The negotiating marathon of the "Norman Four" in Minsk left open the question of the status of Donbass and its future. Vlast figured out how national construction went on in Ukraine after the loss of the Crimea and the start of the war in the southeast and how it breaks Russian stereotypes about this post-Soviet republic.
Russia looks at Ukraine through the TV screen and browser window. As in any war, including information warfare, the world is divided into friends and foes and becomes black and white for everyone. Federal television has fueled stereotypes of the Russian majority: the Ukrainian army is the mercenaries, the Ukrainian elite is the junta, the Ukrainian media are consumers of the State Department cookies, the Ukrainian language policy is the infringement of Russian, the Ukrainian national construction is Bandera. Anyone who fights in the Donbass for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MAT) is a punisher and dill.
Modern Ukraine in the territorial sense was created by Lenin, whose monuments are falling, and Stalin, who remained completely without monuments. All my life in empires - Russian and Soviet - and the word "Ukraine" did not exist. There were “Little Russia” to denote any ethnic community and “outskirts” for naming the territorial, like the Urals and the Caucasus — hence the Russian “to Ukraine” instead of “to Ukraine”. Actually, "Ukraine" as a political project was invented by the Austrians with the help of the Poles, so that by heating the national anti-Russian movement, weaken the Russian Empire at the very beginning of the First World War. Simply put, "a Ukrainian is a Russian bitten by a Pole." Now the Polish-Austrian laurels passed to the Americans. The technologies are the same: the growth of national identity and the "paid Maidan", "Right Sector", neo-Bandera as the main institutions for the separation of fraternal Slavic peoples. To what extent do these stereotypes reflect historical and political reality?
For many centuries in the territory occupied by Ukraine, there was no consolidated political community, that is, a nation. On the one hand, the Ukrainian state in the 20th century, like a patchwork quilt, was formed by joining very different territories to it. On the other hand, even after the appearance of a sovereign state in 1991, the Ukrainian nation did not become identical to the community that has a Ukrainian passport. Who is Ukrainian? Where are the geographical boundaries of Ukrainians?
The use of the Russian language automatically placed the interlocutors in their own coordinate system - someone else's
If the Ukrainian nation nevertheless existed for centuries, surviving under the imperial oppression that carried out waves of Russification and Sovietization, then are Russian-cultural Russian-speaking people living in the southeastern regions and focusing more on Moscow than on Kiev, even if they have blue passports? The lack of answers to these founding questions led post-Soviet Ukrainists, if not to deny the absence of a consolidated nation, then to distinguish between two and four national identities opposite to each other. Russian historian Slavicist Alexey Ilyich Miller, comparing their evolution over the centuries, wrote in 2007: “Ukrainians looked at Little Russians as an object of education and social engineering as distorted by someone’s influence. If a Little Russia insisted on his identity, in the eyes of Ukrainians, he became the henchman of Muscovites. Western Ukrainians also look at East Ukrainians. In their turn, the Little Russians considered Ukrainophiles to fall under harmful influence (Poles, Austria, Germany) and accused them of aggressive nationalism. to the same, East Ukrainians are looking at Western Ukrainians, calling them "Natsik" and believing that they serve the interests of the Poles and the Americans. "
Reflecting the priorities of these completely opposite identities, historical schools were formed. The Canadian Ukrainianist Taras Kuzio counted four. Imperial: "Old Russian" - a synonym for "Russian", the successors of Kievan Rus - Vladimir-Suzdal principality, the Moscow kingdom, the Russian Empire. In the Soviet school, the historiographic monopoly belonged to the RSFSR, and not to the Ukrainian SSR. Novgorod and Yaroslavl were the main centers for studying the heritage of Kievan Rus. Ukrainians appear on the historical scene only in the middle of the 17th century in order to “reunite” with the Russians. As part of the Ukrainian-centric school, modern Ukraine is the heiress of Princess Olga, Prince Vladimir, Yaroslav the Wise, and Galitsko-Volyn principality, which is the true successor of the “first Ukrainian state” of Kievan Rus, in contrast to the Vladimir-Suzdal and Moscow lands. East Slavic School: Kiev is the birth center of three fraternal Slavic peoples who do not have an “older brother” in the shape of Russia. Russians are Great Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians combined. "Great Russia is not identical to Great Russia."
