The weight of the South Korean "missile ultimatum" to China in the light of the militarization of the APR. Its consequences for the Russian Federation

20


The beginning of 2016 was marked by a mass of military-political events, which emphasized the tendency of the world to “fall into a spin” of the global confrontation for unconditional domination of the planet. At the same time, if in 2015, the picture of the collision between our and Western models of the world order still retained some more or less decent frames, when the leadership of the countries of the NATO bloc and its direct command explained the strengthening of their OVS in a given region with all sorts of security enhancement and interaction programs then this year the situation has completely changed and assumed the most drastic and bitter character.

In the political international arena towards Vladimir Putin, for the first time in modern stories completely biased and bold accusations of corruption (by the US Deputy Secretary of State for Financial Intelligence and Terrorism A. Shubin) unexpectedly fell down, apparently connected with the West’s confusion against the background of the strategic successes of the Russian videoconferencing in Syria, which now allow us to set a favorable tone for us further foreign policy orientation of the key Middle Eastern state. It can also be counted as an attempt to discredit V. Putin and the pro-presidential parties of Russia before an unsophisticated or resident voter abroad on the eve of the elections of 2016 and 2018. For example, the final decision of the latter is often influenced by the misinformation of Western television.

On the military-strategic arena, much more significant events are taking place that point to the new rules of the “game”, which require not just a harsh reaction from the top officials of the state to the media, but specific and immediate military responses. One of the latest decisions of the NATO command was the dispatch of AWACS E-3C “Sentry” AWACS aircraft from the German air base Geilenkirchen to the Turkish Konya Avb to strengthen Turkish air defense. Given that all the goals of DAIS are detected by radio-electronic and optoelectronic means of tactical aviation, in extreme cases, with airborne target designation systems of the E-8C "J-STARS" type, and the IG has no aviation and OTRK, the transfer of air combat control aircraft (E-3) is directed exclusively against the Russian Aerospace Forces. At the same time, the Turkish Air Force already has 4 AWACS Boeing 737AEW & C aircraft, which indicates the plans to organize an unprecedented NATO air reconnaissance for the actions of the Russian Air Force from the airspace of the Crimea to the Syrian sky.


Onboard radar with PFAR Н035 "Irbis-E", installed on an experienced Su-30МК2 as a test bench (upper photo). Such radars and equipped with multifunctional super-maneuverable Su-35S. In the Syrian military company and “Irbis” and “Drying” themselves, they are currently undergoing baptism, and are not only the most advanced attack units in the Middle East, but also partially perform the functions of an airborne early warning center with the possibility of target designation for such vehicles as Su-30CM and Su -34. The link “Su-35С - Su-30СМ” will certainly have a sobering effect on the entire aviation of the coalition led by the United States, even “Raptors” will not be an exception. The Su-35С network-centric equipment includes an airborne radio communication complex and C-108 tactical information transmission (lower photo), which is a more advanced version of the well-known K-DLAE / UE. It is known that the latter allowed the exchange of tactical information (with output to the MFIs of pilots) in the “enhanced” squadron from 16 fighters with the update rate 1 times / 10 s, while in the link from the 4-x machines the data is updated for 6,5 from, from 2 x planes - for 2 with. The C-108 complex, referring to a newer generation, is built on a more efficient processor, and therefore its refresh rate is higher. The system can also maintain radio communications with ground units of the ground forces. Protection against interception of information is carried out thanks to the most complicated frequency scrambling algorithm, which in turn have a frequency hopping mode (pseudo-random frequency tuning, in English FHSS - frequency-hopping spread spectrum) with a frequency change frequency of 78,125 kHz in the range from 0,96 to 1,215 GHz. It is almost impossible to decode such a signal quickly.




The answer came instantly. Khmeimim airbase received the best super-maneuverable fighters to gain air superiority of the Su-35С. The unit from four Su-35С from the Far Eastern Dzemgi airbase will not only help the Su-30CM multi-role fighters and the C-400 complex to finally close the airspace above the SAR, but will also perform the functions of the DRLO aircraft, which will not allow the Turkish F-16C to use low-altitude flight and difficult terrain, "limitless" in the Syrian airspace. Thanks to the on-board radar with the PFAR Н035 "Irbis-E", the secret shock operations of American F-22A operating from the airfields of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ("Raptors" will be detected at a distance of 180 — 240 km) will not go unnoticed.

