporarily left by our troops, 122 zap, 25 arrived in Sevastopol , 26, 114 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions (ambush), began to form 62 zap.

In early November, 1941, the German troops rushed to the assault on the city, with the move trying to seize it. At the Crimean airfields, the enemy concentrated more than two hundred bombers and fighters. And in the Sevastopol Defense Region (COP), created by 4 on November 1941 of the year, the order of 100 aircraft was based.

Enemy aviation has launched massive strikes on Soviet warships and on the city. The first raid was made on the night of November 2. The noise of the engines of the aircraft was auditioned from several directions. The searchlights illuminated only individual targets, so the number of aircraft and their battle formations could not immediately be determined. The commanders of the units were forced to open barrage. Sevastopol sky lit up with hundreds of outbreaks of anti-aircraft shells. Of the 63 aircraft, one was shot down. Several broke through to the city and to the bay. Some residential neighborhoods and ships were damaged by the bombing. It is worth remembering that the barrage fire at that time was imperfect, ineffective, required the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition (the 2 November anti-aircraft artillery spent 7039 shells), and their delivery to Sevastopol was fraught with difficulties. Therefore, anti-aircraft gunners resorted to this method of firing only in extreme cases, firing at group, unobservable targets. An accompanying fire was usually fired at visible (lighted) aircraft.

Massive raids in mid-November increased. The objects of the attacks were mainly batteries of field and coastal artillery, troops in the defense, ships parked. The enemy has applied a number of new tactics. For example, before striking at altitudes up to 7000 meters, one or two aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew by. The anti-aircraft gunners began their shelling, and at that time enemy bombers appeared from other directions and at other heights. We had to retarget our anti-aircraft batteries and fighter units on duty. It took time for the gunners to prepare the new data for shooting, so they opened fire either too late or not organized enough. As a result, individual aircraft broke through to objects.

Used by the Nazis and small groups of aircraft (9-12), layered in time and height. First, the first group of enemy bombers appeared, and in a minute or two - new group targets from other directions and at other heights. Usually in similar cases fighters were directed at one of the groups of aircraft, while the others were firing anti-aircraft batteries, and strictly in their sectors.

In November, the pilots and anti-aircraft gunners repelled 134 air strikes, involving 380 aircraft; in December, during the second assault, - 344 raid with 467 aircraft. The 131 aircraft was destroyed by pilots and anti-aircraft gunners on the ground and in the air.

Anti-aircraft gunners in the defense of Sevastopol. By airplanes, tanks and manpower to the last shell


The peculiarity of the air defense of Sevastopol was that the air defense units had to operate in conditions of the complete domination of enemy aircraft in the air. With each new assault on Sevastopol, the German command attracted an increasing number of aircraft to attack the Soviet troops and the city. Thus, during the second assault (December 1941 of the year), the enemy singled out an air squadron as part of 150 bombers only for operations against fleet ships. Sevastopol’s defensive area had only 53 serviceable aircraft.

Our aviation forces thawed every day. Small airfields, where Soviet fighters were based (on the Kulikovo field and at the Chersonesus lighthouse), were constantly subjected to air strikes and shelling. During the defense of Sevastopol, 3372 bombs and 15624 artillery shells exploded at these airfields. Only in the parking lot 40 was destroyed and our aircraft was damaged by 131. The battles killed near 100 and injured the 103 pilot. In the decisive battles for Sevastopol no more than two dozen of our fighters could participate. Bomber aviation, in particular, Pe-2 aircraft based on Caucasian airfields, launched bombing and assault attacks on enemy airfields in the Crimea and were able to destroy and incapacitate many enemy aircraft. However, the main share of the fight against fascist aviation fell on anti-aircraft artillery and the remaining fighter aircraft.

Another feature of the anti-aircraft artillery fighting in the defense of Sevastopol was that 75% of its composition was used to repel enemy ground attacks, to fight against tanks and infantry. Therefore, anti-aircraft artillery was not fully used in the fight against German aircraft. In addition, by order of the command, 4727 privates and sergeants and 83 officers were assigned to the Marine Corps from air defense units, as a result of which many guns and anti-aircraft artillery equipment were serviced by abbreviated calculations.

