Military Review

Death hid under the crests of the waves ...

38



“Victory in the war is not achieved by a separate class of ships, but by a balanced fleet, which, in essence, was demonstrated by the Americans, who fused battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines into an invincible combat vehicle”, - the author of the previous article thoughtfully finished. You can also add that being rich and healthy is certainly better than the poor and the sick.

The Yankees' fleet was not “balanced”, but inadequately huge. One hundred heavy cruisers and battleships, 40 high-speed aircraft carriers, 800 destroyers, each of which was larger and more advanced than any of their foreign peers.

From the American squadrons moaned the ocean. But the magnificent variety of surface ships did not change the main postulate of naval warfare. In terms of performance, the submarines abruptly escaped. Unconditional leaders in the number of sunk Japanese ships and ships, participants in daring operations to neutralize the Imperial fleet. Fought always, under any conditions and the balance of power in the selected square.

Death hid under the crests of the waves ...

Submarines - go ahead!


The author could not deny himself the pleasure of publishing this wonderful diagram. Minimum separation of the deck aviation according to the tonnage of sunken ships, due to the nature of the choice of targets. For example, on the account of naval aviators, the sinking of non-operational aircraft carriers and battleships of the reserve of the 4th category is listed during a raid on the Naval Forces of Kure (July 1945). When in their destruction all military meaning has already disappeared.

The submarine heroes each trophy was won in hot battles with the enemy. Boats waited for their targets in the straits and searched on the high seas. When each of the broken Japanese ships could pose a real threat to the American fleet. And it was necessary to do everything to stop the enemy on the way.

If you change the criteria and take for comparison the number of sunken warships, the ratio will be even worse. A hundred and a few American submarines destroyed the 201 battleship, ranging in size from a patrol ship to a strike carrier! The closest “rival”, carrier-based aircraft, fell behind the submariners on 40 points.

Among the loud trophies of the submarines are the Congo high-speed battleship, four heavy aircraft carriers - the Shokaku, Taiho, Unryu and the legendary Shinano, three heavy and ten light cruisers, 50 destroyers and escort destroyers.

As for the merchant fleet, there is a pure mayhem, 4,9 million tons. Oil, coal, ore, equipment, uniforms, food and ammunition. Everything flew to the bottom, when meeting with the evil little fish.


The landing of the submarine “Flasher”, which sent the cruiser “Oi” to the bottom, four tankers and 16 transports with a total tonnage of 100 231 bt.

Despite the obvious numbers, there is a different view on the results of submarine operations in the Pacific theater. The boats very successfully (if not to say more) cut the enemy’s sea communications, but when carrying out large defensive and offensive operations turned out to be completely helpless.

Strategically, submariner combat successes were rarely of great importance. The valiant knights of the deep sea "failed" all the important tasks, failing to achieve the expected results.

Unsuccessful actions of the American submarines at the beginning of the war, who failed to hold up the Japanese offensive in the Philippines, were cited as evidence. As a result, 29 submarines based on Fr. Luzon had only three victories: the destroyer and a pair of transport ships. Plus, the unsuccessful defeat of the hydro-avian carrier “Sanyo Maru” with an unexploded torpedo.

But before expressing stormy criticism, it is worth remembering that at that time the praised American aviation and surface ships were doing. The answer is nothing. Lay prone. Throughout the theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to the island of Java.

So against the background of their colleagues, the actions of submariners look like a kind of achievement. Were able to cause the enemy at least some damage.

As for the amount of damage, a couple of conditions intervened there. First, the US Navy at the beginning of the war experienced a clear shortage of modern submarines. The only “Gatou” that entered service has not yet managed to arrive in the combat zone. And what was based on Luzon was a blatant junk of the 1920's construction. And it would be naive to expect submariners to win in such conditions, despite the fact that they were opposed by three serious convoys with powerful PLO escort, where every Japanese transport with a landing force had three escort ships.

There have been tragicomic cases. In January, 1945, the entire 25 of American submarines deployed along the entire route of the Japanese convoy, could not intercept the Hyuuga battleship with a military cargo.

Similar reproaches are received by Japanese submariners. The barrage of 13 submarines failed to hold up US aircraft carriers under Midway. True, what is the fault of the submariners themselves? The Americans broke into the Japanese naval code JN-25 and bypassed the dangerous area in advance.

Well, failure happened to all. In the battle of Midway, the wings of two aircraft carriers could not destroy the damaged cruiser “Mogami” with a severed nose. The “youngsters” left and later did a lot of mischief.

An example of a more successful use of submarines were the 23 events of October 1944. On that night, Admiral Takeo Kurita’s strike connection (10 heavy cruisers and 5 battleships accompanied by a dozen destroyers) hit the American underwater barrier at Palawan. With the greed of hungry piranhas, the boats “Darter” and “Dace” attacked their prey. TKR "Atago" and "Maya" died on the spot. Torpedoed “Takao” was forced to interrupt participation in the operation and, accompanied by two destroyers, return to Singapore.

