Military Review

Trenches against carts

37
About the military doctrine of the Red Army in the early 20-x-defend or attack?


The last quarter of the 20th century was marked in the Russian stories the introduction into scientific circulation of a huge array of previously inaccessible documents. But little-studied topics remain. One of them - a discussion at the beginning of 20-ies of the Military Doctrine of the Red Army.

In the USSR, ideas about it were reflected in the words of a popular song about peaceful people and an armored train, standing on the siding, but ready to leave at the right time. Thus the idea was postulated: we don’t want wars, but if that, remember, bourgeois, “from the taiga to the British seas the Red Army is the strongest”. And if necessary, it will assist the proletariat of any neighboring country.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a different point of view appeared: the Leninist government obsessed with the idea of ​​the world revolution followed a very aggressive formula in its foreign policy: "We will blow the world fire on all the bourgeoisie on the mountain." Let not the fire, but at least the Bolsheviks tried to kindle a fire in the expanses of Europe in 1920 by extending a helping hand to the Polish proletariat. However, the latter showed a blatant class ignorance and began to actively fight for the freedom of pans Poland. The defeat near Warsaw cooled the fervor of the Communists, and plans to export the revolution were put on the shelf - as history showed, until the Khrushchev era.

Marx was not a commander


After the end of the Civil and failure of the Polish campaign, the prospects of a great war of Soviet Russia with any of the neighboring countries were absent. And the leadership of the young state could reflect on the development of the Armed Forces. What led to the discussion about the military doctrine of the Red Army.

Faced two glance. The first was defended by Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), who headed the Revolutionary Military Council and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. The Bolshevik state owed this victory to the Civil War to no small degree, for Trotsky, who had no military education at the very beginning, understood perfectly: the key to victory was to create a regular army, for which it was necessary to abandon dilettantism and bring professionals to the service. In a very short time, a considerable part of the officer corps of the former imperial army was mobilized in the Red Army. By the end of the Civil War, the number of military specialists in the Red Army was 75 thousand. They are the true creators of communist victories on all fronts.

Close contact with the Russian military elite was not a gift for Trotsky, and therefore the successful end of the Civil War for the Bolsheviks could not shake his convictions: the future of the Red Army should be based on a thorough study of world experience — first of all, the First Imperialist one. Trotsky outlined his views at the April 1922 meeting of delegates to the XI Congress of the RCP, and in the same year published the book Military Doctrine and Imaginary Doctrinalism.

Trotsky's opponent was his future successor as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Mikhail Frunze, who wrote the work “United Military Doctrine and the Red Army”. Frunze is also a purely civilian person who was interested in military matters exclusively at the journalistic level. From the military point of view he had nothing to do with the victories attributed to him by Soviet historiography. They are the merit of advisers to the commander, former generals F. F. Novitsky and A. A. Baltiysky. However, to honor Frunze, we note that he never claimed the status of commander, and even the position of the head of the Revolutionary Military Council demanded not so much strategic talent and professional training as loyalty to the Bolshevik ideals and parties, and these qualities did not hold Mikhail Vasilyevich. But the very line of Trotsky was not going to curtail the involvement of Frunze military experts in the construction of the Red Army, being a clever man, although he was skeptical about them, considering it to be retrograde.

Trenches against carts


The discussion of Trotsky and Frunze turned around the question of what kind of war should be taken as a basis: First World War, which was primarily of a positional nature, or Civilian with its maneuverable character, lack of a solid front line, conducting combat operations mainly along railroads, rear raids enemy and cavalry battles.

Already on the first pages of his work, Frunze complains about the inability of former generals to say something meaningful about the military doctrine of the proletarian state. He seemed to have forgotten that it was thanks to military experts that the Bolsheviks won the Civil War, and he himself acquired the status of commander in the eyes of the people. A considerable part of the Bolshevik command personnel, whose herald was Frunze, could not idealize the actions of the Red Army. They even talked about the new proletarian strategy and other innovations in military affairs, born in the bloody chaos in the open spaces of Russia.

Paradoxically, Marxist, to the core, Trotsky rather sharply opposed the division of military science into bourgeois and proletarian. From his point of view, the class nature of the proletarian state determines the social composition of the Red Army and especially the governing apparatus, its political outlook, goals and moods, however, the strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Armed Forces depend not on the outlook, but on the state of the technology action. Criticizing the views of opponents, Trotsky does not hide the irony: "To think that it is possible, by arming yourself with the Marxist method, to decide on the best organization of production at a candle factory, means to have no idea about the Marxist method, nor about the candle factory."

Defense of Trotsky


How did Trotsky see the future of the Red Army? In his opinion, the cornerstone of the Bolshevik Military Doctrine under the conditions, as he put it, "the greatest demobilization of the army, its continuous reduction in the NEP era" should be defense, because it "meets the whole situation and all of our policies."

