Comintern in the countries of the Middle East
One of the most important channels for the Soviet leadership to obtain intelligence information in 1920 – 30 was the Comintern.
Under the influence of the October Revolution, communist parties began to emerge in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Persia (1920) [1], Turkey (1920) [2], Palestine (1921; transformed from the Socialist Party of Palestine created in 1919) [3], Egypt (1922; converted from the Socialist Party of Egypt, created in 1921 d.) [4], Syria (1924) [5], Iraq (1934) [6], Algeria (1936; from 1920 in Algeria there were communist sections that were part of the French Communist Party) [7], Tunisia (1939; since 1920 there was a Communist Federation of nissa as part French CCP) [8]. As reported in his memoirs, the Soviet defector E.V. Dumbadze [9], members of these parties collaborated with Soviet intelligence through the Comintern, providing information on the situation in their countries and carrying out "special assignments": "In addition to his staff, the OGPU resident [10] uses the staff of an authorized Comintern and recruits informants for his spyware targets among [members] of the local communist party. Often, also recruited communists do not even suspect that, being members of the communist party at home, they at the same time become traitors to their homeland, revealing to possible enemies the secrets of the state defense of their fatherland ”[11].
In the Communist University of Workers of the East (KUTV), formed in 1921 as one of the educational institutions of the Comintern, the OGPU / NKVD agents were also trained. In addition to the “head office” in Moscow, KUTV had branches in Baku, Irkutsk and Tashkent. Over the years, representatives of 1938 nationalities from dozens of countries around the world studied at KUTV, abolished in 73. [12] Prominent leaders of the communist movement, including Iraqi Yusif Salman Yusif, Palestinian Mohammed Nadjati Sidqi, Syrian Khalid Bakdash graduated from , Turk Nazim Hikmet Ran and others.
The first students of KUTV from Arab countries were Egyptians in 1922. [13] In 1929, here, besides them, Algerians, Yemenis, Palestinians, reefs, Syrians, Transjordans and Tunisians were already trained. [14] They were accepted as trained applicants intellectuals, as well as completely unprepared candidates from among the Bedouins and port workers. [15]
It is noteworthy that among the KUTV students there were no Saudis, since “unlike other Arab countries, Moscow’s foreign policy towards Arabia Ibn Saud had practically no ideological (read - Comintern) coloring” [16].
One of the KUTV teachers was his graduate, Hamdi Salam, who arrived in 1924 in the 20 years of age to study in the USSR. This was one of the reasons why, in 1928, he was deprived of the citizenship of his homeland and was forced to remain in the Soviet Union. Here he becomes a certified surgeon and teacher of oriental studies in his native KUTV, the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and the International Lenin School, and one of the best translators of works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. [17]
In 1918 – 1919 in the big cities of Egypt among the workers began to emerge socialist cells, united in 1921 in the Socialist Party of Egypt (SPE). In 1922, SPE was renamed the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) and accepted into the Comintern. [18] “At the end of October 1922 to participate in the 4th Congress of the Communist International, members of the Alexandrian faction insisted on going to Moscow SPE member Husni al-Orabi. ... During his stay in Moscow, he was introduced to 1922, prepared in June, by an employee of the Eastern Department of the ECCI, a famous Soviet orientalist K.M. Troyanovsky, theses on the program and tactics of the Communist Party of Egypt.
This document emphasized that in Egypt "a base is being created for communist work not only in Arabic, but also in the entire Middle East, ... along the entire southern and southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea." K.M. Troyanovsky believed that this circumstance is fundamental, since Egypt is extremely important "for ... British capitalism" because this country is located "at the crossroads of the main sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, in general, and the western part of the British Empire (metropolis) with east (India) ”. And further he wrote: “In order to separate the brain from the vertebra of the empire, it is necessary to cut this 'occipital nerve', which Egypt is for English imperialism”. It was about the Suez Canal, which acted as the “focus” of international politics, “the capture of the channel by the British meant militarily and politically subjugation and occupation of the whole country, and the return of the channel to its natural owners means political liberation and independence of Egypt.” But, moreover, a change in the status of this waterway (the author of the theses spoke of the need for the socialists to nominate the canal nationalization) would mean “breaking the British Empire into two parts, at the same time, the disintegration of the empire”. However, Soviet geopolitics, framed by KM. Troyanovsky class slogans, had a tendency to further development ”[19].
Egyptian socialists clearly overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union in the confrontation with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet side skillfully used this: “The Egyptian delegate was seduced by the promises of Sudan in order to gain full support for his foreign policy from his supporters in Egypt. In turn, for his recognition as the head of the Egyptian section of the Comintern, H. al-Orabi was ready to recognize the legitimacy of Moscow’s claims on his country and its surrounding geopolitical space ”[20].
What were the reasons for the desire of the Egyptian socialists to cooperate with Moscow? “The coming to an alliance with the Soviet state of those who, ultimately, became the Communists of Egypt, was a consequence of the radicalization of the nationalist views of these people, absolutely far from any concepts of internationalism, as well as of working life. ... The leadership of the ETUC (at least, H. al-Orabi), was aware of the price paid by him for joining the Comintern. The repetition in the program of a party of ideas of Soviet geopolitics is a sufficiently weighty confirmation [21].
It is noteworthy that a translation of Lenin's The State and the Revolution was published in Egypt in 1922. [22]
In October, the Socialist Workers Party of Palestine (SRPP) was established in Jaffa in Jaffa, a Jewish organization by nationality. [1919] The Palestinian Communist Party (PKP) emerged from the SRPP in 23. [1922] adopted in the Comintern: “In March, the 24 of the ECCI decided to fully recognize the Palestinian Communist Party, issued as the“ Resolution on the Palestinian Party ”of 1924 in March of the same year. ... Palestinian communists were told that “there is a danger that PPK as an organization of predominantly Jewish workers ... stands in the way of isolation from the bulk of the Arab workers and peasants, ”and therefore they are required to“ abandon national exclusivity, as well as an open and consistent struggle against Zionist colonialists who pursue ... the policy of British imperialism ”. The resolution noted that “the Comintern is awaiting from P.P.P. the earliest possible transformation into a territorial communist party, i.e. to the party of revolutionary workers of the Arab, Jewish and other nationalities inhabiting the territory of Palestine. ” The party was supposed to be united, without any “national sections” in its ranks ”[1924].
The PCP question was one of the points of foreign policy differences between the USSR and the KSA, since “for Ibn Saud the Soviet position of relying on the“ international ”Jewish-Arab Communist Party of Palestine was unacceptable ...” [26].
Speaking for the joint struggle of Jews and Arabs against British imperialism and the liberation of Palestine from British colonial domination, the PCP set as its ultimate goal the creation of an Arab-Jewish state on the territory of Palestine. "The PCP was called upon to create a united front of Arab and Jewish workers, under its leadership, fighting not for the realization of their present, basically private aspirations, but for the fundamental transformation of socio-economic relations and the political system of Palestine and the entire Middle East region." [ 27]
In a secret letter to “All members of the KP Palestine”, sent in December to 1930, “ECCI qualified Palestine“ as an Arab country of Jewish and Arab workers ”.” The letter emphasized that “English imperialism ... turned the incoming Jewish national minority into an instrument of oppression of the indigenous Arab population.” [28] “Arabization of the PCP was like an emergency job, when Jewish party cadres were urgently and thoughtlessly replaced by Arab cadres who barely joined the party, more often altogether ill-prepared theoretically and not having the experience of a long political struggle ”[29].
