Military Review

Soviet airfield defense during the war

24
Soviet airfield defense during the war



In the prewar years, Soviet military theoretical thought, assessing the possible nature of a future war, correctly determined not only the role of the air force, but also the need to organize air defense of airfields. So, even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the directive of the USSR NKO from 25 on April 1941 provided for the formation of one hundred and sixty-six anti-aircraft artillery batteries to perform air defense tasks for airfields and other objects of the Red Army air forces. However, due to the lack of the necessary amount of material parts, batteries were formed extremely slowly and, moreover, unorganized. Therefore, in November 1941, by the directive of the Deputy Commander of the Air Force KA, their further formation was discontinued.

Thus, in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, the defense of airfields, which would meet the requirements of that time, in essence, did not exist. A very small number of full-time anti-aircraft weapons that were in the possession of airfield service battalions (3 total, quad-rifle anti-aircraft guns on the battalion, and even then not everywhere) could not provide airfield cover.



In preparation for the attack on the USSR, the German command set a task for its Air Force to gain air superiority in the very first days of the war and thereby ensure successful operations of the ground forces. 22 June 1941, over a thousand bombers struck 66 massively at our border airfields. First of all, those that had air regiments armed with new equipment were attacked. On the ground, more than 800 of our aircraft were destroyed (according to German 850 data).

The Soviet Air Force on this day made about 6 thousand sorties and in air battles shot down about 200 enemy vehicles. It should be noted that the Air Force of the Southern Front (Air Force Commander General F.G. Michugin) had almost no losses. This is due to the fact that a few days before the start of the war, the command of the Odessa Military District carried out a check of the combat readiness of the troops and aviation. Aviation units were relocated to field operational airfields. There, the aircraft were dispersed and camouflaged, and the flight crew was transferred to high alert. The fighter aviation regiments organized the duty of the links, worked out measures to alert personnel. Thanks to the measures taken, fighter pilots were able to meet the attack of fascist aviation in a timely and organized manner. Our losses amounted to only 6 aircraft, while the enemy missed a much larger number of aircraft. It should be noted that in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, where fighter aviation units were trained and gave a decisive rebuff, the enemy stopped raids on airfields.



The tactics of the German aviation was varied. Fighter aircraft (aircraft Bf.109 and Bf.110) operated on airfields that were located no further than 50-80 km, and, as a rule, in several groups at different altitudes. One of the groups distracted our fighters, while others attacked the airfield with a strafing flight, firing machine guns at planes on the ground. During the daytime, bomber aviation most often acted on advanced airfields under the cover of its fighters with single planes and groups of 3, 8, 10, and sometimes more planes, skillfully using the sun and cloudiness. Bombing, as a rule, was made from several visits. At night, the fascists sought to strike long-range airfields with single cars or in pairs with 5-10-minute intervals, making several visits from different directions and heights, using lighting bombs. Often bombers followed groups on the 2-3 aircraft. Above the airfield they dispersed in order to disperse the fire of anti-aircraft weapons and reduce its effectiveness. Sometimes the fascist German pilots used the following technique: 2-3 Ju-88 were attached to the tail of our reconnaissance aircraft, the landing gear was released above the airfield, dropped suddenly and dropped bombs from the height of no more than 500 and bombarded the aircraft on the ground. Thus, for example, 28 was produced on June 1941, a raid on the airfield of the Western Front's air force Old Bykhov.

Even a brief analysis of the actions of the enemy’s aircraft convincingly confirmed the need to organize reliable air defense of airfields. Seeking ways to solve this important problem, the Red Army Air Force Command in August 1941, to improve the organization of the interaction of strike aircraft (bomber and attack aircraft) with fighters, and, in addition, to reliably cover them on their airfields, decided to have in the newly formed near bomber and assault air regiments of one fighter squadron. Although this improved the organization of the interaction of strike aviation with fighters in the course of jointly performing combat missions, it could not significantly affect the effectiveness of the air defense of aerodromes, since upon returning from a mission, fighters were not always able to repel enemy air raids and accompanied by the machines themselves are often the targets of the attack. A similar situation was created in the cases of the landing of their fighters on the airfields of bombers, in order to cover them.

The active actions of enemy aviation urgently demanded strengthening of the air defense of aerodromes, both by strengthening its organizational structure and incorporating additional air defense forces and assets into the air force. In connection with this, in December 1941 of the Red Army Air Force Rear Unit was formed by the 3 Division (5 man), who was in charge of ground and air defense, chemical defense, camouflage, mine service personnel of the Air Force facilities. The creation of such a small department did not completely solve the problem of air defense of aerodromes, since a unified management system was not organized, and the necessary number of anti-aircraft units and subunits were not allocated.

Of all the activities that the 3 department was trying to carry out, to some extent only two were allowed, moreover, far from being the main ones, namely: a masking department was created and a mine-engineer service was organized. Not being able to radically solve the issue of air defense of airfields, the department instructed aviation units to use all available anti-aircraft weapons, including trophy weapons. As a result, the most diverse anti-aircraft armament appeared in the units, but they were not always able to use them properly.



The serious problem of air defense of airfields remained unresolved. In September-October 1942, the issue of creating anti-aircraft units to cover the most important facilities of the Air Force was discussed three times at the State Defense Committee of the USSR, but this event was not quickly implemented due to industrial overload. In March, the 1943 airfield air defense regiment was formed to provide cover for the front-line airfields, consisting of three small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery batteries (MZA) and two anti-aircraft machine-gun companies in each.

At the same time, other measures were taken to strengthen the air defense system in the home bases of aviation. Thus, in the instructions of the Commander of the Air Force of the SC from 14 of May 1943 about organizing the struggle for air supremacy, it was noted that the enemy is trying with all his might to damage our aircraft on the ground. In this regard, it was required: to increase vigilance, disperse the material part; disguise it; check for personnel gaps; cover airfields from the air, using ambushes, air patrols, duty on the ground; to have at least one-third of the aircraft in all the bases of the fighters in readiness for departure one minute after the announcement of the alarm signal; the data arriving from VNOS posts, immediately to bring to parts and divisions.

Of exceptional importance was also assigned to the operational camouflage of operating airfields and the creation of a developed network of spurious ones. An analysis of the experience of these events shows that they well complemented the general defense system of aerodromes and increased its effectiveness. For example, the operational camouflage of operating airfields and the creation of false ones occupied an important place in preparing for the actions of aviation in an offensive operation on the r. Mius in 1943 year. By 15 August, around 40 false airfields were deployed here, which simulated combat activities. As a result, from 18 raids made by enemy aircraft from 1 to 31 in August, 16 was made to false airfields.

