Totskie teachings 1954g. and security measures taken
The development and deployment of tactical nuclear munitions (TNBMs) in the USSR and the USA led to the need for practical development of methods for their use. TYABP planned organically fit into the scheme of combined arms combat, using primarily as a means of suppressing fortified enemy defenses. At the same time, the advancing troops were to skillfully use the consequences of a nuclear strike, while not exposing their lives to danger. Created at the dawn of the nuclear era, the methodological guidelines for conducting such a battle had a significant drawback: they were built solely on theoretical fabrications. But as you know, theory without practice is dead. Very soon there was a need to conduct a practical development of theories in the course of real combined-arms exercises.
The first such exercises were held by the United States of America. 1 November 1951, at the Nevada test site, the Buster Dog exercises were conducted, during which a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 21 CT was detonated. At a distance of about 11 kilometers from the epicenter were the troops, separate units which carried out after the explosion forced marches approximately 1 km from the epicenter. Subsequently, 7 similar exercises were conducted with the code names "Desert Rock". The last exercises were especially large-scale, during which dozens of nuclear charges were blown up within a few weeks.
In the Soviet Union, despite a similar need practical verification of theoretical instruction, it was carried out only 2 such teachings: on Totsky range in g 1954 and 1956 in Semipalatinsk was being carefully secretive during the Soviet era, they became known to the public only at the end of perestroika . Unfortunately, detailed, impartial descriptions of the course of the exercises appeared much later, and the first newspaper articles relied solely on rumors and individual memories, and therefore were written in the key of another horror story. However, the situation has changed little so far about the scientists write in the majority of cases, in a negative way: "macabre experiments on soldiers and civilians," "thousands of victims" (if not on the spot, in the early years), "thousands of square .kilometry, contaminated radiation. " Only with the advent of a detailed description of these teachings directly from the test, prepared the exercises, it was possible to objectively consider the course of events and to assess the security measures taken.
Now we can safely say that during these exercises command and scientists have made every effort to ensure the safety (as do nuclear doctrine may be safe). In the course of the exercise, which took place clearly according to the plan, minimal (virtually zero) damage was caused to the health of all participants and the local population. That security was put at the forefront - it follows from all the details. We illustrate this with the example of the Tokyo exercises 14 September 1954.
As is known, nuclear weapon (NF) affects the surrounding area with a shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation, and also infects nearby territory with the products of radioactive decay (there is also electromagnetic radiation, but in this context it is not significant). The air wave, light cure and penetrating radiation act only at the time of the explosion and it is easy to defend against them with the help of fortifications and removal from the epicenter. Infection of the surrounding area is mainly determined by the nature of the explosion. During the Totsky exercises was undermined aviation NSF with an equivalent capacity of about 40 thousand tons of TNT. The most important thing to say about this explosion was that it was airborne (the height of the blasting was 350 meters with a power of 40 kt [1]).
The fact is that during air explosions the contamination of the surrounding area is minimized. When a ground or surface explosion in the so-called "luminous region" is drawn into the heavy dust from the ground, on which light highly radioactive decay products settle. Because dust particles are heavy enough, they immediately begin to settle down - both in the area of the explosion and along the route of the cloud from the epicenter itself. The background is heavy and will last very long. At low air nuclear explosion dust rises from the ground, but is within range of the explosion too late to massively connect with radioactive products of an explosion. Most of this dust in the uninfected state falls in the epicentral region, and the radioactive cloud is carried away by an explosion. Since the particles are mostly light, the cloud there is a much longer period of time and is scattered over a much larger area than at ground explosions, with short-lived radioactive decay products directly in the cloud as part of the air blast clouds. Thus, the specific amount of fallen radioactive products per square kilometer of trace is very small and only in the 20 – 30 area of km from the epicenter can radioactivity slightly exceed the natural background of the terrain. The radiation epicenter area immediately after the explosion may be 1-50 roentgens per hour 0 2000-m distance (for blast 40 kt) due to the influence of penetrating radiation on soil in blasting. Formed in this soil isotopes have a basically short half-life, calculated by minutes, so that the radiation level is significantly reduced already during the first hours. Thus, the radioactive contamination during Totsky teachings was weak and the danger is only the epicentral area immediately after the blast.