But let's move on to the equally difficult and “swinging” Far East, where the People’s Republic of China shares with Russia the task of containing the US-Japan-Republic of Korea daily-strengthening military-political coalition, which turned the Asia-Pacific region into a powerful unipolar American enclave interests.

Here, at the base of the Pacific fleet The US Navy is forming an echelon strike and defense system designed to counter the developing Chinese Navy, as well as the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet, including anti-submarine patrol aircraft and air defense of the main naval Pacific Fleet targets. At the same time, by the beginning of 2020, our and Chinese fleets should have found a comprehensive solution for air defense / missile defense of naval strike groups based on such ships as frigates of the project 22350 and the heavy Shkval EM, since tactical long-range cruise missiles are hardly noticeable " LRASM "will begin to arrive in the US Navy in the near future. And their placement in the TPK UVPU Mk 41 does not impose restrictions on the amount of arsenal on one ship of the Aegis system (up to 122 units on the Rkr URO "Ticonderoga" and over 240 units on the modernized "San Antonio"). Due to the ultra-small EPR “LRASM” (less than 0,1 m2), its interception is ten times more complicated than the anti-ship version of the “Tomahawk”, and their “star raid” on the KMG with unprepared or outdated ship’s air defense can lead to serious losses.

An example of the work of the Americans in blocking the defense ambitions of the People's Republic of China in the southern operational sector can be observed in the sharply increased military-technical cooperation between the United States and Australia and India. For example, for the Royal Australian Air Force was built 8 long-range anti-submarine aircraft P-8A "Poseidon", another 4 machine will be transferred in the coming years. Twelve "Poseidons" in the Australian Air Force is enough to establish effective control over the movement of Chinese submarines of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, given the mediocre low-noise indicators of the latter. The Indian Navy also adopted the X-NUMX P-3I "Poseidon" naval aviation because of the need to monitor the Chinese submarine fleet.


In the video, the very same 2015 incident of the year with the US anti-submarine patrol aircraft P-8A from the US Naval Aviation Squadron Patrol Squadron 45 Pelicans, which, ignoring all warnings of the Chinese Navy, flew directly over the Chinese artificial island Fiery Cross Reef in the vicinity of the controversial Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea and conducted optical-radio electronic surveillance of the situation at the site. P-8A “Poseidon” airplanes of the Increment 3 Block 2 version have the widest range of passive electronic, radio and optical reconnaissance equipment. Side-mounted radars AN / APS-137D (V) 5, AN / APS-149 have a synthetic aperture mode for working on surface and ground targets, and therefore are capable of photographically defining the radar image of the crew members of the aircraft crew and relaying it to the command -scale unit for various communication channels. Radar can detect small surface targets, including submarine periscopes and small landing craft, but at much shorter distances (up to 100 km) than ordinary ships. An updated AN / APS-154 radar is being developed for the aircraft, which will give the US Navy the reconnaissance potential of the E-8C “J-STARS” ground-targeting aircraft. Our analogue of J-STARS, the Tu-214P, has more advanced parameters: the RLK-411, which, in addition to the synthesized aperture, has a subsurface radiolocation mode for detecting enemy infrastructure under the ground, sand or snow. In addition to hundreds of active-passive highly sensitive RSL, anti-submarine torpedoes Mk54 and depth charges, the Poseidon is also equipped with a tactical long-range cruise missile (270 km) AGM-84H SLAM-ER (photo below). The rocket has a small EPR (less than 0,1m2) and EKGSN with telemetry image transmission mode on the MFI of the operator on board the carrier. This allows real-time correction of the capture of a moving target with low thermal contrast. And the use of a container with self-targeting combat elements (SPBE) as an AGM-84H warhead partially transforms the P-8A into a formidable vehicle for a land theater.




In the southern strategic direction, the only conflict-prone area for China is the South China Sea, where the Celestial Empire is leading a territorial dispute over the Spratly Archipelago with Vietnam and the Philippines. The shores of Malaysia and Indonesia, which have close economic cooperation with China, are washed by this sea, and therefore an increase in the presence of the US Navy in this region will cause serious dissatisfaction on the part of these powerful island nations with Russian tactical aviation in service, as any aggravation will certainly affect on their economy. And therefore, we will not see here anything except the anti-submarine Poseidon patrol missions and the Arly Burke’s demonstrative approaches to the shores of Southeast Asia. Another thing - the eastern strategic direction of China.