The night mayhem had far more serious consequences. In addition to finding the third Japanese squad, about which American intelligence knew nothing, and significantly weakening its strike potential, the Darter submarine, by chance, sank the flagship (cruiser Atago), which caused swimming in the night sea and demoralization of the entire squadron headquarters, including Admiral Kurita himself.

Despite the fact that the Yankees had an 1200 aircraft group of aircraft, the Kurita compound continued to roam the battle zone. By the morning of October 25, cruisers and battleships broke into the landing zone of the American landing force in Leyte Gulf, smashed the last barrier of escort aircraft carriers, but when the miles remained to the target, Admiral Kurita suddenly turned back. As he later admitted, he lost his nerve, he was not in the best shape after a night bathing at Palavan.

Another interesting episode is marked 5 June 1942 of the year. The submarine Tambor was on the way of the cruisers “Suzuya”, “Kumano”, “Mogami” and “Mikuma”, which were in full swing. Convinced of the presence of an underwater predator, the Japanese laid such a steep evasion maneuver that the Mogami and the Mikuma rammed each other. Thus, the operation on artillery bombardment at. Midway.

The newest aircraft carrier, the Taiho, did not even have time to get to the war zone (destroyed in its first expedition with the Albacore boat in June 1944).

A similar fate befell the “Shokaku” and “Shinano”. The largest of the sunk ships in the sea stories. Destroyed by Archerfish submarine.

I wonder why and why the “Archerfish” was located off the coast of Japan? The answer - there was an evacuation point. The submarines ensured the bombing of Japanese cities, raising the morale of the crews of the “Super Fortress”. Strategic aviation pilots knew that they would save them if they crashed over the ocean.

2 September 1944, the Finback submarine, took SOS from a downed aircraft. After four hours of unsuccessful searches, the submariners nevertheless found and pulled the lanky pilot out of the water. Saved by the name of George Herbert Bush.

And a completely mystical incident occurred with the Japanese submarine I-58. During a patrol to the east of the Philippines, the boat crossed the course with the American cruiser Indianapolis. The first time the attack did not take place. The boat sank the cruiser already on the way back. But, alas, too late - “Indianapolis” managed to deliver a bomb for Nagasaki to Tinian.

In the death of “Indianapolis” there is not only a mystic, but also a harsh calculation. The calendar was 30 July 1945 g. Before the surrender of Japan, there were three weeks left. The sea and the air were under the full control of the Americans. But, Japanese submarines continued to operate there. Taking advantage of the uncertainty of the aquatic environment, boats are able to pass where no other ship will pass. And to fight at the most unfavorable balance of forces, while achieving success.

In addition to performing their “slaughter” tasks, Japanese submarines were used for courier traffic along the Brest-Tokyo route. That is how the Messerschmitts and samples of German engines came to Japan.


The crew of the Japanese submarine I-8 in the harbor of Brest

In general, the use of submarines in the Pacific theater has confirmed all the results of the submarine war in the Atlantic:

a) submarines were the most victorious type of sea weapons (maximum number of victories, fact);

b) submarines turned out to be the most effective type of naval weapons (the best ratio of costs and achieved results without taking into account indirect damage - the costs of antisubmarine defense and the economic costs of the enemy associated with the formation of convoys);

c) for all this, the submarine fleet remained the most underdeveloped component of the US Navy, which received the least attention and resources.

Yes, submarines are not designed for linear squadron combat. They are not able to defeat the enemy in a flash. They have their own tactics, much more skillful and sophisticated in their cruelty. Suck out all the forces of the enemy fleet - so that by the time of the general battle from its former might only one sting remains.

It remains to add that the modern admirals took into account the mistakes of their predecessors and made certain conclusions. Currently, the number of nuclear submarines in the US Navy (72 units) exceeds the number of missile destroyers.


Cavella drowned the aircraft Shokaku


This material is a response to the article by A. Kolobov "The role of aircraft carriers and submarines in the war in the Pacific".
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  1. 357PDP
    357PDP 19 January 2016 08: 14 New
    10
    keep old submarines carefully
    1. PSih2097
      PSih2097 19 January 2016 08: 23 New
      +8
      Not only submarines, there are battleships and aircraft carriers, even a frigate made of wood, and that one is stored.
    2. Lord of Wrath
      Lord of Wrath 19 January 2016 18: 20 New
      +5
      There is a clear mistake in the last photo. Too modern body contours. A boat like Gato looks like this.
      1. Santa Fe
        20 January 2016 00: 20 New
        -3
        Quote: Lord of Wrath
        There is a clear mistake in the last photo

        No mistake

        From a different perspective - the museum ship SS-244 Cavalla, the boat sunk "Shokaku"
        Quote: Lord of Wrath
        Too modern body contours.

