"A whip raised is more terrible than a whip lowered," or why war did not become chemical
Another "secret page" of the Second World War - hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic substances were prepared in the arsenals of the USSR and England
Since the Khrushchev era, the phrase “no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten” has become routine on the eve of the celebration of the Great Victory. Now it seems to have been written about everyone, even a disproportionate amount of penalties. But we have forgotten about the chemical troops. But they, too, fought valiantly against the enemy, even if not "in their specialty." And how hard it was for our soldiers and officers to die under the bombs and shells of the Germans, not being able to use the formidable ready for battle weapon!
Isn't it time to pay tribute to them at least for the fact that by their very presence they kept Hitler and his allies from using chemical weapons ?!
Mythical "aces" and real gases
Alas, instead of a detailed study of the activities of the chemical troops in the Great Patriotic War, the media periodically print "fried ducks".
So, in the summer of 2006, a certain TV journalist from Channel One made the greatest discovery in stories The Great Patriotic War. It turns out that in late 1942, Hitler ordered a massive gas attack on Leningrad. This order was sent on a plane piloted by Germany's top ace. But he was shot down in an air battle near Leningrad by "one of our pilots, now living in St. Petersburg." The daring journalist only didn't know the German ace's name, but otherwise, everything matched perfectly.
Well, and if without the fun of the playful "teledam", then "was there a boy?" Researcher at the Military Historical Research Center in the city of Freiburg, Gerd Huberscheer, wrote in the article "The attack on Leningrad and the blockade of the city by the German Wehrmacht": "At the end of December 1941, one of the services of the General Staff of the ground forces even worked out the question of a possible attack using poisonous gases against Leningrad. A memorandum with an approximate calculation of the requirements for poisonous gas was drawn up on December 22, 1941, in case the city was taken in this way. According to calculations, hundreds of thousands of shells filled with poisonous gas would be required. To deliver such a quantity of ammunition to the targets, it was necessary to use more than 330 batteries. And since there would have been no way to get them anyway, this plan was rejected. For this reason, Leningrad escaped another terrible catastrophe, which it had already been subjected to since the blockade established in September 1941 ”.
In the spring of 1942, the Germans were preparing to use chemical weapons on the Eastern Front. Having received the relevant intelligence, the Soviet command began to retaliate.
At 4:30 am On July 13, 1942, a large sanitary transport "Georgia" enters the South Bay of Sevastopol. A few meters are already left before the Mine pier, and suddenly five German Ju-87s dive into the transport with red crosses clearly visible on board. At 4 hours 48 minutes. two bombs hit the engine room and the rear of the vehicle. "Georgia" is still afloat, but after 7 minutes there was a terrible explosion and the transport 116 m long was literally torn in half. Further, our historians put a fat point, having previously condemned the next crime of the fascists, since naval law prohibits sinking medical ships.
But in 1948-1949, during the cleaning of the Sevastopol bays from sunken ships, both parts of the "Georgia" were raised. Usually, vessels raised from the seabed are either rehabilitated or sent to shipbreaking bases. This is understandable, in 1949 the country needed iron scrap like air. But both parts of the "Georgia" for some reason were not sent to Inkerman for cutting, but towed to the Cossack Bay and flooded there. Moreover, several divers and workers who participated in the rise of "Georgia" were hospitalized. They developed ulcers on the skin, characteristic of mustard gas.
The most amazing thing is that in 1956-1959, both parts of the "Georgia" were raised again, and this time they were towed and flooded further from the coast and at great depths.
What actually happened? I'll start with the fact that in the spring of 1942 the ships of the Black Sea fleet experienced a chronic shortage of anti-aircraft weapons, especially for protection against low-flying aircraft. But the ambulance transport "Georgia" had better anti-aircraft weapons than on our destroyers of that time: five 45-mm cannons, two 12,7-mm DShK machine guns and six American coaxial machine guns. And in its holds there was a significant number of shells. But it's half the trouble that there were hundreds of high-explosive shells on the ambulance. Worse, there were hundreds of chemical shells ranging in caliber from 130 to 76 mm, as well as barrels of chemical weapons intended for equipping aerial bombs. That is why it took twice to reburial the remains of "Georgia".
A rhetorical question arises: why bring chemical munitions to Sevastopol in July 1942? After all, the city's defenders were in dire need of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Looking ahead, I will say that it was precisely because of the lack of shells that Sevastopol was surrendered. So, was it necessary to carry there chemical shells that obviously could not be used?