Since 1923, “Syrian-Lebanese nationalists themselves established contacts with the ECCI. 31 October 1924 was received by the ECCI from Beirut, stating that the 28 of October of the same year in the Lebanese capital during the first meeting of its Executive Committee was the Syrian Communist Party (UPC). In 1928, the single party organization of the Communists of Syria and Lebanon - the Syrian Communist Party was officially recognized by the Comintern and accepted into its ranks. 1 April 1930 The expanded text of the “Draft Resolution on the Situation in Syria and the Work of the Syrian Communist Party” prepared in the Eastern Department was introduced for discussion by the ECCI. This document put everything in its place. "Syria," it was noted, "lies on the high road of world politics, where world imperialism is fighting against the revolutionary East and against the USSR." Everything became clear, this country was in the center of attention of Moscow geopolitics. The Comintern cherished the Arabized UPC. As noted in the resolution of the Secretariat of the ECCI of February 29 from 1936. “The tasks of the KP Arab countries in the struggle for the popular anti-imperialist front”, the communist parties in the countries of the Arab region continued to preserve the character of “closed groups separated from the masses”. Only in Syria did the Communists lead the “line of Arabization” ... ... In Syrian-Lebanese and Palestinian communists in Moscow, they proposed a resolution of the ECCI Secretariat “On the Relationship and Relationship Between the Communist Parties of the Arab Countries”. These parties not only could, but also pledged to maintain multilateral contacts ”[30].
It is noteworthy that out of the Communist Arabs, a “career” in the Comintern was made by a member of the Syrian Communist Party, Aboud Salim [31], who became a member of the ECCI. [32]
In 1934, the “Committee Against Imperialism and Exploitation” was created in Iraq — the first communist organization that was transformed into an Iraqi Communist Party (IKP) in 1935. In the same year, the ICP established contacts with the Comintern and its representatives as observers attended the VII Congress of the Comintern, and already in 1936, the IKP became its section. [33]
From the essays "The Work of the Comintern and the GPU in Turkey" (were written in Paris in 1931 and remained unpublished), the former Deputy Trade Representative in Turkey, I.M. Ibragimov [34] it follows that a resident of the Comintern in Turkey occupied a special place among the Comintern employees in the Middle East, who exercised general leadership and, moreover, conducted direct work among the Balkan peoples, both in Turkey and in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania ( in Romania, work was carried out through Vienna), Egypt, throughout the Arabian Peninsula. [35] With regard to the work of the Comintern in Turkey itself, “besides the designated leader, there are also assistants, the main is always the second secretary of the Consulate General (with Peace [36] b He is a Kheyfetz [37]) who manages the work exclusively of the Turkish Communist Party, its organization, reorganization, recruitment of new members, control, procurement, material means, member approval, etc. Communication is maintained through a general secretary tour. Communist Party, which appoints and approves the Comintern on the proposal of the Commissioner. Here they act more cautiously, fearing a scandal with the Turks. Meetings take place in safe houses or in one of the Soviet economic organizations. There are ramifications throughout Turkey, where there are only Soviet consulates or cons. agents or just devices (at least temporary, like seasonal purchases of cotton, sesame, distribution of petroleum products, etc.) of economic organizations, not counting the actual tour. Komjacheyki: in Ankara, Smyrna [38], Mersin, Trapezunde [39], Samsun, Eskisehir, Artvin, etc. "[40].
The involvement of activists of foreign communist parties in intelligence activities began almost immediately after the creation of the first Soviet intelligence stations in Western Europe and the East. [41] "The agents, informing the Comintern on specific issues, also covered issues of [O] GPU" [42]. “In addition, in foreign communist parties, especially in eastern countries, there is a large stock of provocateurs, the OGPU took up the fight against and was identified, so the business connection between the OGPU and the Comintern [was] inevitable” [43].
American Councilor David Dallin revealed the background and mechanism of cooperation between the leadership of foreign communist parties and the Soviet secret services, which differs from the above scheme: “... Stalin never agreed to release satellite parties from their espionage tasks. The biggest concession he made was that he went to the formal separation of the Soviet intelligence apparatus from the communist party: contacts between the party and this apparatus should be kept to a minimum so that cooperation between them could never be proved. The compromise was solved by bringing to the “special assignments” a prominent and reliable functionary, usually from among the leaders of large communist parties. The candidacy was approved only after agreement with Moscow. One of his main responsibilities was cooperation with secret Soviet agents. He also helped in other matters, mainly in recruiting new people for secret assignments. He, however, never informed his party comrades about this side of his activity. Thus, the remaining party leaders had every reason to deny that they knew anything about ties with the Soviet secret services ”[44].
The Comintern also acted where there were no Communist parties at all. As Lipetsk researcher Yury Tikhonov writes, “... work began in Kabul to create an“ Indian revolutionary base ”. In the Afghan capital, on the instructions of the CI, N. Bravin [45] took the first steps in this direction, who promised Indian nationalists and representatives of the Pashtun tribes (“border revolutionaries”) assistance in the fight against England and gave some of them mandates to travel to Tashkent. [ 46] The full-scale work on the Comintern’s cooperation with anti-British elements in Afghanistan and India began with the arrival in Kabul of J. Suritz [47], which was officially the representative of CI in the countries of Central Asia. It was with this that the plenipotentiary in Afghanistan developed a rather logical division of responsibilities for Soviet diplomats: the intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Kabul were overseen by the NKID, and the illegal ties with the anti-British leaders of India were the Comintern. However, until the dissolution of CI in 1943, the ambassadors [48] of the USSR in Afghanistan were “united in two persons”, secretly combining their direct duties with illegal work on the instructions of the Third International. Of course, in this state of affairs, the Soviet embassy in Kabul from the first days of its existence turned into a center of subversive activity against Great Britain ”[49].
Irkutsk historian Sergey Panin reports the attitude of the NKID to the Comintern's activity in Afghanistan through the position of the People's Commissar: “... Chicherin believed that the Comintern, sending its agents to Afghanistan, could harm the Soviet foreign policy: it annoys the Afghan emir and“ disrupts our policies ”[50] . After the signing of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty 1921, Mr. Chicherin was convinced that one should not “touch the Afghan system and ... frighten the Afghans with the slogans of the world revolution”, from which they “rush to the British” [51] ”[52].
G.V. Chicherin
However, the British did not sit idly by: “Thanks to the excellent work of British intelligence, the plans of the Bolsheviks and Cominterns in Asia were known in detail in London. The intelligence service was able to penetrate into the Comintern structures, both in Tashkent and in Moscow ”[53]. As early as 1918 in Tashkent, the Cheka officials stopped the attempts of the British agent F.-M. Bailey [54], with his activities in Central Asia, to intensify the Basmach movement. [55] However, in 1919 in Tashkent, he continued to collect information about Soviet-Afghan contacts, about Indians who arrived in Tashkent. He collected information about the Bravin mission to Afghanistan, met with the translator of the first Afghan mission Vali Khan to Moscow Abdul Ghani. [56] Later on, the British information will allow them to come forward with convictions of the Soviet side in the communist propaganda in the “Kerzon ultimatum.” [57 ]
Russian researcher Vladimir Pyatnitsky clearly exaggerates the role played by his father, I.A. Pyatnitsky [58] in the development and adoption of political decisions by the leadership of the USSR. In essence, the Comintern was a branch of the Foreign Department (INO) [59] of the GPU [60], which was in constant contact with the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), including its Eastern Secretariat, on a variety of issues.
I.A. Pyatnitsky
The INO at the initial stage “consisted of an inordinate part and a department of a foreign registry. According to the regulations on the Special Department of the GPU (June 1922), he (INO. - PG) was “the organizational center that concentrated all the leadership and management of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work”. All the work of the remaining departments of the GPU with the people's commissariats of foreign affairs, foreign trade, the Central Commission for Evacuation and the Bureau of the Comintern was to be carried out only through the INO GPU [61]
In addition, the GPU provided its materials and received materials to the ECCI. [62] It is noteworthy that one of the presidium members and a candidate member to the ECCI secretariat in 1935 – 1938. was the former head of the INO, MA Trilisser [63], who was also responsible for the work of the International Communications Department of the ECCI. [64] “The Comintern was, like an iceberg, two unequal parts. The smaller part of the iceberg that was on the surface is an activity that is still seen history Comintern: congresses, plenums of the ECCI, educational institutions ... Most of the iceberg was not visible. It was the world of “underground politics”, and here the main organizational structure was the MLA ... ”[65] (International Cooperation Department).