        Because the boat is American
    3. ava09
      ava09 21 January 2016 13: 05 New
      +1
      Quote: 357PDP
      keep old submarines carefully

      Do not store boats, keep memory. If you don’t know what path this old iron has traveled, it will be only old iron, and nothing more.
  2. blizart
    blizart 19 January 2016 08: 34 New
    +3
    Under what conditions the Baltic submariners operated, you will not wish the enemy.
    1. Elena2013
      Elena2013 19 January 2016 09: 56 New
      +1
      Quote: blizart
      Under what conditions the Baltic submariners operated, you will not wish the enemy.

      Intrepid. The submarine war of Peter Grishchenko.
    2. Andrey NM
      Andrey NM 19 January 2016 11: 08 New
      +5
      Under what conditions the Baltic submariners operated, you will not wish the enemy.


      Wow ... The captain of the 1st rank of Soldiers taught us, during the war the flagship navigator of the submarine brigade in the BF, the captain of the 1st rank of the GSS Lisin, a frequent visitor was Arvanov, who at one time was the headquarters of Gadzhiev in the SF. Real heroes submariners. And they went without any electronics, GLONASS and GPS, were determined by the moon and stars, and shot at the target elements calculated “on the knee” and manually.
      1. Santa Fe
        19 January 2016 11: 19 New
        -4
        Quote: Andrew NM
        And they went without any electronics, GLONASS and GPS, were determined by the moon and stars, and shot at the target elements calculated “on the knee” and manually.

        Well, how are you?
        1. saturn.mmm
          saturn.mmm 19 January 2016 18: 19 New
          +5
          Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
          Well, how are you?

          There is a sign.
  3. igordok
    igordok 19 January 2016 09: 10 New
    +5
    Somewhat off topic.

    U.S. Navy anti-aircraft fire statistics - http://starcom68.livejournal.com/1947009.html
    Tables, including the effectiveness of kamikaze.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 January 2016 19: 24 New
      +1
      Interesting, thanks a lot!
  4. alexej123
    alexej123 19 January 2016 09: 18 New
    +5
    Oleg, thanks for the article. Honestly, when you write such articles on the history of the Navy, and not for the "best in the world F-35," Zamvolt, etc. - you read like a novel. One request, describe for participating in the Navy of the United States, Britain. And for the operations of the USSR’s submarine fleet? By myself, I know only for Marinesko and the Tirpitz attack by Lunin. And M. Gadzhiev? He is named after the Navy. Hero of the Soviet Union. Innovator of tactics of surface combat submarines.
  5. Per se.
    Per se. 19 January 2016 09: 56 New
    +5
    The Yankees fleet was not “balanced”, but inadequately huge.
    From the American squadrons moaned the ocean. But the magnificent variety of surface ships did not change the main postulate of naval warfare. In terms of performance, the submarines abruptly escaped.
    The fact that the US fleet is huge does not cause much doubt, and the fact that it is "unbalanced" causes. Were it not for this huge fleet, primarily the surface one, the Yankees would not have done anything, the Americans would not have won the war in the Pacific Ocean with only boats (or betting on boats, shifting the “balance” in their direction), as they had not won the battle for the Atlantic the Germans, with more numerous and beautiful boats, excellent crews, having lost the support of their surface fleet. As a victory over the Doenitz submarine aces, and, conversely, the success of the American submariners, would have been impossible for the United States (and England with the Dominions) without a powerful surface fleet, primarily an aircraft carrier. The article, however, is interesting, be it only information. For the rest, from “my bell tower” - “Amicus Plato, sed magis arnica Veritas” (Plato is my friend, but the truth is more expensive).
    1. Santa Fe
      19 January 2016 10: 22 New
      +2
      Quote: Per se.
      Were it not for this huge fleet, especially the surface fleet, the Yankees would not have done anything

      Build at least 500 boats (for comparison - the Germans riveted 1170 u-bots), instead of several useless Essexes and Baltimore - they could achieve victory even faster, with less loss and cost.

      would gobble up the imperial fleet with giblets.
      Quote: Per se.
      as the Germans did not win the battle for the Atlantic, with more numerous and more beautiful boats, excellent crews, having lost the support of their surface fleet.

