In 1955, after the period of trial operation and development, the first domestic C-25 anti-aircraft missile system, also known as the "Berkut", was officially adopted. The Moscow anti-aircraft defense system C-25 consisted of two rings, which included 56 anti-aircraft missile systems in concreted capital positions and dozens of radar surveys. Placing the outer “ring” of 36 stationary complexes at a distance of about 100 km from the center of Moscow with the launch range of the first B-300 - 20-25 anti-aircraft missiles km, made it possible to move the interception line and block off the affected areas of the 2-3 complexes. This theoretically allowed with a high degree of probability to repel the raid of several groups of long-range bombers, rushing towards Moscow from different directions. However, this protection design scheme was very costly, since it required the construction of numerous launching positions around the perimeter of the covered object. The scale of capital construction, when adopting the C-25 anti-aircraft system, is at least said that its creation and maintenance required the creation of a network of roads that, after unification, turned into the Moscow ring road. Naturally, to afford the protection of other cities with systems similar to the one that was deployed around Moscow, in a country that only began to build up after a devastating war, could not.
In the mid-50s, the Minister of Radio Industry V.D. Kalmykov and famous designer aviation and rocketry S.A. Lavochkin came to the leadership of the country with a proposal to create a promising long-range multi-channel stationary anti-aircraft missile system. Due to the range of 160-200 km and the height of destruction of 20 km, the new air defense system could effectively protect covered objects without constructing numerous positions around the perimeter. The ZRS, which received the designation "Dal", was to produce simultaneous firing of ten missiles at ten targets. Radio-technical means of detection and guidance of the designed air defense system were to function not in a sectorial but in a circular mode. This made it possible to abandon the ring construction of elements of the anti-air system and move to a compact centralized location, requiring much lower costs for the construction of fire and technical positions. N.S. Khrushchev, who had a weakness for rocketry and sincerely believed that other types of weapons could be replaced with missiles, despite the great technical risk and the novelty of a number of solutions, met this project very favorably.
It was assumed that the system "Dal" will protect most of the industrial and administrative centers of the USSR. At the first stage it was planned to build positions near Leningrad and Baku. Placing such an anti-aircraft system in the Moscow region using the C-25 infrastructure would allow several times to increase the air defense capabilities of the capital. Repeated overlapping of the airspace with Dal anti-aircraft missile systems with a layered placement of system elements and an increase in the distant border of the affected area several times would have brought the calculated efficiency of hitting air targets to 0,96.
24 March 1955 was issued by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, according to which the development of the Dahl long-range multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system was set. Homing on the final segment of the ZUR trajectory should have hit targets at a distance of 160 km, at altitudes of 5-20 km, at flight speeds of the target 1000-2000 km / h. The radars of the system were to detect targets at a distance of 300-400 km. The withdrawal of the missiles in the radio command mode was to be carried out to remove 10-15 km from the target. It was planned that prototypes of guidance equipment and rockets would be ready in the first quarter of 1958. In the second quarter of 1959, the start of factory testing was planned. The deadlines set for the creation of ground-based equipment and anti-aircraft missiles were very tight. By 1960, the industry had to produce sets of equipment for two firing channels and 200 SAM Dal systems for conducting field tests.
When the range was increased compared to the C-25 system 6-8 times, the radio command and air defense missile guidance method could not provide the required accuracy without using "special" combat units. Therefore, it was decided to use the combined method of targeting missiles at a target, with radio command guidance on the main part of the trajectory and with radar homing on the final flight segment to the target. At that time it was an unprecedented technical solution, very difficult to implement and by modern standards.
The multichannel nature of the air defense systems was realized due to the airspace review by a narrow rotating radar beam. For the new anti-aircraft system, a method of transmitting information to the missile “in transit” by the radar of the command transmission system was not used before. A new rational way of coding guidance signals transmitted to the rocket was also applied. It was assumed that with this method of guidance with a frequency of 5 - 10 seconds survey periods, the level of mean square errors in determining the azimuth will be only 8-10 angular minutes, and the error in determining the range will be 150-200 meters. Practice has shown that in reality, the error was obtained several times more. Nevertheless, the obtained accuracy of determining the coordinates of air targets and the missiles being aimed at them was quite sufficient for the normal functioning of the entire guidance loop when using homing equipment on the final segment on missiles. The management of the combat work of the Dal ZRS, the tracking of targets and missiles, and the development of guidance commands was carried out by an electronic computing machine, the so-called guidance guidance machine.