In the development of the instructions of the commander of the Red Army Air Force about organizing the struggle for air supremacy, new issues of interaction with the fighter and anti-aircraft units of the Air Defense Forces of the country were clarified and developed. The interaction between fighters based on different aerodromes became wider. In order to avoid losses, it was forbidden to take off from airfields blocked by fighters that had not previously been linked by combat. Deblocada was carried out by means of air defense in cooperation with the fighters of neighboring airfields.

In March, 1944, the responsibility for providing air defense of airfields and other important objects was assigned to the head of the rear of the Air Force KA. At the same time, the post of the head of the air defense of the Air Force KA was established with the subordination to it of a small apparatus to provide guidance to the air defense service.

During the war years there was a gradual increase in the number of anti-aircraft weapons in the air armies. Thus, in March 1944 of the year 17, the air army (commander General V.A. Sudets), in addition to fighter aviation units, had three regular airfield air defense regiments, four attached anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the GDGs and anti-aircraft machine gun companies of airfield service battalions.



The cover issues for aviation bases began to find a more concrete expression in the orders of the commanders of the air armies. Some of them contained a categorical prohibition to land aircraft on advanced airfields that were not covered by air defense weapons. This has already indicated that air defense, organized in operational formations of the Air Force, has earned full recognition as a force, capable of interacting with other means, as well as with the help of passive defense measures, to ensure the safety of aviation, which was on the airfields.

Many aviation commanders and their headquarters, knowing full well that our aviation, due to the weak organization of airfield cover, suffered more losses on the ground than in the air, began to pay more attention to the air defense issues of the airfields. An example is the organization of an air defense system of the 11 th 15 mixed air corps of an air force based at the air hub Chuprovo in March 1944. In the order of the commander, the actions of German aviation were assessed and measures were described to repel air raids on the air garrison. The headquarters developed a detailed combat plan together with the attached 243 anti-aircraft artillery regiment. It called the responsible executives, assigned tasks to the commanders of the units, provided for conducting aerial reconnaissance, determined the degree of combat readiness of fighters and anti-aircraft weapons, methods of their actions, the interaction between fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, the use of small arms and turret machine guns installed on aircraft. Particular attention was paid to the organization of communication and control during the reflection of raids. The order and plan were carefully studied by all personnel, so each fighter and officer knew his place, task and method of its implementation.

It can be said with confidence that, where the commanders of aviation units, to which all available forces and means were practically subordinate, paid more attention to the air defense, the losses on the ground were much smaller. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the theory of air defense of the basing of aviation somewhat lagged behind the growth rates of air defense forces and assets allocated by the Air Force to organize the cover of airfields from air strikes. This is explained by the fact that military-theoretical work focused mainly on the development of the problems of the use of aviation in the interests of ensuring the successful conduct of operations by ground forces.

In 1944-1945, a more coherent air defense system of airfields began to be created. It included: the organization of reconnaissance of the air enemy, aviation and anti-aircraft protection, extensive use of passive means of protecting airfields, that is, in essence, the whole complex of measures constituting the main content of air defense. However, they were sometimes carried out without proper interconnection between themselves, and especially with the air defense system of the ground forces, as a result of which the expended efforts and means did not always achieve the desired result.

In many offensive operations with the deployment of troops in the original areas, fighter aviation aerodromes were built in 20-40 km, assault - in 30-70 km and bomber - in 60-140 km from the front line. Such a relatively small removal of the air army airfields led to the fact that some of them found themselves in the zones of anti-aircraft units and formations covering the troops of the first echelon of the front. Therefore, the direct protection of these airfields could be carried out by a small number of standard anti-aircraft weapons, especially when our aviation dominates the air. But such favorable conditions existed, as a rule, not for long. With the transition of the Soviet troops on the offensive began to move and anti-aircraft units. The advanced airfields remained without anti-aircraft cover for the ground forces already in the second half of the first day of the offensive.

During the offensive, at least one third, and sometimes more available anti-aircraft weapons were constantly in motion, which weakened the cover and increased the likelihood of enemy strikes, especially on advanced airfields located on the main line.

To prevent air strikes in some major operations, such as the Belarusian, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and others, despite the very tense situation and air battles, in which both sides suffered significant losses, fighter units on duty were provided to cover the airfields. But in most cases such a task was carried out by regular anti-aircraft weapons.



During the war, the amount of anti-aircraft weapons allocated to cover airfields varied within very considerable limits: from anti-aircraft machine-gun installations to anti-aircraft regiments, and sometimes even more. And this is quite natural, since practically covering all airfields with the same amount of air defense weapons was not possible, and there was no need for that.

With a lack of anti-aircraft weapons, they were allocated more to airfields that were not covered by fighters. The airfields with artificial runways were particularly well defended, as they had better throughput, and they usually had a larger number of aircraft (sometimes up to 150).

The nature of the construction of the air defense of the airfield depended on the amount of air defense assets allocated for this purpose, the caliber of anti-aircraft batteries, the location of the main cover objects (airplanes, warehouses for various purposes, airfield facilities, etc.) and the tactics of enemy aviation. During the raids, the Germans most often sought to destroy the runway, stopping at it, usually at an angle of 15-30 °. Therefore, anti-aircraft units were located at the aerodrome in such a way as to ensure the greatest density of fire along the runway in the 30-60 ° sector in the direction of take-off and landing. This in the best way provided the possibility of take-off of the aircraft during the blocking of the aerodrome and safety during landing, after the combat mission was completed.

As an illustrative example, we can take the case that took place on 19 on April 1942 of the year at the Slavyanoserbsk aerodrome, where the 494 of the Air Force of the Southern Front was based. Senior Lieutenant N. Chernov was wounded in an air battle, left the fighters attacking him with a dive and landed on the fuselage. The enemy tried to set fire to his Yak-1 on the ground, but our anti-aircraft battery, which was covering the airfield, opened fire on time and did not allow enemy fighters to do it.