If we take into account the circumstances of the era, the judgment of Trotsky cannot but be considered as going against the mood of the military elite of the Red Army, which made a dizzying career in the fields of the Civil War.

He justified his position as follows: “We deliberately imagine the enemy to attack first, by no means considering that this gives him some kind of“ moral ”advantage. On the contrary, with space and strength for ourselves, we calmly and confidently draw the line where the mobilization provided by our elastic defense will prepare an adequate fist for our counteroffensive. ” Very sober and reasonable judgments, coinciding with the views of the Russian military thinker A. A. Svechin - the author of the strategy of starvation.

Along the way, Trotsky criticized Frunze, who argued: “Our Civil War was primarily maneuverable. This was the result of not only purely objective conditions (the enormity of the theater of military operations, the relative small number of troops, etc.), but also the internal properties of the Red Army, its revolutionary spirit, the fighting impulse as manifestations of the class nature of the proletarian elements that guided it. ” Trotsky reasonably objected to Frunze, drawing his attention to the fact that it was White who taught the Bolsheviks maneuverability and the revolutionary properties of the proletariat to do with it. Then we have to explain the basics of military art: “Maneuverability stems from the size of the country, from the number of troops, from the objective tasks facing the army, but not from the revolutionary nature of the proletariat ...”

Some words of justification for Frunze can be recognized by his words: “I consider it most harmful, dumb and childish now to speak of offensive wars on our part.” However, he immediately did not fail to notice: "We are a party of a class marching to conquer the world."

One of Trotsky's leitmotifs: the doctrine should correspond to the capabilities of the Armed Forces, this is the task of military art: reduce the number of unknowns in the equation of war to the smallest number, and this can be achieved only by ensuring the greatest fit between design and execution.

“What does this mean?”, Trotsky asks. And he answers: “It means to have such parts and such a management team that the goal is achieved by overcoming the obstacles of place and time by combined means. In other words, you need to have a steady - and at the same time flexible, centralized - and at the same time springy command apparatus, possessing all the necessary skills and passing them down. Looking for good shots. ”

Born of revolution


That is, Trotsky advocated building an army according to all the rules of military science. But was he just a polemic with Frunze? No, one of Trotsky’s opponents was the former second lieutenant and executioner of his own people, who by the will of Khrushchev turned into almost a genius general, MN Tukhachevsky. He literally issued the following: “The Marxist method of research shows that in matters of recruitment, in matters of organizing the rear (in a broad sense) there will be a very significant difference. And this difference is already changing to a great extent the nature of the strategy to which we will adhere. ”

As the Marxist method should reflect on it, Tukhachevsky wrote in his work “National and Class Strategy”, but the above lines indicate the future marshal’s inclination to demagogy, with which he throughout his career in the Red Army tried to compensate for the lack of knowledge and education.

Thus, to Trotsky’s fair statement, according to which it was White who was taught by the Bolshevik troops to maneuver, Tukhachevsky replied: “Now, as to whether we had maneuverability in the last Civil War and what kind of maneuverability it was. Tov. Trotsky is inclined to depreciate this maneuverability. True, it was somewhat primitive, that is, a thousand miles ahead and a thousand miles ago, but there was maneuverability and such a good one that would probably go down in history. ”

Comments are superfluous. And this man, who was not able to formulate his thoughts in an accessible form, which in principle is unacceptable for a strategist, was for a long time considered in the USSR the standard of a commander. Unfortunately, in the words of Frunze there was a lot of demagogy: “In the Red Army, we sometimes lacked, perhaps, technical knowledge, orderliness, consistency, but there was determination, courage and breadth of operational design, and in this direction we certainly formally close to the methods that were used in the German army. This is our property that I put in connection with the class nature of the proletarian elements that have become the head of the Red Army. ”

At the head of the Red Army were professional revolutionaries and military experts, most of whom had nothing to do with the proletariat. Mikhail Vasilyevich knew this perfectly well, but the ideology demanded the birth of proletarian commanders and they "appeared".

Trotsky's recommendations, and in fact the views of military specialists he voiced - in a future war to stick to the strategy of starvation - were contrary to the one adopted a decade later by the Voroshilov doctrine of “Little blood in a foreign territory”. The latter, as history has shown, turned out to be erroneous, because an active defense, exhausting the enemy and capable of inflicting significant damage on his manpower, was what the Red Army lacked in 1941.

Trotsky had to argue not only with Frunze and Tukhachevsky. In the Bolshevik military elite there were hotheads demanding preparations for offensive revolutionary wars. So, from the point of view of the head of the Red Army Political Directorate, S. I. Gusev, it is necessary to train the class army of the proletariat not only in defense against bourgeois-landlord counterrevolution, but also in revolutionary wars against the imperialist powers.

In response, Trotsky drew the attention of his opponent to the need for favorable foreign policy conditions for the realization of expansionist ideas.