With the adopted launch range of missiles, radar control on the rocket flight path was impossible without using the on-board transponder signal. The radio signal produced by the responder was much more noticeable than the weak reflected signal of the rocket. Therefore, when creating a missile control system at the approach site, it was decided to use an active request-response system and transfer commands to the missile board prior to the hijacking by the homing equipment.
In the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on 11 of October 1957, the terms of development and characteristics of the main elements of the system were specified. For the SAM, the following parameters were adopted: target range at altitudes 3-20 km - 150-160 km, starting weight 6500-6700 kg, warhead weight - 200 kg.
In practice, the Dal anti-aircraft missile - 5B11 (400 product) was slightly different from the specified parameters. Rocket launch weight increased to 8760 kg. The length of the rocket with an air pressure receiver is 16,2 m, the wingspan of the march stage is 2,7 m, the diameter of the solid propellant starting accelerator is 0,8 m, the diameter of the march stage is 0,65 m.
Externally, the “400” product strongly resembled the B-750 BOMS-CNUMX missile enlarged in size, but at the same time it was longer, approximately, by 75 meters. The transition from a vertical launch, implemented in C-5 missiles, to an inclined one, made it possible to reduce the gravitational loss of speed. The two-stage scheme provided more optimal overclocking characteristics compared to the V-25 SAM.
Another Resolution of the USSR Council on 11 in November 1957 of the year NII-244 asked for the development and creation of the Pamir P-90 circular radar. This radar was supposed to be the "eyes" of the Dal anti-aircraft system. According to the technical project, the station could detect air targets of the IL-28 type at a distance of up to 400 km.
In the 1961, the P-90 Pamir radar was put into service, later it was used to detect aircraft and target designation to interceptors and air defense systems. On the basis of this radar station, a high-performance “Holm” radar complex was created, which, in turn, was an element of the “Luch” system. The centralized system "Ray" was intended to control the joint actions of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missile units of the Air Defense Forces of the country.
To test the Dal system at the Sary-Shagan air defense ground, the site number 35 was allocated. Tests of prototypes of anti-aircraft missiles began with a long delay. This was due to the high degree of novelty and complexity of the 5B11 SAM systems. Initially, in the first stage it was planned to use the LRE, but later it was decided to use a solid propellant jet engine.
The first launch in throw mode took place in December 1958 of the year. In 1959, 12 launches conducted more launches for testing engines and missile equipment. On the whole, the rockets did not prove themselves to be bad, but the further stage of testing was restrained by the unreadiness of the active homing head and ground-based electronic equipment.
Much time was taken by the alteration of the ground launch complex. After a number of emergencies and incidents during the launch, they finally stopped at a relatively light truss PUU-476 lifting and launcher weighing about 9 tons, which was comparable to the launch weight of the rocket and was a very good indicator. Unlike other Soviet air defense systems of the USSR, the 5ВХNUMX rocket was suspended from the bottom of the launch beam. In the future, this version of the suspension was adopted mainly for sea-based anti-aircraft missile systems.
According to the results of the first tests, the rocket was revised to simplify the design and prepare for launch, in order to change the shape of the rudders. In the spring of 1960, tests of missiles equipped with a seeker began. Due to the absence of standard radar facilities, target tracking and missile defense, the launch of the rocket into the target area after launch was carried out using kinetic theodolites intended for trajectory measurements during testing. After pairing theodolites with an electromechanical system for recording the spatial position of the optical axis with a non-standard rocket control circuit, they managed to use theodolites to accompany the rocket and the target.