M.A. Trilisser
Transformed into 1921 from the Secret Department (created in 1920, from 1936 - Communication Service), the MLA maintained a secret link between the ECCI and the Communist Parties. From 1921, the OMC had a contact point in Istanbul, which also provided links to the communist parties of some Arab countries, and from 1929, to Tehran, which also provided links to the communist elements of India and Iraq. [66] From 1923, the MLA was forced to use OGPU courier service. [67] The close cooperation between the Comintern and the OGPU is evidenced by the fact that even the OMS archive records are still kept in secret storage (RGASPI. F. 495, op. 23, 138, 151). [68]
Sometimes the employees of the INO combined their duties with work in the Comintern, and sometimes they worked in these institutions alternately [69], which shows how similar the nature of the activities of these structures was.
Of great importance as a historical source are the "Notes of the Chekist" of the Soviet resident in the Middle East G.S. Agabekov [70], published in Russian [71] in Berlin in 1930. The “Notes” in detail reflect the political situation in the Middle East in 1923 – 1930, reveal the methods of work of the INO, describe the direct organizers and participants of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence activities in these regions and describe the operations they carried out. Agabekov rightly notes that “despite the official assurances of the Soviet government that he was not fully involved in the affairs of the Third International ... in fact, the People's Commissariat [, the OGPU] and the Intelligence Agency [72] work together for a common purpose and for one owner - to whom: Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, or Stalin ”[73]. “No, therefore, it is not surprising that the diplomatic and trade missions of the Soviet government abroad carry out the orders of the Comintern and often lead the propaganda of the Third International” [74].
In 1920 – 30, there were episodes of cooperation between the Red Army’s intelligence service and the Comintern, despite the fact that this organization was a “fiefdom” of the OGPU / NKVD. [75] So, military intelligence provided the Comintern with some of its materials, including military-political reports [76], and corresponded with him on the issue of personnel. [77] It is noteworthy that the future head of the Soviet military intelligence, Ya.K. Berzin in 1919 – 1921 He held a number of high positions at the Executive Committee. [78]
Y.K. Berzin
Yuri Tikhonov, in our opinion, correctly noted the desire of the Red Army commanders to cooperate with the Comintern at the beginning of the 20s: “For the cooperation of the Red Army with the Comintern during the Civil War, which, according to the Bolsheviks, was to develop into a world revolution, the General Staff [79] The Red Army went readily, subordinating the revolutionary dreams of the Comintern to the harsh demands of the “battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” The prevailing sentiments in the command of the Red Army are most frankly and militarily expressed in the appeal of the faction of the RCP (b) of the Academy of the General Staff [80] to the delegates of the 2nd Congress of the CI [81]: We are delighted to welcome in your person the WORLD GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (as in the document. - Yu.T.) of the revolutionary victory. In the Communist International we see our immediate leader and leader, for our Red Army is only the vanguard of the International Red Army, and we are only a unit of the great General Staff, whose name is Communist International. We vow to fight, not sparing the strength and not sparing life, fully armed with our knowledge and experience for the cause of world communism ... [82] ”[83]. Later in connection with the division of influence in the sphere of intelligence, the situation will change. [84]
In October, the Comintern 1936 initiated the creation of international brigades, international formations, which brought together anti-fascist volunteers from 54 countries under their banner. In total, seven international brigades were formed. [85] According to the Comintern, representatives of the Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians and Palestinians fought among the Arab peoples in the international brigades. [86]
So, the Comintern, contrary to the assertions of the Soviet leadership about the independence of this organization, was an active “supplier” of intelligence information to the Soviet leadership, in close cooperation with other special services of the USSR.
Notes
[1] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 11, 90, 154.
[2] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 11, 154, 181.
[3] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 81, 154.
[4] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 85, 154.
[5] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 84, 110.
[6] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14.
[7] RGASPI. F. 517, op. 1.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Dumbadze, Evgeny Vasilyevich (1900 – 1939) - KI officer, reconnaissance scout. From 1918 - in the Red Army. Member of the Civil War. From June 1921 - in the Cheka of Georgia. In 1925, he entered the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages. A.S. Yenukidze Since February, 1928 has been on a scientific mission in Istanbul, where he was hired by the trade mission of the USSR. He combined work duties with the fulfillment of the tasks of the foreign intelligence resident Ya.G. Minsky, who invited him to continue the agent work in Paris. In June, 1928 Dumbadze left for Paris, where he announced his break with the Bolsheviks. Later settled in Brussels. Date and place of death unknown. Presumably, it was eliminated by the employees of the Soviet special services. See: V. Genis. Wrong servants of the regime. The first Soviet defectors (1920 – 1933). Prince 1. M., 2009, p. 570 – 576.
[10] With the formation of 30 in December of 1922 in the Soviet Union, by a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of November 2 in 1923, the Main Political Administration (GPU) was transformed into the United State Political Administration (OGPU). (Approx. P.G.).
[11] Dumbadze E. In the Service of the Check and Comintern. Paris, MCMXXX, p. 142. See: P. Gusterin. The policy of the Soviet state in the Muslim East in 1917 – 1921. // Questions of history. 2010, No. 1.
[12] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 7, 18, 54, 93, 114, 115, 158, 182. See: Adibekov G.M., Shakhnazarova E.N., Shirinya K.K. The organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919 – 1943. M., 1997, p. 127 – 128, 171 – 172, 207. See: I.V. Stalin On the political objectives of the University of the Peoples of the East. - In the book: Stalin I. Essays. T. 7. M., 1954.
[13] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 2, l. 49.
[14] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 71, l. 31.
[15] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 71, l. 12.
[16] A. Yakovlev Saudi Arabia: the path of evolution. M., 1999, p. 57.
[17] Braginsky I.S. Life Paradoxes of Dr. Hamdi Selyam // Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1964, No. 4, p. 269.
[18] Recent History of the Arab Countries in Africa, p. 9. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East in the USSR. 1920 – 1930's. M., 2009, Ch. I.
[19] Kosach G.G. Red flag over the Middle East? M., 2001, p. 74, 78.
[20] Ibid., P. 79.
[21] Ibid., P. 89.
[22] OM Gorbatov, L.Ya. Cherkassky Cooperation of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East and Africa. M., 1980, p. 22.
[23] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 150.
[24] Ibid., P. 179.
[25] Ibid., P. 184. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Ii.
[26] at-Turki M. Saudi-Russian relations in global and regional processes. M., 2005, p. 127.
[27] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 187. See: Communist Party of Israel. The XVII Congress of the Communist Party of Israel. Tel-Aviv, 1972.
[28] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 237.
[29] Ibid., P. 238.
[30] Ibid., P. 283, 304, 333, 346, 382. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Iii.
[31] Real name is Mahmoud Maghribi.
[32] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 182, 210.
[33] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 27. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Iv.
[34] Ibrahimov, Ibrahim Mustafovich (1888 -?) Is a Soviet defector who fled 1928 to Europe in April from the post of deputy. trade representative of the USSR in Turkey. He graduated from the teachers' seminary in Simferopol (1904), a teacher's college in Istanbul (1908). In 1920, he joined the RCP (b). In 1922 – 1925 - People's Commissar of Education of the Crimean ASSR. From 1925 - deputy. trade representative in Turkey. After the flight, after some time settled in Paris. See: V. Genis. Wrong servants of the regime, p. 561 – 570.
[35] RGASPI. F. 328, op. 1, d. 203, l. 1.
[36] Mirny, Simon Maksimovich (1896 – 1973) - intelligence officer and diplomat (“Abdullah”). He graduated from the East Department of the Military Academy of the Red Army (1923). Member of the Civil and World War II. In 1923 – 1926 - on reconnaissance in Turkey under diplomatic cover. Later - in diplomatic posts in Norway, Hungary and Sweden. In 1955 – 1961 - Chief Bibliographer of the State Library. IN AND. Lenin. (Approx. P.G.).