However, recognizing the sobriety of Trotsky’s strategic views during the period under review, the following should be taken into account. He was of high opinion about the military abilities of the same Tukhachevsky, despite the differences with him. And it is quite likely that he would have left him in key posts in the Red Army, as well as his fellow amateurs Uborevich and Yakir, whom he wrote very warmly in the preface to the book “The Devoted Revolution”, where these military leaders are called the best generals of the Red Army.

Such a flattering assessment would guarantee the named military leaders (they cannot be called commanders in any way) the preservation of places in the Bolshevik army elite. And in military science, the amateurish views of the former second lieutenant would have been established, which at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War would have led to even more terrible losses, and perhaps, to the defeat of the Red Army.

It is unlikely that if a war had happened, Trotsky would have gone on to restore relations with the Church. Even the attempt of the Bolsheviks to create Cossack formations in 1935 caused its sharp criticism.

Thus, Trotsky's correct vision of the main directions of military construction in the USSR could be negated by his policies, primarily internal, that were harmful to the country and its national spirit. And over time, the amateur Soviet views of Tukhachevsky on how the Red Army should develop could have prevailed in the highest Soviet military-political leadership. And then the defeat in the Great Patriotic War would have become virtually inevitable.
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  1. Moore
    Moore 22 February 2016 08: 33
    20
    What was wrong with Frunze’s military doctrine?
    1. The "proletarian" character of the VD, in his opinion, was in full accord with his own phrase: "It is quite probable that an enemy will appear before us, who will be very difficult to succumb to the arguments of revolutionary ideology." Therefore, he wrote, in the calculations of future operations, the main attention should be paid not to hopes for the political disintegration of the enemy, but to the possibility of "actively crushing him physically."
    2. Yes, Frunze considered the main type of hostilities to be an offensive, which in the only way could contribute to victory, since the imposition of the initiative on the enemy is its guarantee. But at the same time he emphasized the importance of defense, which should be active and create the conditions for a transition to the offensive. A huge role in the future war, argued Frunze, will belong to the rear, so it is extremely important not to miss the preparation of the country's rear as the basis of the defense power of the Soviet state. What's wrong with that?
    3. Another side of the future war, which will certainly manifest itself, Frunze considered its maneuverable and active character (as in the Civil War), as well as the fact that it will use technical means on an even larger scale than in the First World War: “For achievements of victory, the belligerents will throw into battle all the latest achievements of science and technology. In a future war, elements of positioning and the breakthrough of heavily fortified enemy defense lines are not excluded. And here the experience of the First World War will be necessary. ”
    4. Frunze paid great attention to tanks and aircraft. Back in 1921, he raised the question of the need to deploy tank building in our country: "... at least to the detriment and expense of other weapons." Frunze also considered the role of military aviation to be enormous: “... with the most modest assessment of the air fleet, its significance will be decisive. Any state that does not have an air fleet will be doomed to defeat. ”And therefore, the main task of the fighters and commanders is to learn to master the equipment:“ Only in this way we will achieve victories with little blood, with the least sacrifice. ”
    I believe that Frunze was largely able to see the contours of the future war with its main features:
    -maneuverability;
    -Massive use of equipment (tanks, aircraft);
    1. Cap.Morgan
      Cap.Morgan 22 February 2016 13: 17
      -6
      I would like to ask if you understand that in the 21st year the production of tanks in the USSR was impossible. Kerosene was not produced. Too complicated production. But Frunze, you see, raises the question of the production of tanks. At what capacities, let me say Frunze was going to do this? What plants? Where should the armored plate be forged? Gather engines? That is, Frunze was an empty dreamer.
      As for the fact that along with the offensive, defensive tactics will be used in the future - a thought that is simply amazing in its depth ....
      1. Moore
        Moore 22 February 2016 15: 51
        +6
        I would like to ask if you understand that in the 21st year the production of tanks in the USSR was impossible. Kerosene was not produced. Too complicated production. But Frunze, you see, raises the question of the production of tanks. At what capacities, let me say Frunze was going to do this? What plants? Where should the armored plate be forged? Gather engines? That is, Frunze was an empty dreamer.

        In 1920 - the serial production of Renault FT-17 analogues in Sormovo and the approval of the GOELRO plan, in the 1923-25s - the assembly of Ju-20, Ju-21 at Fili and in 1927 the first MS-1 and the construction of Magnitogorsk? No, not heard.
        As for the fact that along with the offensive, defensive tactics will be used in the future - a thought that is simply amazing in its depth ....