In November, the 880 anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Primorsky Army was included into the air defense system of the Sevastopol defense region, consisting of three battalions of the SZA and one MZA. However, the material part of his guns was badly worn out or damaged, there was a lack of ammunition, and the regiment itself was not fully manned. Navy anti-aircraft gunners could not help either. On 20 in May, 1942 of the year, before the decisive battles for Sevastopol, they lacked projectiles before full ammunition: for 85-mm guns - more than 13 thousand pieces, for 76,2-mm - about 13 thousand pieces. Sometimes, due to the lack of ammunition, the commanders did not open fire on single enemy aircraft, and kept a scant supply of shells to fight ground targets.

By the spring of 1942, the number of anti-aircraft weapons in Sevastopol was significantly reduced. The newly formed 62 zap, 122 zap and a detachment of aerostats barrage were forwarded to the Caucasus along with the squadron ships. In Sevastopol, there are: 61 zap, 1, 55, 114 rear, floating battery. Total 64 medium-caliber guns, 15 small-caliber cannons, 12 quadruple anti-aircraft machine guns M-4, 29 searchlight stations. For the third assault, the fascists pulled under Sevastopol parts and formations from all over the Crimea, concentrating here up to 600 aircraft of all classes. The forces were too unequal.



7 June 1942, after a long artillery and air preparation, the Germans launched an offensive. The gunners, anti-aircraft gunners, like other Sevastopol fighters, stood to death, causing significant damage to the enemy. Here are some examples.

The personnel of the 227-th antiaircraft battery of Lieutenant Ivan Grigorov Mamashayskoy near the valley within a short period of time 11 repulsed enemy attacks with enemy tanks, destroying tanks 7, 4 vehicles, mortars 13, 5 machine gun points, more than a battalion of infantry and 1 aircraft. The 229-I anti-aircraft battery of Senior Lieutenant N. Startsev in the Inkerman Heights area destroyed and dispersed the enemy's 8, crushed 3 mortar batteries, 30 machine-gun points.

From 7 to 13 in June, 1942 of the year fought bravely in the environment of 365-I anti-aircraft battery of Senior Lieutenant I. Pyanzina, who occupied a position near the Mekenzievy Gory railway junction. Dozens of air and ground enemy attacks were repulsed. Fascist tanks managed to break into a firing position when shells and grenades ran out on the battery. Then the seriously wounded battalion commander I. Pyanzin openly transmitted on his radio: "There is nothing to fight off ... the position of the fascists, open fire on our command post, I will correct myself."



During the defense of Sevastopol, the anti-aircraft gunners inflicted enormous damage on the enemy. Only fighters 61 anti-aircraft artillery regiment with 22 1941 June till June 30 1942 171 of destroyed enemy aircraft, tanks 84, 53 artillery and mortar batteries, machine-gun points 38, 164 car with manpower and goods, and to 14 thousand. German soldiers and officers. Due to the high combat readiness of the air defense unit of the GVBB Black Sea Fleet, the enemy’s initial plan, designed to mine the exit port and destroy the squadron ships, was thwarted. The coastal anti-aircraft artillery, in addition to its task of destroying enemy aircraft, was an important means of combating enemy ground forces. The effectiveness of the combat operations of anti-aircraft gunners in the defense of Sevastopol was achieved thanks to a clear and flexible interaction with parts of fighter aviation and ship defense, reliable and uninterrupted control of air defense units.

Sources:
Svetlyshin N. The Air Defense Forces of the country in the Great Patriotic War. M: Science, 1979. C.50-51, 80-82.
Group of authors. Air defense forces of the country. Historical feature article. M .: Military publishing house, 1968. S.232-237.
Ignatovich E., Kotov I. Anti-aircraft artillery in the defense of Sevastopol (1941 - 1942). // visage 1978. No.11 C.76-80
Ivanov A. Air defense troops in the defense of Sevastopol. // Bulletin of Air Defense. 1989. No.4. C.23-28.
Panov I. Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky M .: Young Guard, 1979. C.255-319
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  1. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack April 5 2016 06: 31
    +5
    Thank !!! I really liked the floating battery! I read it with pleasure !!!
  2. qwert
    qwert April 5 2016 07: 09
    +10
    I knew about the floating battery, but this is a section from the battleship Sovetsky Soyuz ... If so, it would be extremely difficult to sink it.
    Then the seriously wounded battalion commander I. Pyanzin broadcast in plain text on the radio: "There is nothing to fight back ... to the Nazis, open fire at our command post, I will correct it myself." Not only aircraft manufacturers and artillery spotters, but also anti-aircraft gunners. Eternal Glory to our heroic grandfathers and great-grandfathers.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik April 5 2016 08: 08
    +7
    So you are such a glorious battery "Don't touch me!" .. Thank you .. wonderful article ..
  4. Serg65
    Serg65 April 5 2016 08: 31
    +11
    Quote: qwert
    I knew about the floating battery, but this is a section from the battleship "Soviet Union"