[37] Heyfets, Grigory Mendelevich (Markovich) (1899 – 1984) is a talented intelligence agent. Member of the Civil War. In 1920, he studied at the Moscow Commercial School and on the background of 1-th Moscow University. In 1921, N.K. Krupskaya. From 1921, a KI employee (“Grimmel”), in 1922, he was transferred to NKID for cover. In 1924 – 1927 - on reconnaissance under diplomatic cover in Latvia and Turkey, in 1927 – 1929. - assignments in China, Germany, Austria and France. In 1931 – 1947 - Foreign Intelligence Officer ("Charon") - assignments in Sweden, the United States and Italy. (Approx. P.G.).
[38] Smyrna - Greek name, Turkish - Izmir. (Approx. P.G.).
[39] Trabzon - Greek name, Turkish - Trabzon. (Approx. P.G.).
[40] RGASPI. F. 328, op. 1, d. 203, l. 3 – 4. See: P. Gusterin. At the source of Soviet intelligence in the East // Asia and Africa today. 2012, No. 3.
[41] Pyatnitsky V.I. Osip Pyatnitsky and the Comintern on the scales of history. Minsk, 2004, p. 302.
[42] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes chekista. Berlin, 1930, p. 77.
[43] Ibid, c. 25.
[44] Dallin D. Spying Soviet-style. Objects and agents of Soviet intelligence. 1920 – 1950. M., 2001, p. 22.
[45] Bravin, Nikolai Zakharovich (1881 – 1921) - diplomat. He graduated from the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University and the Educational Department of Oriental Languages at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. From 1904 - in the service of the Foreign Ministry: business trips to Tehran, Mashhad, Husseynabad, Bombay, Calcutta, Qazvin, Hoy. He accepted the October Revolution, carried out diplomatic missions of the Soviet government. It was liquidated after it decided to enter into contact with the British. See: V. Genis, Vice Consul Vvedensky. Service in Persia and the Bukhara Khanate (1906 – 1920). M., 2003, p. 71 – 84; Genis V. The Incorrect Servants of the Regime, p. 9 – 28. (Approx. P.G.).
[46] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 68, d. 11, l. 24.
[47] Surits, Yakov Zakharovich (1882 – 1952) - statesman, diplomat. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg. In 1918 – 1919 - deputy plenipotentiary in Denmark, in 1919 – 1921. - Plenipotentiary in Afghanistan. In 1921 – 1922 - Member of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and authorized by the NKID for Turkestan and Central Asia. In 1922 – 1923 - Plenipotentiary in Norway, in 1923 – 1934. - in Turkey, in 1934 – 1937 - in Germany, in 1937 – 1940 - in France. In 1940 – 1946 - Advisor in the central office of the NKID / MFA. In 1946 – 1947 - Ambassador to Brazil.
[48] By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 9 in May 1941, plenipotentiaries of the USSR received the status of ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary. (Approx. P.G.).
[49] Tikhonov Yu.N. Afghan war of Stalin. Battle for Central Asia. M., 2008, p. 79 – 80. See: S.B. Panin Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. 1919 – 1929. M. — Irkutsk, 1998, p. 68 – 92.
[50] Dispatches G.V. Chicherina V.M. Zuckerman from 18 October 1921 g. // RGASPI. F. 5, op. 1, d. 2116, l. 29.
Tsukerman, Vladimir Moiseevich (1891 – 1937) - diplomat. From 1921 - head. 1-m East department NKID. (Approx. P.G.).
[51] Encrypted dispatch G.V. Chicherina V.M. Zuckerman from 6 August 1921 g. // RGASPI. F. 5, op. 1, d. 2116, l. 19.
[52] Panin SB, p. 91.
[53] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 126.
[54] Bailey, Frederick Marshman (1882 – 1967) - British intelligence officer, scientist, explorer of Tibet. In the British Army from 1900. In 1905 – 1938. - Officer of the British political service in the British colonial administration in India. In his book “Mission to Tashkent” (L., 1946; 1992; 2002), he made a number of distortions. See: Swinson A. Beyond the Frontiers. The Biography of Colonel F.-M. Bailey. Explorer and Special Agent. L., 1971.
[55] See: A. Raikov. Calculating the English Super Spy / / Asia and Africa Today. 2006, No. 2.
[56] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 126.
[57] See: P. Gusterin. Soviet-British relations between the world wars. Saarbrücken, 2014, p. 22.
[58] Pyatnitsky (real surname is Tarshis) Joseph (Osip) Aronovich (1882 – 1938) is a figure of the Russian and international communist movement. Party activity with 1898. From 1921, to the Executive Committee of the Executive Committee. From 1935, in the office of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
[59] A foreign department was established in 1920 to conduct intelligence work abroad in the Special Section of the All-Russian Emergency Commission (VChK) to combat counterrevolution and sabotage.
[60] 6 February 1922 was based on the INO Cheka at the NKVD of the RSFSR was created by the INO GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR, renamed 2 in November 1923 in the INO OGPU under the SNK of the USSR. 10 July 1934. External intelligence was transferred to the 7 department of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR.
[61] Chekists: History in the faces. M., 2008, p. 38.
[62] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 84, 136, 137, 204, 224, 230, 251 – 255, 346, 363, 431; Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 88.
[63] Trilisser, Mikhail Abramovich (1883 – 1940) is an outstanding intelligence organizer. In 1901 – 1921 - party activities in Siberia and the Far East. From 1921, in the central office of the Cheka. From May 1922 to October 1929 - early. INO. From 1926 - deputy. before OGPU. From 1930 - deputy. Commissar of Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection of the RSFSR. From 1935, to ICKI. See: V. Antonov, V. Karpov. Kremlin Secret Informers - 2. With them, the exploration began. M., 2003.
[64] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 184, 189, 191, 242.
[65] History of the East. T. V. M., 2006, p. 63.
[66] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 160.
[67] Ibid., P. 49, 75.
[68] See: ibid., P. 48 – 50, 74 – 75, 115 – 117, 159 – 161, 199 – 201, 215 – 216.
[69] Pyatnitsky V.I., p. 337.
[70] Agabekov, Georgy Sergeevich (Arutyunov; 1895 – 1938) - the scout-defector. In 1924 – 1926 - Resident in Afghanistan, in 1928 - in Persia, in 1929 – 1930. - illegal resident in Istanbul. Ran to Paris. See: Prokhorov D.P. How much does it cost to sell the motherland? SPb. —M., 2005, p. 50 – 64.
[71] The book has been translated into many languages, including Persian.
[72] Red Army Intelligence Agency. (Approx. P.G.).
[73] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes Chekista, with. 247.
[74] Ibid., P. 105 – 106.
[75] See: Agabekov G. Cheka at work. M., 1992.
[76] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 224, 528.
[77] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 513.
[78] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 8, 9, 21.
[79] This is the All-Russian General Staff. (Approx. P.G.).
[80] The current Combined-Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from 7 in October 1918 to 9 in August 1921 was called the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, from 10 in August 1921 in November to 9 in November 1925 in the Military Academy of the Red Army, from 10 in November 1925 g. To 31 october 1998 g. Bore the name of M.V. Frunze. (Approx. P.G.).
[81] 19 took place on July - 7 on August 1920. See: the Second Congress of the Comintern. July - August 1920 g. M., 1934. (Approx. P.G.).
[82] RGVA. F. 24696, op. 1, d. 3, l. 45 (on).
[83] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 77 – 78.
[84] See: P. Gusterin. Soviet Intelligence in the Near and Middle East in the 1920-30s Saarbrücken, 2014.
[85] See: L. Longo. International Brigades in Spain. M., 1960.
[86] RGASPI. F. 545, op. 6, d. 436; 437; 626; 843.