The control of anti-aircraft equipment covering the airfield and their interaction with fighter aircraft was based on general principles, taking into account the current situation. The main issues of interaction were: bilateral information on the ground and air situation; the order of interaction in repelling fighters from the airfield being covered up and blocking off by enemy aircraft; cutting off anti-aircraft artillery fire by enemy fighters when returning their aircraft to the airfield; ensuring the safety of our aviation; the use of anti-aircraft weapons to combat ground enemy; coordinated actions with air defense systems of neighboring airfields or other objects.

The presence of anti-aircraft artillery at the aerodrome forced German aircraft to devote up to a third of the forces during the raids to suppress it, which naturally reduced the effectiveness of strikes against aircraft on the ground.

As you can see, in the air armies (like combined arms and tank) During the war, a certain air defense system was created. But, unfortunately, some aviation commanders and commanders did not always use it effectively. Sometimes the issues of organizing air defense of airfields were not reflected even in plans for the combat use of the air forces of the fronts.

The most difficult problem was the protection from air strikes of airfields during offensive operations. The difficulties of solving this problem consisted, firstly, in the absence of reserve anti-aircraft units in the air armies that could be sent to new airfields in advance with the aim of organizing their cover before the air connections arrived there; secondly, in the absence of a sufficient number of vehicles. It was not always planned to move the existing anti-aircraft units in accordance with the plan for the redeployment of regiments and divisions.



The underestimation of the role of air defense of airfields led and leads to large unjustified losses of aircraft on the ground. This is convincingly shown by the experience of not only the Second World War, but also subsequent local wars.

Sources:
The team of authors. Soviet Air Force in World War II 1941-1945 M .: Voenizdat, 1968. C. 27-37.
Pankin V. Evolution of the organizational structure of the Air Force, methods and methods of organizing control and interaction during the Great Patriotic War // The role of the air forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 M .: Voenizdat, 1986. C. 73-74,77-78.
Strusevich A. On the air defense of airfields // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1975. No. 5. S. 29-33.
Tour M. Development of air defense in the Great Patriotic War // Military-Historical Journal. 1982. No.1. C. 56-64.
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  1. Good cat
    Good cat 17 February 2016 06: 35
    14
    Technician engineer, who are you? Very diverse articles, always a lot of interesting facts and rare photos
    1. shasherin.pavel
      shasherin.pavel 17 February 2016 20: 41
      +4
      Quote: Good cat
      and rare photos

      instructed the aviation units to use all available anti-aircraft weapons, up to captured weapons. As a result, the most diverse anti-aircraft weapons appeared in the units,
      And below is a photo of a quadruple machine gun "Aviation Maxim", the machine gun was created for aviation, therefore there is no water casing, it was believed that the air flow could be more effective than the water one. So this is just a very old weapon removed from aviation and transferred to the air defense. In another photo of the Yak-3, even the history of the photo is known: over Romania, the Yak-3 engine was damaged and it sat on its belly on Romanian territory. The flight planes circled over the Yak, and waited for the pilot to leave the plane to shoot the secret car. But suddenly they saw that the Romanian soldiers were waving their hands to them. They pulled the pilot out of the plane and he also began waving his arms, showing that everything was in order. When they flew to this place on Po-2, it turned out that the Romanian soldiers had already learned about the surrender and the transition to the side of the USSR. This photo was taken at that moment. You need to be more attentive to the photographs. And the article is good.
  2. Aaron Zawi
    Aaron Zawi 17 February 2016 06: 46
    +9
    A very interesting and obscure page of war. Thank.
    1. Bongo
      Bongo 17 February 2016 14: 23
      +6
      Quote: Aron Zaavi
      A very interesting and obscure page of war. Thank.

      Yes, the topic is really quite interesting. And the author covered it well, but in my opinion, more attention could be paid to specific weapons. I have a question for the respected author, does he know what kind of machine guns are used in this anti-aircraft installation?

      As is known, due to the aviation specifics, air defense aerodromes were often equipped with artisanal or small-scale anti-aircraft installations based on: ShVAK, ShKAS, PV, DA, UBT.
      Quote: Angry Guerrilla
      An interesting episode was once subtracted in the memoirs of a fighter pilot from the Drabkin series: as a means of air defense, a battery from RS-82 was used, which were installed on specially made guides. The launch was carried out in one gulp.

      This really took place, but not from a good life, of course, and was more a "deterrent weapon".
      Quote: 24hours
      For effective destruction of such targets, RSs had to be equipped with AGDT-A remote tubes.

      And they equipped them, because these artificially manufactured installations were used in air defense airfields. And where fighters and attack aircraft were based, there were also PCs with remote handsets.
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 17 February 2016 15: 25
        +5
        Quote: Bongo

        As is known, due to the aviation specifics, air defense aerodromes were often equipped with artisanal or small-scale anti-aircraft installations based on: ShVAK, ShKAS, PV, DA, UBT.

        Sergei! Hello! In the photo you have given, the installation of the ZPU-3 of three PV machine guns, the designer of the installation N.F. Fedorov, the author of the conversion of the Maxim machine gun into the PV aircraft machine gun, Nadashkevich A.V. I read about the RS anti-aircraft guns in the book "Weapon of Victory ". There are several collections of them, in kaom and who the author of the collection I do not remember, but there the creation of mountain packs (beyond the scope of the topic), anti-aircraft single, anti-aircraft multi-charge installations was considered to be the most successful. The installation created, it seems, by Lieutenant Baranov, in Leningrad, was considered to be the most successful. several installations were described for anti-aircraft firing under RS ​​projectiles of different calibers, created on different fronts.
        1. Bongo
          Bongo 17 February 2016 15: 53
          +4
          Quote: Amurets
          Sergei! Hello! In the photo above, the installation of the ZPU-3 of the three PV machine guns, the installation designer N.F. Fedorov, the author of the conversion of the Maxim machine gun to the PV aviation machine gun, Nadashkevich.A.V.

          Hi Nikolay! So, I know it, read: http://topwar.ru/70758-otechestvennye-zenitno-pulemetnye-ustanovki-chast-1-ya.ht
          ml

          I was wondering if the author knows?
          1. Amurets
            Amurets 17 February 2016 16: 42
            0
            Quote: Bongo

            Hi Nikolay! So, I know it, read: http://topwar.ru/70758-otechestvennye-zenitno-pulemetnye-ustanovki-chast-1-ya.ht

            ml

            Sergey, I have a book Bolotin. D.N. "Soviet Small Arms", Fedoseev. From the book "Machine Guns of the Russian Army in Battle" to his own books about modern machine guns. Somewhere there are five typed. I can't find: I have there was an interesting book "Small-caliber automatic guns. Atlas of constructions". He translated it into electronic form and lost it somewhere. Publishing Voengiz shaggy years.
        2. shasherin.pavel
          shasherin.pavel 17 February 2016 20: 45
          +1
          Before the war, tested anti-aircraft installations in the Sevastopol Bay.
          1. Amurets
            Amurets 18 February 2016 00: 59
            +1
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            Before the war, tested anti-aircraft installations in the Sevastopol Bay.