Here, China does not have friendly states (like Indonesia or Malaysia), but is surrounded by the very aggressive “Anti-China Axis” previously mentioned, represented by the United States, Kazakhstan, Japan and Taiwan, as well as the expanses of the Pacific Ocean, which 7 will keep control for a long time operational fleet of the US Navy. But they do not stop at this, and for additional militarization of the region they use any reason, even if they are not supported by anything, because its main goal is control over the Russian and Chinese coasts and fleets in their immediate vicinity. To do this, just “one click on the nose” of the South Korean leadership, which without hesitation decided to multiply the presence of the US Armed Forces, in particular, due to the radical expansion of the military base in Pyotntak.

And such occasions arise over and over again due to the historically unstable military-political situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea (a territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai archipelago and sluggish conflict with Taiwan). The latest of these were the test of the new nuclear “equipment” by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, conducted by 5 on January 2016, and the launch of ICBMs from a satellite to Earth orbit 7 in February.

According to the national interest.org resource, the testing of new nuclear weapons again led to sharp criticism from South Korea, and also raised the issue of deploying the American missile defense system of the upper THAAD territorial boundary in its territory. At the same time, the Russian ambassador to South Korea, A. Timonin, sharply criticized such plans at a press conference in Seoul, stressing that the location of the complex would not solve the problem, but would only aggravate it. The five-party talks, which Kazakhstan wants to hold without the participation of representatives of North Korea, will further put Pyongyang against South Korea, Japan and the United States.

But as usual, not listening to the experienced opinion of the rightful owner of the Far East - Russia, representatives of South Korea began to make military-political pressure on the leadership of the PRC, intimidating it with the placement of THAADs, if China does not participate in condemning the North Korean nuclear program. This program, in essence, is a well-founded measure of the DPRK to contain the military threat from the US Armed Forces in the APR, and even theoretically it should not be accompanied by any economic sanctions, as Timonin also pointed out. But not everything is so simple here.

The United States has been looking for a pretext for the transfer of THAAD APC to the Republic of Korea for several years, and now it has been found.

THE EMBODIMENT OF THE AMERICAN PLAN FOR THAAD DOESN'T DEPEND ON THE PRINCIPAL "TIGHTNESS" OF THE PRC OR FROM REFUSAL OF PHYENIAN FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Even if the leadership of the Celestial Empire would put pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regarding the development of its nuclear weapons, the situation with plans to deploy the THAAD complex in the RK would remain unchanged, since the purpose of the complexes is directed not only against the OTRB and the BRSD of the DPRK . To contain the North Korean missiles, the US and Japanese Navy forces would only have to deploy only two anti-missile “belts” (frontier) on the basis of Aegis-Congo, Atago and Arley Burke missiles with the SM-3 complex (The 1 line is in the southern part of the Sea of ​​Japan, the second line is in the East China Sea). RIM-161A / B anti-missiles have an 500 km range and an application ceiling of up to 250 km, and therefore a small DPRK would have enough 4 or 5 of such ships to cover the aerospace directions of a small DPRK, while the Americans also needed a ground-based THAAD. And the "trick" here lies in what.

First, in the radar equipment of the complex THAAD. Multifunctional radar detection, tracking and target designation with AFAR AN / TPY-2 refers to high-potential high-resolution radars. The MRLS operates in the X and Ku-bands of centimeter waves, so that even ultra-high-altitude targets can be detected hundreds of kilometers away. The highest resolution is achieved not only due to the high energy of the radiating aperture, but also thanks to the 25344 AFAR receiving and transmitting modules, which is many times more than other radars (for 30Н6Е2 - 10000 MRP, for AN / MPQ-53 - 5161 ППМ, for one AP) AN / SPY-1A - 4096 MRP). The AN / TPY-2 radar will be able to conduct ARLO over the entire northeastern part of China (instrumental range of action is more than 1000 km). Previously, this was not possible, since the nearest positional missile defense areas with THAAD were based only in Japan, which allowed TPY-2 to monitor only the coastal areas of the north-eastern part of the People's Republic of China. Their deployment in South Korea is pushing the detection line 500 km to the west than today.