        Engaged in cheating and juggling? Well, it’s quite a respectable occupation for modern times.
        Actually, it was a question of defense, as a compelled form of hostilities, which was reflected in the Field Charter of 1939, article 14 of chapter 1:
        Defense will be needed whenever defeating an adversary by an offensive in a given situation is impossible or impractical.
        Defense must be indestructible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he is in this direction.
        It should consist of stubborn resistance, depleting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and a decisive counterattack, causing him complete defeat. Thus, the defense must achieve victory by small forces over a numerically superior enemy.
        1. Cap.Morgan
          Cap.Morgan 22 February 2016 16: 43
          -1
          This is ridiculous. Serial production of tanks in Sormovo? Probably the whole tank division was riveted, or even the corps?
          Do you call the series hardly 14 pieces assembled on the knee? This is called unit production.
          The assembly by German engineers from German components of several dozen aircraft really took place. Will you take an interest in the number of cars? The same piece production.
          MS-1 is the same Renault. Workmanship is below all criticism.
          Even the T-26 tank, which was bought from the British and began to be manufactured in the early 30s - already 10 years after the daydreams, Frunze had a marriage in armored vehicles of up to 80%. So how can mechanization be required in the 21st? The former paramedic in military production did not understand anything.
          So who among us is engaged in fraud?
          1. Pre-cat
            Pre-cat 22 February 2016 22: 05
            +4
            Quote: Cap.Morgan
            You call a series of barely assembled on the knee 14 pieces

            Tanks MS-1 (aka T-18) until the age of 31 were released more than 900.
            1. Cap.Morgan
              Cap.Morgan 23 February 2016 09: 52
              -2
              This is from the article of the Red Star for the 67th year.
              The actual amount is much less - 325 pieces.
          2. Moore
            Moore 23 February 2016 07: 39
            +3
            You do it. Because before that they were talking about the impossibility of producing something technologically advanced in the USSR. I pointed out to you the growth points in the military sphere, which Frunze correctly accepted.
            That the doctrine is not of a momentary nature, is not based on impressions obtained from the view behind the window, but is a document on the basis of which military construction is carried out for a long period of time, needs to be explained?
            1. Cap.Morgan
              Cap.Morgan 23 February 2016 09: 13
              -1
              It was generally not about the possibility of production in the USSR in principle, but about production at a certain point. Namely, for 21-22 years. After all, it is then that the discussion described in the article is conducted.
              The doctrine, of course, is a document for decades, but the situation in industry at the beginning of the 20s is deplorable.
              It’s the same as discussing the construction of the base of the Russian Aerospace Forces on Mars.
              However, this is more realistic since there is such a field as rocket science. In the USSR, at the beginning of the 20s, heavy engineering was breathing incense. And even programs to build tractor factories have not yet been. Even in dreams. What for? Indeed, now the world revolution is about to break out. Do you remember that Tukhachevsky just got a snot near Warsaw. Poland is the key to Germany. Germany, with its powerful left-wing labor movement, is the key to Europe. That's what they wanted. World domination through the world revolution. This is their real military doctrine, and therefore they urgently needed tanks.
              What are the growth points in 1921? The famine in the Volga was there, and not a point of growth.
              1. Cap.Morgan
                Cap.Morgan 23 February 2016 09: 20
                -1
                The beginning of the 20s in Russia was marked by a deep crisis. At the beginning of 1921, the volume of industrial production was only 12% of the pre-war period, and the production of iron and cast iron was 2%. Labor productivity in some sectors decreased by 5%. Most of the mines and mines were destroyed and flooded. Factories and factories for the most part stood.

                The crisis swept the village. Sales of agricultural products decreased by 92%. In 1920, less than 64% of the pre-war level of grain was grown.
      2. 92827365
        92827365 18 March 2016 23: 03
        +1
        Yes, in 1925 they came to the conclusion that the mobile troops in the Red Army will be represented by cavalry, and the number of horses will be restored in the former Cossack regions. But already in the years of the first five-year plan, by 1932, 1500 enterprises were built in the USSR, during the years of the second five-year plan - about 3000, and during the incomplete third five-year plan, another 1500 industrial enterprises. By 1940, the USSR became one of the 3-4 countries in the world capable of producing any industrial product. Here is the "dreamer" or "empty dreamer" Frunze. This is the result of the country's development over 20 years after the Civil War. The possibilities of the state economy turned out to be enormous. After the famine of 1933-1934, conclusions were drawn. The issues with the Cossacks were settled by 1936 and from April 21, 1936, the formation of the Cossack cavalry units of the Red Army began. In 1937, on May 1, at the parade on Red Square, for the first time, carts, on which sat the Kuban and Don Cossacks in Cossack uniforms, raced, which caused a state of shock among the foreign attachés who were present among the guests.
    2. Cap.Morgan
      Cap.Morgan 22 February 2016 13: 29
      -5
      Thanks to the efforts of the officers of tsarist Russia, by 1930 the Soviet Union had modern armed forces, the power of which was recognized by all possible opponents. However, in 1937-1938. another blow was inflicted on the officers. The vast majority of “military specialists”, and along with them many commanders of the new generation, were declared “enemies of the people”, participants in the White Guard and anti-Soviet fascist military mythical conspiracies and spies. Thousands of them died in Stalin's dungeons and camps.

