Khrushchev, considering himself a great specialist in the field of agriculture, launched several destructive projects at once. At the end of the Stalin era and in the first years after his death, agriculture developed successfully. However, the successful rise of agriculture quickly came to an end. Khrushchev suddenly ordered the liquidation of state machine-tractor stations (MTS).
These state-owned enterprises on a contractual basis with agricultural collective farms carried out their production and technical services. Most of the collective and state farms did not have enough money to independently buy complex agricultural machines, tractors and ensure their uninterrupted work, to train the corresponding personnel. In addition, the technology in the first stages was not enough, and there was a need for its concentration and centralized distribution. The concentration of large-scale agricultural equipment in the MTS gave in such conditions a great economic gain. MTS also played a significant role in the general rise in the cultural and technical level of the peasantry. In the Soviet Union, a large layer of the rural technically literate population appeared - qualified tractor drivers, chauffeurs, combine operators, repairmen, etc. By 1958, there were about 2 million people in total.
Khrushchev eliminated the MTS and ordered the collective farms to buy agricultural equipment — tractors, combines, etc. Moreover, prices were set high. Collective farms had to spend all the savings that were left over for 1954-1956 for the purchase of equipment, which worsened their financial situation. Also, collective farms did not have the means to immediately create an appropriate base for the storage and maintenance of machinery. In addition, they did not have relevant technical specialists. They could not massively attract former employees of MTS. The state could allow workers in machine-tractor stations to pay more wages than collective farms. Therefore, the majority of workers began to look for more profitable niches and found another use for themselves. As a result, many machines without proper maintenance quickly turned into scrap metal. Continuous losses. It was a heavy blow to the economic potential of the Soviet countryside.
In addition, Nikita Khrushchev launched a campaign to consolidate collective and state farms. Their number was reduced from 83 thousand to 45 thousand. It was believed that they would unite into powerful "collective farm unions". Khrushchev was hoping to implement his old project on the creation of "agro-cities".
As a result, new giant, overwhelmingly unmanaged, farms, including dozens of villages, were created. The leaders of these “agro-cities” began to quickly degenerate into a food-marketing “mafia”, which dictated its rules to the authorities, including prices and volumes of supplies. Thus, the "collective farm unions" actually achieved the right to sell "their" products mainly in urban markets at inflated prices. In addition, this project required large capital investments, which the collective farms did not have. Collective farms and so have spent the last funds for the purchase of equipment. As a result, the enlargement campaign failed. By the middle of the 1980s, over 60% of state farms established in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period in the Russian Non-Black Earth Region turned out to be unprofitable.
Interestingly, even the pricing policy was directed against the Russian countryside. The state set minimum purchase prices for agricultural products precisely in the Non-Black Earth Region of the RSFSR. This policy was conducted from the end of 1950 to the end of the USSR. As a result, the national republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia received an additional channel of stimulation and monetary support.
Sentence Russian village
Khrushchev struck another powerful blow to the village when he began the course of eliminating "unpromising" villages. Suddenly, all of a sudden, thousands of prosperous Soviet villages were declared unprofitable, "unpromising" and destroyed in a short time for such a fraudulent reason. The “experts” who came from where they began to evaluate which villages could be left and which had no prospects. Top descended instructions to search for "unpromising" villages. This process began in 1958 with the North-West region of the RSFSR, in accordance with the “closed” decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.
In fact, the current Russian “optimizers” (“optimization” of rural schools, polyclinics, etc.) repeated the experience of Khrushchevites. The policy was aimed at the settlement of residents from small villages to large ones and concentrating in them the main part of the population, industrial and social facilities. The "reformers" proceeded from the false promise that highly concentrated forms of settlement should correspond to highly mechanized agriculture. It was assumed that in the future each collective farm (state farm) will include 1 or 2 settlements with the number of inhabitants from 1-2 thousand to 5-10 thousand people. Based on this, strongholds were allocated in the settlement network - promising villages. They planned to resettle residents from small, so-called unpromising villages, which ranked up to 80% (!) Of their total number. It was believed that such a change in the settlement structure would not only create opportunities for a more rapid development of the socio-cultural and household sphere of the village, bringing it closer to urban standards, but also reduce the flow of migrants from village to city.
The settlement and liquidation of “unpromising" villages were carried out in the form of an order, without taking into account the desire of the villagers themselves. Once in the “black list”, the village was already doomed, since capital construction stopped, schools, shops, clubs were closed, bus routes were liquidated, etc. Such conditions forced people to leave the well-lived places. At the same time, 2 / 3 immigrants did not migrate to their localities, but to district centers, cities, and other regions of the country. Residents of "unpromising" villages were resettled, villages and farms were empty throughout the Soviet Union. Thus, the number of villages in Siberia for 1959 — 1979. decreased in 2 times (from 31 thousand to 15 thousand). The largest decline occurred from 1959 to 1970 (35,8%). There has been a significant reduction in the number of small villages and the entire settlement network.
It must be said that this same policy, but by default, without centralized evacuation of people from their homes, was continued in the Russian Federation. Nobody declared “unpromising” villages, villages and settlements, but capital construction stopped, they began to “enlarge” schools (“optimize”, essentially liquidate), reduce polyclinics, hospitals, bus routes, movement of suburban trains-electric trains, etc.
