Naval Aviation in the Great Patriotic War
In the prewar period aviation The Navy was assigned the role of a force designed to provide combat operations for surface ships. It was considered the main means of reconnaissance and the most important element of air defense of naval bases (Navy) and ships at sea. In addition, the ability was recognized. naval aviation to carry out torpedo-bombing attacks on fleet ships, maritime communications, military industrial facilities, naval and air bases of the enemy.
On 22 June 1941, the naval aviation had a 2581 aircraft (on the Northern Fleet - 116, Baltic - 656, Black Sea - 626 and Pacific - 1183). The number of torpedo bombers was 9,7%, bombers 14%, fighter jets 45,3% and reconnaissance seaplanes 25% of the total number of naval aviation. It was dominated by fighter aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft (70,3%), i.e. providing forces.
The distribution of aircraft by fleet basically corresponded to their purpose in the pre-war years. The insufficient number of aircraft in the Northern Fleet was largely dictated by the insignificant capacity of its airfield network. Before the war, the fleet of aircraft fleet consisted mostly of machines of the types DB-3, SB, TB-1, TB-3, I-15 bis, I-16, I-153, MBR-2, which were inferior to German in flight tactical characteristics. The retooling of fleet aviation to new types (Pe-2, Yak-1, MiG-3) was just beginning. Naval aviation did not have anti-submarine aircraft. For the purpose of anti-submarine defense, the MBR-2 flying boats were adapted first, and then the DB-3, DB-3ф and Pe-2 wheeled boats. The aircraft had no equipment for detecting submarines, except for a small number of Gneiss radar stations. Being armed scouts, they could only detect submarines in a surface position, since at that time, the aviation technical means for their search in the submerged position did not exist.
The air forces of the fleets did not even have special fighters with an increased radius of action, which in part could compensate for the lack of aircraft carrier fighter cover. The fleets were forced to use only front-line fighters, which extremely narrowed the possibilities of combat use of surface ships.
From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, in accordance with the prevailing situation on the fronts, the naval aviation carried out the following tasks: assistance to ground forces in the fight against opposing formations of enemy troops and attacking its rear facilities; participation in the defense of the Navy; the destruction of warships and ships of the enemy in the course of the fight against its maritime transport; air defense of ships in basing areas and at sea; providing amphibious operations.
During the period of strategic defense on the Soviet-German front, most of the fleet aviation was involved in attacks on ground targets and battle formations of the German ground forces. Her actions at land theaters were separated in time, as a rule, were tactical in nature, but their total result was a major operational contribution to the struggle at the front. In total, during the war years, about a quarter of fleet sorties were spent on military operations in the interests of ground forces. About 130 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed by naval pilots, more than 1500 tanks, over 9000 cars.
Naval aviation was engaged in combat operations against enemy logistical targets. Already in the first days of the war, long-range bomber aviation launched a series of bombing strikes against Constance and the oil fields in Ploiesti. From 2 July to 18 on August 1941, the Black Sea Fleet air forces performed 22 raids on Ploiesti facilities. As a result, Romania lost 15% of its oil reserves, in addition, the railway bridge and the Danube oil pipeline were destroyed, and two oil refineries were damaged. These actions were of operational importance, because under the threat of losing Romanian oil, Hitler’s bid 12 on August 1941 ordered Army Group South to seize the Crimea and thereby eliminate the Soviet airfields from which attacks on Romanian targets were made. A special place in the military work of naval aviation was strikes at Berlin, inflicted on 1941 in August. These raids by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and Long-Range Bomber Aviation had immense moral and political importance.
Considering the nature of the use of naval aviation during the war, it is necessary to single out its combat operations during the defense of the naval base and coastal cities. The 22 of the fighter aircraft was allocated to the aviation support of the naval defense of Hanko. The airfield, on which the group was based, was under continuous artillery fire. On certain days, the enemy fired missiles at the airfield to 1500. In these difficult conditions, the aviation group had to solve a wide range of diverse tasks. It provided air defense for the troops and base facilities, conducted air reconnaissance, stormed the troops and enemy firing points on the land front, acted by floating craft at sea, destroyed German planes at airfields, supported naval landings and carried out other tasks, including adjusting artillery fire.