      Do you seriously believe that if the Germans had built cruisers and aircraft carriers instead of part of the boats, would they have lasted longer?
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 19 January 2016 14: 00 New
        +9
        Many warm seas, where battles took place in the Pacific, have shallow depths, shallow shallows and rocks, all of these are not the best places for boats to operate. Simply, the Japanese lagged behind in the means of anti-submarine warfare, but if the Americans began to build boats "instead of several useless Essex and Baltimore", something else from the surface fleet, the boats would be sorted out in an adult way. It is unlikely that in the Pacific, among the many islands, it was possible to do without what the Americans did. The bet on submarines did not roll in that war either the United States, or even Japan, which, losing, according to this logic, would begin to rivet the boats.
        About the Germans, the war is not an end in itself, the interests of big capital, transnational corporations stood for the war, Hitler was allowed to come to power, his eyes were closed on the restrictions of Versailles, because Hitler was needed against the USSR, as the antipode of Soviet Russia and the Communists. If Germany hadn’t got to fight further than the Baltic and the Black Sea, the Anglo-Saxons would have suffered Hitler longer. But, read the "Plan Z", this is the creation of the ocean fleet, aircraft carriers and super links, with the prospect of bending not only England, but also the States. Even part of this plan, obtained from the Germans, gave chances to win. It must be understood that a strong country a priori will not rely on a weak fleet, with various "asymmetric" decisions, be it submarines, clouds of torpedo boats, or firewalls. By the way, the Spanish fleet, the Great Armada, was not destroyed to a small extent, at one time, thanks to the British firewalls, but this did not prevent England from becoming the mistress of the seas, having built squadrons of battleships and frigates instead of cheap and angry firewalls. I repeat, Oleg, boats are a very good thing, but in naval armaments, as in a chess game, besides pawns and light pieces, heavy pieces, rooks and a queen, that is, large surface ships, are also needed. The fleet will not be able to solve all the problems at sea with one boat.
        1. Scraptor
          Scraptor 20 January 2016 08: 20 New
          -1
          They didn’t lag behind but simply didn’t introduce the convoy system for civil courts, because of which the American submarines knocked out tankers and their fleet with aviation were left without fuel (including air defense from B-29 raids). After that, without an escort (and emergency parties) then even Sinano walked on.
          Yeshe they, clanging their katanas, did not distill oil directly to the place of its production in the Philippines and Indonesia, because of which they lost them. Instead, it was transported (while there were tankers) for processing to Japan, and gasoline, oil and fuel oil were supplied back from there.
          Also in the picture is a mistake - American base aircraft (B-17, B-29, A-20) melt more than deck, including on the high seas. Especially in the absence of enemy air defense. Large ships were hit better by a series of bombs from a height. Carrier aircraft with its small radius beyond the Japanese "perimeter of the islands" where American submarines were operating simply did not get there, only the base could partially fly there.

          The German unbalanced fleet, of course, did not solve the problem in the Atlantic because the convoy system was introduced by the Anglo-Americans there. Not a single escort escorted by the American airship / blimp was attacked at all, because before the helicopter and basic aviation with GA buoys, it was the worst enemy of the submarine. If the Germans had an aircraft carrier they would solve this problem, and so they blew the battle for the Atlantic back in May 1943. The Germans were more afraid of American airships than anyone else, because from them (while the planes were weak) they melted almost all Russian submarines in the Baltic in WWII.
  6. saturn.mmm
    saturn.mmm 19 January 2016 10: 43 New
    0
    An interesting article, thanks to the author, some of the major failures of the Japanese are most likely related to the leak of information.
    In addition to the sinking of enemy ships, submarines fired at the enemy’s coast, provided supplies subject to the dominance of the enemy, performed communication functions, carried out reconnaissance, because this also contributed to the fight against the enemy.

    Even if we consider the number of sunken Japanese submarines by displacement, then it is approximately equal to the displacement of sunken fighting ships of the Americans, not including transport and more.

    I agree with the author for all 100.

    The Yankees' fleet was not “balanced”, but inadequately huge. One hundred heavy cruisers and battleships, 40 high-speed aircraft carriers, 800 destroyers, each of which was larger and more advanced than any of their foreign peers.
    From the American squadrons moaned the ocean
    1. Scraptor
      Scraptor 20 January 2016 08: 56 New
      -3
      The most advanced submarines and NK were among the Germans. Then the Japanese, especially ocean submarines.
      And the fact that the Americans are usually inadequate is yes.
      1. Scraptor
        Scraptor 20 January 2016 17: 21 New
        +1
        “-1” disagrees with the fact that Americans are usually inadequate (even if for the most part they, even with brains inverted by propaganda, justify or even FOR) the bombing of Japanese cities, or that Japan had the best ocean submarines (for example, Sentoku- class)?
  7. Delta
    Delta 19 January 2016 11: 49 New
    +3
    Everything is as usual.

    The minimum separation of carrier-based aircraft by the tonnage of sunken ships is due to the nature of the choice of targets. For example, on the account of naval aviators, the sinking of combat-ready aircraft carriers and battleships of the reserve of the 4th category is listed during a raid on the Naval Forces of Kure (July 1945). When in their destruction all military meaning has already disappeared.

    Well, yes, and “Sinano” (as an example) was drowned when he terribly threatened the entire US Navy laughing

    For submarine heroes, each trophy was obtained in hot battles with the enemy.