    To be more precise, this is the experimental section of the middle part-citadel of the future battleship "Soviet Ukraine", "Soviet Union" was laid in St. Petersburg.
    I would like to supplement the author, namely that part of the article where the glorious 365th battery is mentioned. The battery initially covered the airfield in Sarabuz (Guards), when the Germans approached the airfield, the latter left its positions. She arrived in Sevastopol on the night of October 31 and immediately joined the air defense of the GVMB. The location of the battery was an earthen redoubt during the Crimean War, the 365 was armed with four 76 mm. anti-aircraft guns 9K model 1915/28. (the so-called "long Lenders") and the M4 anti-aircraft machine gun. The main task of the 365th battery was to cover the 30th coastal battery, but it so happened that the anti-aircraft gunners were located near the shortest road leading to the Northern Bay. This fact became the reason for the fierce attacks of the Germans. Due to the stubbornness of the battery and the huge losses of the enemy, the Germans christened the 365th battery the "Stalin" fort. The last gun of this battery is in the Black Sea Fleet Museum. The 365th battery deserves a separate article full of heroism and, oddly enough, betrayal.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 April 5 2016 08: 54
      +4
      I. Pyanzin read about the feat of anti-aircraft gunners of the artillery battery of senior lieutenant in childhood. I don’t remember the name of the book, but it talked about the exploits of our fighters. fighting in the Crimea and the Black Sea. The fact that the 365th battery was armed with 76-mm guns arr. 1915/28 I find out for the first time, for some reason I thought that the battery was armed with more modern 85-mm anti-aircraft guns 52-K arr. 1939
      Apparently, we have something in the continuity of generations (and the best traditions) - Senior Lieutenant I. Pyanzin (and many other Red Army commander officers who caused fire on themselves in order to take as many enemies as possible with them) and the captain of forces special operations of the RF Armed Forces, Alexander Prokhorenko, who performed a feat under the Syrian Palmyra - as long as we have such heroes - we are invincible!
      I regret that while in Sevastopol I could not get to any of the museums in this city - I was there only one day - on May 9, 2014 - you know, on such a day it was not at all a matter of museums. And then I did not succeed in arriving in Sevastopol, although I really wanted to visit Sapun Mountain, the Malakhov Hill, and Cape Khersones. I hope that someday I can still get into this glorious city - the city of our common history.
      I have the honor.
      1. wanderer_
        wanderer_ April 5 2016 09: 08
        +6
        The title of the book: "Heroes of the battles for the Crimea." The street and school No. 14 of Sevastopol are named after I. Pyanzin. In general, Sevastopol is a city of military glory, wherever you go, there have been battles everywhere since the time of Nakhimov. I am proud that I live in this beautiful city. Eternal memory to our grandfathers and great-grandfathers for our peaceful sky overhead.
        1. Serg65
          Serg65 April 5 2016 09: 44
          +2
          Quote: wanderer_
          I am proud to live in such a beautiful city

          Alexander, on the 4 photo there is an anti-aircraft gun, if I'm not mistaken over the railway station on Krasnaya Gorka. In my opinion there is now standing next to the T-34 pedestal?
        2. jktu66
          jktu66 April 8 2016 00: 43
          +1
          I studied at the 14th school
      2. Serg65
        Serg65 April 5 2016 09: 32
        +4
        Quote: Aleksandr72
        The fact that the 365 battery was armed with 76 mm guns arr. 1915 / 28 I know for the first time, for some reason I thought that the battery was armed with more modern 85-mm anti-aircraft guns 52-K arr. 1939