On the tactical map of the eastern coast of the People's Republic of China, the Korean Peninsula and Japan, the basing and viewing areas of the American AN / TPY-2 radar are shown in red in Japan. As you can see, their range does not allow to monitor Chinese airspace, the maximum range is limited to the middle of the Yellow Sea and the DPRK. Blue indicates the AN / TPY-2 area of ​​view after deploying the THAAD system near Seoul on the west coast of the Republic of Korea. In such a case, the airspace of the PRC over Hebei Province (including Beijing), Shandong, Liaoning and, in part, Henan and Shanxi is under observation. It is known from open sources that the largest number of known and secret military facilities are located in these provinces of China, including the Baoding, Tingshan, Zunhua, Kangzhuang, Xuzhou, Zhuchek and other airbases, and on the coast of the Bohai Bay there is also a large testing ground for new secret anti-aircraft missile systems. All aircraft rising into the stratosphere will be immediately detected and accompanied by AN / TPY-2 stations. For the PLA, this is a very bad sign, since now the enemy will be partially aware of what is happening over the territory of the PRC, and will be able to develop effective tactics for a possible retaliatory strike.


From a military and strategic point of view, AN / TPY-2 US forces will be able to gain control over the stratospheric section of a large part of Chinese airspace in the northeast of the country without sending E-3C DRLO aircraft to dangerous air duty, which are 1,5 times smaller than the detection range of which would make the crews come close to the Chinese provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei and Liaoning. Also, in the event of a possible escalation of hostilities with the People's Republic of China in the APR, the US Navy will not need to send its warships with the Aegis to the waters of the Yellow Sea, which in the conditions of China’s development of promising supersonic YCR-18 anti-ship missiles will be a real suicide.

Secondly, the deployment of THAAD anti-missile systems in South Korea will make it possible to form a dense ground-based “shield” of EKR from Chinese ICBMs and MRBDs in the Far East, closing most of the known naked gaps in aerospace.

The third function can be attributed to the auxiliary, as well as to the one that directly affects the security of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region. The “Arctic race” is slowly and surely gaining momentum, and therefore already in the 20s. will require the involvement of huge military-technical resources from its members. The US Navy will require good interchangeability between the Arctic Navy grouping and the Pacific Fleet. In some crisis cases, it may be necessary to relocate the warships of the American Pacific Fleet to gain strength in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean in the Bering Strait, which is the main transit hub from the APR to the Arctic Ocean. It is logical that because of this, the shipboard "Aegis" groupings in the East China Sea will have to weaken, and therefore reduce, the possibilities of missile defense against Chinese ballistic missiles.
In this case, the American troops in the Far East will be insured and THAAD complexes will be insured. And the ship composition of the US Navy in the North Pacific may increase significantly, creating problems for our Pacific Fleet.

Fourthly, THAAD will be used to reinforce the defense of US naval facilities in Okinawa, Guam and the Philippines from a possible missile strike from the DPRK. If you look at the APR map, it is clear that all the flight trajectories to these bases of the United States pass precisely over the territory of the Republic of Korea. The THAAD complexes will be used for early detection and interception of North Korean BRs at the initial leg of the flight with the support of EM and UDI cruisers with Aegis, while the Americans launch the medium-range missiles only to shoot down SM-3, and to finish off the air defense missile system “Patriot PAC- 3.

Approximately this concept of the deployment of these complexes in the Republic of Kazakhstan is envisaged by the Americans today. Therefore, it would be very naive to believe that THAAD is going to be used only for the purpose of protecting South Korea from the DPRK nuclear missile program.