Apparently, "Georgia" went on its last voyage precisely to use chemical weapons! Moreover, hundreds of tons of chemical ammunition - artillery shells, aerial bombs, various pouring aviation devices, etc. - by the beginning of the war, they were stored in numerous adits of Sevastopol.
Apparently (I did not see a specific order), in Crimea, our command was preparing for the massive use of chemical weapons. I note that General Manstein's 11th Army was the first to use OV in April-May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula. Colonel-General Franz Halder wrote in his diary dated June 13, 1942: “General Ochsner: Report on the participation of chemical troops in the battles for Kerch”.
Thus, the Soviet side could quite objectively declare retaliatory measures. The massive use of chemical weapons near Sevastopol could have led to the complete defeat of Manstein's army. It should be noted that the Germans at Sevastopol had a huge advantage in high-altitude weapons (howitzers and mortars). And the city's defenders had a significant advantage in long-range guns (even without taking into account the naval artillery). But, alas, the mountainous terrain made guns with excellent ballistics powerless against German mortars hidden in the folds of the terrain. But chemical shells with remote fuses would have easily smoked the Germans out of their shelters. By the way, photographs, newsreels and numerous memoirs show that our soldiers did not part with gas masks until the last day of defense. But gas masks are not visible on the half-naked German soldiers near Sevastopol. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine the effect of the massive use of toxic agents.
However, the death of "Georgia" and the offensive of the Germans from near Kharkov to Stalingrad forced the Soviet command to abandon the use of weapons in the Crimea.
Before the city was surrendered between June 27-29, 1942, chemical munitions were transported at night from the storage facilities of Yukharina Balka to Kazachya Bay, where they were loaded onto the Papaninets schooner, on which they were then taken out into the open sea near the bay, where they were dumped overboard. The discharge depth was at least 50 m. At the same time, mustard gas and lewisite, which were used to fill chemical bombs, were stored at that time in L-100 barrels. From time to time, such barrels are found on the coast of the Crimea today. In the 80s, not far from the Cossack Bay, divers found an L-100 type barrel and dragged it ashore. They found an oily liquid that smelled of geraniums. Laboratory analysis showed that the domestically produced barrel contains lewisite, a chemical warfare agent.
Allies are ready to come to the rescue
Indirectly, the possibility of using chemical weapons on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1942 was confirmed by negotiations between the Soviet government and the Western allies:
Churchill - Stalin
Private and confidential
March 21, 1942.
“... Ambassador Maisky was at my breakfast last week and mentioned ... that ... the Germans ... can use gases against your country ... I want to assure you that His Majesty's Government will treat any use of poisonous gases as a weapon against Russia in the same way as if these weapons were directed against ourselves. I have created colossal reserves of gas bombs for airplane dropping, and we will not hesitate to use these bombs for dropping on all suitable targets in West Germany, from the moment when your army and people are attacked by such means. "
Private and confidential
March 21, 1942.
“... Ambassador Maisky was at my breakfast last week and mentioned ... that ... the Germans ... can use gases against your country ... I want to assure you that His Majesty's Government will treat any use of poisonous gases as a weapon against Russia in the same way as if these weapons were directed against ourselves. I have created colossal reserves of gas bombs for airplane dropping, and we will not hesitate to use these bombs for dropping on all suitable targets in West Germany, from the moment when your army and people are attacked by such means. "
March 29, 1942.
Stalin - Churchill.
Private and confidential.
“According to our information, not only the Germans, but also the Finns can begin to use poisonous gases against the USSR ... The Soviet government would be very grateful if the British government could help to obtain in England some of the missing chemical defenses, as well as chemical retaliatory weapons, having in view of the possibility of a chemical attack by Germany on the USSR. If there are no objections on your part, I could in the near future send a special person to England on this case. "
Stalin - Churchill.
Private and confidential.
“According to our information, not only the Germans, but also the Finns can begin to use poisonous gases against the USSR ... The Soviet government would be very grateful if the British government could help to obtain in England some of the missing chemical defenses, as well as chemical retaliatory weapons, having in view of the possibility of a chemical attack by Germany on the USSR. If there are no objections on your part, I could in the near future send a special person to England on this case. "
Retrieved April 10, 1942.
Churchill - to Stalin.
Private and confidential.
“… 2. Please send your chemical defense and counter-attack specialist to explain exactly what materials the Soviet government needs to get from England.
3. ... if necessary, we will be able to provide you with at least one thousand tons of mustard gas and one thousand tons of chlorine on the first nearest steamer before receiving a message from this specialist ... "
Churchill - to Stalin.
Private and confidential.