Under the influence of the October Revolution, communist parties began to emerge in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Persia (1920) [1], Turkey (1920) [2], Palestine (1921; transformed from the Socialist Party of Palestine created in 1919) [3], Egypt (1922; converted from the Socialist Party of Egypt, created in 1921 d.) [4], Syria (1924) [5], Iraq (1934) [6], Algeria (1936; from 1920 in Algeria there were communist sections that were part of the French Communist Party) [7], Tunisia (1939; since 1920 there was a Communist Federation of nissa as part French CCP) [8]. As reported in his memoirs, the Soviet defector E.V. Dumbadze [9], members of these parties collaborated with Soviet intelligence through the Comintern, providing information on the situation in their countries and carrying out "special assignments": "In addition to his staff, the OGPU resident [10] uses the staff of an authorized Comintern and recruits informants for his spyware targets among [members] of the local communist party. Often, also recruited communists do not even suspect that, being members of the communist party at home, they at the same time become traitors to their homeland, revealing to possible enemies the secrets of the state defense of their fatherland ”[11].
In the Communist University of Workers of the East (KUTV), formed in 1921 as one of the educational institutions of the Comintern, the OGPU / NKVD agents were also trained. In addition to the “head office” in Moscow, KUTV had branches in Baku, Irkutsk and Tashkent. Over the years, representatives of 1938 nationalities from dozens of countries around the world studied at KUTV, abolished in 73. [12] Prominent leaders of the communist movement, including Iraqi Yusif Salman Yusif, Palestinian Mohammed Nadjati Sidqi, Syrian Khalid Bakdash graduated from , Turk Nazim Hikmet Ran and others.
The first students of KUTV from Arab countries were Egyptians in 1922. [13] In 1929, here, besides them, Algerians, Yemenis, Palestinians, reefs, Syrians, Transjordans and Tunisians were already trained. [14] They were accepted as trained applicants intellectuals, as well as completely unprepared candidates from among the Bedouins and port workers. [15]
It is noteworthy that among the KUTV students there were no Saudis, since “unlike other Arab countries, Moscow’s foreign policy towards Arabia Ibn Saud had practically no ideological (read - Comintern) coloring” [16].
One of the KUTV teachers was his graduate, Hamdi Salam, who arrived in 1924 in the 20 years of age to study in the USSR. This was one of the reasons why, in 1928, he was deprived of the citizenship of his homeland and was forced to remain in the Soviet Union. Here he becomes a certified surgeon and teacher of oriental studies in his native KUTV, the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and the International Lenin School, and one of the best translators of works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. [17]
In 1918 – 1919 in the big cities of Egypt among the workers began to emerge socialist cells, united in 1921 in the Socialist Party of Egypt (SPE). In 1922, SPE was renamed the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) and accepted into the Comintern. [18] “At the end of October 1922 to participate in the 4th Congress of the Communist International, members of the Alexandrian faction insisted on going to Moscow SPE member Husni al-Orabi. ... During his stay in Moscow, he was introduced to 1922, prepared in June, by an employee of the Eastern Department of the ECCI, a famous Soviet orientalist K.M. Troyanovsky, theses on the program and tactics of the Communist Party of Egypt.
This document emphasized that in Egypt "a base is being created for communist work not only in Arabic, but also in the entire Middle East, ... along the entire southern and southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea." K.M. Troyanovsky believed that this circumstance is fundamental, since Egypt is extremely important "for ... British capitalism" because this country is located "at the crossroads of the main sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, in general, and the western part of the British Empire (metropolis) with east (India) ”. And further he wrote: “In order to separate the brain from the vertebra of the empire, it is necessary to cut this 'occipital nerve', which Egypt is for English imperialism”. It was about the Suez Canal, which acted as the “focus” of international politics, “the capture of the channel by the British meant militarily and politically subjugation and occupation of the whole country, and the return of the channel to its natural owners means political liberation and independence of Egypt.” But, moreover, a change in the status of this waterway (the author of the theses spoke of the need for the socialists to nominate the canal nationalization) would mean “breaking the British Empire into two parts, at the same time, the disintegration of the empire”. However, Soviet geopolitics, framed by KM. Troyanovsky class slogans, had a tendency to further development ”[19].
Egyptian socialists clearly overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union in the confrontation with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet side skillfully used this: “The Egyptian delegate was seduced by the promises of Sudan in order to gain full support for his foreign policy from his supporters in Egypt. In turn, for his recognition as the head of the Egyptian section of the Comintern, H. al-Orabi was ready to recognize the legitimacy of Moscow’s claims on his country and its surrounding geopolitical space ”[20].
What were the reasons for the desire of the Egyptian socialists to cooperate with Moscow? “The coming to an alliance with the Soviet state of those who, ultimately, became the Communists of Egypt, was a consequence of the radicalization of the nationalist views of these people, absolutely far from any concepts of internationalism, as well as of working life. ... The leadership of the ETUC (at least, H. al-Orabi), was aware of the price paid by him for joining the Comintern. The repetition in the program of a party of ideas of Soviet geopolitics is a sufficiently weighty confirmation [21].
It is noteworthy that a translation of Lenin's The State and the Revolution was published in Egypt in 1922. [22]
In October, the Socialist Workers Party of Palestine (SRPP) was established in Jaffa in Jaffa, a Jewish organization by nationality. [1919] The Palestinian Communist Party (PKP) emerged from the SRPP in 23. [1922] adopted in the Comintern: “In March, the 24 of the ECCI decided to fully recognize the Palestinian Communist Party, issued as the“ Resolution on the Palestinian Party ”of 1924 in March of the same year. ... Palestinian communists were told that “there is a danger that PPK as an organization of predominantly Jewish workers ... stands in the way of isolation from the bulk of the Arab workers and peasants, ”and therefore they are required to“ abandon national exclusivity, as well as an open and consistent struggle against Zionist colonialists who pursue ... the policy of British imperialism ”. The resolution noted that “the Comintern is awaiting from P.P.P. the earliest possible transformation into a territorial communist party, i.e. to the party of revolutionary workers of the Arab, Jewish and other nationalities inhabiting the territory of Palestine. ” The party was supposed to be united, without any “national sections” in its ranks ”[1924].
The PCP question was one of the points of foreign policy differences between the USSR and the KSA, since “for Ibn Saud the Soviet position of relying on the“ international ”Jewish-Arab Communist Party of Palestine was unacceptable ...” [26].
Speaking for the joint struggle of Jews and Arabs against British imperialism and the liberation of Palestine from British colonial domination, the PCP set as its ultimate goal the creation of an Arab-Jewish state on the territory of Palestine. "The PCP was called upon to create a united front of Arab and Jewish workers, under its leadership, fighting not for the realization of their present, basically private aspirations, but for the fundamental transformation of socio-economic relations and the political system of Palestine and the entire Middle East region." [ 27]
In a secret letter to “All members of the KP Palestine”, sent in December to 1930, “ECCI qualified Palestine“ as an Arab country of Jewish and Arab workers ”.” The letter emphasized that “English imperialism ... turned the incoming Jewish national minority into an instrument of oppression of the indigenous Arab population.” [28] “Arabization of the PCP was like an emergency job, when Jewish party cadres were urgently and thoughtlessly replaced by Arab cadres who barely joined the party, more often altogether ill-prepared theoretically and not having the experience of a long political struggle ”[29].