        Alexander, as it is not strange, but the old Lenders played a very important role in the defense of Sevastopol, perhaps even more than the guns of new modifications. The fact is that the stock of shells at the naval arsenal for these guns ensured the complete wear of the guns. 9K and 8K not only stood guard over the sky, but also were installed in the bunkers of the SORA.
  5. Fotoceva62
    Fotoceva62 April 5 2016 08: 47
    +6
    The floating ship was equipped on the body of the experimental compartment PTZ (one side of the pulse system, the other American system).
    The fascists were able to suppress the defense of the Sevastopol URA only then, when the anti-aircraft gunners ran out of ammunition (an order was issued to conduct fire only for self-defense). At the field artillery, the BC was also running out ...
    During the first raid, saboteurs acted who cut the telephone line and did not let the quench lights go out, the messenger motorcyclist was killed. A false command was received on the telephone to the operational duty of the fleet ... do not open fire, training flights ... If the operational duty of the fleet had not been vigilant, everything would have been sadder.
    The attack was foiled, but lost on mines: a tugboat, a floating crane and the EM “Perfect”. One mine fell on the city and exploded, many civilians died, these were the first victims in the city.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 5 2016 11: 02
      +3
      Quote: Fotoceva62
      The attack was foiled, but lost on mines: a tugboat, a floating crane and the EM “Perfect”.

      Um ... actually the Perfect One was lost on their mines. EM "Fast" exploded in German.
  6. Sarma
    Sarma April 5 2016 08: 50
    0
    If Oktyabrsky thought with his head and not his ass and did not send transport ships to missions without cover for warships and Pe-3, everything could have ended differently.
    1. Serg65
      Serg65 April 5 2016 09: 37
      +4
      Quote: Sarma
      If Oktyabrsky thought with his head and not his ass and did not send transport ships to missions without cover for warships and Pe-3, everything could have ended differently.

      laughing I wish Vladislav to command the KChF in those days !!!!!
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 5 2016 10: 32
      +2
      Quote: Sarma
      If Oktyabrsky thought with his head and not his ass and did not send transport ships to missions without cover for warships and Pe-3, everything could have ended differently.

      Oktyabrsky had Pe-3? belay
      And by the way, how long will the Pe-3 live when it meets 109 Messer? It was good for them in the north - there their enemy could be at most "one hundred and ten".
      1. Amurets
        Amurets April 5 2016 11: 42
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        By the way, how long will the Pe-3 live when it meets 109 Messer? It was good for them in the north - there their enemy could be at most "one hundred and ten".

        P. Tsupko. "Over the expanses of the northern seas." Dedicated to the OMAG in the 13th and 95th regiments of the IAP. Writes how the Pe-3 fought in the north. God forbid they got it.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 5 2016 12: 54
          +2
          Quote: Amurets
          P. Tsupko. "Over the expanses of the northern seas." Dedicated to OMAG in the 13th and 95th regiments of the IAP

          A thin red book in a soft cover, with the image of a two-keeled twin-engine over the waves inscribed in the star. smile

          I remember this ... the basing conditions at the Ensk aerodrome (an advanced airfield in the tundra on the seashore) and the fact that most of the losses were caused not by the enemy, but by the meteo, coupled with the complete lack of equipment of the aerodrome, are still well described. The airfield of distant fighters flying from dawn to dusk did not have night start equipment - the strip was marked with burning barrels. It’s good if there were two barrels ... and once it was possible to light up only one - and the boarding plane could not correctly enter the lane and crashed.

          Moreover, I first read Tsupko about the service of the crews of long-range fighters in the north, and then I was surprised to find some of those about whom he wrote, already in the Baltic, in scouts (Rakov’s memoirs).
          1. Amurets
            Amurets April 5 2016 17: 31
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            a thin red book in a soft cover, with an image of a two-keeled twin-engine over the waves inscribed in the star.