Modern descriptions of the preparation and conduct of the Totsky exercises allow us to state: ensuring the safety of people and equipment was considered one of the most important tasks. It is enough to say that the maximum permissible infection rates were underestimated by 4 times for the personnel and equipment participating in the exercises. Theoretical training of officers and soldiers was sufficient. Back in 1953, the troops received instructions on the conduct of hostilities in the context of the use of nuclear munitions. Army leadership and fleet Secret films shot at the training grounds were shown - real nuclear explosions.
In principle, the main characteristics of the explosion were known in advance on the basis of previous tests. However, almost all visible multiple reinsurance. Allowable infection rates were understated. For the most part, the troops were farther than 7,5 km from the epicenter of the explosion, with all the personnel in the trenches. Shallow part forces, located in 5 km from the epicenter is in the closed trenches [2], although such power blast at a specified distance just enough to lie feet epicenter tightly closed eyes palms. Fortification defense personnel was obviously excessive: in bunkers safely in 800 meters from the epicenter sorokakilotonnogo TYABP, in the trenches - a mile.
The radiation levels in the epicentral area were well known to the designers of nuclear weapons from the data of previous field tests. Despite this, a radiation-measuring "neutral" team was sent to the epicenter on specially equipped tanks... Only this team was in the contaminated zone of more than 25 R per hour, and only this team could theoretically receive any noticeable dose of radiation. However, the armor reduces the radiation level by at least 5 times (that is, the vehicles had no more than 3-10 roentgens / hour), and the team was in the zone "more than 25 R / h" for less than half an hour (a safe dose for l / s it is considered that no more than 50 roentgens are received within one day, radiation sickness of mild severity develops with a one-time receipt of 100-200 roentgens). The team marked the zones "more than 25 R / h", "0.5–25 R / h," 0.1–0.5 R / h "with special flags. Subsequently, the "advancing" troops were guided by these flags. It should be noted that the troops passed through the terrain two hours after the neutral command, that is, the radiation on the terrain decreased and was less than it was marked by flags (which was confirmed by the military radiation reconnaissance).
Certain requirements were imposed on the weather. Clear allowed. The permissible wind directions were chosen so that the radioactive cloud passed through the neutral zone between the troops, and then the nearby settlements passed. On the day of the exercise, the weather met all the requirements.
Carefully fulfilled the aviation issue, eliminating the lining. The crew of the Tu-4 has previously carried out the actual bombing of the Semipalatinsk test site. The bomber carrier had to follow a well-defined route, bypassing major settlements. On the route he was accompanied by a second bomber and two fighters who, in addition to guards, also secured the navigator of the aircraft carrier. With the carrier provided continuous radio communication. The route in the dumping area (with the bomb hole already open) passed along the neutral strip between the troops in order to rule out accidental dropping of ammunition on the head of the troops. Because the zone “with an open bomb bay” was significant and passed over some settlements, then the population was removed from all these points. The bombing was carried out from the second approach, the target was marked visually and reflective corners, which made it possible to focus on the radar.
Great importance was given to the fact of high-altitude blasting, as well as the accuracy of bombing. If the deviation from the target would be more 500 meters (in reality turned 250m), or undermine would occur at a height much less 350 meters (in reality turned out just about 350m), the teachings immediately interrupted and would be carried out emergency evacuation of troops and the population, to which had been created in advance special evacuation team. Compliance with the height was necessary to ensure minor radiation contamination of the area.
For some time before the explosion of the troops was given a signal "Chemical alarm" in which staff had to wear a gas mask, cape, gloves and stockings. Ten minutes before the reset TYABP the troops was given a signal "Nuclear Emergency", in which staff took refuge in bunkers and trenches and armored crews took place in combat vehicles and battened down the hatches. In fact, no one in the troops saw the explosion. After the subsequent artillery preparation and radiation reconnaissance, the troops of the "eastern" began an offensive. Three hours later, they almost reached the epicenter area of the explosion. We passed through this area only 5 45% of the thousands of the movement carried out in armored vehicles (or inside it). Movement speed - 5 km / h, the closest to the epicenter of the unit - 10 km / h. The troops focused on the symbols placed by the radiation team and on their own radiometric means. There was a strict ban on entry into the area indicated by "more 25 P / h," although in fact the radiation positions ahead of the next troop columns, recorded only 0.1 P / h at 400 meters from the epicenter. It is not surprising - a lot of time has passed, the radiation was rapidly declining.