Since 1923, “Syrian-Lebanese nationalists themselves established contacts with the ECCI. 31 October 1924 was received by the ECCI from Beirut, stating that the 28 of October of the same year in the Lebanese capital during the first meeting of its Executive Committee was the Syrian Communist Party (UPC). In 1928, the single party organization of the Communists of Syria and Lebanon - the Syrian Communist Party was officially recognized by the Comintern and accepted into its ranks. 1 April 1930 The expanded text of the “Draft Resolution on the Situation in Syria and the Work of the Syrian Communist Party” prepared in the Eastern Department was introduced for discussion by the ECCI. This document put everything in its place. "Syria," it was noted, "lies on the high road of world politics, where world imperialism is fighting against the revolutionary East and against the USSR." Everything became clear, this country was in the center of attention of Moscow geopolitics. The Comintern cherished the Arabized UPC. As noted in the resolution of the Secretariat of the ECCI of February 29 from 1936. “The tasks of the KP Arab countries in the struggle for the popular anti-imperialist front”, the communist parties in the countries of the Arab region continued to preserve the character of “closed groups separated from the masses”. Only in Syria did the Communists lead the “line of Arabization” ... ... In Syrian-Lebanese and Palestinian communists in Moscow, they proposed a resolution of the ECCI Secretariat “On the Relationship and Relationship Between the Communist Parties of the Arab Countries”. These parties not only could, but also pledged to maintain multilateral contacts ”[30].
It is noteworthy that out of the Communist Arabs, a “career” in the Comintern was made by a member of the Syrian Communist Party, Aboud Salim [31], who became a member of the ECCI. [32]
In 1934, the “Committee Against Imperialism and Exploitation” was created in Iraq — the first communist organization that was transformed into an Iraqi Communist Party (IKP) in 1935. In the same year, the ICP established contacts with the Comintern and its representatives as observers attended the VII Congress of the Comintern, and already in 1936, the IKP became its section. [33]
From the essays "The Work of the Comintern and the GPU in Turkey" (were written in Paris in 1931 and remained unpublished), the former Deputy Trade Representative in Turkey, I.M. Ibragimov [34] it follows that a resident of the Comintern in Turkey occupied a special place among the Comintern employees in the Middle East, who exercised general leadership and, moreover, conducted direct work among the Balkan peoples, both in Turkey and in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania ( in Romania, work was carried out through Vienna), Egypt, throughout the Arabian Peninsula. [35] With regard to the work of the Comintern in Turkey itself, “besides the designated leader, there are also assistants, the main is always the second secretary of the Consulate General (with Peace [36] b He is a Kheyfetz [37]) who manages the work exclusively of the Turkish Communist Party, its organization, reorganization, recruitment of new members, control, procurement, material means, member approval, etc. Communication is maintained through a general secretary tour. Communist Party, which appoints and approves the Comintern on the proposal of the Commissioner. Here they act more cautiously, fearing a scandal with the Turks. Meetings take place in safe houses or in one of the Soviet economic organizations. There are ramifications throughout Turkey, where there are only Soviet consulates or cons. agents or just devices (at least temporary, like seasonal purchases of cotton, sesame, distribution of petroleum products, etc.) of economic organizations, not counting the actual tour. Komjacheyki: in Ankara, Smyrna [38], Mersin, Trapezunde [39], Samsun, Eskisehir, Artvin, etc. "[40].
The involvement of activists of foreign communist parties in intelligence activities began almost immediately after the creation of the first Soviet intelligence stations in Western Europe and the East. [41] "The agents, informing the Comintern on specific issues, also covered issues of [O] GPU" [42]. “In addition, in foreign communist parties, especially in eastern countries, there is a large stock of provocateurs, the OGPU took up the fight against and was identified, so the business connection between the OGPU and the Comintern [was] inevitable” [43].
American Councilor David Dallin revealed the background and mechanism of cooperation between the leadership of foreign communist parties and the Soviet secret services, which differs from the above scheme: “... Stalin never agreed to release satellite parties from their espionage tasks. The biggest concession he made was that he went to the formal separation of the Soviet intelligence apparatus from the communist party: contacts between the party and this apparatus should be kept to a minimum so that cooperation between them could never be proved. The compromise was solved by bringing to the “special assignments” a prominent and reliable functionary, usually from among the leaders of large communist parties. The candidacy was approved only after agreement with Moscow. One of his main responsibilities was cooperation with secret Soviet agents. He also helped in other matters, mainly in recruiting new people for secret assignments. He, however, never informed his party comrades about this side of his activity. Thus, the remaining party leaders had every reason to deny that they knew anything about ties with the Soviet secret services ”[44].
The Comintern also acted where there were no Communist parties at all. As Lipetsk researcher Yury Tikhonov writes, “... work began in Kabul to create an“ Indian revolutionary base ”. In the Afghan capital, on the instructions of the CI, N. Bravin [45] took the first steps in this direction, who promised Indian nationalists and representatives of the Pashtun tribes (“border revolutionaries”) assistance in the fight against England and gave some of them mandates to travel to Tashkent. [ 46] The full-scale work on the Comintern’s cooperation with anti-British elements in Afghanistan and India began with the arrival in Kabul of J. Suritz [47], which was officially the representative of CI in the countries of Central Asia. It was with this that the plenipotentiary in Afghanistan developed a rather logical division of responsibilities for Soviet diplomats: the intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Kabul were overseen by the NKID, and the illegal ties with the anti-British leaders of India were the Comintern. However, until the dissolution of CI in 1943, the ambassadors [48] of the USSR in Afghanistan were “united in two persons”, secretly combining their direct duties with illegal work on the instructions of the Third International. Of course, in this state of affairs, the Soviet embassy in Kabul from the first days of its existence turned into a center of subversive activity against Great Britain ”[49].
Irkutsk historian Sergey Panin reports the attitude of the NKID to the Comintern's activity in Afghanistan through the position of the People's Commissar: “... Chicherin believed that the Comintern, sending its agents to Afghanistan, could harm the Soviet foreign policy: it annoys the Afghan emir and“ disrupts our policies ”[50] . After the signing of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty 1921, Mr. Chicherin was convinced that one should not “touch the Afghan system and ... frighten the Afghans with the slogans of the world revolution”, from which they “rush to the British” [51] ”[52].
G.V. Chicherin
However, the British did not sit idly by: “Thanks to the excellent work of British intelligence, the plans of the Bolsheviks and Cominterns in Asia were known in detail in London. The intelligence service was able to penetrate into the Comintern structures, both in Tashkent and in Moscow ”[53]. As early as 1918 in Tashkent, the Cheka officials stopped the attempts of the British agent F.-M. Bailey [54], with his activities in Central Asia, to intensify the Basmach movement. [55] However, in 1919 in Tashkent, he continued to collect information about Soviet-Afghan contacts, about Indians who arrived in Tashkent. He collected information about the Bravin mission to Afghanistan, met with the translator of the first Afghan mission Vali Khan to Moscow Abdul Ghani. [56] Later on, the British information will allow them to come forward with convictions of the Soviet side in the communist propaganda in the “Kerzon ultimatum.” [57 ]
Russian researcher Vladimir Pyatnitsky clearly exaggerates the role played by his father, I.A. Pyatnitsky [58] in the development and adoption of political decisions by the leadership of the USSR. In essence, the Comintern was a branch of the Foreign Department (INO) [59] of the GPU [60], which was in constant contact with the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), including its Eastern Secretariat, on a variety of issues.
I.A. Pyatnitsky
The INO at the initial stage “consisted of an inordinate part and a department of a foreign registry. According to the regulations on the Special Department of the GPU (June 1922), he (INO. - PG) was “the organizational center that concentrated all the leadership and management of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work”. All the work of the remaining departments of the GPU with the people's commissariats of foreign affairs, foreign trade, the Central Commission for Evacuation and the Bureau of the Comintern was to be carried out only through the INO GPU [61]
In addition, the GPU provided its materials and received materials to the ECCI. [62] It is noteworthy that one of the presidium members and a candidate member to the ECCI secretariat in 1935 – 1938. was the former head of the INO, MA Trilisser [63], who was also responsible for the work of the International Communications Department of the ECCI. [64] “The Comintern was, like an iceberg, two unequal parts. The smaller part of the iceberg that was on the surface is an activity that is still seen history Comintern: congresses, plenums of the ECCI, educational institutions ... Most of the iceberg was not visible. It was the world of “underground politics”, and here the main organizational structure was the MLA ... ”[65] (International Cooperation Department).