During the heroic defense of the base of Hanko, a small aviation group quite effectively solved the tasks assigned to it. Naval pilots destroyed the enemy's 34 aircraft, sank more than 20 ships, boats and ships. Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet in the defense of Odessa was an important and very effective means of assisting the troops. The air group, which included 35 fighters and 6 attack aircraft, based at the Odessa airfield, was directly included in the grouping of the defense forces of Odessa from the fleet air forces. The bombers, however, for strikes against the enemy who had besieged the city, were raised from the airfields of the Crimea, in the area of the strikes their cover was carried out by fighters of the Odessa group. This greatly complicated the organization of interaction and ruled out the possibility of joint preparation for the conduct of hostilities of strike and fighter aircraft.
The pilots of the Odessa Air Group also had to operate in a very difficult situation, take off and land on the airfield under the shelling of the enemy. On average, they produced daily 3-4 departures, and on some days before 7. In total, during the defense of Odessa, aviation made over 4600 sorties, during which 80 enemy planes were destroyed, 168 tanks, 135 vehicles, 25 tanks with fuel, 7 guns and about two thousand enemy soldiers and officers.
The aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet during the defense of Sevastopol covered the objects and troops of the Sevastopol defensive area, warships and transport ships at sea, bombed and assault attacks on ground enemy forces in the forefront and in the depths of its battle formations, as well as conducted air reconnaissance.
Directly in Sevastopol based aviation group in the number of 82 aircraft, which consisted mainly of fighters and seaplanes. A larger number of aircraft could not take the remaining airfields - two land and one sea.
The destruction of enemy manpower and equipment on the land front was carried out by systematic bomber and assault aircraft. The most efficiently acted on ground forces of the enemy were attack aircraft. They caused the enemy serious damage, and in some cases, with their blows, they predetermined the outcome of the battle for the ground forces in our favor.
It should be noted the numerical superiority of the Germans and their allies in the aircraft. So, for example, by May 1942 of the year, near Sevastopol it operated up to 400 bombers and almost 150 enemy fighters. In the most difficult situation, the Black Sea Fleet aviation, during the defense of Sevastopol, made more than 16000 sorties, of which 5735 was in the interests of the land front. As a result, sea pilots destroyed 438 enemy aircraft, more than 20000 people, 115 tanks, over 1500 vehicles and more 100 artillery guns.
From the experience of the use of air forces of the fleets in the defense of bases it is clear that their activities were carried out under conditions of significant enemy air superiority. The limited capabilities of the basing of aviation in the protected areas did not allow for the growth of aviation groups. The difficulty of basing was manifested in the fact that not only the enemy's air force, but also its field artillery could strike at our airfields. It should be borne in mind that, assisting the ground forces, fleet aviation had limited capabilities for military operations at sea, but these tasks were not removed from it and, to the best of its strength, it successfully carried them out.
In the combat work of aviation of the Navy, an important place was occupied by actions to hinder the maritime transport of the enemy. Due to the insufficient number of attack aircraft and the attraction of it mostly to the land front, in 1941-1942, a relatively small number of sorties were carried out to attack enemy transport ships and warships at sea and bases. In those years, the “free hunt” method was actively used, which was carried out by single machines or in pairs. Often these missions were not provided with preliminary reconnaissance of enemy sea communications, and therefore were not always successful.
For the violation of enemy sea communications, bomber and mine-torpedo aircraft were used, the latter being a variant of high-altitude torpedo bombs. The effectiveness of bombing from horizontal flight and altitude torpedoing by a small number of aircraft was low. It increased significantly with the transition to low torpedoing, dive-bombing and subsequently to the top-mast method of striking.
With the increase in the number of strike aircraft in the fleets and the decrease in the volume of tasks on land, naval aviation began to dominate combined attacks on convoys at sea crossings and ships stationed in bases and ports. When attacking in the most advantageous sequence, dive bombers, torpedo bombers and attack aircraft were used under the cover of fighters. Such strikes involved up to 1943 aircraft. The effectiveness of the combat operations of the fleet aviation has increased, and since 160, it has firmly taken the lead in sinking enemy ships.
A significant achievement was the tactical interaction of aircraft and torpedo boats when striking convoys, which was especially characteristic of the Northern Fleet. The interaction of aviation with submarines was operational.
In total, naval aviation spent about 10% of sorties on ships and ships at sea, bases and ports during the war, during which over 50% of the total transport tonnage and about 70% of all ships destroyed by the fleet were sunk. Naval aviation dropped over 1300 torpedoes and delivered about 2500 mines. Mine-torpedo aircraft, sank one and a half times more warships and transport ships than the bomber and assault. However, it is worth noting the very effective actions of attack aircraft against small ships, boats and ships of the enemy.