Through 6 hours after entering the area of infection has begun full decontamination equipment, washing of the personnel and a complete change of clothing. Prior to this, the troops were partially decontaminated and sanitized. The next day, the command personnel of the subunits were driven to the epicenter of the explosion, at the epicenter point the background was less than 10 P / h.
The information provided allows an approximate assessment of possible damage to personnel in the course of the exercise. Firstly, at the time of the blast, the personnel were in shelters at a considerable distance from the epicenter, which means that neither light radiation, nor shock wave, nor penetrating radiation acted on it. Secondly, since the explosion was airborne, there was very little radiation contamination of the area. Third, since the forces entered in the epicenter area only through 3 hours, and radioactive contamination was caused by soil activated isotopes, different small half-life thus obtained fighters dose was small. This is also determined by the short residence time of troops in the zone of infection and the presence of armored vehicles. After the end of the exercise, thorough decontamination of the equipment was carried out and washing of l / s with a change of clothes, which, coupled with the small dose received, ensured that the fighters received a real dose below the norm.
Based on the stated facts, it can be stated that the personnel entering the epicentral area (5% of the total number of servicemen), in fact, did not undergo any of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.
Totsky training ground was located in a populated area, as a result of which it was necessary to ensure the safety of civilians. The point of detonation was chosen so that there were as few villages as possible. The terrain was divided into several zones. From the zone "of less than 8 km" and zone "flight of the carrier to open bomb doors" population was evacuated for at least 15 km from the explosion. In the remaining zones, the population was taken out of the houses and either hid in ravines and gorges, or lay down on the ground away from the houses, or remained in houses in full readiness for evacuation (these are very remote villages). A few days before the exercise of all the settlements arrived instructors, explained in detail the methods of ensuring security during the exercise. During the exercises in each village were instructors, ensuring the implementation of safety requirements, as well as fire departments (in some places had to work - lit up the forest and the roof).
In case of emergency of the situation (the epicenter of a strong deviation from the target or low-altitude undermining) the population had to be evacuated to safe areas. For this, an evacuation plan was developed, and special units provided with vehicles were prepared. Dosimetric posts were deployed in settlements. civilian decontamination points separate medical battalion, reinforced by local hospitals and aid stations have been deployed. Residents of the nearby zone (less than 8 km) were later asked to either return to their homes to receive compensation, or move to new apartment buildings built in remote locations [3].
Thus, all necessary measures were taken to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and actions were taken in case of an emergency. During the exercise, the local population was not affected.
In the autumn of 1991, in the wake of publicity, a commission was formed at the request of a deputy, which conducted work on the assessment of the radiation-hygienic situation at the venue of the Totsk exercise. The Commission made the following findings:
“1. In all localities Totskii, Buzuluk, Sorochinsk areas radiation situation defined by the normal natural background and is safe for the population.
2. According to a retrospective assessment of the situation, the estimated radiation doses could not have an impact on the health status of the population living in the surveyed areas.