“… 2. Please send your chemical defense and counter-attack specialist to explain exactly what materials the Soviet government needs to get from England.
3. ... if necessary, we will be able to provide you with at least one thousand tons of mustard gas and one thousand tons of chlorine on the first nearest steamer before receiving a message from this specialist ... "
April 22, 1942.
Stalin - Churchill.
Private and confidential.
“… I express my gratitude to you for your willingness to provide 1000 tons of mustard gas and 1000 tons of chlorine. But since the USSR feels a more acute need for other chemical products, the Soviet government would like to receive 1000 tons of calcium hypochlorite and 1000 tons of chloramine instead of the above products, or if it is impossible to supply these products with 2000 tons of liquid chlorine in cylinders.
The Soviet government intends to send the Deputy People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry Andrei Georgievich Kasatkin to London as its expert on chemical defense and counter-attack. "
Stalin - Churchill.
Private and confidential.
“… I express my gratitude to you for your willingness to provide 1000 tons of mustard gas and 1000 tons of chlorine. But since the USSR feels a more acute need for other chemical products, the Soviet government would like to receive 1000 tons of calcium hypochlorite and 1000 tons of chloramine instead of the above products, or if it is impossible to supply these products with 2000 tons of liquid chlorine in cylinders.
The Soviet government intends to send the Deputy People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry Andrei Georgievich Kasatkin to London as its expert on chemical defense and counter-attack. "
Here are two interesting TASS reports: Krasnodar, May 8.
"Yesterday, German troops used several mines containing toxic agents on the Crimean Front. Tests showed that the toxic agents primarily affect the respiratory system and incapacitate soldiers."
London, May 10.
"British Prime Minister Churchill, speaking on the radio… dwelled on the possibility that the Germans… might use poisonous substances against the Soviet Union. Churchill declared that if Hitler were to commit this new crime, England would use its vast and growing air superiority in the West to wage chemical warfare on a massive scale against German military installations."
The German command was wary. The Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, Colonel-General Franz Halder writes in his diary:
March 7, 1942:
"Colonel Oksner. On the Russians' chemical warfare capabilities, as well as our capabilities in this area (Gelan and other chemical warfare agents)."
April 24, 1942: “General Ochsner. Current issues of the chemical service. Enemy readiness for chemical warfare. Our defenses ”.
"Colonel Oksner. On the Russians' chemical warfare capabilities, as well as our capabilities in this area (Gelan and other chemical warfare agents)."
April 24, 1942: “General Ochsner. Current issues of the chemical service. Enemy readiness for chemical warfare. Our defenses ”.
Red Chemical Sword
What chemical weapons arsenal did the Red Army possess? Production of toxic agents in Russia began in 1915 and continued uninterrupted until June 22, 1941. There may have been only brief interruptions (up to several months). I omit the use of domestic toxic agents in World War I and the Civil War, as they are beyond the scope of this book.
By April 1931, the capacity of the Soviet factories for the production of mustard gas had reached 15 tons per year, and plants for another 800 tons of mustard gas were under construction. For phosgene, by October 18, 000, the planned capacity was to be 1 tons.
In 1935, the capacity for mustard gas was already 35 tons (at the request of the People's Commissariat of Defense for 000 tons), for phosgene - 58 tons, diphosgene - 000 tons. But the problem of large-scale production of lewisite and hydrocyanic acid was solved only by the end of the 13s. years. In total, in 000, with the request of the People's Commissariat of Defense for a capacity of 1900 tons of OM, there were 1930 tons of them.
By January 1, 1938, the capacity of the industry for the production of organic matter should have already reached 139 tons; by January 560, 1, these capacities were planned to be increased to 1939 tons. These were the plans.
Judging by the documents of the Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, by 1939 the industry supplied the army with the following OM: Levinstein's mustard, Zaykov's mustard, lewisite, mustard-lewisite mixture, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrocyanic acid, cyanogen chloride, chloropicrin, adamsite, diphenylchloroarcetane phenylcyanin.
According to the reports of the Chemical Administration of the Red Army, as of December 1, 1936, "Our aviation with its actual (as of 01.12.35) chemical weapons can, within one year of the war, attack the enemy with a consumption of over 40 tons of OM." At that time, the Soviet Air Force was armed with 000 thousand chemical aerial bombs, and the mobilization capacity of the industry was designed to release 90 thousand chemical bombs during the year.