As stated at the beginning of the article, the response to this threat must be comprehensive, and the full-fledged network-centric interaction achieved between the Russian Armed Forces and the PRC. The submarine components of the Pacific Fleet of Russia and the Chinese Navy in the Pacific HF should be equipped mainly with modern low-profile and supersonic ASR “Caliber PL” and YJ-18 RCCs to eliminate the threat from Japanese and American AUGs. For the destruction of the missile defense infrastructure in the Republic of Kazakhstan, several dozen 3P14Ts, correctly launched from Russian submarines and strategic missile-carriers Tu-160, as well as Chinese CJ-10 from ground-based mobile missile systems "Mech-10", are sufficient. The task here will be facilitated, since neither the Air Force nor the US Navy in the Far East can build a full-fledged defense against low-flying EAS, which would certainly require fighter aviation, and its use in the area of ​​the enemy’s dominant air defense is theoretically impossible.
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  1. 0
    9 February 2016 06: 47
    "... and its use in the zone of action of the enemy's dominant air defense is even theoretically impossible."
    Well, they will not admire her work
  2. VP
    +1
    9 February 2016 07: 12
    The article speaks of the RCC as the "correct answer". But this is an offensive weapon that will only work if you strike first.
    And if not the first? What if the adversaries were discharged in your ships in one gulp? In my opinion, there is nothing for us to neutralize it, naval systems based on the S-300 are, of course, a good thing, but not sharpened for work on mass targets, a hundred or two anti-ship missiles will simply break any air defense.
    Earlier in the Union against large group targets, air defense systems (for example, the S-200) included missiles with "special ammunition". And now how about this, and does the fleet have them?
    1. +2
      9 February 2016 07: 25
      Short-range electronic warfare systems are also located on ships past missile and artillery weapons. Besides, no one will send hundreds of missiles to a lone target at the same time, since there is no such possibility from a purely technological problem. For ACG, such a goal is not a priority.
      1. VP
        +3
        9 February 2016 07: 40
        And what is the technological problem for Ticonderoga to shoot at, for example, "Lazarev" and "Varyag"?
        And then everything, Pacific Fleet no longer has large surface except landing.
        However, I am not naval, I am an amateur in these matters, of course, please do not stomp)
        1. +1
          9 February 2016 16: 56
          How many times he will release the Kyrgyz Republic, after all, our radars are constantly working, plus almost always such fleets are being monitored and all suspicious steps will be noticeable in advance. Our intelligence also doesn’t just eat bread, both behind enemy lines and directly in their area maneuvers.
    2. +1
      9 February 2016 12: 01
      Their deployment in South Korea pushes the limits of detection 500 km to the west than today.


      Until these milestones are created, we will still see the reciprocal move of the PRC. As for the Russian Federation, I already drew attention to the fact that the first frontier of anti-aircraft defense, air defense and missile defense must be created in the Kuril and Commander Islands.
  3. +1
    9 February 2016 07: 50
    Everything is bad at the Pacific Fleet now, apart from the strategic missile carriers.
    And if you look at the map in the article, it becomes clear
    why the Japanese are forcing negotiations on the return of the Kuril Islands.
    What do we get the islands back to them at first
    and then they think about concluding a peace treaty ...
    And given the fact that part of our forces was transferred
    to the west of the country, our region in the region of Japan is most vulnerable to attack.
    It’s clear that the response to the attack will be the zeroing of the aggressor country,
    but somehow it will not help us much.
    1. +4
      9 February 2016 10: 19
      Quote: Zomanus
      It’s clear that the response to the attack will be the zeroing of the aggressor country,
      but somehow it will not help us much.


      Why doesn't it help much? The aggressor country has been reset, there is no one else to be aggressive, those who manage to swim to the Kuriles and gain a foothold there will not represent anything of themselves and will not live long either. The United States, looking at the sunken and burned out Japan, thoughtfully scratches its turnip and says - "Oh, here you are in what sense .. Well, you didn't say before that you were serious .." And everything is clear to everyone, everyone is happy with everything, except Japan, or rather, what used to be Japan, nuclear weapons rule.
      1. -2
        9 February 2016 16: 50
        In vain you overestimate the power of nuclear weapons, for the most part all fears about this weapon are a myth. Link to a resource where you can see the consequences of nuclear explosions up to 50 megatons: http: //nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap3d/
  4. 0
    9 February 2016 07: 54
    Judging by the attached map, the detection range of AN / TPY-2 is approximately 1200 km.
    I don’t understand something. No one is bothered by the range of over-the-horizon radars, which "shine" on the floor of the ball, and here the author predicts an almost direct threat of war ... request
    =================================================
    AN / TPY-2 .... with 25344 PPM AFAR, is a serious thing.
    1. VP
      +2
      9 February 2016 08: 53
      Over-the-horizon do not provide the necessary resolution and accuracy, they give a general idea of ​​the situation.
  5. +1
    9 February 2016 08: 34
    As stated at the beginning of the article, the answer to this threat should be comprehensive, and achieved full-fledged network-centric interaction between the Russian Armed Forces and China.
    But I doubt very much about this. Still, we are not so great friends. Anyway, the Chinese also need to keep an eye out.
    1. VP
      +4
      9 February 2016 08: 56
      Yeah, the Chinese still didn’t have enough with us .. for complete happiness.
      They need us and will be needed for a long time
  6. +3
    9 February 2016 10: 13
    So let's see how China will like it when the Americans begin to deploy missile defense systems on its borders. Otherwise, China likes to watch from the outside how the US is flattening us, now let it feel in its own skin what it feels like.
  7. +2
    9 February 2016 10: 46
    Text


    full owner of the Far East - Russia




    I think this is said too loudly. We are a player on the Far East, but certainly not the owner.
  8. 0
    9 February 2016 10: 56
    As stated at the beginning of the article, the answer to this threat should be comprehensive, and achieved full-fledged network-centric interaction between the Russian Armed Forces and China.