3. Health of the population in the surveyed areas currently on the basic health and demographic characteristics correspond to the average regional indicators, including cancer incidence and congenital anomalies, and do not exceed those in the control areas of the region and the RSFSR »[4]
In the 1994, in the framework of the program of work on the preparation of the joint peacekeeping exercises site survey exercises conducted a joint Russian-American group. In the course of its work, the commission measured the gamma-radiation power of air and soil samples. From the measurements it was found that "the dose rate of gamma radiation in the epicentral area of the air nuclear explosion carried out by 14.09.1954 was, and control points on the Totsky range did not exceed 20 mR / h, which ... is in the range of variations of the natural background radiation" [4]
[1] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 247
[2] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 239 – 240
[3] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 250 – 255
[4] Nuclear tests: a scientific journalistic monograph on general. ed. V.N. Mikhailov. S.A. Zelencov. Totsky military doctrine http://www.iss.niiit.ru/ksenia/tockoe/6.htm
The first such exercises were held by the United States of America. 1 November 1951, at the Nevada test site, the Buster Dog exercises were conducted, during which a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 21 CT was detonated. At a distance of about 11 kilometers from the epicenter were the troops, separate units which carried out after the explosion forced marches approximately 1 km from the epicenter. Subsequently, 7 similar exercises were conducted with the code names "Desert Rock". The last exercises were especially large-scale, during which dozens of nuclear charges were blown up within a few weeks.
In the Soviet Union, despite a similar need practical verification of theoretical instruction, it was carried out only 2 such teachings: on Totsky range in g 1954 and 1956 in Semipalatinsk was being carefully secretive during the Soviet era, they became known to the public only at the end of perestroika . Unfortunately, detailed, impartial descriptions of the course of the exercises appeared much later, and the first newspaper articles relied solely on rumors and individual memories, and therefore were written in the key of another horror story. However, the situation has changed little so far about the scientists write in the majority of cases, in a negative way: "macabre experiments on soldiers and civilians," "thousands of victims" (if not on the spot, in the early years), "thousands of square .kilometry, contaminated radiation. " Only with the advent of a detailed description of these teachings directly from the test, prepared the exercises, it was possible to objectively consider the course of events and to assess the security measures taken.
Now we can safely say that during these exercises command and scientists have made every effort to ensure the safety (as do nuclear doctrine may be safe). In the course of the exercise, which took place clearly according to the plan, minimal (virtually zero) damage was caused to the health of all participants and the local population. That security was put at the forefront - it follows from all the details. We illustrate this with the example of the Tokyo exercises 14 September 1954.
As is known, nuclear weapon (NF) affects the surrounding area with a shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation, and also infects nearby territory with the products of radioactive decay (there is also electromagnetic radiation, but in this context it is not significant). The air wave, light cure and penetrating radiation act only at the time of the explosion and it is easy to defend against them with the help of fortifications and removal from the epicenter. Infection of the surrounding area is mainly determined by the nature of the explosion. During the Totsky exercises was undermined aviation NSF with an equivalent capacity of about 40 thousand tons of TNT. The most important thing to say about this explosion was that it was airborne (the height of the blasting was 350 meters with a power of 40 kt [1]).
The fact is that during air explosions the contamination of the surrounding area is minimized. When a ground or surface explosion in the so-called "luminous region" is drawn into the heavy dust from the ground, on which light highly radioactive decay products settle. Because dust particles are heavy enough, they immediately begin to settle down - both in the area of the explosion and along the route of the cloud from the epicenter itself. The background is heavy and will last very long. At low air nuclear explosion dust rises from the ground, but is within range of the explosion too late to massively connect with radioactive products of an explosion. Most of this dust in the uninfected state falls in the epicentral region, and the radioactive cloud is carried away by an explosion. Since the particles are mostly light, the cloud there is a much longer period of time and is scattered over a much larger area than at ground explosions, with short-lived radioactive decay products directly in the cloud as part of the air blast clouds. Thus, the specific amount of fallen radioactive products per square kilometer of trace is very small and only in the 20 – 30 area of km from the epicenter can radioactivity slightly exceed the natural background of the terrain. The radiation epicenter area immediately after the explosion may be 1-50 roentgens per hour 0 2000-m distance (for blast 40 kt) due to the influence of penetrating radiation on soil in blasting. Formed in this soil isotopes have a basically short half-life, calculated by minutes, so that the radiation level is significantly reduced already during the first hours. Thus, the radioactive contamination during Totsky teachings was weak and the danger is only the epicentral area immediately after the blast.
Modern descriptions of the preparation and conduct of the Totsky exercises allow us to state: ensuring the safety of people and equipment was considered one of the most important tasks. It is enough to say that the maximum permissible infection rates were underestimated by 4 times for the personnel and equipment participating in the exercises. Theoretical training of officers and soldiers was sufficient. Back in 1953, the troops received instructions on the conduct of hostilities in the context of the use of nuclear munitions. Army leadership and fleet Secret films shot at the training grounds were shown - real nuclear explosions.