            Thank you for reminding me. As far as I know or remember, there were tested signal and lighting installations in the interests of the Navy, not only anti-aircraft, but also for coastal defense. If I’m not mistaken, it was these installations that began to be put on torpedo boats since 1943.
  3. qwert
    qwert 17 February 2016 07: 05
    +6
    The last photo is gorgeous.
  4. 25ru
    25ru 17 February 2016 07: 07
    +2
    Well, if for five years they have been constantly improving the system of near air defense of airfields, how did they miss the assault strike of a pair of "Shootingstars" on the Sukhaya Rechka airfield in the Primorsky Territory in 1950? The diplomatic "showdown" there was very serious. Truman even made an official apology to the UN and was "... ready to compensate for any damage to Soviet property ..."
  5. qwert
    qwert 17 February 2016 07: 38
    +5
    Quote: 25ru
    how they missed in 1950 the assault strike of a pair of "Shooting Stars" on the Sukhaya Rechka airfield in the Primorsky Territory

    I think that is precisely because of peacetime. There was no preliminary aggravation of the situation; there was no transfer of troops to readiness No.1. The Correian war has not yet begun. Nearby allied China, the Pacific direction was not considered at that moment sharp and basic. Plus, in many people, Americans were still associated with allies. It was difficult for a Soviet person to understand that those who yesterday fought alongside you against a common enemy will stick a bayonet in your back today. Our mentality was completely different from that of the Anglo-Saxons.
    And yes .. If the Americans made one or two more calls, they certainly would not have left without losses.
    And so this is from a series of cases when our Tu-16 were detected by American aircraft carriers practically during the flight above the deck (i.e., when they could have used weapons already), and the air defense system of the aircraft carrier group improved even longer
  6. evil partisan
    evil partisan 17 February 2016 10: 24
    +3
    An interesting episode was once subtracted in the memoirs of a fighter pilot from the Drabkin series: as a means of air defense, a battery from RS-82 was used, which were installed on specially made guides. The launch was carried out in one gulp.
    1. 24hours
      24hours 17 February 2016 12: 28
      +1
      Quote: Angry Guerrilla
      a battery of RS-82 was used as an air defense system, which were installed on specially made guides. The launch was carried out in one gulp.

      For effective destruction of such targets, RSs had to be equipped with AGDT-A remote tubes. I have not heard that they were delivered to ground units. And without it, all these volleys were practically useless and dangerous (it is not known where such a PC would fall). To get from the RSA to the plane was from the realm of fiction, only if by accident.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 17 February 2016 16: 16
        +5
        Quote: 24hours
        For effective destruction of such targets, RSs had to be equipped with AGDT-A remote tubes. I have not heard that they were delivered to ground units.

        And where does the ground parts? The original post directly says:
        read in memories fighter pilot from the Drabkin series
      2. carbine
        carbine 17 February 2016 19: 52
        0
        Quote: 24hours
        I have not heard that they were delivered to ground units.

        This is apparently about self-propelled air defense systems of the airfield. PCs with tubes were taken from pilots. Very good thought. Unfortunately, this is not serial things, this is folk art.
      3. The comment was deleted.
  7. 24hours
    24hours 17 February 2016 12: 15
    -2
    Quote: Technical Engineer
    The issues of covering aircraft-based places began to find more concrete expression in the orders of the commanders of the air army

    You won’t be fed up with orders. With anti-aircraft artillery during the Second World War in the USSR it was very bad. Not even quantitatively, but qualitatively. Due to its absence, the main forces of the Baltic Fleet were actually destroyed from the air. For the same reason, the Black Sea Fleet was defeated and driven into the far corner of the Black Sea, where German aircraft could not get it. The ground units did not fight off aerial attacks, but hid in trenches and trenches. If they were and the bombing or attack did not catch them on the march.
    What was left to do? There was practically nothing to beat off the ground and the deck of the ships. There were no adequate air defense systems. Maybe for this reason, after the war in the USSR, such an emphasis was placed on air defense. And the late Soviet air defense systems today are known throughout the world.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 February 2016 14: 33
      +4
      Quote: 24hours
      You won’t be fed up with orders. With anti-aircraft artillery during the Second World War in the USSR it was very bad. Not even quantitatively, but qualitatively. Due to its absence, the main forces of the Baltic Fleet were actually destroyed from the air.

      One anti-aircraft artillery to disrupt the raid is not in power. Especially when the ships are stationary.
      By the way, in Kronstadt the problem was not with ZA - there its concentration was, as it were, not the highest.
      Kronstadt defended the 1st regiment of anti-aircraft artillery under the command of Captain S.A. Ignatovsky as part of three divisions, whose anti-aircraft weapons were located on Kotlin itself and the forts surrounding it. Two four-gun 76-mm anti-aircraft batteries, combined into the 1st separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion (ozad) under the command of senior lieutenant N.D. Konopatsky stationed at forts Obruchev [57] (No. 413 and No. 416) and Totleben (No. 412 and No. 418). The composition of the 2nd ozadn under the command of captain P.I. Petrova included four four-gun 76-mm anti-aircraft batteries (No. 414 - Komsomolsky Fort, No. 421 - Carefree, No. 422 - Fort Konstantin, No. 423 - Fort Yuzhny No. 2), and one four-gun 85-mm battery No. 420 on Mortirnaya. The 3rd squad under the command of senior lieutenant V.E. Doronin. 76-mm batteries were located: No. 431 - North Fort No. 5, No. 432 - North Fort No. 1, No. 433 - the so-called Military Corner (southeast tip of Kotlin), No. 435 - Northern Fort No. 3, and 85 mm No. 424 was located at Fort Yuzhny No. 1. In addition, there was an anti-aircraft machine-gun company deployed at the southern tip of Ust-Rogatka. Total 48 76-mm and eight 85-mm guns, as well as three (according to other sources - six) 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, not counting naval artillery.