In conditions of near-perfect air transparency and unlimited visibility, it was possible to confidently hold in the center of the field of view of one film theodolite the target being fired, and the other - the target missile. According to the data produced by the theodolite instrument complexes, the standard devices of the Dahl radio command guidance system determined the current angular coordinates of the target and the missiles, issuing control radio commands to bring the missile to the target hijacking area. During one of these launches, the target was captured by the GOS and successfully intercepted in the homing mode. Thus, the landfill sample of the anti-aircraft missile system demonstrated the fundamental possibility of firing guided missiles at a predetermined range and confirmed the correctness of the construction of the control loop.
Without waiting for the end of the tests, the Soviet military-political leadership decided to build the capital positions of the Dal anti-aircraft missile system near Leningrad. In total, five anti-missile regiments were going to be deployed around the northern capital.
Satellite image of Google earth: prepared capital positions for the deployment of the “Dal” AAMS near the village of Lopukhinka in the Leningrad Region.
The erection of the “Dal” ZRS positions was carried out in the areas of the Lopukhinka, Kornevo, Pervomaiskoe settlements. At each of the positions under construction, it was intended to deploy a regiment of an anti-aircraft missile system consisting of five anti-aircraft missile divisions.
Prior to the final cessation of work on the Dal system, the military builders erected concrete bases for launching sites, a missile depot, control bunkers and personnel shelter. Compared with the cyclopean scale of the capital facilities of the C-25 system, the Dal anti-aircraft missile system looked much more modest. But it also required considerable investments in the ground infrastructure.
In fairness it should be said that this haste was largely justified. Prior to the start of the 70, American long-range bombers conducted combat patrols with thermonuclear weapons on board, flying along the air borders, and Leningrad was very vulnerable to their attacks. It may also be recalled that the construction of the C-25 capital positions around Moscow also began long before this system successfully completed the tests and was put into service. In the 50-s in the USSR, which was on the rise of the development of aviation and rocket technologies, nothing was impossible.
9 June 1960, during the testing of the Dal air defense system at the Sary-Shagan test site, Semyon Lavochkin, the chief designer of the OKB-301, suddenly died from a heart attack. His early death was one of the reasons why the Dal complex was never accepted for service. After the death of S.A. Lavochkin was appointed Mikhail Mikhailovich Pashinin as chief designer. This specialist, of course, very competent and perfectly knowing the technical side of the matter, did not have the authority and penetrative qualities of Lavochkin, he did not have much-needed acquaintances in the highest military and party structures. In recognition of the merit of the outstanding designer OKB-301, it was renamed to “Zavod im. S.A. Lavochkin.
In 1960, four more missile test launches were carried out. But by that time, it became clear that, in its present form, the complex could not be put into service. The development of advanced homing equipment “Zenit-2” and the control guidance machine were delayed. In addition, the system for determining the coordinates of air targets and missiles intercepting them did not confirm the required accuracy characteristics. There was a paradoxical situation: the designers managed to create an anti-aircraft missile that met the requirements of the military, and most of the ground-based electronic equipment was not ready.
In 1961, testing continued. During the tests, 57 also launched missile launches, three of them for real purposes. The launches were carried out on Il-28 and MiG-15 target planes, as well as on a parachute target, while the Il-28 and the parachute target were shot down.
Recent efforts to fine-tune the Dal anti-aircraft system to a state acceptable for State tests were made in 1962. By that time, flight tests of the system had lasted for four years, but due to unreliable operation and regular failures of the onboard guidance systems of the missile defense system and the ground equipment complex, it was not possible to achieve satisfactory results. All the efforts of specialists "Plant them. S.A. Lavochkin "and NII-244, engaged in the development of ground-based electronic component, were in vain.
Finally, work on the Dal system was closed by a government decision in December 1962 of the year, which did not allow to complete the full cycle of field tests of a prototype of an anti-aircraft missile system. The works completely stopped in the 1963 year, even the joint appeal of the “Plant them. S.A. Lavochkin "and NII-244 to the government with the promise to produce and bring to serial production the mobile version of the Dal-M ZRS. By that time, much simpler and cheaper C-75 air defense systems began to en masse the Air Defense Forces of the country, and work was underway to create a C-200 long-range air defense system.