      As a result of the Civil War and subsequent repressions, the creative spirit was quenched, continuity was interrupted, the centuries-old officer school and professionalism were largely lost, which immediately negatively affected the upcoming Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. “If there had not been 1937, then there would have been no war of 1941,” subsequently noted Marshal AM Vasilevsky. Historian O.F. Souvenirs based on serious research came to the conclusion: "The tragedy of the Red Army in 1941-1942. in many ways, and perhaps, mainly, a direct consequence of the tragedy of the Red Army in 1937-1938. "
      1. Ze Kot
        Ze Kot 22 February 2016 16: 04
        +8
        Quote: Cap.Morgan
        As a result of the Civil War and subsequent repressions, the creative spirit was quenched, continuity was interrupted, the centuries-old officer school and professionalism were largely lost, which immediately negatively affected the upcoming Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. “If there had not been 1937, then there would have been no war of 1941,” subsequently noted Marshal AM Vasilevsky. Historian O.F. Souvenirs based on serious research came to the conclusion: "The tragedy of the Red Army in 1941-1942. in many ways, and perhaps, mainly, a direct consequence of the tragedy of the Red Army in 1937-1938. "



        According to Beria's memoirs, the military and in front of the Finnish one reported that "they would all be torn up" before the Second World War. However, the fighting immediately showed who was really engaged in combat training (border troops), and who was all sorts of garbage. And most importantly, after the Finnish, they did not make any conclusions, they put a lot of people, lost equipment, supplies in the initial period of the Second World War. And how Khrushchev and the military misled Stalin about the Kiev operation of 42 ...
      2. Pre-cat
        Pre-cat 22 February 2016 22: 30
        +6
        Quote: Cap.Morgan
        The vast majority of “military specialists”, and along with them many commanders of the new generation, were declared “enemies of the people”, participants in the White Guard and anti-Soviet fascist military mythical conspiracies and spies. T

        The purge carried out in the ranks of the Red Army in the 30s was caused by the need to cleanse its ranks of Trotsky's supporters and sympathizers. In addition, a number of heroes of the Civil War "starred" considering themselves great strategists, and "screwed up the service." As a result, many units were more engaged in household work and not in combat training. As an example - Marshal Blucher, who, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, began to thump to full compliance with his untranslatable surname into Russian, and the headquarters camarilla was in charge of affairs in the Far Eastern Special District. As a result, during the Khasan events, the tanks were driven through the swamp, without reenactment, and some of the soldiers did not know how to use grenades.
        And most of the military convicts on the basis of the "debriefing" had Art. 58 p. 758-7. Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, money circulation or the credit system, as well as cooperation, committed for counter-revolutionary purposes through the appropriate use of state institutions and enterprises, or opposition to their normal activities, as well as the use of state institutions and enterprises or opposition to their activities, committed in interests of former owners or interested capitalist organizations entail -

        social protection measures specified in Articles 58-2 of this code. [June 6, 1927 (SU No. 49, art. 330)]. and Art. 58 p. 14 Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e. the deliberate non-performance by someone of certain duties or their deliberately careless performance for the special purpose of weakening the power of the government and the activities of the state apparatus, entails -

        imprisonment for a term of not less than one year, with the confiscation of all or part of the property, with an increase, about especially aggravating circumstances, up to the highest social protection measure - execution, with confiscation of property. [6 of June 1937 (SU No.49, Art. 330)].
      3. RoTTor
        RoTTor 24 February 2016 14: 10
        0
        Thanks to L.D. Trotsky, the number of officers of the old army, including those assigned to the General Staff in the Red Army, was several times greater than their number in ALL white armies combined. See the monograph by A. Kavtoradze on genshabists in the Red Army.

        The fact that partisanism was overturned in record time, discipline strengthened and a truly invincible 3 millionth Red Army created, as well as who really led the uprising in Petrograd, is somehow not remembered. And this is also Trotsky. Indeed - the leader of the Red Army, who enjoyed great authority and love.

        Trotsky is one of the unjustly slandered and blackened by the envious heroes of our history. Like Arakcheev, Pavel, Nikolai Pavlovich, Anna Ioannovna - to bring them numbers ...
  2. engineer
    engineer 22 February 2016 10: 10
    +2
    but proponents of positional warfare in the spirit of World War I at the beginning of the war prevailed. and the Finnish war with the Mannerheim Line. and the construction of fortified areas - Brest Fortress. and digging anti-tank ditches. only in 42 and 43 years did the war really become maneuverable with active defense. Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge. and then everything was repeated.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. creak
      creak 22 February 2016 14: 17
      +7
      [quote = engineer] construction of fortified districts - Brest fortress. / quote]