            Yes! And he also has books "Dive bombers" about the beginning of the war and how he started on the Ar-2 dive bomber of Arkhangelsk and "Torpedo bombers." "Torpedo bombers" is about the 51st mine-torpedo regiment with a bunch of regalia of the DKBF. the shelf draws on the article, so I do not list.
      2. Metoclopramide
        Metoclopramide April 5 2016 13: 31
        +1
        The Me-109 was a dangerous high-speed fighter, but its flight range was not great. Overland, the Germans solved this issue due to the excellent work of their rear units, which quickly prepared new field airfields, closer to the front, but over the sea, the 109th In view of the lack of cover for transport ships, the Germans became so impudent that Soviet transport ships attacked single torpedo bombers He-111 and U-88, without any fighter cover. It is clear that the Pe-3 is not a Su-27, but Messers were also shot down by the Pe -2, which did not have cannon armament, and the fuel supply in battle can play an important role, especially over the sea. The Pe-3 had a whole battery of cannons and machine guns, including large caliber (12,7), so whipping he was not ''
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 5 2016 15: 13
          +2
          Quote: Metoclopramide
          The Me-109 was a dangerous high-speed fighter, but its flight range was not long. The Germans resolved this issue on land due to the excellent work of their rear units, which quickly prepared new field airfields, closer to the front, but over the 109th sea not enough range.

          The Black Sea is not the Atlantic. In 1943, the Bf-109 had enough range to cover the dive bombers who had worked on the "Kharkov" comrades (Operation "Verp").
          Moreover, the Germans in the cover not only "served the number", but were conducting an air battle with our "axes" covering the LD and EM.
          The flight range of the 109s is quite enough to cover their strikers working on our Sevastopol route. Therefore, the Pe-3 there will suffer the fate of the Bf-110 in the initial period of the "Battle of Britain", when they were tried to be used as cover fighters.
          The only way to defend Sevastopol was to hold onto the Kerch Peninsula with its teeth and cover from it the supply route for single-engine fighters (plus work on enemy airfields).
  7. 1440minutes
    1440minutes April 5 2016 09: 46
    -5
    Quote: Technical Engineer
    With their help, the Nazis planned to block the exit from the Sevastopol Bay, after which, with air strikes, destroy the ships of our fleet. The air defense forces did not allow the Germans to fulfill this plan.

    Nothing wrong. The next day, the forts began to be mined by order of the RKKF command. And they mined them, thereby making the task facing the Luftwaffe as easy as possible. So the Germans could not spend money on gas and mines.
    Quote: Technical Engineer
    Due to the high combat readiness of the air defense units of the naval naval base of the Black Sea Fleet, the enemy’s initial plan, designed to mine the exit from the port and destroy the squadron’s ships, was disrupted.

    Well yes. And the leadership of the RKKF frustrated the plan of anti-aircraft gunners to prevent clearance of exits from the port. And so they foiled each other's plans.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 5 2016 10: 34
      +3
      Quote: 1440minutes
      Nothing wrong. The next day, the forts began to be mined by order of the RKKF command. And they mined them, thereby making the task facing the Luftwaffe as easy as possible. So the Germans could not spend money on gas and mines.

      Right the fairways? And as soon as the ships went to Sevastopol along the mined fairways? ..

      By the way, the Germans did exactly the same thing, who began to put up defensive minefields with the beginning of the war.
      1. 1440minutes
        1440minutes April 5 2016 11: 17
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Right the fairways? And as soon as the ships went to Sevastopol along the mined fairways? ..

        I agree, I put it wrong. Minefields, leaving forwarders.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        By the way, the Germans did exactly the same thing, who began to put up defensive minefields with the beginning of the war.

        It may very well be. But the question arises, why was this done at the World Cup? The enemy’s surface forces were not there. Underwater, too. Why did they force vessels to sail only in daylight hours on forwarders, which the Germans learned very quickly? And the ships were waiting there.
        It was much simpler to send a pair of auxiliary cruisers (large parades) to the Bosphorus, even if they were hanging out there, conducting reconnaissance. And then heaped up things, the Germans for joy, for their trouble.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 5 2016 13: 00
          +1
          Quote: 1440minutes
          It may very well be. But the question arises, why was this done at the World Cup? The enemy’s surface forces were not there. Underwater, too. Why did they force vessels to sail only in daylight hours on forwarders, which the Germans learned very quickly? And the ships were waiting there.

          Echoes of past war. smile
          Plus, at that time no one was sure of the neutrality of Turkey. Or at least in the fact that the Turks will not turn a blind eye to the violation of the Convention. Supermarine in the Black Sea - The nightmare of our admirals.
          Quote: 1440minutes
          It was much simpler to send a pair of auxiliary cruisers (large parades) to the Bosphorus, even if they were hanging out there, conducting reconnaissance.

          Backlash for violence? These VSKR would be quickly drowned by the same torpedo bombers, based, EMNIP, in Romania.