M.A. Trilisser
Transformed into 1921 from the Secret Department (created in 1920, from 1936 - Communication Service), the MLA maintained a secret link between the ECCI and the Communist Parties. From 1921, the OMC had a contact point in Istanbul, which also provided links to the communist parties of some Arab countries, and from 1929, to Tehran, which also provided links to the communist elements of India and Iraq. [66] From 1923, the MLA was forced to use OGPU courier service. [67] The close cooperation between the Comintern and the OGPU is evidenced by the fact that even the OMS archive records are still kept in secret storage (RGASPI. F. 495, op. 23, 138, 151). [68]
Sometimes the employees of the INO combined their duties with work in the Comintern, and sometimes they worked in these institutions alternately [69], which shows how similar the nature of the activities of these structures was.
Of great importance as a historical source are the "Notes of the Chekist" of the Soviet resident in the Middle East G.S. Agabekov [70], published in Russian [71] in Berlin in 1930. The “Notes” in detail reflect the political situation in the Middle East in 1923 – 1930, reveal the methods of work of the INO, describe the direct organizers and participants of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence activities in these regions and describe the operations they carried out. Agabekov rightly notes that “despite the official assurances of the Soviet government that he was not fully involved in the affairs of the Third International ... in fact, the People's Commissariat [, the OGPU] and the Intelligence Agency [72] work together for a common purpose and for one owner - to whom: Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, or Stalin ”[73]. “No, therefore, it is not surprising that the diplomatic and trade missions of the Soviet government abroad carry out the orders of the Comintern and often lead the propaganda of the Third International” [74].
In 1920 – 30, there were episodes of cooperation between the Red Army’s intelligence service and the Comintern, despite the fact that this organization was a “fiefdom” of the OGPU / NKVD. [75] So, military intelligence provided the Comintern with some of its materials, including military-political reports [76], and corresponded with him on the issue of personnel. [77] It is noteworthy that the future head of the Soviet military intelligence, Ya.K. Berzin in 1919 – 1921 He held a number of high positions at the Executive Committee. [78]
Y.K. Berzin
Yuri Tikhonov, in our opinion, correctly noted the desire of the Red Army commanders to cooperate with the Comintern at the beginning of the 20s: “For the cooperation of the Red Army with the Comintern during the Civil War, which, according to the Bolsheviks, was to develop into a world revolution, the General Staff [79] The Red Army went readily, subordinating the revolutionary dreams of the Comintern to the harsh demands of the “battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” The prevailing sentiments in the command of the Red Army are most frankly and militarily expressed in the appeal of the faction of the RCP (b) of the Academy of the General Staff [80] to the delegates of the 2nd Congress of the CI [81]: We are delighted to welcome in your person the WORLD GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (as in the document. - Yu.T.) of the revolutionary victory. In the Communist International we see our immediate leader and leader, for our Red Army is only the vanguard of the International Red Army, and we are only a unit of the great General Staff, whose name is Communist International. We vow to fight, not sparing the strength and not sparing life, fully armed with our knowledge and experience for the cause of world communism ... [82] ”[83]. Later in connection with the division of influence in the sphere of intelligence, the situation will change. [84]
In October, the Comintern 1936 initiated the creation of international brigades, international formations, which brought together anti-fascist volunteers from 54 countries under their banner. In total, seven international brigades were formed. [85] According to the Comintern, representatives of the Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians and Palestinians fought among the Arab peoples in the international brigades. [86]
So, the Comintern, contrary to the assertions of the Soviet leadership about the independence of this organization, was an active “supplier” of intelligence information to the Soviet leadership, in close cooperation with other special services of the USSR.
Notes
[1] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 11, 90, 154.
[2] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 11, 154, 181.
[3] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 81, 154.
[4] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 85, 154.
[5] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14, 84, 110.
[6] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 14.
[7] RGASPI. F. 517, op. 1.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Dumbadze, Evgeny Vasilyevich (1900 – 1939) - KI officer, reconnaissance scout. From 1918 - in the Red Army. Member of the Civil War. From June 1921 - in the Cheka of Georgia. In 1925, he entered the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages. A.S. Yenukidze Since February, 1928 has been on a scientific mission in Istanbul, where he was hired by the trade mission of the USSR. He combined work duties with the fulfillment of the tasks of the foreign intelligence resident Ya.G. Minsky, who invited him to continue the agent work in Paris. In June, 1928 Dumbadze left for Paris, where he announced his break with the Bolsheviks. Later settled in Brussels. Date and place of death unknown. Presumably, it was eliminated by the employees of the Soviet special services. See: V. Genis. Wrong servants of the regime. The first Soviet defectors (1920 – 1933). Prince 1. M., 2009, p. 570 – 576.
[10] With the formation of 30 in December of 1922 in the Soviet Union, by a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of November 2 in 1923, the Main Political Administration (GPU) was transformed into the United State Political Administration (OGPU). (Approx. P.G.).
[11] Dumbadze E. In the Service of the Check and Comintern. Paris, MCMXXX, p. 142. See: P. Gusterin. The policy of the Soviet state in the Muslim East in 1917 – 1921. // Questions of history. 2010, No. 1.
[12] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 7, 18, 54, 93, 114, 115, 158, 182. See: Adibekov G.M., Shakhnazarova E.N., Shirinya K.K. The organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919 – 1943. M., 1997, p. 127 – 128, 171 – 172, 207. See: I.V. Stalin On the political objectives of the University of the Peoples of the East. - In the book: Stalin I. Essays. T. 7. M., 1954.
[13] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 2, l. 49.
[14] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 71, l. 31.
[15] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 71, l. 12.
[16] A. Yakovlev Saudi Arabia: the path of evolution. M., 1999, p. 57.
[17] Braginsky I.S. Life Paradoxes of Dr. Hamdi Selyam // Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1964, No. 4, p. 269.
[18] Recent History of the Arab Countries in Africa, p. 9. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East in the USSR. 1920 – 1930's. M., 2009, Ch. I.
[19] Kosach G.G. Red flag over the Middle East? M., 2001, p. 74, 78.
[20] Ibid., P. 79.
[21] Ibid., P. 89.
[22] OM Gorbatov, L.Ya. Cherkassky Cooperation of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East and Africa. M., 1980, p. 22.
[23] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 150.
[24] Ibid., P. 179.
[25] Ibid., P. 184. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Ii.
[26] at-Turki M. Saudi-Russian relations in global and regional processes. M., 2005, p. 127.
[27] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 187. See: Communist Party of Israel. The XVII Congress of the Communist Party of Israel. Tel-Aviv, 1972.
[28] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 237.
[29] Ibid., P. 238.
[30] Ibid., P. 283, 304, 333, 346, 382. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Iii.
[31] Real name is Mahmoud Maghribi.
[32] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 182, 210.
[33] Kosach G.G. Red flag ..., p. 27. See: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East ..., ch. Iv.
[34] Ibrahimov, Ibrahim Mustafovich (1888 -?) Is a Soviet defector who fled 1928 to Europe in April from the post of deputy. trade representative of the USSR in Turkey. He graduated from the teachers' seminary in Simferopol (1904), a teacher's college in Istanbul (1908). In 1920, he joined the RCP (b). In 1922 – 1925 - People's Commissar of Education of the Crimean ASSR. From 1925 - deputy. trade representative in Turkey. After the flight, after some time settled in Paris. See: V. Genis. Wrong servants of the regime, p. 561 – 570.
[35] RGASPI. F. 328, op. 1, d. 203, l. 1.
[36] Mirny, Simon Maksimovich (1896 – 1973) - intelligence officer and diplomat (“Abdullah”). He graduated from the East Department of the Military Academy of the Red Army (1923). Member of the Civil and World War II. In 1923 – 1926 - on reconnaissance in Turkey under diplomatic cover. Later - in diplomatic posts in Norway, Hungary and Sweden. In 1955 – 1961 - Chief Bibliographer of the State Library. IN AND. Lenin. (Approx. P.G.).