      The key phrase - apart from naval artillery... But only one "Oktyabrina" is 2x2 81-K + 6x1 34-K caliber 76 mm and 12 70-K caliber 37 mm. 10 barrels 76 mm and 12 barrels 37 mm.

      The problem was with the air defense system:
      The disposition of anti-aircraft batteries did not provide the same density of fire from all directions. The base was most reliably covered from the northwest, and from the southeast, on the contrary, weakly. They were not provided with direct fire cover for ship parking lots in the harbors of Kronstadt, on raids, especially on Vostochny, where almost all combat-ready large surface ships were concentrated. In fact, up to three anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and a battery of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on Ust-Rogatka, participated fully in repulsing enemy air strikes

      In addition, the fire control was badly built, and often the batteries of the ZA did not work for the most important purposes, but simply beat everything that they saw.
      In conditions of a massive raid with “breaking through” the air defense system in a narrow sector, not only the regiment commander, but also the division commanders could not centrally manage their subordinate forces and the batteries independently chose targets for firing. As a result, many enemy planes generally acted without opposition. Not without any kind of unforeseen circumstances. For example, the commander of the 433rd anti-aircraft artillery battery located almost on the edge of the strike, Lieutenant F.I. Deineka, having received at 21:07 an order to open fire, began to request by phone permission not to open fire, so as not to attract the attention of enemy aircraft. While they explained to him why he was there, airplanes flew over the battery with impunity.

      Source: Andrey Platonov. The tragedy of the Gulf of Finland.
      1. 24hours
        24hours 17 February 2016 16: 51
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        One anti-aircraft artillery to disrupt the raid is not in power.

        Ask why the Japanese got comicadze. Because ordinary pilots were not able to overcome the anti-aircraft fire of the normal anti-aircraft artillery of American ships. Look, on the Internet there is a photo of the United States anti-aircraft artillery of that period. Forest of trunks.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        in Kronstadt, the problem was not with ZA - there its concentration was, as it were, not the highest.

        Apparently 3-K. Do you think a shell weighing 6,6 kg is adequate for air defense in 1941? I remind you, at the Lender gun arr. 1914/15 were about the same. Only aircraft in 25 years have changed very much.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Key phrase - not counting naval artillery.

        You would at least have a TTX of these little guys would be interested, or something. Nominally, there was something anti-aircraft there in the USSR. In fact, there was nothing. This is clearly seen when studying their performance characteristics.
        PS. The German Flak 36, as well as their Soviet relatives 52-K, with their shells weighing 9,2 kg, were also of little use. But 52-K, it was the best that was anti-aircraft in the USSR.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        10 trunks 76 mm and 12 trunks 37 mm.

        Translated into normal Russian, this roughly means "there were almost no anti-aircraft weapons." Inquire about the actual 70-K fire rate. After 40 sec. continuous fire, the barrel had to be cooled for 1,5 hours or changed (at least 15 minutes). Those. in the presence of 16 barrels, in reality, without interruption, only one of them could work. PPTs.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        they just beat everything they saw.

        Stumble. Without introductory information, they most likely did not get anywhere.
        1. shasherin.pavel
          shasherin.pavel 17 February 2016 21: 02
          +2
          Quote: 24hours
          why the Japanese got comicadze.

          Here you distort the facts ... the kamikaze appeared in the Japanese because of the great losses in the air, they just did not have time to prepare enough pilots, and then ... lightened the plane to the limit, loaded the bomb and taught to take off and fall on the target for sure. Week and kamikaze ready.
          Quote: 24hours
          After 40 seconds continuous fire

          The leader of Tashkent for the hour of the battle with Yu-87 fired the entire ammunition of 37 mm shells ... Then they began to search for shells that misfired and fired single shots.
          Quote: 24hours
          Soviet relatives of 52-K,

          had a devastating effect in repelling raids on Moscow. Brad wrote like a bull ...
          1. carbine
            carbine 17 February 2016 21: 56
            0
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            had a devastating effect in repelling raids on Moscow.

            It is a pity that the Germans did not notice this effect. And our pilots on German FlaK 18/36/37/41 also did not complain much. More tankers were unhappy with them.
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            Brad wrote like a bull ...

            It was necessary to erase. Once they wrote nonsense. Want to look self-critical?
          2. 24hours
            24hours 18 February 2016 00: 59
            0
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            Here you distort the facts ... kamikaze appeared in the Japanese because of the large losses in the air,

            Here you distort the facts. Too big losses among the Japanese did not appear due to a sudden attack of a cyclone. And because of the strong air defense.
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            fired the entire ammunition of 37 mm shells ... Then they began to search for misfiring shells and fired single shots.

            And then they began to produce shells themselves in ship workshops. Launch a projectile dell simple. It's a tricky thing to fire a cannon. For this, the barrel must not be overheated. And from overheated barrels only and it is possible that "release shells". Without much harm to the enemy.
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            had a devastating effect in repelling raids on Moscow.

            And why no one except you knows about this?
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            Brad wrote like a bull ...

            Check this out. It also tries to be rude.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 18 February 2016 10: 59
          +1
          Quote: 24hours
          Ask why the Japanese got comicadze. Because ordinary pilots were not able to overcome the anti-aircraft fire of the normal anti-aircraft artillery of American ships. Look, on the Internet there is a photo of the United States anti-aircraft artillery of that period. Forest of trunks.

          In fact, special attack units appeared due to the fact that ordinary pilots were not able to hit to the target. Even the former elite has degraded: if before the war, deck pilots hit the Setsu LK target 9 out of 10 dropped bombs, then in 1943 - only 1 out of 10.
          And do not forget that ZA was the last line of defense of ships - it was finishing off those planes that were lucky enough to break through the barriers of American fighter aircraft.
          If the ship turned out to be one-on-one with aviation, it was most often either sunk or severely damaged. In 1943, the "Chicago" MRT was not even saved by 8-127 mm, 4x4-28 mm and 28-20 mm Erlikons. And in 1945 "Fletchers" were not rescued even by the decks studded with "bofors".
          1. 24hours
            24hours 19 February 2016 16: 34
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Even the former elite has degraded: if before the war, deck pilots hit the Setsu LK target 9 out of 10 dropped bombs, then in 1943 - only 1 out of 10.