Naturally, each of the schools had its own arguments, which politicians actively used, especially in the framework of the eternal struggle of the east and west of Ukraine in the presidential election. Each time, the “candidate of the East” promised to make Russian the second state. Changes in official interpretations of history, depending on the personality of the president, have never stopped in Ukraine and have clearly worked against national unity.
For a long time, the language was a political marker. The very use of the Russian language in communication automatically placed the interlocutors in its own coordinate system - someone else's. The officers of the State Traffic Inspectorate, the customs and border guards of Ukraine, who are fluent in Russian, can speak Russian in a friendly manner and, in the event of displeasure, switch to Ukrainian. After the Orange Revolution, the use of Russian at the official meetings of the leaders of the south-eastern regions was a clear sign of the front in relation to the center. Viktor Yushchenko, who is fluent in Russian, preferred to talk exclusively with his target audience in Ukrainian. Yulia Tymoshenko, who knew only Russian, specially learned Ukrainian, which became one of the most distinctive elements of her national image along with Lesia Ukrainka's scythe. From April 2004, Russian-language broadcasts were to be accompanied by Ukrainian subtitles, from 2007, all foreign films were translated into Ukrainian in cinemas. Then in Kharkov began to appear made in Russian ads "All films in the Ukrainian language !!!".
After Maidan-2013, there was a tendency to search in the general Soviet Victory exclusively for the Ukrainian part.
Already President Yanukovych, in 2010, was actively trying to get rid of his pro-Russian image, made a public scandal with Interior Minister Mogilev when the latter was reporting in Russian. The president ordered the minister to learn Ukrainian in two months. In July of the same year, a video appeared on the Internet, in which the president warned the Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, who was speaking poorly in Ukrainian, before the official filming began: "I will contact you in Ukrainian Move." Finally, as part of the linguistic struggle before the autumn parliamentary campaign-2012, the Party of Regions pushed through the project of the deputies Kolesnichenko-Kivalov, who went to the masses under the name of the “law on the Russian language”. According to him, the Russian and other minority languages (which were counted by 17, including Gagauz, Yiddish and Krymchak) "measures were taken to use them, subject to a ten-percent representation of native speakers in the territory in which it is spoken." In 2014, one of the first actions of the new government after the flight of Viktor Yanukovych was an attempt to repeal this law, which was obviously perceived in the southeast as an attack on the Russian language.
Euromaidan and subsequent events radically changed the lines of confrontation in Ukraine. If nine years earlier on Maidan, the number of clicks on the horn meant either "Y-schen-ko" or "I-n-ko-wich", the scarves could be either orange or white-blue, the place of residence was either west or south -East, then in December 2013, Maidan turned out to be much more Ukrainian. Thanks to Viktor Yanukovych’s legislature, which is described in Lviv and in Donetsk as “everything was enough!”, The emphasis from geographical opposition shifted to political. In this regard, the Russian language ceased to be a bright marker, becoming one of the means of communication on Independence Square, uniting businessmen who bought tents and food for their money, and radicals from the Right Sector with chains and Molotov cocktails and security guards hundreds of self-defense, and the majority of genuinely protesting people, and those for whom, according to Victoria Nuland, the USA spent about $ 23 billion for 5 of the year.
After Maidan-2013 and Crimea-2014, Russia lost its monopoly on Russian. The use of Russian is not equal to pro-Russian, which, of course, breaks the stereotype that "the junta suppresses the Russian language." Former Russian journalists Savik Shuster and Yevgeny Kiselev continue to conduct their four-hour talk shows in Russian, in which principally Ukrainian-only politicians answer easily the questions asked by their opponents in Russian. The websites of the president, the government, the Verkhovna Rada and the majority of the popular Ukrainian mass media contain a full-fledged Russian-language version, and some do not have Ukrainian-language versions at all.