    Given the almost complete absence of PLO among the Japanese (almost the entire war), American submarines drowned the merchant ships of Japan with absolutely no danger to themselves.
    1. Santa Fe
      19 January 2016 12: 04 New
      0
      Quote: Delta
      Well, yes, and “Sinano” (as an example) was drowned when he terribly threatened the entire US Navy

      and all? the only case

      aviators met all the time. The simplest example is the death of the Ozawa squadron, specially sent to slaughter without aircraft, like bait
      Quote: Delta
      Given the almost complete absence of PLO among the Japanese (almost the entire war), American submarines drowned the merchant ships of Japan with absolutely no danger to themselves.

      Old barrel organ, tired

      1. The presence or absence of PLO weakly affects the effectiveness of submarines.
      2. PLO among the Japanese was. US Navy lost 51 submarine
      3. It is impossible to assign an escort to each bulk carrier. In the Atlantic 2 / 3 transports went through the entire war without convoys
      1. Delta
        Delta 19 January 2016 12: 10 New
        +2
        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        and all? the only case


        so you brought it yourself in the article. As an example of the greatest skill and heroism of US submariners)))

        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        Old barrel organ, tired

        Well, I'm sorry, burn the labors of Dall, Polmar. It's them, not me

        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        The presence or absence of PLO weakly affects the effectiveness of submarines.


        yes ...
        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        PLO among the Japanese was.

        well, it’s clear that some

        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        US Navy lost 51 submarines

        from the actions of PLO?
        1. Santa Fe
          19 January 2016 22: 12 New
          +2
          Quote: Delta
          As an example of the greatest skill and heroism of US submariners)))

          the largest sunken ship in history
          Quote: Delta
          so you brought it yourself in the article

          And he did it right.

          At the same time, being equipped with an air group - Shinano could pose a considerable threat. On the calendar was November 1944, and not the 28-th of July 1945
          Quote: Delta
          yes ...

          In order for the PLO to become at least somehow effective, you need to spend as allies in
          The Atlantic. 10 anti-submarine ships and 10 aircraft on one German submarine. + regularly bomb bases and create fuel interruptions

          And that did not save, the Germans continued to drown them, like puppies. In January 1945, an aircraft carrier was torpedoed at the mouth of the Thames.
          Quote: Delta
          from the actions of PLO?

          Defense
          1. Scraptor
            Scraptor 20 January 2016 09: 11 New
            0
            at the mouth of the Thames one aircraft carrier was torpedoed and 700 German submarines sunk in the Atlantic
      2. PPD
        PPD 19 January 2016 13: 00 New
        +6
        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN


        1. The presence or absence of PLO weakly affects the effectiveness of submarines.

        Yes, admit not weakly.
      3. Operator
        Operator 19 January 2016 17: 11 New
        +1
        The presence of PLO at the ship's connection:
        - affects the effectiveness of torpedo submarines;
        - does not affect the effectiveness of missile (shock) submarines.

        The range of the PLO of the naval compound is longer than the range of the torpedoes and smaller than the range of the missiles.

        The Russian Navy was fortunate enough that during the construction of the post-war fleet, the US leadership focused on the old-fashioned surface ships, where the lion's share of funds went.

        Thanks to NS Khrushchev for the choice in favor of an underwater nuclear missile sword am
        1. Cap.Morgan
          Cap.Morgan 19 January 2016 20: 39 New
          -1
          Yes, Khrushchov was right. Probably not Khrushchov himself, but some of his advisers, specialists ...
          Submarines and missiles were more effective.
      4. Scraptor
        Scraptor 20 January 2016 08: 59 New
        0
        rare crap - on the contrary, 100 dry cargo ships are escorted by 10 ships and there are no problems

        non-convoy transportation in the Atlantic was banned and the “happy times” for German submariners immediately ended, as most of them went to the bottom.
  8. Resistance
    Resistance 19 January 2016 13: 45 New
    0
    According to "Blockade and Counter-Blockade. The Fight on Ocean-Naval Communications in World War II", V. P. Bogolepov, 1967 and "Torpedo Submarines", R. Cuen, 1970, are the first among the submariners.
  9. Kars
    Kars 19 January 2016 15: 20 New
    +5
    A submarine on the account of which there is a steam locomotive))))
    USS Barb (SS-220)
  10. okroshka79
    okroshka79 19 January 2016 16: 05 New
    0
    Finally, Oleg Kaptsov marked his flag! Why would he describe the exploits of Alexander Marineskeo, Sergey Lisin or Petr Grishchenko. He has a task set by the State Department, so he is trying.
    1. saturn.mmm
      saturn.mmm 19 January 2016 17: 59 New
      +1
      Quote: okroshka79
      Finally, Oleg Kaptsov marked his flag!