            Have you been drunk? Got hooked on a needle? Did you eat a mole? Not at all, were knocked out by the Americans.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            she finished off those planes that were lucky enough to break through the barriers of American fighter aircraft.

            Do not exaggerate. These very "terrible barriers" were those so frequent and not so dense.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            In 1943, the "Chicago" MRT was not even saved by 8-127 mm, 4x4-28 mm and 28-20 mm Erlikons. And in 1945 "Fletchers" were not rescued even by the decks studded with "bofors".

            Anything can happen. But it is not necessary to derive the norm from special cases. And the norm is that dense anti-aircraft automatic fire forced pilots to abandon the attack of sea targets.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 February 2016 14: 38
      +5
      Quote: 24hours
      Due to its absence, the main forces of the Baltic Fleet were actually destroyed from the air.

      By the way, what kind of destruction from the air of the main forces of the KBF are in question?
      During these days, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet lost the battleship Marat, the leader of Minsk, the destroyer destroyer Steregushchiy, the guard ship Vikhr, the gunboat Pioneer, and the submarine M-74. The second battleship (“October Revolution”), both cruisers, three destroyers, a mine-layer and a number of other ships were damaged.

      "Marat" in fact survived, turning into a floating battery. And the light forces of the fleet also took part in the evacuation of Hanko - that's where the loss of ships was sensitive.
      Quote: 24hours
      What was left to do? There was practically nothing to beat off the ground and the deck of the ships.

      BGG ... on 1941 air defense of the ships of the Navy of the USSR in artillery was quite on par with the rest of the world's fleets. Moreover, at this time, the USSR had, EMNIP, the largest number of heavy ship MZUs - 37-mm 70-K. The British at that time got along with ancient pom-poms with shitty ballistics and rare "bofors". The Yankees did not have a heavy ship MZA at all (they generally had a bad situation with MZA - instead of "Chicago pianos" they had to put 76-mm anti-aircraft guns in their nests). For the Germans, the MZA was limited to light 20-mm "rheinmetals".
      Here with MPOZO we had an ambush, yes ...
      1. maximghost
        maximghost 17 February 2016 23: 20
        +1
        And yet the Amers and Germans on destroyers and destroyers (the Germans) had a universal GK, but we had very few generalists. + Amers MZA seemed to be with stabilization. So with the air defense on the ships we still had a shit ...
      2. 24hours
        24hours 18 February 2016 00: 47
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        What kind of destruction from air of the main forces of the KBF are in question?

        The defeat. Of course, there was no and could not be any complete destruction. But the losses were colossal. Including from the air.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        "Marat" in fact survived

        Of course. And if even the torpedo boat was called Marat 2, then we could assume that it even multiplied.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        in 1941 the air defense of the ships of the USSR Navy in terms of artillery was quite at the level of the rest of the fleets of the world.

        Do not make me laugh. Better not write about this topic. You obviously do not understand it.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        the largest number of heavy ship MLMs is 37 mm 70-K.

        But nothing, that she was actually inept? After all, this is a rework 49-K. And rework is extremely rare. And in general, the 37-mm mass air-cooling machine is nonsense of the mind intact (what can we say then about the 45-mm 49-K?). The same Bofors on land had extremely limited use. As anti-aircraft special forces, not a workhorse. But for some reason the 61-K was stamped in large quantities. And in the fleet, the Bofors were water-cooled (unlike the 70-K).
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The British at that time got along with ancient pom-poms with shitty ballistics and rare "bofors".

        You still need to figure out what is good and what is bad (for anti-aircraft artillery). Then you will understand why the pom-pomps had just such ballistics.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The Yankees did not have a heavy ship MZA at all (they generally had a bad situation with MZA - instead of "Chicago pianos" they had to put 76-mm anti-aircraft guns in their nests).

        Yeah. Only the Japanese could not really fly up to them. Not even every kamikaze reached the ship.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        For the Germans, the MZA was limited to light 20-mm "Rheinmetals"

        You know what the main difference between the German 20-mm bus. guns from the Soviet 37 mm? The fact that 20 mm provided the necessary density of fire, but 37 mm did not. Just so they were designed. Rather, redone. From 49-K. There was nothing like the 2,0 cm Flak-Vierling 38 or 2,0 cm FlaK 30 in the USSR.
        72-K (25 mm) was already made much more competent than 61-K. And in principle, as a heavy land anti-aircraft automatic system, it even had a right to exist.
        But as the main system of this purpose, the land version of the air gun VY would be much more profitable. And from the point of view of unification of production, and from the point of view of performance characteristics. By the way, the parasitic energy of VW was 1,5 times less than that of 72-K. True, the shell is 1,5 times lighter, despite the small difference in calibers. However, I would have weakened the land VL by 20 percent. It's just that it was necessary to pour less gunpowder into land shells.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 18 February 2016 11: 39
          +1
          Quote: 24hours
          The defeat. Of course, there was no and could not be any complete destruction. But the losses were colossal. Including from the air.

          In Kronstadt from the actions of backlash - 1 LC, 1 LD and 1 EM.
          Mines in 1941 were worse.
          Quote: 24hours
          The same Bofors on land had extremely limited use. As anti-aircraft special forces, not a workhorse.

          Yes, yes, yes ... extremely limited. After all, the United States produced only 23897 40-mm guns for the Army - 2,3 times more than for the fleet. smile
          A total of about 42,895 guns were built by the end of the war, distributed as 23,897 for the Army, 10,019 for the Navy and Coast Guard, and 8,979 for export to other nations.

          ICH, despite all its shortcomings, the imported Bofors in the USA actually buried 2 purely American developments - an army 37-mm anti-aircraft gun and a naval 28-mm machine gun.
          Moreover, they wanted to cancel the order for 37-mm anti-aircraft guns altogether - the contract was saved only by the delay with a series of "bofors". As a result, the native American anti-aircraft gun was left in production for some time "as a temporary replacement."
          Quote: 24hours
          You still need to figure out what is good and what is bad (for anti-aircraft artillery). Then you will understand why the pom-pomps had just such ballistics.