    China is an ally like the United States, it is now profitable, it is with you. Then it’s not profitable, it puts its missile defense closer to Vladik or something else. We must keep an eye on China acutely, we have already suffered from such allies.

    If it is profitable for us to do something with China - we do it, it is not profitable, we change the conditions, wait for the agreement. Otherwise, we will again have to bear the brunt of the losses of the war, and China's "ally" will only collect repatriation and profit.

    If China wants us to help them militarily, let them offer us investments, money in the economy, technologies that are not so developed in some areas. And only then we will think.
  9. 0
    9 February 2016 11: 00
    Games with nuclear drafts will not lead to anything good ... It is a pity that August 1945 did not teach Japan, when American friends first dumped a humanitarian aid on them to Hiroshima ..
  10. +3
    9 February 2016 13: 01
    The article is good, weighty, reasoned. It makes the gray matter work, look for a solution to the problems outlined in it.
    Rather, they are about protecting our Far East from unwanted partners. Let me remind you: we have no special ambitions there, the main thing is not to get in on us. But the Celestial Empire decided to become the "king of the mountain" in the APR, which is opposed by the main hegemonist of our time. China clearly understands that without Russia, its chances in the confrontation with the Yusser and K * are not preferable. Therefore, relying on their economic power, they will drag the latest military technologies out of us and buy the latest weapons.
    Apparently, the Chinese will be the first to stir up a territorial showdown and try to attract us to them. That is why there is still no treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between our countries. (In this situation, it’s very easy to be at someone else’s wedding with a fingal under the eye.)
    What to do? The Shoigu inspection showed the directions of our main efforts: airborne navigation systems, airborne missile defense system, airfields, aviation industry, and infrastructure. Sorry for the money and time to spare.
    And most importantly, in my opinion: no matter how close the Chinese 1,5 billion people are to us, we need to think about our naked Far East. We should not get involved in any war, even if they ask very much. Forces of general purpose - the cat cried, so we will have to spread the "last argument of the Presidents." And this is fraught with the apocalypse.
    IMHO
  11. 0
    9 February 2016 14: 06
    The link from the four Su-35С arrivals from the Far Eastern air base of Dzemgi will now not only help the Su-30СМ multipurpose fighters and the С-400 complex to completely close the airspace above the ATS, but will also serve as the AWACS aircraft,


    Well, I heard about the capabilities of the MIG-31 in the area of ​​AWACS, but the first time about SU-35. Is this true and where can I learn more about it.
  12. +3
    9 February 2016 18: 44
    The article is based on advertising facts and statements of US representatives and their satellites. It’s impressive to draw beautiful sectors of shelling and defeat, especially not very strong specialists in military affairs.
    I judge by myself. At one time, we, too, in tactical offices drew diagrams and graphs according to which our boat should be found, for example, in the Bashi Strait, in a couple of hours and immediately "destroyed". But in reality, I walked this strait many times and never once did the enemy's PLO forces find the boat. Moreover, later across the strait, in the South China Sea, we surfaced and for two days "chap" on the surface to the Singapore Strait. Around hundreds of civilian ships, which are obliged to inform the military about the Soviet boat and - silence. Only at the end of the second day, the Orions and the US frigate appeared in the strait itself. The impression was that they finally woke up !!!
    After all this, I don’t at all believe cards with circles and arrows. Nonsense is all that. And the war, if any, will go according to completely different rules.
  13. 0
    9 February 2016 23: 35
    Quote: indifferent
    The article is based on advertising facts and statements of US representatives and their satellites. It’s impressive to draw beautiful sectors of shelling and defeat, especially not very strong specialists in military affairs ...

    Perhaps I agree, it all reminds Reagan cartoons about star wars, which didn’t go further than cartoons, and Gorbachev fell for this misinformation and climbed to merge the Soviet Union, and leaked the parasite.

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