There were also other means of delivering chemical agents to the battlefield. As of December 1, 1935, the Red Army had: 420 wheeled chemical combat vehicles (CCV) (mobile capacity of 1300), 26 T-530 chemical tanks (mobile capacity of 1000), 107 600-mm chemical mortars (mobile capacity of 5900), and 21 portable devices for contaminating terrain (mobile capacity of 800). The bulk of the chemical agents and combat equipment of the chemical troops were concentrated in the Belorussian, Kiev, and Leningrad military districts, as well as in Transbaikalia.
A few words should be said about chemical artillery shells.
In the Red Army, they were divided into chemical, equipped with liquid OM, and fragmentation-chemical, equipped with solid OM. The latter provided additional defeat of the enemy by shrapnel like high-explosive fragmentation shells.
The starting point for calculating the number of chemical projectiles required for shelling areas was the norm - one 76-mm chemical grenade per 40 square meters. m area and one 152-mm chemical projectile for 80 sq. m area.
The ballistic data of 76-mm chemical grenades did not differ from ordinary fragmentation grenades, and they were usually made in the bodies of high-explosive fragmentation grenades.
So, in the fall of 1927, 76-mm short-term chemical projectiles went into production. They did not yet have an alphabetic index. The shells contained 740 g of OM, of which chloropicrin C (NO2) Cl3 was 45%, phosgene COCl2 was 45%, and tin tetrachloride SnCl4 was 10%.
Old chemical projectiles, which received the indices XN-1930F and XC-354F in the late 354s, should have fired at the firing tables for F-354F grenades. The designations ХН and ХС were determined by the filling: explosives "NOV" or "SOV".
In the second half of the 1930s, the OX-76 350-mm chemical fragmentation grenade, weighing 6,25 kg and 4 clb length, entered service. It was equipped with TNT and an R-12 or R-15 type OF. Fuse KTM-1. The grenade was included in the ammunition load of 76-mm divisional guns with a barrel length of 30, 40 and 50 klb, as well as in the ammunition load of regimental guns mod. 1922 year.
The ballistic data of the OX-350 almost coincided with the data of the HE-350 high-explosive grenade, and the crews were allowed to shoot at the OF-350 firing tables for the corresponding guns.
In the fall of 1937, NII-24 developed a heavy chemical projectile weighing 76 kg with a knockout bottom and a T-22 fuse for the 7,0-mm F-6 cannon. The weight of the SOV type OM is 500 g, the muzzle velocity of the projectile is 680 m / s.
In the same year, 1937, a new, more advanced howitzer 122-mm chemical projectile of drawing 2-03217 with a knockout bottom was developed. Projectile weight - 22,827 kg. The weight of the SOV type OB is 1,7 kg.
In 1939, the KhN-152 and OX-530 530-mm howitzer shells entered service, and firing tables were compiled for them. The KhN-530 chemical projectile was filled with a NOV substance and a KTM-2 fuse, and an OX-530 fragmentation projectile weighing 40 kg was loaded with solid explosives and an RG-6 or KTM-2 fuse.
Both shells were included in the ammunition of both the old howitzers (mod. 1910-1937 and 1909-1930) and the new M-10 howitzer. It was possible to shoot the OX-530 projectile according to the OF-530 projectile firing tables. (I apologize for the tautology, but that's what the docs say.)
There was also a 122 mm Kh-530 chemical howitzer projectile weighing 38,8 kg.
A long-range chemical fragmentation projectile OX-152 (drawing 20-540) was created specifically for the ML-1 09268-mm howitzer-gun. It was possible to shoot them according to the firing tables of the XC-530 projectile, but in 1938 an order was issued “not to complete” the cannon shots of the XC-530 projectile.
The navy also had chemical munitions. As with land chemical munitions, the author had to collect information on the Navy, literally bit by bit, in various archives that were not directly related to the creation of OV. So, I was able to establish that the project 68 cruisers, laid down in 1939, should have had an ammunition load of 2130 152-mm shells, of which 330, that is, 15%, were chemical.
According to the report of the Navy Art Department for 1941-1945, according to the old state, that is, laid down even before the revolution, the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine" was put on 80 fragmentation chemical shells for one 130-mm cannon.
Accordingly, the destroyers of projects 7 and 7U that were in service were assigned 30 130-mm chemical rounds per barrel. The same applies to the Project 48 leaders under construction and the Project 30 destroyers.
For monitors under construction project 1190 "Khasan" for the Amur and the project SB-57 "Shilka" for the Dnieper, respectively, 70 and 100 130-mm chemical shells.
Old Amur monitors of the "Lenin" type had 70 120-mm chemical rounds per ship.