      The Brest Fortress was not built as part of the Brest Fortified Area, but was built in the 19th century. along with other fortresses such as Osovec and Przemysl.
      The Red Army simply used the fortress, which no longer had strategic importance, to deploy troops - before the war in Western Belarus, the barracks and other infrastructure were sorely lacking ...
      It was not supposed to defend it - just on June 22, units of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions were unable to organizely leave their places of deployment and suffered heavy losses (this was one of the points of indictment of the executed commander of Korobkov 4) ...
  3. moskowit
    moskowit 22 February 2016 12: 33
    +6
    About the greatest contribution of military experts to the construction and strengthening of the combat power of the Red Army is an excellent book by Alexander G. Kartavadze ...
    Those interested in this topic, highly recommend it. The most comprehensive and professional study ...
    1. RoTTor
      RoTTor 24 February 2016 14: 18
      0
      this is a direct merit of L.D. Trotsky: some of the general staff were mobilized almost by force, someone was given an unlimited course of service, which they could never count on in the tsarist, especially in the white armies.
  4. Conrad
    Conrad 22 February 2016 13: 10
    10
    The most interesting thing is that in this discussion of the 20s, S.M. Budyonny. The founder of the very mobility that the "red" allegedly taught the "white". Who beat all these, well, very learned generals, himself being not just a "former second lieutenant", but in general a former sergeant-major (this is like a foreman). Incidentally, Mamontov's Cavalry Corps and the First Cavalry Corps ("Budenny's gang" in the words of Leon Trotsky) are earth and sky. It was the revolutionary change, the introduction of heavy "machine-gun" squadrons into the structure of the cavalry regiments, that made the confrontation on equal terms between the classical cavalry corps and the First Cavalry unrealistic. And the dialogue in the main headquarters of the Red Army, which preceded the transfer of the First Horse to Ukraine in the 20th year, speaks well of the scholarship of military experts. Where the mega-military expert (by the way) cannot understand the picture of the actual state of the railways in the country. (It was about the method of the First Cavalry march from Rostov to Kremenchug. By railroad or horse-drawn order.) That same Budyonny, who had no place after the military Red Army.
  5. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 22 February 2016 13: 13
    0
    Amazing! Trotsky is the standard "whipping boy"
    all authors of HE and other resources - suddenly, it turns out, gave
    sober and realistic assessments of the armed forces of the USSR
    and correctly determined their doctrine ...
    Is his activity as Minister of Defense throughout the Civil War
    was justified?
  6. Lopatov
    Lopatov 22 February 2016 13: 42
    +5
    As history has shown, both "prominent military theorists" were wrong.
    The Red Army has neither learned to retreat competently without losing control, nor to hold a strike on the defensive without heavy losses, nor to competently advance again without attacks on the forehead with throwing corpses on the enemy (remember Zhukov’s order on the inadmissibility of this, it did not arise out of nowhere)
    All this knowledge and skills were bought in the Great Patriotic War with huge blood.

    When ideology pokes its mug in military art, do not expect good from this.

    If anyone disagrees, remember the operation "Bagration" as an example of an offensive, remember the battles near Lake Balaton, as an example of a maneuverable defense, when the elite of the German armored forces were ground with almost one artillery. In 1941, our commanders were not ready for operations of this level.

    Remember that the Second World War radically changed strategy and tactics, that is, the Red Army was not ready for this war.
    1. IS-80
      IS-80 22 February 2016 15: 31
      +2
      Quote: Spade
      As history has shown, both "prominent military theorists" were wrong.

      In what?
      Quote: Spade
      When ideology pokes its mug in military art, do not expect good from this.

      Tsushima defeat, defeat of the 2nd army in Prussia, Dunkirk, defeat of France in a border battle, Pearl Harbor, storm of Grozny. Everywhere ideology let us down? smile
      Quote: Spade
      Remember that the Second World War radically changed strategy and tactics, that is, the Red Army was not ready for this war.

      And who was ready? England, France, Poland, USA? Such were not ready, not only all, but many. smile
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 22 February 2016 15: 52
        +3
        Quote: IS-80
        In what?

        In their views on the use of the Red Army. We decided not to read the article, immediately to the comments?

        Quote: IS-80
        Everywhere ideology let us down?

        Almost yes. Tsushima and Pearl Harbor - underestimating the enemy on a racial basis
        The defeat of the 2nd Army in Prussia - the prevalence of foreign policy interests over the military
        The defeat of France was a natural result of the "strange war". For political reasons, they did not hit Germany at an opportune time, they allowed to prepare
        Dunkirk - Hitler's hopes for a truce with the British
        "Storm" of Grozny - despite what happened to the detachments of Avturkhanov, the Kremlin "sages" decided that it was possible in Grozny to repeat what was done in Moscow in the fall of 93.

        Continuous politics and ideology. Become the cause of these lesions. Any other options?

        Quote: IS-80
        And who was ready?

        Germans.
        1. IS-80
          IS-80 22 February 2016 16: 14
          +1
          Quote: Spade
          In their views on the use of the Red Army. We decided not to read the article, immediately to the comments?

          No, I read the article. I just don’t understand your point. I wanted to hear a more detailed answer.
          Quote: Spade
          Continuous politics and ideology. Become the cause of these lesions. Any other options?