The SeventyPent did not have such a launch range and was single-channel in purpose, but it favorably differed from the multi-channel Dal anti-aircraft system many times lower in cost, relative simplicity, did not require the construction of expensive stationary positions and had the ability to relocate. In addition, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has largely revised its views on the role of long-range stationary air defense missile systems in providing protection against nuclear strikes. Compared with the first half of 50's, when strategic bombers were the only means of delivering nuclear weapons over long distances, it became obvious in 60 that in the near future they would be replaced by intercontinental ballistic missiles, against which costly multi-channel stationary anti-aircraft systems were not effective.
Two years after the death of S.A. Lavochkin former OKB-301 was transferred to the disposal of the Chief Designer V.N. Chelomey. In this regard, in 1963, the scope of work carried out by the design team was drastically changed. All efforts “Machine-Building Plant named after S.A. Lavochkin ”, which became a branch of 3 No. as part of the OKB-52, focused on the development of spacecraft and the fine-tuning and production of anti-ship missiles. From their own backlog, work was continued only on upgrading the targets of La-17M and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft La-17Р.
In the future, the niche of the failed “Dal” air defense missile system was partly occupied by the long-range air defense system C-200. In the variants C-200B and C-200D - “Dukhsotok” significantly exceeded the “Dal” in the range of the start of the missile attack. Thanks to a more rational layout, with a comparable starting mass, the length of the missile defense systems of the C-200 complexes was significantly shorter. This not only facilitated the transportation and loading of rockets, but also increased the operational overload. As you know, during the combat use of the C-75 air defense missile system, whose missiles were very thin and long, sometimes they broke in an attempt to intercept an intensively maneuvering target. However, the C-200 air defense system was single-channel in purpose and had a much simpler guidance system. Moreover, although quite limited, the C-200 complex of all modifications had the ability to maneuver in the field, which the Dal system was completely devoid of.
Some of the achievements and experience gained during the development and testing of the Dahl air defense systems were further used to create other anti-aircraft complexes, telecontrol systems and radars. So to say that there was no benefit from the creation of “Dali”, and the people's money was thrown to the wind, it would not be right. In fairness it should be said that the developers have seriously overestimated their capabilities in creating the most complex multichannel anti-aircraft system, and, most importantly, the capabilities of the Soviet radio-electronic industry. In many ways, "Dal" ahead of its time. The death of S.A. affected the fate of the anti-aircraft system in the most negative way. Lavochkin. In our country, air defense systems with comparable characteristics in range and number of simultaneously fired targets appeared only at the end of the 80-x. At a qualitatively new level, the design data of the Dali, which was not accepted for service, was implemented in mobile multi-channel air defense systems with solid-propelled missiles - C-300М.
But in 1963 year история The “Dal” air defense missile system is not complete For a long time, the 5B11 missiles were shown in parades, being a source of pride for ordinary Soviet citizens and a source of misinformation and a "scarecrow" for Western intelligence services. For the first time, 400 products were transported during the military parade on 7 November 1963 Red Square, that is, immediately after work on the anti-aircraft system was rolled up. In the comments voiced by the announcers, it was said that these missiles are "high-speed unmanned interceptors for aerospace targets." Since 1964, the Dal missiles have been shown several times in military parades in the city on the Neva.
Initially, in the USA, the 5ВХNUMX missiles, taking into account their dimensions and rapid forms, were considered as interceptors of the missile defense system developed in the USSR. Just at that time, information about the tests of the Soviet antimissile system "A" leaked. In the future, Western experts long took the 11 products for the C-400 complex SAM, which remained secret until the middle of 200, was not shown at parades and was not shipped abroad.
In addition to the demonstration in parades, some of the missiles as a whole and in the “prepared” form served as educational and visual aids in military and civilian educational institutions. After our country switched to the “market path of development”, almost all of them were put to scrap. The only surviving specimen known to the author is the Dal anti-aircraft missile located in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.