The deputy with the poetic name for the Russian ear Birch spoke in Russian and when he was the press secretary of the Right Sector. Now Borislav Bereza speaks good Russian in PACE to the deputy head of the Russian delegation Leonid Slutsky. His colleague on the Rada, Dmitry Tymchuk, publishes in Russian on Facebook regular reports about battles with "Russian-terrorist forces." One of the main speakers of the “anti-terrorist operation,” the adviser to the head of the Interior Ministry, Anton Gerashchenko, also speaks only Russian and “protects the information space of Ukraine from information aggression from Putin’s Russia” calls on Gogol, not Shevchenko. Presidential adviser Yuri Biryukov, an ethnic Russian who volunteers in the ATO area to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, says that “the language has nothing to do with the causes of the conflict”: “At the front line, in radio communications, mostly Russian is heard. But if someone’s he said in Ukrainian, no one asks him again, everyone understands each other. " Andrei Biletsky, head of the extreme nationalist organization "Patriot of Ukraine", gives a great interview in Russian, in which, along with phrases about "Russian brothers", he speaks with admiration about the militants who blew up December 4 in Grozny, 2014. Igor Kolomoisky's right hand in business (and now in managing the Dnipropetrovsk region, which has almost become the center of the new Ukrainians) And this is also in Russian.
Of course, the government, which is the opposite side in the information war, is attacking the Russian mass media. In the spring of 2014, by a court decision, the broadcasting of Russian federal television channels was suspended. And at the beginning of this year, the head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech, Victoria Syumar, was going to lobby for a law that would allow the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting to suspend channels for up to six months without a court decision. Last summer, the State Agency of Ukraine on Cinema recognized the Russian films “White Guard” and “Poddubny” demonstrating “disregard for the Ukrainian language, people and statehood”, and therefore refused to issue rolling certificates to them. In the autumn several TV shows were banned. From 5 on April 2015, in Ukraine, all Russian-made films and TV series about Russian security officials, shot from 1 August 1991, will actually be banned in Ukraine.
Under pressure from the authorities, in early February, the Ukrainian company GDF Media Limited, billionaire Dmitry Firtash, bought 29% of the leading Inter TV channel from the Russian First Channel. The deal, according to the management of the Ukrainian company, was forced: the Ukrainian government squeezes Russian residents from the media market. In addition, representatives of the Ukrainian establishment of various levels have repeatedly stated that the Ukrainian will be the only state, clearly not understanding that the “Russian-second state” project is not the whim of the Kremlin. Raising the status of a Russian is a means of legally consolidating an already existing phenomenon (bilingual nation) and returning the population of Donbass to the Ukrainian state. The tool is clearly more effective than rocket artillery volleys across the separated territories.
In addition to language, the past year has also torn off Russia from the ethnic identity of Ukrainians. “I am Russian” now means “I sympathize with Russia” even less than before 2014. On the popular website "Peter and Mazepa", created by Russian nationalist from Nikolaev Alexander Noynets, on the banner of the colors of the Ukrainian flag you can read the "credo of the Russian people of Ukraine", which proclaims that "the Russian Federation is a consistent anti-Russian state, pursuing its history Russophobic policy ". If earlier in Ukraine, as in the entire post-Soviet space, our country was the center of Russianness, legitimate in the eyes of its neighbors, now many Russians in Ukraine see no contradiction in identity: ethnic Russian within the Ukrainian nation. They speak Russian, feel Russian, many are members of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. That is, in essence, the representatives of the very “Russian world”, which both the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church actively promote, but which these citizens of Ukraine do not want to hear, actively promote the flesh of flesh. For them, this concept is inextricably linked with the "occupation of the Crimea" and "aggression in the Donbass." The paradox of our perception of today's Ukraine in persistent conviction: the verbal opponents of the “Russian world” are exclusively Ukrainian nationalists, extremists and radicals. We simply cannot believe that not “dill” and “junta” have a negative attitude towards Russia, but the real Russians - just like us, just from a neighboring state.
Cases of mass glorification occur in numerous reports from the front.