          You see, not only ideology, but also politics. smile And the reasons, as always, are a whole bunch. Some are more significant, some less. It all came down to ideology. But what about bureaucracy, sloppiness, theft, erroneous assessments, inaccurate information, conservatism, or vice versa, the desire to run ahead of a steam locomotive, yes, the same case is happy or not.
          Quote: Spade
          Germans.

          Well, I’m saying not only not everything. smile
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 22 February 2016 16: 34
            +2
            Quote: IS-80
            It all came down to ideology.

            But because this is the root cause. And political decisions, and bureaucracy, and all of the above.
            1. IS-80
              IS-80 22 February 2016 17: 56
              +1
              Quote: Spade
              But because this is the root cause. And political decisions, and bureaucracy, and all of the above.

              If so, ideology is the cause of not only defeats, but also victories. And since we won, then the ideology was correct. smile Shovels be careful in utterances. laughing
    2. Moore
      Moore 22 February 2016 16: 01
      +3
      Quote: Spade
      When ideology pokes its mug in military art, do not expect good from this.

      How did the "ideological mug" influence the creation of the Kalinov-Triandophil's theory of the "Deep Operation"?
      It’s not about ideology, it’s about specific individuals and objective conditions of life. For "it is difficult to fight" - Clausewitz.
      In this part, some of our meat throwers with ideology are no different from their colleagues without it, for example, who planned and directed the landing in the Omaha sector.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 22 February 2016 16: 23
        +2
        And for what reasons did the Red Army not learn to retreat?
        For what reasons did the defense spread rot, presenting it not as one of the two main types of combat, but as something temporary, auxiliary before the start of the epic "to beat the enemy in foreign territory with little blood, a mighty blow"?
        For what reasons did the fathers commanders drive subordinates into German positions forehead, seeking to fulfill the order at any cost? (see Directive No. 086 of the Armed Forces of the Western Front)

        All this is pure ideology. And it was she who led to the disaster for 41 years. Starting with the concept of "in foreign territory", because of which the "rear" was too close to the border. After all, Rezun is right in many ways. It's just that in his collection of facts he "forgets" that the USSR was preparing for reciprocal hit.
        1. Moore
          Moore 23 February 2016 07: 30
          +2
          Quote: Spade
          And for what reasons did the Red Army not learn to retreat?

          Can you give an example of successful retreats from "non-ideologized" allies or opponents? When the front line is torn to shreds by those who consider offensive as the main type of combat operations and dictate to the enemy the time and place of the strike, the need for "specialists" in retreat disappears and the defense settles down when the attackers have exhausted their forces and means to develop success.
          Quote: Spade
          High-quality equipment? 8))) Just the same, everything is exactly the opposite. We had a qualitative advantage in technology in 1941. And by 44-45, they lost it.

          It depends on what to take as a criterion. If, for example, the operating time of the engine, then the T-34 of the period of the beginning of the war somehow did not stand next to its colleague from the 45th. If we take manufacturability and maintainability as a criterion - "Tigers" and "Panthers" again smoke.
    3. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 22 February 2016 16: 39
      +2
      for Shovels:
      It is not known what the future war will be; it is very difficult to predict this.

      The IDF prefers to train "small bricks" - companies,
      and "medium bricks" - battalions, and do not bother with large-scale
      teachings and all sorts of doctrines. But if the companies are harmonious and fired,
      they will somehow cope even in a critical, non-standard environment.

      It worked in 1973, when large Syrian forces entered operational
      space in the Golan, and Israeli forces found themselves in isolated scraps of defense.
      Then Rafael Eitan repeated to the commanders, who reported "around a hundred tanks":
      "You were taught to count enemy tanks? You were taught long and hard to accurately shoot at them -
      and do this. "And it turned out that the Syrians have not an infinite number of tanks ...
      after a day of battle - over.
  7. Denimax
    Denimax 22 February 2016 16: 18
    +2
    Quote: Spade
    If anyone disagrees, remember the operation "Bagration" as an example of an offensive, remember the battles near Lake Balaton, as an example of a maneuverable defense, when the elite of the German armored forces were ground with almost one artillery. In 1941, our commanders were not ready for operations of this level.

    So this is when it was. When there was already a high-quality technique, without which it is possible to fantasize any doctrines and strategies, there will only be little sense.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 22 February 2016 16: 33
      -1
      High-quality equipment? 8)))
      Just the same, everything is exactly the opposite. We had a qualitative advantage in technology in 1941. And by 44-45, they lost it.
  8. Denimax
    Denimax 22 February 2016 16: 40
    +3
    Quote: Spade
    Just the same, everything is exactly the opposite. We had a qualitative advantage in technology in 1941. And by 44-45, they lost it.