[37] Heyfets, Grigory Mendelevich (Markovich) (1899 – 1984) is a talented intelligence agent. Member of the Civil War. In 1920, he studied at the Moscow Commercial School and on the background of 1-th Moscow University. In 1921, N.K. Krupskaya. From 1921, a KI employee (“Grimmel”), in 1922, he was transferred to NKID for cover. In 1924 – 1927 - on reconnaissance under diplomatic cover in Latvia and Turkey, in 1927 – 1929. - assignments in China, Germany, Austria and France. In 1931 – 1947 - Foreign Intelligence Officer ("Charon") - assignments in Sweden, the United States and Italy. (Approx. P.G.).
[38] Smyrna - Greek name, Turkish - Izmir. (Approx. P.G.).
[39] Trabzon - Greek name, Turkish - Trabzon. (Approx. P.G.).
[40] RGASPI. F. 328, op. 1, d. 203, l. 3 – 4. See: P. Gusterin. At the source of Soviet intelligence in the East // Asia and Africa today. 2012, No. 3.
[41] Pyatnitsky V.I. Osip Pyatnitsky and the Comintern on the scales of history. Minsk, 2004, p. 302.
[42] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes chekista. Berlin, 1930, p. 77.
[43] Ibid, c. 25.
[44] Dallin D. Spying Soviet-style. Objects and agents of Soviet intelligence. 1920 – 1950. M., 2001, p. 22.
[45] Bravin, Nikolai Zakharovich (1881 – 1921) - diplomat. He graduated from the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University and the Educational Department of Oriental Languages at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. From 1904 - in the service of the Foreign Ministry: business trips to Tehran, Mashhad, Husseynabad, Bombay, Calcutta, Qazvin, Hoy. He accepted the October Revolution, carried out diplomatic missions of the Soviet government. It was liquidated after it decided to enter into contact with the British. See: V. Genis, Vice Consul Vvedensky. Service in Persia and the Bukhara Khanate (1906 – 1920). M., 2003, p. 71 – 84; Genis V. The Incorrect Servants of the Regime, p. 9 – 28. (Approx. P.G.).
[46] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 68, d. 11, l. 24.
[47] Surits, Yakov Zakharovich (1882 – 1952) - statesman, diplomat. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg. In 1918 – 1919 - deputy plenipotentiary in Denmark, in 1919 – 1921. - Plenipotentiary in Afghanistan. In 1921 – 1922 - Member of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and authorized by the NKID for Turkestan and Central Asia. In 1922 – 1923 - Plenipotentiary in Norway, in 1923 – 1934. - in Turkey, in 1934 – 1937 - in Germany, in 1937 – 1940 - in France. In 1940 – 1946 - Advisor in the central office of the NKID / MFA. In 1946 – 1947 - Ambassador to Brazil.
[48] By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 9 in May 1941, plenipotentiaries of the USSR received the status of ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary. (Approx. P.G.).
[49] Tikhonov Yu.N. Afghan war of Stalin. Battle for Central Asia. M., 2008, p. 79 – 80. See: S.B. Panin Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. 1919 – 1929. M. — Irkutsk, 1998, p. 68 – 92.
[50] Dispatches G.V. Chicherina V.M. Zuckerman from 18 October 1921 g. // RGASPI. F. 5, op. 1, d. 2116, l. 29.
Tsukerman, Vladimir Moiseevich (1891 – 1937) - diplomat. From 1921 - head. 1-m East department NKID. (Approx. P.G.).
[51] Encrypted dispatch G.V. Chicherina V.M. Zuckerman from 6 August 1921 g. // RGASPI. F. 5, op. 1, d. 2116, l. 19.
[52] Panin SB, p. 91.
[53] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 126.
[54] Bailey, Frederick Marshman (1882 – 1967) - British intelligence officer, scientist, explorer of Tibet. In the British Army from 1900. In 1905 – 1938. - Officer of the British political service in the British colonial administration in India. In his book “Mission to Tashkent” (L., 1946; 1992; 2002), he made a number of distortions. See: Swinson A. Beyond the Frontiers. The Biography of Colonel F.-M. Bailey. Explorer and Special Agent. L., 1971.
[55] See: A. Raikov. Calculating the English Super Spy / / Asia and Africa Today. 2006, No. 2.
[56] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 126.
[57] See: P. Gusterin. Soviet-British relations between the world wars. Saarbrücken, 2014, p. 22.
[58] Pyatnitsky (real surname is Tarshis) Joseph (Osip) Aronovich (1882 – 1938) is a figure of the Russian and international communist movement. Party activity with 1898. From 1921, to the Executive Committee of the Executive Committee. From 1935, in the office of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
[59] A foreign department was established in 1920 to conduct intelligence work abroad in the Special Section of the All-Russian Emergency Commission (VChK) to combat counterrevolution and sabotage.
[60] 6 February 1922 was based on the INO Cheka at the NKVD of the RSFSR was created by the INO GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR, renamed 2 in November 1923 in the INO OGPU under the SNK of the USSR. 10 July 1934. External intelligence was transferred to the 7 department of the Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the NKVD of the USSR.
[61] Chekists: History in the faces. M., 2008, p. 38.
[62] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 84, 136, 137, 204, 224, 230, 251 – 255, 346, 363, 431; Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 88.
[63] Trilisser, Mikhail Abramovich (1883 – 1940) is an outstanding intelligence organizer. In 1901 – 1921 - party activities in Siberia and the Far East. From 1921, in the central office of the Cheka. From May 1922 to October 1929 - early. INO. From 1926 - deputy. before OGPU. From 1930 - deputy. Commissar of Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection of the RSFSR. From 1935, to ICKI. See: V. Antonov, V. Karpov. Kremlin Secret Informers - 2. With them, the exploration began. M., 2003.
[64] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 184, 189, 191, 242.
[65] History of the East. T. V. M., 2006, p. 63.
[66] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 160.
[67] Ibid., P. 49, 75.
[68] See: ibid., P. 48 – 50, 74 – 75, 115 – 117, 159 – 161, 199 – 201, 215 – 216.
[69] Pyatnitsky V.I., p. 337.
[70] Agabekov, Georgy Sergeevich (Arutyunov; 1895 – 1938) - the scout-defector. In 1924 – 1926 - Resident in Afghanistan, in 1928 - in Persia, in 1929 – 1930. - illegal resident in Istanbul. Ran to Paris. See: Prokhorov D.P. How much does it cost to sell the motherland? SPb. —M., 2005, p. 50 – 64.
[71] The book has been translated into many languages, including Persian.
[72] Red Army Intelligence Agency. (Approx. P.G.).
[73] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes Chekista, with. 247.
[74] Ibid., P. 105 – 106.
[75] See: Agabekov G. Cheka at work. M., 1992.
[76] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 224, 528.
[77] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 154, d. 513.
[78] Adibekov G.M. et al., p. 8, 9, 21.
[79] This is the All-Russian General Staff. (Approx. P.G.).
[80] The current Combined-Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from 7 in October 1918 to 9 in August 1921 was called the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, from 10 in August 1921 in November to 9 in November 1925 in the Military Academy of the Red Army, from 10 in November 1925 g. To 31 october 1998 g. Bore the name of M.V. Frunze. (Approx. P.G.).
[81] 19 took place on July - 7 on August 1920. See: the Second Congress of the Comintern. July - August 1920 g. M., 1934. (Approx. P.G.).
[82] RGVA. F. 24696, op. 1, d. 3, l. 45 (on).
[83] Tikhonov Yu.N., p. 77 – 78.
[84] See: P. Gusterin. Soviet Intelligence in the Near and Middle East in the 1920-30s Saarbrücken, 2014.
[85] See: L. Longo. International Brigades in Spain. M., 1960.
[86] RGASPI. F. 545, op. 6, d. 436; 437; 626; 843.
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