Significant efforts of naval aviation during the war years were focused on solving the tasks of the air defense of home areas and covering ships at sea. Fighter aviation fleets destroyed more than half of all downed enemy aircraft by forces and means of air defense of the Navy. However, the insufficient radius of action of fighter aircraft, limited the possibility of covering Soviet ships in the sea by a narrow coastal strip. When surface ships were forced to act outside the range of the fighter aircraft, the air enemy inflicted significant damage to them, which in digital terms was about half of all the losses of our ship personnel.
During the war, the methods and methods of using aviation to fight the air enemy were continuously improved. The methods of combat use of fighter aircraft include: targeting fighters to the target using radio equipment; hacking on threatened directions; duty on the airfields; "Free hunting"; blocking enemy airfields.
In the combat work of the fleet aviation, preemptive strikes have been used on enemy airfields to suppress its bomber and torpedo-bearing aviation, which threatened our ships and ships during periods of support for convoys.
It should be noted that the cover of the Allied convoys in the Barents and White Seas took the form of operations, for which, from May 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command subordinated the Karelian Front, the Arkhangelsk Military District and a part of the Air Forces reserve bomber to the Commander of the Air Force. To ensure the posting of convoys РQ-16, РQ-17, РQ-18, the rate issued special directives.
To combat enemy aircraft, naval aircraft made more than 40% of sorties. They were destroyed during the air battles and at the airfields of more than 5500 enemy aircraft. During the war, landing over 100 amphibious assault forces. And if in 1941-1942. airborne troops landed predominantly without air preparation, then from 1943 and until the very end of the war, aircraft were widely involved in airborne operations at all their stages. To ensure amphibious operations, aviation carried out reconnaissance, fighter cover in the landing areas, during the sea crossing and at the landing points, as well as suppressing enemy antiamphibious defense and assisting the landing party in operations on the coast.
So, in the 1943, during the Kerch-Eltigens landing operation, the Black Sea Fleet and the 4 airborne airplanes performed over 4400 sorties. Only from 1 to 3 in November, the attack aircraft participated in the 37 repulse of enemy counterattacks in the Eltigen area.
The aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in the period of the landing operation to seize the islands of the Vyborg Bay, turned out to be the main force for the suppression of the enemy fire system on the islands. She made more than 7500 sorties to facilitate the landing, as well as for strikes at enemy warships, trying to prevent the landing and the landing operations on the coast.
Airplanes, and above all, bombers and attack aircraft, were the main striking force that ensured the success of the battle for disembarkation at all its stages. Moreover, the actions of bomber aviation were more effective at the stage of preliminary preparation for disembarkation, and assault - during direct support of the landing and escorting of the landing force when solving its tasks on the coast. Fighter aircraft provided cover for strike aircraft and assault operations at all stages of the operation.
In order to achieve the success of amphibious operations, sometimes an airborne assault was carried out in front of it, as it was during the landing of troops by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet near the village of Grigorievka, in September 1941 of the year near Odessa. A naval landing in the Stanichka area, Yuzhnaya Ozereyka was supported, and very effectively, by a parachute landing ejected in the vicinity of the village of Vasilyevka.
The experience of the war once again proved that the success of landing operations largely depends on the conquest of air supremacy in the area of operation. Fleet aviation was also involved in the task of supplying the landing forces with ammunition and food, as was the case, for example, during stormy weather during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation.
The current situation on land fronts and maritime theaters largely determined the direction of the main aviation efforts of our fleets. Thus, the special importance of providing internal and external sea communications required the Northern Fleet aviation to concentrate its efforts on covering the ships and convoys at sea, bases and ports from enemy air strikes (71% of sorties). At the same time, the difficult and tense situation on the flanks of our fronts adjacent to the Baltic and Black Seas forced the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet aircraft to spend 29% and 24% airplanes, respectively, to directly assist ground forces.
As you can see, naval aviation during the Patriotic War became the main branch of the naval forces, she had a leading role in the fight against the ships and ships of the enemy, she was the most effective means of air defense of the forces and objects of the fleet.
The experience of the use of naval aviation during the war years helped to correctly determine the role and place of this kind of fleet forces in modern armed struggle at sea. He contributed to its development in the postwar period as one of the main branches of the forces of the Russian Navy.
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