          He-he-he ... the pom-poms were so good that the British reinforced the ship's MZA with air-cooled Bofors. Moreover, the commander of the British LK said that he would have preferred even such a "bofors" to an eight-barreled "pom-pom".
          Quote: 24hours
          Yeah. Only the Japanese could not really fly up to them. Not even every kamikaze reached the ship

          Kamikaze in 1941? Originally.
          If you carefully read my post, then there was a phrase for 1941 air defense of the ships of the navy of the USSR ... In 1941, the Yankees did not even have enough "Erlikons" ... and before the "Bofors" there was still a year. For "bofors" in their native Swedish version were not suitable for large-scale production. And it took "Chrysler" a year to bring the Swedish product to mind - as a result of which only the scheme and the caliber remained from it.
          Quote: 24hours
          But as the main system of this purpose, the land version of the air gun VY would be much more profitable.

          23 mm anti-tank anti-aircraft gun. Say thanks to comrade Taubin, who has also failed this project.
          EMNIP, the problem was that the entire issue of VYa-23 was devoured by the Air Force. In addition, air cannons have traditionally been demanding on maintenance and did not tolerate dust. The BTV had the experience of the TNSh-20, which, despite the "swelling", in the summer began to give refusal after refusal - it came to the point that the commanders of the brigade in the southern direction reported on the universal transformation of the T-60 into machine-gun tanks.
          1. 24hours
            24hours 18 February 2016 12: 41
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            After all, the United States produced only 23897 40-mm guns for the Army - 2,3 times more than for the fleet.

            Count the number of pennants and the number of at least land headquarters. Of course, limited. In addition, do not forget about the production for Lend-Lease.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            the imported Bofors in the USA actually buried two purely American developments - an army 2-mm anti-aircraft gun and a naval 37-mm machine gun.

            Do you seriously think that these are "classmates"? What does this weapon have to do with Bofors? Shoots up in bursts? Can you find any other similarities?
            Another 61-K at least (not really) can be written in classmates to Bofors. And your examples are not correct. At the same time, I already wrote about water cooling for sea Bofors.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The pom-poms were so good that the British reinforced the ship's MZA with air-cooled Bofors. Moreover, the commander of the British LK said that he would have preferred even such a "bofors" to an eight-barreled "pom-pom".

            If someone is supposedly coughing up something, so is this the ultimate truth? Once again, I repeat to you, do not write about what you do not understand. The Vickers QF 2 pounder Mark II was not a classmate of the Bofors L60. Despite the same caliber. He was not even a classmate of the less powerful 37 mm Gun M1. He had his own "six" on which he felt great. You are comparing, relatively speaking, a submachine gun with a light machine gun. On the grounds that they both shoot in bursts. And these are different classes.
            And, I repeat, do not compare water-cooled weapons with air-cooled weapons.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            23 mm anti-tank anti-aircraft gun.

            Does this phrase surprise you? Or are you from that series of "figures" who believe that the 37-mm 61-K had some anti-tank qualities there? And they were allegedly included in anti-tank brigades not for air defense, but for anti-tank defense? The 61-K was ineffective against tanks, except that some armored personnel carrier inadvertently and not far jump out. Or the tank will be ambushed. The range of destruction of similar armored targets from 61-K was half as much the same distance 45-mm gun PTO 53-K. A 25-mm 72-K was completely useless. Therefore, such a 23-mm gun would be simply ridiculous. Taubin could not jump above his head. Unless, at the cost of incredible efforts, he would have reached her level 72-K. But then the problems of strong guns forcing would have come up. A good gun is a very, very difficult thing. And even more so automatic. There are more problems at times.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            the entire issue of VYA-23 was consumed by the Air Force. In addition, airguns have traditionally been demanding maintenance and did not tolerate dust.

            It was possible to produce instead of 61-K (while the production of 72-K could be left). And about the dust could be improved. Small work.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            BTV had the experience of TNSh-20,

            It is better not to remember this "product" at all. The idea to adapt it for land needs could only come from complete despair. Those. even the ammunition was not suitable for this at all.
            1. carbine
              carbine 18 February 2016 13: 23
              0
              Quote: 24hours
              A good gun is a very, very difficult thing. And even more so automatic. There are more problems at times.

              Support.
              But there the problem is not as complicated as the problem of creating a good automatic individual weapon. This is where the top class really needs to be in a whole range of characteristics. Not everyone can do it.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 19 February 2016 10: 25
              +1
              Quote: 24hours
              Count the number of pennants and the number of at least land headquarters. Of course, limited.

              23897 "Bofors" would be enough for almost 3000 MZA batteries. Or 1500 automatic weapons battalions - battalions of MZA (based on the calculation that half of the battalion's batteries are armed with MZA, and half are equipped with ZPU). Each division had one such battalion.
              Extremely limited amount, yes ... smile
              Quote: 24hours
              In addition, do not forget about the production for Lend-Lease.

              It is not included in the number of army anti-aircraft guns, but is given separately: 8,979 for export to other nations.
              Quote: 24hours
              Do you seriously think that these are "classmates"? What does this weapon have to do with Bofors? Shoots up in bursts? Can you find any other similarities?

              My point is that since the mid-30s the Ordnance Department has been looking for a heavy MPA for the army. And initially the choice fell on the American-designed 37-mm cannon. She was even brought to the series. However, according to the results of the war in Europe, as well as the results of tests of the British 40-mm Bofors battery in the USA, the 37-mm was considered ineffective and it was decided to replace it with a 40-mm one.
              Moreover, the decision of the meeting of April 9, 1941 (Ordnance Committee Meeting Item No. 16647, April 9, 1941) explicitly stated that the 40-mm M1 gun will replace the 37-mm anti-aircraft guns in production and in the army (the latter will be left in production only until execution already signed contracts).

              Tactically and organizationally, 40-mm "Bofors" in the US Army replaced the 37-mm MZA of American design. As well as in the Navy, 40-mm were placed in the nests of 28-mm MZA.

              It is in this sense that I say that Bofors-Chrysler buried 2 native American developments.
              Quote: 24hours
              And about the dust could be improved. Small work

              Yeah, not big ... how long did the TNS work out for years?
              Quote: 24hours
              The idea to adapt it for land needs could come only from complete hopelessness. Those. even the ammunition was completely unsuitable for this.

              Excuse me - in 1941 the industry could not put anything into the T-60 tower. And the T-70 under the standard 45 mm still had to be developed.
              Quote: 24hours
              Does this phrase surprise you?