The Soviet view on history, as well as on national construction, was also subjected to obstruction. President Yushchenko also tried to "reconcile the UPA and Red Army soldiers." The historian Alexei Miller wrote in 2006: “On Ukrainian television, videos are being made specially for public funds on the rights of social advertising about the honest way of the SS divisions of the Halychyna division ... when these people start making heroes, which are the correct Ukrainians ( they want to rehabilitate them as such). " At the same time, the term "Soviet-German war" appeared, intended to be a substitute for the "Great Patriotic War". In the Ukrainian political after Maidan-2013, there was a tendency to search in the general Soviet Victory exclusively for the Ukrainian part. Now, unlike the times of the Yushchenko’s Legislature, Ukrainian politicians do not deny the significance of the battles of the “Soviet-German war. So, the defense of the Donetsk airport is compared with the defense of Moscow, Stalingrad and the Brest Fortress to those who are not “image-oriented”: Boryslav Bereza, soldiers of the Azov Interior Ministry regiment. The one that has a “wolf hook” - wolfsangel on the chevrons, used by the NSDAP and the SS division “Das Reich”, although the commander Andrey Biletsky claims that the “idea of the nation” is an exclusively Ukrainian, Cossack symbol.
At the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine from fascism in October 2014, President Poroshenko said: "More than 9 million immigrants from Ukraine began to fight with the enemy as part of the Red Army. Millions more Ukrainians fought with the Nazis and their allies as part of the UPA ..." In an interview with the German television channel ARD, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk put forward the exact opposite version, seeing the enemy in the east: "Russian aggression in Ukraine is an attack on the world order and order in Europe. We still remember well the Soviet invasion of Ukraine and Germany." . The head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Grzegorz Schetyna, also joined the trolling campaign, making the Russian mass media discuss for a week who had finally liberated Auschwitz - the Soviet Red Army or the Ukrainian commander of the Soviet tank Igor Pobirchenko.
In addition to "reforming the past," the creation of a national myth includes the formation of a pantheon of new heroes - absolute moral authorities, the attitude towards which should be unequivocally positive, regardless of political position. The first in this series were the victims of the Revolution of Dignity (now the official name of Euromaidan) - “Heroes of the Heavenly Hundreds”. Last summer, President Poroshenko established the Order of Heroes of the Heavenly Hundreds (currently, two citizens of Georgia and one of Belarus, who were posthumously awarded, are the knights of the order). Already in March, 2014, monuments and memorials dedicated to the Heavenly Hundred began to appear throughout Ukraine. Later they began to rename squares and streets. "Heroes of the Heavenly Hundreds" in one of his speeches even mentioned US Vice President Joseph Biden. Naturally, now a rare Ukrainian talk show costs without mentioning their memory by politicians of various kinds.
Cases of mass glorification occur in numerous reports from the front, in which volunteer battalion fighters appear to be brave guys, fervently submitting to their commanding fathers, who teach to fight for a just cause. Artillery in such reports shoots exclusively at "separatists", "terrorists" and "fighters", delicately ignoring the houses of Donetsk. The participants of the anti-terrorist operation themselves, almost with good-nature Shveyk, criticize the Kiev authorities and the "Russian aggressor", but sincerely hate the generals who eat fat at their expense. If someone in this reality missed when firing, it was only “at night with the help of a thermal imager he put all the hedgehogs in the district”. They did not hear about the massacres of civilians, human trafficking, abductions and torture.
Two special cases of glorification also refer to the ATO. The defenders of the Donetsk airport, whose courage and courage are recognized even by Russian nationalist publications, began to be called cyborgs (allegedly one of the DPR militiamen said that it was not people who were fighting against them, but cyborgs). After leaving the airport, the APU in January of this year in the style of “cyborg survived - concrete failed”, the Ukrainian blogosphere, along with Thermopylae, recalled the Stalingrad Pavlov House, creating in the community of defenders of the airport that had a great symbolic significance not only 300 Spartans, but also turned the tide World War II Soviet defenders of Stalingrad.