          Only the submarines could carry a watch at the Bosphorus. And then with the risk of getting under the aircraft Axis PLO when recharging.
          1. 1440minutes
            1440minutes April 5 2016 18: 25
            -1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Supermarine in the Black Sea is a nightmare of our admirals.

            This is the nightmare of our sailors. And not night, but daytime. It was during the day moving along these forts that they were attacked by German aircraft. and not everyone managed to reach it.
            And the blame for all the unreasonable phobias of the highest naval command.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Backlash for violence? These VSKR would be quickly drowned by the same torpedo bombers, based, EMNIP, in Romania.

            It was still necessary to find them. And fly to them. In addition, no one bothered to send a couple of three submarines there. All the same, they were of little use, there was no enemy fleet.
            That's about the submarine you write yourself. And recharging at night is quite safe.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA April 5 2016 18: 47
              0
              Quote: 1440minutes
              This is the nightmare of our sailors. And not night, but daytime. It was during the day moving along these forts that they were attacked by German aircraft. and not everyone managed to reach it.

              With the same success, ships and ships were sunk on the high seas. Or right in the bays of Sevastopol - like "Chervona Ukraine".

              The problem was not in the fairways. The problem was the clearly insufficient air defense of the main base.
            2. Manul
              Manul April 5 2016 23: 38
              0
              Quote: 1440minutes
              This is the nightmare of our sailors. And not night, but daytime. It was during the day moving along these forts that they were attacked by German aircraft. and not everyone managed to reach it.
              And the blame for all the unreasonable phobias of the highest naval command.

              Such words are not misspelled. Except for the jumping schoolboys. Ponaduse. Who is there for knives, and gilyak? "I'm Charlie"?
          2. The comment was deleted.
  8. qwert
    qwert April 5 2016 12: 15
    +1
    Quote: 1440minutes
    It may very well be. But the question arises, why was this done at the World Cup? The enemy’s surface forces were not there.

    According to the memory of some admiral, and during the war years, the captain. At the beginning of the war, they opened the envelope and acted on the basis of plans developed before the war. Therefore, he believes that in this regard, attacks on Oktyabrsky are incorrect. Because, in its place, no one would have so quickly decided to deviate from the plans approved by the General Staff. It later. They mastered, realized that the war was not going as planned. They understood that they would not beat hands for the initiative and began to fight as it should.
    And the defensive fields were from the middle of the 19 century. This aviation mining was new. So, whether English or American admirals were in place of October, in the early days of the war they behaved in exactly the same way.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 5 2016 13: 27
      0
      Quote: qwert
      So, whether English or American admirals were in place of October, in the early days of the war they behaved in exactly the same way.

      And they behaved like that. One dispatch of naval aircraft carriers on anti-submarine patrols with insufficient cover (3-4 EM) is worth it. Moreover, these EMs not only escorted the AB, but also provided assistance to transport.
      It's good that the "Arc Royal" spotted torpedoes from the U-39 in time. But "Koreyges" was so unlucky - and U-29 sent him to the bottom. Only after that did the Admiralty catch on and abandoned the pre-war plans for the use of AB, recalling them from the area teeming with submarines.
    2. Amurets
      Amurets April 5 2016 17: 54
      0
      Quote: qwert

      According to the memory of some admiral, and during the war years, the captain. At the beginning of the war, they opened the envelope and acted on the basis of plans developed before the war.

      I also can't remember who read something like that, I think Bassisty. According to my recollections, these plans were drawn up back in the mid-20s, when there were not enough ships. The main role was assigned to coastal artillery and minefields. Then these packages were not altered. These plans concerned these plans. Red Banner Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet. And it seems they were called on the Black Sea Fleet "Defense plan against an attack by the Turkish and Italian fleets." And at the Red Banner Baltic Fleet "Defense plan during an attack by the Entente Fleets." I don’t remember exactly who wrote about the plans, whether Isakov, or whether in the book about Galler. It's about the development of "Defense Plans".
      1. 1440minutes
        1440minutes April 5 2016 18: 31
        -1
        Quote: Amurets
        Therefore, these packages were not altered. These plans of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet were concerned. And it seems that they were called on the Black Sea Fleet "Plan of defense against an attack by the Turkish and Italian fleets." And on the Red Banner Baltic Fleet "Plan of defense against an attack by the Entente Fleets."