    That is, it was possible to carry out such operations at the beginning of the war with "bt-shkami" and "donkeys"? As far as I know, not everything worked out very well.
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 22 February 2016 17: 33
      +2
      Quote: Denimax
      That is, "bt-shkami" and "donkeys"

      And also T-34 and KV. They could have.

      Read about the battles at Balaton. Qualitatively, the Germans outnumbered us by almost an order of magnitude. But only due to the art of war, all these "royal tigers" and other "elephant" were turned into scrap metal.
      1. Denimax
        Denimax 22 February 2016 18: 03
        +2
        This is when air superiority was lost, otherwise the Junkers would have worked. And not BTs fired from ambushes, but ISs, T-34-85 and SAU-152. The combat quality of the equipment has also improved an order of magnitude. There was already something to exhibit. Well, experience has appeared in practice.
      2. Cap.Morgan
        Cap.Morgan 22 February 2016 23: 36
        -3
        They have run out of gasoline. And the fuse. In Germany there was a complete collapse in supply.
        In addition, ours was 10 times more.
  9. Denimax
    Denimax 22 February 2016 18: 36
    +1
    Quote: voyaka uh
    The IDF prefers to train "small bricks" - companies,
    and "medium bricks" - battalions

    I wonder what weapons you had if you could hit tanks? Surely it was balanced.
    I served in mountain rafts, there was everything for partisan actions: there were 120mm mortars on the M113, on the Wizels the 20mm guns or TOUs, snipers, grenade launchers, MG-3 machine guns. That is, they could hit everything that moves. By the way, it can be considered elite; it is not in vain that they send all hot spots.
  10. engineer
    engineer 22 February 2016 22: 28
    +3
    SAU 152 was developed and manufactured in St. Petersburg at the Kirov plant. and Peter was already in the blockade. however, the 'St. John's wort' regularly supplied. if hit, the tank has no chance of surviving. pierced the frontal armor at times. and only if the board. then the tank remained scrap metal.
    1. Cap.Morgan
      Cap.Morgan 22 February 2016 23: 32
      -4
      Well, this is when hit.
      During the shelling of the Tiger SAU-152 at the firing range, no cases of contact were recorded. She's good at breaking concrete walls of pillboxes.
      Kirovsky factory was evacuated.
      What could he put in a blockade ...
      1. Protos
        Protos 23 February 2016 23: 29
        +4
        The Kirovsky plant throughout the blockade produced and repaired KV-1 tanks, as well as manufactured self-propelled guns based on the running T-26 ... "part of the capacities and specialists of the Kirov plant, as well as the procurement of heavy KV tanks, remained in Leningrad, and throughout During the war, the Leningrad Kirovsky plant, which was almost on the front line, continued to assemble and repair tanks and other armored vehicles.During the war, 4680 shells and 770 bombs fell on the plant's territory, 139 people were killed by fragments of bombs and shells, 788 were injured; more than 2500 workers died from exhaustion. [15] For the repair of tanks in the besieged Leningrad, the Kirov Plant was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, XNUMXst degree. " hi
        Take an example from your ideologist Rezun, he even knows the materiel ... wink
  11. VSkilled
    VSkilled 23 February 2016 16: 50
    0
    Lev Davidovich Bronstein - was the author of the total and cruel terror and the effective, but very bloody tactics of "throwing corpses at the enemy."

    The corpses of soldiers of the Red Army.

    Costs of Jewish education: among Jews it is not customary to count the corpses of non-Jews.

    A vivid and, relatively, fresh example is the "lament over the Holocaust", where only Jews are defiantly counted, and, accordingly, they only cry over Jews ...
  12. Predator
    Predator 14 November 2016 22: 00
    0
    [quote = Moore] [quote = Lopatov] And for what reasons did the Red Army not learn to retreat? [/ quote]
    Can you give an example of successful retreats from "non-ideologized" allies or opponents? When the front line is torn to shreds by those who consider offensive as the main type of combat operations and dictate to the enemy the time and place of the strike, the need for "specialists" in retreat disappears and the defense settles down when the attackers have exhausted their forces and means to develop success.
    I can, if interested. A competent retreat of Army Group Center in 1943. near Smolensk. First from Rzhev and Vyazma, and then systematically, from line to line and still not allowing himself to be surrounded, without losing control with causing very large losses of the Red Army.
  13. Predator
    Predator 14 November 2016 22: 08
    0
    Quote: Moore
    Quote: Spade
    When ideology pokes its mug in military art, do not expect good from this.

    How did the "ideological mug" influence the creation of the Kalinov-Triandophil's theory of the "Deep Operation"?
    It’s not about ideology, it’s about specific individuals and objective conditions of life. For "it is difficult to fight" - Clausewitz.
    In this part, some of our meat throwers with ideology are no different from their colleagues without it, for example, who planned and directed the landing in the Omaha sector.

    Yes, but they all forgot something, what they said, that a strong and maneuverable defense is a success for the offensive, that the offensive must still be earned by the defense.