Ukrainian navigator-operator of the helicopter "Mi-24" Nadezhda Savchenko was the first number on the list before the October elections to the Rada made the party of Yulia Tymoshenko. While the Russian pro-Kremlin speakers in every way bowed to the appearance and inner world of Savchenko's detention center, in Ukraine, soldier Jane, unfairly accused of killing Russian citizens, was made of her with the same energy. When 8 of January of this year, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, drove past the Russian embassy in Berlin in a motorcade, he first saw a picket of pro-Russian citizens, reminiscent of the tragedy in Odessa on May 2. Ten meters further - picketers with the Ukrainian flag, demanding the release of Savchenko. After the senior lieutenant, commander of the Order of Courage of the third degree, became a deputy of the Rada, her oath signed in the SIZO was shown to the applauded deputies, and after Savchenko entered the Ukrainian delegation of the PACE, the assembly actively took up her fate.
Nothing contributes to the formation of a nation like the presence of an external enemy. 12 September 2014 of the year in Ukraine began to act the law "On sanctions", which referred to the "Russian aggression". In January, the city councils of regional centers, including Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Poltava, Mariupol, and the Verkhovna Rada, addressing several international organizations, recognized Russia as the “aggressor state”, noting the results of the official investigation of our obvious involvement in such terrorist attacks as a catastrophe of the civil passenger plane of the MH2015 flight, to the tragedies in Volnovakha, Donetsk and Mariupol ".
Russia plays the same role for Ukraine as the United States plays for us, and we ourselves play for Georgia and the Baltic states. Earlier, the west and east of Ukraine, the authorities and the opposition blamed each other for their misfortunes, now a convenient euphemism has emerged about the "eastern neighbor" who is guilty of all serious (Georgian politicians constantly talk about the "northern neighbor"). It is obvious that all political forces readily play on this stereotype. The hand of the Russian special services with almost Georgian frequency is seen in every opposition action or internal Ukrainian conflict of interest. On the other hand, having completely turned its face to the west, Ukraine received a ray of hope from the series “foreigners will help us” and stubbornly repeats the same mistakes as Russia, in 90-s without hoping that credits, advisers and reforms on Western patterns will affect the situation much more than factors of internal development.
At the end of 2013, another Ukrainian nationalism, the traditional one, which in Russia is justly called Bandera, began to move actively into the masses. Its leaders have repeatedly stated that they are exclusively “for the Ukrainians,” and not “against someone.” Despite modern public rhetoric, and Oleg Tyagnybok’s speech on Yavoryní’s mountain in 2004, and Dmitry Yarosh’s interview with one of the Chechen militants ’sites in 2008, years later, they still describe their attitude to Russia and the Russians. The use of the “wolf hook” on the flags of the organization “Patriot of Ukraine”, which has become one of the personnel foundations of the Azov regiment, numerous photos of Nazi greetings of ATO participants, a swastika in the form of tattoos constitute the symbolic basis of ethnic xenophobic nationalism. On the first day of 2015, the traditional thousands of torchlight procession under the flags of "Freedom" and "Right Sector" took place in Kiev. Its participants carried portraits of Stepan Bandera and chanted: "Bandera, Shukhevych are the heroes of Ukraine! Russia is a prison of nations!"
However, 2014 is the year for many Ukrainians to untie the slogan "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!" from its traditional background associated with the UPA. Having lost a narrow historical connotation, he turned from a pure Bandera slogan into a greeting to the “new” Ukraine. But the older generation, brought up in the framework of the historiography of the USSR with a corresponding attitude to the OUN and UPA as accomplices of Hitler, especially in the Donbas, he is perceived absolutely negatively. This is another symbolic problem of the formation of the Ukrainian nation. In turn, Russia either ignores the rise of traditional anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism in 2013-2015, as many liberally-minded citizens do, or by the efforts of federal TV channels turns this trend into an all-Ukrainian policy. Thus, the formation of a much broader social base of civic nationalism, aimed at building a supra-ethnic political nation, is eclipsed.