      He did not seem to hide the fact.
      Colonel-General
      Full name: Oleg [Add to the black list]
      Group: Journalists
      Registration Date: December 27 2011 23: 40
      Last Visited: 19 January 2016 11: 46

      ICQ Number: 454678987
      Location: Wildwoods
      Number of publications: 426 (View all publications) rss
      Number of comments: 7394 (Recent Comments)
  11. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 January 2016 19: 19 New
    +7
    It's boring.
    The Yankees fleet was not “balanced”, but inadequately huge

    And balanced, one doesn’t interfere with the other
    One hundred heavy cruisers and battleships, 40 high-speed aircraft carriers, 800 destroyers

    The numbers are overpriced. Oleg, you are even too lazy to count.
    But the magnificent variety of surface ships did not change the main postulate of naval warfare. In terms of performance, the submarines abruptly escaped.

    well, we focus on the "main tenet of naval warfare." German submarines during the war years sank more tonnage than the British and American Navy combined. Of course, the German fleet won the war at sea ... What? No? Germany lost the war? Who would have thought... laughing
    Oleg, you did not notice (unlike most readers of my article) - the sunk tonnage is not an end in itself in naval warfare. You can drown a lot, more than the enemy - and lose the war.
    So, against the background of their colleagues, the actions of submariners look like a kind of achievement

    Very peculiar :)) The only question is that surface forces (and not submarines) subsequently stopped the Japanese United Fleet and this was an achievement without the prefix "peculiar".
    And what was based on Luzon was a frank junk built in the 1920s.

    Or grandiose illiteracy, or outright lies. On Luzon, 16 submarines of the Salmon type were based, which were commissioned from 1937 to 1940 and 7 submarines of the “R” type, which entered service in 1935-1937. Only 6 submarines were obsolete.
    And it would be naive to expect submariners to win in such conditions, despite the fact that they were opposed by three serious convoys with powerful PLO-guards, where for every Japanese transport with landing there were three escort ships.

    But the aircraft carriers won. Even against 3 escort ships for transport laughing
    True, what is the fault of the submariners themselves? The Americans hacked the Japanese naval code JN-25 and bypassed the danger area in advance.

    Oleg, I already wrote that lying is not good. Well, tell me, from what sources did you take that the Americans knew about the Japanese curtain of the submarine?
    In Midway’s battle, the wings of two aircraft carriers couldn’t destroy the damaged Mogami cruiser with its nose torn off.

    Yes, after the aforementioned air groups banged 4 aircraft carriers, they were a little exhausted.
    As he later admitted, his nerves had passed, he was not in good shape after a night swim at Palawan.

    Again a lie, the admiral did not admit it
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 January 2016 19: 20 New
      +5
      The newest aircraft carrier, the Taiho, did not even have time to get to the war zone (destroyed in its first expedition with the Albacore boat in June 1944).

      Got a torpedo after the Japanese raised 2 waves of aircraft. But I didn’t get to the database zone laughing
      To exhaust all the forces of the enemy fleet - so that by the time of the general battle from its former power there were only one bits left.

      And where did this happen? :)))

      ZY Oleg, it's just rudeness - write such "refutations". I tried, material shoveled. And you? Again a set of slogans cut in half with gross errors.
      1. Santa Fe
        19 January 2016 22: 01 New
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And where did this happen?

        201 warship obviously nowhere
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But I didn’t get to the database zone

        Died in the first hours of battle in the Philippine Sea
        one day before the general battle
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 January 2016 08: 05 New
          +3
          Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
          201 warship obviously nowhere

          Obviously nowhere. There was no such battle to which the submarines left only bits of the United Fleet. Here, how many mantra "201 ship" do not repeat, but you can’t trample against history :))
          Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
          He died in the first hours of the battle in the Philippine Sea a day before the general battle

          Those. the day on which Japanese carrier-based aircraft ceased to exist is not a general battle? M-d ...
          1. Santa Fe
            20 January 2016 09: 18 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There was no such battle to which the submarines left only bits of the United Fleet.

            any battle had the consequences of meeting with the submarine

            one, two three, four, ... two hundred
            200 ships - how much would they strengthen the power of Japanese squadrons

            and how many more ships and planes were built if 1100 transports arrived at destination ports
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Those. the day on which Japanese carrier-based aircraft ceased to exist is not a general battle?