        Of course, there are not enough loafers in the army. Everyone is busy. Therefore, there is no one to redo plans. We are at war with Germany and Romania, and we are introducing a plan of war with Turkey.
        Most of all it looks like an Internet fairy tale. Moreover, it doesn't matter who launched it, Iskov or Maksakov. The goal is important. And the goal is clearly visible, to justify the obvious stupidity of the actions of the RKKF high command. Like, "no one is to blame, it just happened."
        1. Amurets
          Amurets April 6 2016 01: 59
          0
          Quote: 1440minutes
          Most of all it looks like an Internet fairy tale. Moreover, it doesn't matter who launched it, Iskov or Maksakov. The goal is important. And the goal is clearly visible, to justify the obvious stupidity of the actions of the RKKF high command. Like, "no one is to blame, it just happened."

          No one justifies this foolishness. This is just an attempt to calculate the course of the war, if these minefields had not been set, since these fields did more harm than good. Oktyabrsky's foolishness was already manifested in the fact that the leaders of "Moscow" and " Kharkov ", and the cruiser Voroshilov was supposed to cover them. With a range of 9 180mm guns of the cruiser 200 cables and a projectile weight of 97kg," Voroshilov would do more harm than the leaders, who had 10 130mm guns in total.
          See the data on these guns here:
          http://flot.sevastopol.info/arms/guns/b13.htm
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 6 2016 10: 30
            0
            Quote: Amurets
            Oktyabrsky's foolishness was already manifested in the fact that the leaders "Moscow" and "Kharkov" were supposed to fire at Constanta, and the cruiser "Voroshilov" should have covered them. With a firing range of 9 180mm guns of the cruiser 200 cables and a projectile weight of 97kg, "Voroshilov would have inflicted more damage than leaders with a total of 10 130 mm guns

            Um ... in 1939. at the beginning of the SFV, during the shelling of the Russare battery, the BF miraculously did not lose the Kirov KRL on the Finnish mines (the cruiser was saved by Finnish artillerymen who opened fire prematurely).
            The possible presence of mines in the Constanta region was directly written in the order of the Black Sea Fleet for the operation:
            Bear in mind the possibility of the presence of a DOS [ora] To [enemy lei] and minefields

            So sending to the area of ​​the main base of the enemy fleet (intelligence about the BW system of which is very approximate) LD, and not KRL, is fully justified. It was believed that the LD could still operate without the MF, dispensing with paravanes. But KRL - no longer.

            Send Oktyabrsky "Voroshilov" - now there would be moans about "mediocre admiral, who sent the latest cruiser to the minefields and under the fire of 280-mm guns".

            However, the fault of the command of the fleet in the death of the LD "Moskva" is.
            1. The selected combat course of 221 ° with an initial heading angle of 55 ° on the starboard side led to a slight approach to the coastal batteries of the enemy, being under extra fire under fire.
            It would be advisable to arrange the combat course in such a way that the firing would take place on the retreat course, this would make it possible to secretly approach the required distance, more accurately determine and less time to be under fire.
            2. The change in the composition of the strike group and the support group at the last moment, after shooting from the anchor, undoubtedly affected the preparation and conduct of the raid operation. The exit delay forced the ships of the strike group to force the course in the absence of a reserve of time, which could lead to a loss of surprise approach in the event of a forced decrease in the number of moves.
            3. The enemy considered the probability of an attack on Constanta, for which measures were taken accordingly: deploying submarines on the likely routes of our ships, alerting the destroyers (they left the base a few minutes after the shelling started), maintaining coastal batteries in readiness, etc. . d.
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    3. 1440minutes
      1440minutes April 5 2016 18: 27
      -1
      Quote: qwert
      English or American admirals, in the early days of the war they behaved the same way.

      They did not have a World Cup, where there was virtually no enemy fleet. But the Soviet, it was. But they managed it too ...
      1. Manul
        Manul April 5 2016 23: 35
        0
        Quote: 1440minutes
        But they managed it too ...

        They are? So you're not from there? Or not from here? Hold on, ghoul.
    4. The comment was deleted.
  9. Manul
    Manul April 5 2016 23: 30
    0
    A delightful article. Thanks to the author. Inspired by deep mines ... (C 1.19.00)