Before the war, a new generation of naval chemical projectiles - OHS and projectiles with a liquid shock agent - were being finalized. In 1941-1942, 102-mm, 130-mm and 180-mm percussion chemical shells were worked out and tested and manufactured: 180/57-mm - 500 pcs., 130/50-mm - 1000 pcs., 102 / 60- mm - 100 pcs. For the transition to gross production, all technical documentation was prepared.
By order of the People's Commissar of the Navy No. 001100 of April 18, 1942, chemical fragmentation shells were adopted, more precisely, assembled shots for 102/60 mm guns (old destroyers and patrol ships), 130/50 mm (new destroyers and leaders) and 180 / 57 mm (new cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis).
In December 1939, a 107-mm "high-capacity" mine weighing 18 kg was tested at NIAP. Shooting was carried out on the third charge, initial speed - 170 m / s, firing range - 2500 m at an elevation angle of 45? In 1939, a 107-mm SKB-4 chemical mine with an M-2 fuse was tested, equipped with a BHV-type poisonous substance.
Since 1940, 107-mm chemical mines were manufactured with NOV equipment (both with mustard gas and with "volatile substances"), as well as 107-mm mines with IDS equipment.
For 1941, it was planned to release 10 thousand 107-mm mines of the NOV type, equipped with mustard gas, 10 thousand mines of the NOV type with "volatile substances" and 5 thousand mines of the SOV type.
An important role in the conduct of chemical warfare was also assigned to 120-mm regimental mortars. Before the war, 11 chemical mortar battalions were transferred to the artillery of the RGK, which were supposed to have 528 120-mm mortars according to the state. In fact, they had 512 mortars, including 107-mm - 277 and 120-mm - 235.
We also owe the creation of the famous Katyushas to plans for chemical warfare. As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the RKKA chemical department, corps engineer Fishman, was presented with a report by the director of the RNII, 1st rank military engineer Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, 2nd rank military engineer Glukharev, on preliminary tests of 132/82 mm short-range chemical missile mines. This ammunition was complemented by a 250/132-mm short-range chemical mine, the tests of which were completed by May 1936. Thus, “RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need for further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue a pilot-gross order for the manufacture of RHM-250 (300 pieces) and RHM-132 (300 pieces) for the purpose of conducting field and military tests. Five RKhM-250 units remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 units can be used for additional tests according to your instructions. ”
The RHS-132 132-mm chemical shells were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938.
The warhead of one RCS contains 8 liters of a poisonous substance, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of 12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or three artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of OM contamination in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.
Note that chemical rockets were also created to arm aircraft. So, the RHS-132 was modified for the Air Force. Its starting weight was 3,5 kg, and the volume of explosives was 0,5 liters.
In 1939, several prototypes of 132-mm "RAHS-132 chemical-reactive projectiles" were created. They had two options for equipment - with IDS and with NOV.
In the same 1939, at the NII-3 NKB, they created the "132-mm aeronautical missile-fragmentation chemical projectile ROHS-132" weighing 43,1 kg.
Soviet chemists and artillerymen managed to create the most "exotic" types of shells. So, in 1934-1936 the Ostekhbyuro and the ANII RKKA carried out "work of special secrecy" on the theme of "Lafet". So shrapnel with poisonous elements was encrypted. In December 1934, 76mm poisonous shrapnel was tested with three rounds. A crystal of a poisonous substance was pressed into small 2-gram and 4-gram pellets. According to the conclusion of the commission, the shooting was successful.
In the pre-war period, the USSR also produced 45-mm armor-piercing chemical shells, which were intended to poison enemy personnel behind the armor of tanks and pillboxes. The weight of the armor-piercing chemical projectile is 1,43 kg, the projectile contained 16 g of a poisonous substance placed in a chamber with a diameter of 24 mm. The initial velocity of the projectile is 760 m / s, that is, the ballistics of the shot with the same type of UBR-240 armor-piercing projectile was preserved.
And in 1940 in NII-3 NKB was created "132-mm aircraft missile-concrete-piercing chemical projectile RBHS-132" weighing 43,1 kg. He had to break through the concrete wall, and then poison the people in the room. In one of the options, a 130-mm semi-armor-piercing projectile from the B-13 naval system was considered as a warhead body.
Naturally, the German command did not have detailed information about the quality of chemical weapons, but the information received was enough for, with the exception of a few episodes, the Wehrmacht refused to use chemical weapons. Thus, the chemical units of the Red Army that did not fight prevented the enemy from using weapons of mass destruction and the transformation of World War II into a chemical one.
Alexander Borisovich Shirokorad - historian
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