            Aviation began to hammer Japanese ships the next day
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 January 2016 11: 17 New
              +1
              Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
              Aviation began to hammer Japanese ships the next day

              Oleg, well, good already. The battle began on June 19, when the Japanese attacked the American fleet with their carrier-based aircraft - and lost all of it. It was on this day that Taiho was sunk. And on June 20, the Americans finally found the Japanese and dealt an air strike - in the evening.
              In general, if I said frankly .. ehhkm ... and there is no courage to admit it, so do not aggravate it.
              Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
              200 ships - how much would they strengthen the power of Japanese squadrons

              And you count laughing How much would they strengthen the strength of the Japanese towards Midway, Guadalcanal, the Mariana Islands laughing
              And when you find out that it’s almost not what, what will you do? Following the scribe, write about the Great Strategic All-Decisive Battle of Leyte Gulf? laughing
      2. Per se.
        Per se. 19 January 2016 22: 13 New
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Oleg, this is just rudeness - write such "refutations". I tried, material shoveled. And you?
        I already once said that Oleg is a great “provocateur”, and in this his articles are turning people on, making them argue, generally gathering an audience. I do not always agree with him, but always treat his work kindly. According to your “duel,” Nikolay Dorizo ​​has lines that you can smile at.
        It was a duel
        In front of the auditorium
        Duel
        arts
        With a fun scandal;
        Duel
        talent
        With a goat hoof
        Worship of the saint
        With simple curiosity.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 January 2016 11: 19 New
          +1
          Quote: Per se.
          According to your “duel,” Nikolay Dorizo ​​has lines that you can smile at.

          That's the way I smile drinks (although a little tired :))
        2. Scraptor
          Scraptor 22 January 2016 12: 53 New
          0
          Both are actually State Department ... composting the brain of the audience, and smearing shit on the USSR. Among the commentators there are many.

          Deck aviation stopped flying with loss of fuel, a civilian ship of almost any class was converted into an aircraft carrier. It’s not possible to remake them into a battleship or submarine.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 19 January 2016 19: 37 New
      +1
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Oleg, I already wrote that lying is not good. Well, tell me, from what sources did you take that the Americans knew about the Japanese curtain of the submarine?

      EMNIP, everything was much simpler: the Americans just went through the curtain area before the Japanese submarines went there.
      The fact is that, according to the Japanese plan, the US fleet was to leave the base only after receiving a message about an attack on Midway. Based on this, the timing of the deployment of the curtain was chosen. The advance release of TF.16 and TF.17 to IJN staff could not have been dreamed of in a nightmare.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Yes, after the aforementioned air groups banged 4 aircraft carriers, they were a little exhausted.

      Heh heh heh ... You still remember that the Mikum with the "Mogs" also worked the Marines from Midway - after which the myth of the ram of the "Mikum" captain Fleming appeared.

      And so, for the sinking of the Mogami aircraft carriers needed to take into the air 26 “slow but deadly” groups of the Ring (“Hornet”) and 31 dive aircraft + 3 torpers of the Short group (“Big E”). These are all the combat ready drummers left by the Yankees after the main battle.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 January 2016 20: 54 New
        +3
        Quote: Alexey RA
        MNIP, everything was much simpler: the Americans just went through the curtain area before the Japanese submarines went there.

        So it was - the Japanese turned too late. The codes have nothing to do with it.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The fact is that, according to the Japanese plan, the US fleet was to leave the base only after receiving a message about a strike on Midway

        Not certainly in that way. The Japanese just admitted the possibility of the accidental presence of one, maybe two US aircraft carriers. Hence the throwing of Nagumo with the preparation of air groups
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And so, the aircraft carriers for the sinking of the Mogami

        You, as I understand it, mean "Mikumu"?
        Quote: Alexey RA
        it took 26 “slow but deadly” Ring groups (“Hornet”) and 31 dives + 3 torters of the Short group (“Big E”) to fly into the air. These are all the combat ready drummers left by the Yankees after the main battle.

        There is a rather interesting assumption - the American bombs did not penetrate the armored decks of the Japanese TKR. If so - not only the American submarines had defective weapons :)
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 20 January 2016 12: 54 New
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Not certainly in that way. The Japanese just admitted the possibility of the accidental presence of one, maybe two US aircraft carriers. Hence the throwing of Nagumo with the preparation of air groups

          Well yes. But they did not count on the entire available composition of the Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers.

          However, the Yankees, despite all the successes of the Rochfort group, even during the start of the raids, believed that the Japanese had 4 AB, divided into 2 groups. The first group works purely according to Midway, and the second - purely anti-ship - awaits the US Navy. Nobody expected that the Japanese used cars from all 4 air groups for the first raid (after which the merry-go-round with rearmament would begin).
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          You, as I understand it, mean "Mikumu"?

          Mea culpa. Zapororted. fool
    3. Santa Fe
      19 January 2016 21: 52 New
      0
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      And balanced, one doesn’t interfere with the other

      180 submarines on 100 KR and LK, with the ratio of the cost of building TKR and diesel-electric submarines of those years
      What was the cost of building and operating submarines as a percentage of the budget of the US Navy? percent 5?

      as a result, these 5% caused the majority of victories. And they could have done more if they paid more attention
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      well, focus on the "main tenet of naval warfare"

      There is no such postulate

      There is a tonnage of sunk in% of the tonnage of the merchant fleet. And the Germans had problems with this - the Yankees re-built the merchant fleet of Britain
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      You can drown a lot, more than the enemy - and lose the war.