              Not surprising. This is a light automatic cannon for use on lightly armored targets, which, as intelligence believed, the Germans had a lot. So to speak, "ZU-23 - the first approach to the projectile." smile
              We also wanted to introduce a 14,5 mm machine gun for a similar purpose - KPV-41.
              1. 24hours
                24hours 19 February 2016 11: 40
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                23897 "Bofors" would be enough for almost 3000 MZA batteries. Or 1500 automatic weapons battalions - battalions of MZA (based on the calculation that half of the battalion's batteries are armed with MZA, and half are equipped with ZPU). Each division had one such battalion.

                You count in grams.
                Actually look at how many pennants there were in the US. Including armed transports. And your "mass of Bofors" will quickly dissolve.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Extremely limited amount, yes ...

                On land, yes, extremely limited.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                I want to say that since the mid-30s, the Ordnance Department has been looking for a heavy MZA for the army.

                Who told you that it was the right decision at all? It was as wrong and dead-end as the Soviet 37-mm 61-K. The maximum in this segment was apparently something like 72-K. Although she, too, was, perhaps, too powerful. Therefore, it could not be a "workhorse".
                I would have made 72-K slightly (5-10 percent) more powerful by assigning it to heavy MZA. And VY, on the contrary, noticeably weakened (by 20 percent), appointing MZA to the lungs. And from 61-K would have refused completely. And then there would be harmony and good air cover in the Red Army.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                As well as in the fleet, the 40 mm were placed in the nests of the 28 mm MZA.

                Let's not confuse warm with soft. As for water cooling, I already wrote to you 100 times.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                how much time did the TNS finish?

                5 months.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Excuse me - in 1941 the industry could not put anything into the T-60 tower.

                And why? Why did the military industry of the USSR, which had blasted as many weapons before the war as all of Europe combined, did not have a light automatic land gun? Here Germany, despite the post-war restrictions, somehow managed to make a 20 mm series of KwK and FlaK on a single cartridge. But the USSR has been arming itself for so many years, and ... call me? Is Taubin to blame? Took, and single-handedly screwed everything up?
                However, the question is rhetorical. You yourself know why.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                No wonder. This is a light automatic gun for working on lightly armored targets, which, according to intelligence, the Germans had a lot.

                Actually, that's not what I mean. I meant the term "anti-tank". I support the idea of ​​a light tank-anti-aircraft gun. Better yet, a light anti-aircraft cannon in an anti-aircraft turret on an armored platform. Not necessarily a tank, mobile MZK on a platform from BA-10 would be quite suitable for the defense of communications.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                We also wanted to introduce a 14,5 mm machine gun for a similar purpose - KPV-41.

                Yes, I know. Something like an automatic PT gun. Why not enter? The chickens did not peck money from the military. So they fantasized, each to the best of their ability. And when it was. They worked.
                1. 24hours
                  24hours 19 February 2016 11: 59
                  0
                  Quote: 24hours
                  I would have made 72-K slightly (5-10 percent) more powerful by assigning it to heavy MZA. And VY, on the contrary, noticeably weakened (by 20 percent), appointing MZA to the lungs.

                  The optimal caliber of such a modified 72-K would probably be somewhere 26-27 mm, and the new VY somewhere 21-22 mm.
                  1. 24hours
                    24hours 20 February 2016 13: 56
                    0
                    Quote: 24hours
                    somewhere 26-27 mm, and the new VY somewhere 21-22 mm.

                    And in order to finish with the MZA theme, land transported anti-aircraft guns in the USSR should be made in caliber 21 and 27 mm. Different, of course, power. In addition, it was necessary to make sea-based anti-aircraft guns with water cooling in a 34-mm caliber. Exactly the same automatic machines with water cooling behind the shields were to be installed on the modified BA-10 useless platforms open from above (towers with 45 mm guns would be removed). At the same time, 21 and 27 mm anti-aircraft air-cooled automatic weapons could also be installed on ships and small armored vehicles (type T-60). A 21-mm machine for aircraft (instead of VYA).
                    The next step up was already a 45-mm gun of the M-42 type (53-K mobariant), and down the 14,5-mm PTR in the infantry and the 20-mm ShVAK gun in aviation (their power in reality was approximately the same).
                    By the way, that’s why installation in the T-60 tower is not a TNS, but modifying the PTRS on the machine would be a much more correct solution. And there, even before the pair of KPVT in the anti-aircraft tower is already close.
                  2. The comment was deleted.
      3. The comment was deleted.
    3. shasherin.pavel
      shasherin.pavel 17 February 2016 20: 51
      0
      I agree that the air defense was not enough, but it was not so all started. Even before the raids on Moscow, Luftwaffe pilots rated air defense firing higher than the action of fighters. But not enough ..
      1. 24hours
        24hours 18 February 2016 00: 54
        0
        Quote: shasherin.pavel
        I agree that there were not enough air defense assets

        Enough. Only it was not clear why. The anti-aircraft weapons of the ships (76 mm + 37 mm air-cooled machine guns) were just a karastropha.
        The land 85-mm 52-K was better, but compared to the normal anti-aircraft artillery of that time in other countries, this was again not a powerful model. And there was no other.
        Quote: shasherin.pavel
        Even before the raids on Moscow, Luftwaffe pilots rated air defense firing higher than the action of fighters.

        Do not spread network gossip.
      2. The comment was deleted.
  8. Vega
    Vega 17 February 2016 12: 34
    +2
    Very informative and interesting, and most importantly makes you think.
  9. Denimax
    Denimax 17 February 2016 19: 02
    0
    The first photo shows a rangefinder and a 37 mm automatic. I wonder how could such a combination be? For me, it’s better to control the machine using tracers. IMHO
    1. shasherin.pavel
      shasherin.pavel 17 February 2016 21: 06
      +3
      And how to determine the fire lead if you do not know the range to the target? If you look at the tracer from the gun, you will see a straight track, and if you look from the side, you will see a vertical curve. It was clearly visible on the dock. films about the war in Iraq.
      1. Denimax
        Denimax 17 February 2016 21: 17
        0
        As far as I know, there is a scope with marking in range and angles. If only the handset is to be put up for a barrage. I think that the photo was taken either from exercises, the pre-war or the initial stage of the war. With the advent of diving, the range finder is unlikely to help.
  10. skeptik
    skeptik 17 February 2016 22: 27
    0
    The first photo was taken after the war. Soldiers have epaulets.
  11. Technical engineer
    18 February 2016 19: 44
    +1
    Quote: skeptik
    The first photo was taken after the war. Soldiers have epaulets.

    Or in the 1944 year, when they were already entered.