One of the outcomes of national construction is 2014: Ukrainians have ceased to be territorial and ethnic. This word is increasingly acquiring a political character, discarding blood and roots as less important than the brains — the self-awareness of a particular Russian, a Jew, a Crimean Tatar, an Armenian himself a Ukrainian. On the other hand, having received a sizeable impetus for development, the Ukrainian nation lost its borders in the east. In Ukraine, there was not and there is no consensus on the south-eastern regions and their citizens. It is simpler for most Ukrainians to think that “the Kremlin is supplying weapons to the Donbass and sponsoring terrorists” than to accept that the DPR and LNR militia may not sincerely wish to live under the rule of Kiev, willingly defending sovereignty with weapons in hand. 39,6% of Ukrainians said to the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), which conducted a large study in December of 2014, that the conflict in the southeast is “Ukraine’s war with Russia”. Almost 30% believes that this is a civil war: 21,1% is “provoked by the Russian authorities”, 8,1% is “provoked by the Kiev authorities”. The smaller part says: "The residents of Donbass are also our citizens, we have to work with them, not shoot them." But those who are in favor of stopping the ATO are immediately blamed for Ukrainian politicians for betraying national interests. To the question "Does it make sense to fight for the Donbass?" 62,8% answered "yes", 26,8% - "no." It turns out a vicious circle: both the old politicians and the new ones, which the revolutionary wave has brought to power, pretend to be hawks, fearing a new Maidan. Being a "dove" is dangerous: everyone remembers Viktor Yanukovich’s swan song.
On the website of the Ukrainian government are hanging phones for those who "want to leave the danger zone." "Who is a civilian did not leave the Donbass, blame yourself!" - do not speak. But lately, the voices of those who subconsciously support the Georgian version of solving the problem with separatist territories have been heard, when, despite the patriotic mantras about the need to fight for "their lands," they are immediately reforming the rest of the control. Back in the fall of 2014, the former head of the presidential secretariat, and now Rada deputy Viktor Baloga, wrote: "The Donbass should be separated from Ukraine, and Ukraine should wave to the Donbass by hand and further develop according to its own scenario." Ignoring the pathetics of Ukrainian politicians on the topic "our citizens in the southeast", Gennady Korban bluntly declares: "We will become a normal European country. With normal European values. Yes, we will not have Crimea. And to hell with it!" 18,5% of Ukrainians polled by KIIS did not agree with this, insisting that "Ukraine must recapture the Crimea." 21,1% thought that the Crimea would return itself, if Ukraine was an attractive socio-economic state, even 16% - if there were big problems in Russia. But 23,5% responded that "Crimea is lost forever for Ukraine."
We will become a normal European country. Yes, we will not have the Crimea. And to hell with it!
There is no national consensus on Donbass either. A quarter of Ukrainians do not know in principle what to do with it. 21,3% are in favor of "preserving the financing of the region in full, since these territories are Ukrainian." 20,5% believe that it is necessary "to stop all financial transactions, since Ukraine does not de facto control the occupied territories." 19,7% advocate the creation of conditions for the relocation of all those who want to leave, 12,3% - for the termination of all payments, except for pensions.
After the Crimea and Donbass, Ukrainian society does not know where the territory of Ukraine should end. One of the Russian publications in Ukraine on its website solves the problem simply: the part of the territory where the Crimea and Donbass are in the Ukrainian version is accidentally hidden under the menu bar. That is the answer to the establishing question "Where does Ukraine end?" in this case is not required. But "for the people to decide, someone must decide who the people are." Having given a powerful impetus to civic activism, retaining high competition in politics and mass media, starting to build a political nation, creating new heroes, not attacking the Russian language and Russian ethnicity, having turned to the west, Ukraine nevertheless loses its own east.
Perhaps this is what caused the emergence of a new myth. The Ukrainian national idea, whose chief custodian was considered to be the west of the country, and ethnic nationalists as carriers, is being transformed into the idea of some kind of "alternative, European Russian world", challenging Moscow not only the history of Ancient, Kievan Rus, but also the recent, all-Soviet.