In principle, the main characteristics of the explosion were known in advance on the basis of previous tests. However, almost all visible multiple reinsurance. Allowable infection rates were understated. For the most part, the troops were farther than 7,5 km from the epicenter of the explosion, with all the personnel in the trenches. Shallow part forces, located in 5 km from the epicenter is in the closed trenches [2], although such power blast at a specified distance just enough to lie feet epicenter tightly closed eyes palms. Fortification defense personnel was obviously excessive: in bunkers safely in 800 meters from the epicenter sorokakilotonnogo TYABP, in the trenches - a mile.
The radiation levels in the epicentral area were well known to the designers of nuclear weapons from the data of previous field tests. Despite this, a radiation-measuring "neutral" team was sent to the epicenter on specially equipped tanks... Only this team was in the contaminated zone of more than 25 R per hour, and only this team could theoretically receive any noticeable dose of radiation. However, the armor reduces the radiation level by at least 5 times (that is, the vehicles had no more than 3-10 roentgens / hour), and the team was in the zone "more than 25 R / h" for less than half an hour (a safe dose for l / s it is considered that no more than 50 roentgens are received within one day, radiation sickness of mild severity develops with a one-time receipt of 100-200 roentgens). The team marked the zones "more than 25 R / h", "0.5–25 R / h," 0.1–0.5 R / h "with special flags. Subsequently, the "advancing" troops were guided by these flags. It should be noted that the troops passed through the terrain two hours after the neutral command, that is, the radiation on the terrain decreased and was less than it was marked by flags (which was confirmed by the military radiation reconnaissance).
Certain requirements were imposed on the weather. Clear allowed. The permissible wind directions were chosen so that the radioactive cloud passed through the neutral zone between the troops, and then the nearby settlements passed. On the day of the exercise, the weather met all the requirements.
Carefully fulfilled the aviation issue, eliminating the lining. The crew of the Tu-4 has previously carried out the actual bombing of the Semipalatinsk test site. The bomber carrier had to follow a well-defined route, bypassing major settlements. On the route he was accompanied by a second bomber and two fighters who, in addition to guards, also secured the navigator of the aircraft carrier. With the carrier provided continuous radio communication. The route in the dumping area (with the bomb hole already open) passed along the neutral strip between the troops in order to rule out accidental dropping of ammunition on the head of the troops. Because the zone “with an open bomb bay” was significant and passed over some settlements, then the population was removed from all these points. The bombing was carried out from the second approach, the target was marked visually and reflective corners, which made it possible to focus on the radar.
Great importance was given to the fact of high-altitude blasting, as well as the accuracy of bombing. If the deviation from the target would be more 500 meters (in reality turned 250m), or undermine would occur at a height much less 350 meters (in reality turned out just about 350m), the teachings immediately interrupted and would be carried out emergency evacuation of troops and the population, to which had been created in advance special evacuation team. Compliance with the height was necessary to ensure minor radiation contamination of the area.
For some time before the explosion of the troops was given a signal "Chemical alarm" in which staff had to wear a gas mask, cape, gloves and stockings. Ten minutes before the reset TYABP the troops was given a signal "Nuclear Emergency", in which staff took refuge in bunkers and trenches and armored crews took place in combat vehicles and battened down the hatches. In fact, no one in the troops saw the explosion. After the subsequent artillery preparation and radiation reconnaissance, the troops of the "eastern" began an offensive. Three hours later, they almost reached the epicenter area of the explosion. We passed through this area only 5 45% of the thousands of the movement carried out in armored vehicles (or inside it). Movement speed - 5 km / h, the closest to the epicenter of the unit - 10 km / h. The troops focused on the symbols placed by the radiation team and on their own radiometric means. There was a strict ban on entry into the area indicated by "more 25 P / h," although in fact the radiation positions ahead of the next troop columns, recorded only 0.1 P / h at 400 meters from the epicenter. It is not surprising - a lot of time has passed, the radiation was rapidly declining.