Only by the end of the 1970-s, the policy of eliminating "unpromising" villages in the USSR was considered erroneous, but the tendency to reduce the number of small villages was already difficult to stop. Villages continued to die after the closure of this policy. Across the Urals, Siberia and the Far East for 1959 — 1989. the number of villages decreased 2,2 times (from 72,8 thousand to 32,6 thousand). In most cases, this policy adversely affected the entire socio-economic development of the village and the country as a whole. The country suffered serious demographic damage. The process of concentration has led to a decrease in the population level. The thinning of the network of populated areas in the eastern districts weakened and disrupted inter-settlement links and negatively impacted public services. The village lost one of its main functions - spatial development. The village lost the most active, young people, many of whom left their homeland forever. There were also moral negative consequences. There was a marginalization of a significant part of the population, people lost their roots, the meaning of life. No wonder then the village people were considered less spoiled by the vices of urban civilization. The defeated village began to "sink", drink too much. The incidence and mortality of the rural population in "unpromising" regions has sharply increased.
There was a sharp social aggravation of relations between the city and the countryside. The policy led to a strong overpopulation of cities, since the immigrants preferred to migrate not to the settlements determined for them, but to district centers, cities. This led to a constant fall in the price of labor, as well as skilled labor in industry and the extractive industries. Of course, this often led to conflicts with citizens, not to mention the so-called “sausage landings” of villagers in the cities.
This campaign, initiated by Khrushchev, caused terrible harm to the Russian countryside. No wonder the Russian writer Vasily Belov called the struggle with the so-called "unpromising" villages "a crime against the peasants." The first to suffer were the indigenous Russian regions of the Black Earth region, as well as the Russian rural population of Siberia. The damage was multifaceted and enormous: from damage to agriculture to a demographic attack on the Russian people. After all, it was the Russian village that gave the main increase to the superethnos of the Rus.
It is worth noting that the blow was struck precisely on the Russian people and the Russian village with its traditional agricultural sectors. After all, the national autonomy in the RSFSR, this campaign is almost not affected. And such measures were not provided for in the rural regions of the national republics of the USSR.
The consequences of this “reform” were very numerous and affected the Russian civilizations for decades. And still affect. So, the degradation of the village since the end of the 1950-s has been increasingly spread throughout the Non-Black-Earth of the RSFSR, especially the European one. As a result, by the second half of the 1980s, over 70% of all state and collective farms of the European Non-Black Earth Region of Russia proved to be chronically unprofitable, and the commercial yields of most crops and the productivity of pig farming with poultry were even lower than in the first half of 1950's. Similar trends manifested themselves in the Urals and Siberia.
This was a blow to the food security of the empire. If, under Stalin, products were exported from the USSR, then since the end of the 1960-ies there has been a bet on the import of agricultural products from the Eastern European socialist camp and Cuba. These were the long-term implications of Khrushchev’s agricultural and rural policy (including virgin and "corn") epics. It came to the point that articles about the inexpediency of the cultivation of sugar beet in Russia (!) Were published in 1970-s in view of the "guaranteed supply of raw cane sugar from fraternal Cuba." By the middle of 1980, the share of Eastern European and Cuban imports in the supply of RSFSR cities with meat (including poultry meat), sugar and fruits exceeded 70%, and the villages reached 60%. It was a shame and a disaster. The huge Soviet power, which had traditionally strong agriculture, could not provide itself with food!
Thus, the USSR was placed on food supplies from the outside, although Russia-the USSR, both at that time and now has all the possibilities for independent and full provision of food. All these are the consequences of the policies of Khrushchev and his followers, including modern Russian liberals. Not surprisingly, the Russian village since that time in chronic agony, and the policy of Gorbachev - Yeltsin - Medvedev practically killed her. And in Russian stores we see meat, milk, vegetables and even berries from all over the world: from Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Israel, China, etc.
Nikita Khrushchev (left) drinks Pepsi-Cola, Richard Nixon (center) is watching him. American exhibition in Moscow, July 1959 of the year
Impact on population reproduction
As already noted, Khrushchev’s experiments in agriculture caused great harm to the Soviet countryside, leading to its bleeding. Another blow to the people was the decree that allowed abortion. In 1936, due to the difficult demographic situation, abortion operations were banned under penalty of criminal responsibility. Decree of the CEC and SNK of the USSR on June 27 1936 "On the prohibition of abortion ..." The resolution also increased material assistance to women in childbirth, established state assistance to multi-family, expanded a network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens, etc. At the same time, abortions could be carried out for medical reasons.
23 in November 1955 of the Year by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the abolition of the prohibition of abortion", the operation of the artificial termination of pregnancy allowed all women in the absence of medical contraindications. It should be noted that the USSR was an advanced country in this matter. In all developed Western countries, abortion was still banned. In 1920, the Soviet Republic became the first country in the world to legalize termination of pregnancy at the request of a woman. It should be noted that in the 1920 year, the Trotskyists prevailed in the Soviet government. In 1955, the course that led Russia-USSR to destruction again prevailed, and the Russian people to extinction. For comparison, a similar law in Great Britain was adopted only in 1967, in the USA - in 1973, in France - in 1975, etc.
On the one hand, the “reforms” of Khrushchev were chaotic and disorderly, on the other - they were systematic. The essence of this system is destruction. With all their apparent confusion and irregularity, with all the broadest spectrum of Khrushchev inventions, one can always single out one common pattern. All reforms led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet project as a whole.