Through 6 hours after entering the area of infection has begun full decontamination equipment, washing of the personnel and a complete change of clothing. Prior to this, the troops were partially decontaminated and sanitized. The next day, the command personnel of the subunits were driven to the epicenter of the explosion, at the epicenter point the background was less than 10 P / h.
The information provided allows an approximate assessment of possible damage to personnel in the course of the exercise. Firstly, at the time of the blast, the personnel were in shelters at a considerable distance from the epicenter, which means that neither light radiation, nor shock wave, nor penetrating radiation acted on it. Secondly, since the explosion was airborne, there was very little radiation contamination of the area. Third, since the forces entered in the epicenter area only through 3 hours, and radioactive contamination was caused by soil activated isotopes, different small half-life thus obtained fighters dose was small. This is also determined by the short residence time of troops in the zone of infection and the presence of armored vehicles. After the end of the exercise, thorough decontamination of the equipment was carried out and washing of l / s with a change of clothes, which, coupled with the small dose received, ensured that the fighters received a real dose below the norm.
Based on the stated facts, it can be stated that the personnel entering the epicentral area (5% of the total number of servicemen), in fact, did not undergo any of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.
Totsky training ground was located in a populated area, as a result of which it was necessary to ensure the safety of civilians. The point of detonation was chosen so that there were as few villages as possible. The terrain was divided into several zones. From the zone "of less than 8 km" and zone "flight of the carrier to open bomb doors" population was evacuated for at least 15 km from the explosion. In the remaining zones, the population was taken out of the houses and either hid in ravines and gorges, or lay down on the ground away from the houses, or remained in houses in full readiness for evacuation (these are very remote villages). A few days before the exercise of all the settlements arrived instructors, explained in detail the methods of ensuring security during the exercise. During the exercises in each village were instructors, ensuring the implementation of safety requirements, as well as fire departments (in some places had to work - lit up the forest and the roof).
In case of emergency of the situation (the epicenter of a strong deviation from the target or low-altitude undermining) the population had to be evacuated to safe areas. For this, an evacuation plan was developed, and special units provided with vehicles were prepared. Dosimetric posts were deployed in settlements. civilian decontamination points separate medical battalion, reinforced by local hospitals and aid stations have been deployed. Residents of the nearby zone (less than 8 km) were later asked to either return to their homes to receive compensation, or move to new apartment buildings built in remote locations [3].
Thus, all necessary measures were taken to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and actions were taken in case of an emergency. During the exercise, the local population was not affected.
In the autumn of 1991, in the wake of publicity, a commission was formed at the request of a deputy, which conducted work on the assessment of the radiation-hygienic situation at the venue of the Totsk exercise. The Commission made the following findings:
“1. In all localities Totskii, Buzuluk, Sorochinsk areas radiation situation defined by the normal natural background and is safe for the population.
2. According to a retrospective assessment of the situation, the estimated radiation doses could not have an impact on the health status of the population living in the surveyed areas.
3. Health of the population in the surveyed areas currently on the basic health and demographic characteristics correspond to the average regional indicators, including cancer incidence and congenital anomalies, and do not exceed those in the control areas of the region and the RSFSR »[4]
In the 1994, in the framework of the program of work on the preparation of the joint peacekeeping exercises site survey exercises conducted a joint Russian-American group. In the course of its work, the commission measured the gamma-radiation power of air and soil samples. From the measurements it was found that "the dose rate of gamma radiation in the epicentral area of the air nuclear explosion carried out by 14.09.1954 was, and control points on the Totsky range did not exceed 20 mR / h, which ... is in the range of variations of the natural background radiation" [4]
[1] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 247
[2] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 239 – 240
[3] Nuclear Tests of the USSR, ed. Tagirova VM Sarov. IPK VNIIEF. 1997. C. 250 – 255
[4] Nuclear tests: a scientific journalistic monograph on general. ed. V.N. Mikhailov. S.A. Zelencov. Totsky military doctrine http://www.iss.niiit.ru/ksenia/tockoe/6.htm
Information