      So the enemy has stronger industry. And these are not questions for sailors, but for those who started the war.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      sunk tonnage is not an end in itself of naval warfare

      But what is it? Water?))
      The sunk tonnage is not an end in itself. This is a remedy. The goal is to control communications. And the boats are the first in this business.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      surface forces (rather than submarines) subsequently stopped the Japanese United Fleet, and this was an “original” achievement without a prefix.

      Submarines sank the 201 warship and 1100 transports without the prefix "peculiar"
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Well, tell me, from what sources did you take that the Americans knew about the Japanese curtain of the submarine?

      I wrote somewhere that the Americans knew about the Japanese curtain from the submarine?

      They knew much more - the whole essence of the operation. And they passed this area before the deployment of the veil.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      they were a little exhausted.

      but xnumx sorties made
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Again a lie, the admiral did not admit it

      Admiral admitted a mistake. The reason is not difficult to understand - to survive the night shipwreck and in a day again command the squadron.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 January 2016 11: 25 New
        +2
        Quote: SWEET_SIXTEEN
        Admiral admitted a mistake. The reason is not difficult to understand - to survive the night shipwreck and in a day again command the squadron.

        Oleg, the admiral said his group’s retreat was a mistake. And then he took his words back (but the word is not a sparrow, you won’t fly out). But the statement that this mistake was made because of the shipwreck is the result of your irrepressible imagination, which you are trying to pass off as a historical fact.
        About the number of sunk Pl - answered above
  12. tasha
    tasha 20 January 2016 05: 42 New
    0
    I will give a large quote from the introduction of A. Shergin to the book by T. Roscoe "Combat operations of US submarines in the second world war

    Japan's insular position and dependence on the import of strategic raw materials and food have always been its vulnerable side. This vulnerability particularly increased with the seizure of the Dutch East Indies and numerous territories in the South Seas when the front stretched for 15 000 – 16 000 miles. The pursuit of Japanese aggression in a southerly direction required the navy and aviation to solve additional tasks related to the provision of transportation in various parts of the Pacific Ocean. These circumstances increased the importance and role of ocean and sea communications. The protection of merchant shipping was very important.
    The main communications of Japan, determined by the direction of expansion, took place in the western and southwestern parts of the Pacific Ocean. They connected the ports and bases of Japan proper with China, Korea, Indo-China, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, as well as with the island areas of the front line in the southern and central parts of the Pacific Ocean.
    Through these communications, a cargo flow of strategic raw materials and food went to Japan; and troops, weapons, and military [8] equipment were transferred from Japan. To ensure these transportations, Japan at the beginning of the war had a merchant fleet with a total displacement of 6 337 000 t {3}.
    The rapid advance of the Japanese armed forces to the south and the seizure of vast island regions of the southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean made it possible to maneuver, that is, change the direction of movement of convoys and individual ships, change communication areas and make extensive use of coastal aircraft and small ships to protect navigation. But the dispersion of ports and bases in the vast space from the Aleutian Islands to Australia led to the dispersal of the fleet forces necessary to ensure commercial shipping, and required a significant increase in the forces and means of anti-submarine defense.
    In the prewar years, anti-submarine defense in the Japanese fleet was mainly built on the basis of the requirements for preparing a war against the Soviet Union. It was believed that if anti-submarine defense blocked the exit of Soviet submarines from the Sea of ​​Japan, this would solve the problem of ensuring Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean. And as a result, it was supposed to block all exits from the Sea of ​​Japan to the Pacific Ocean by equipping mine and network anti-submarine barriers. During this period, Japan paid attention to the development of anti-submarine positional systems and the construction of large surface ships and aircraft carriers.
    This unilateral development of the Japanese fleet led to the fact that anti-submarine defense was not prepared for the protection of its merchant shipping and remained weak throughout the entire period of hostilities in the Pacific Ocean, the composition of the forces and means of the Japanese fleet did not meet the requirements for the protection of widespread sea and ocean traffic. In addition to the 14 anti-submarine ships of special construction, which were in operation at the beginning of hostilities, the Japanese proposed to build 1942 escort ships during the 1945 – 233 years. However, this plan has not been implemented.
    The Japanese fleet included a significant number of destroyers, but they were mainly used to guard large warships, and were used to escort convoys to a limited extent. The escort of merchant ships was carried out mainly by basic patrol ships, which had weak anti-submarine weapons and imperfect means for detecting submarines.
    To combat submarines, a huge number of motor and sailing fishing vessels were involved. But these ships, without sonar and radar, could not be effective anti-submarine defense forces.
    1. tasha
      tasha 20 January 2016 05: 43 New
      +3
      The losses incurred by the Japanese merchant fleet in the first year of the war significantly exceeded all the assumptions of the Japanese command. However, decisive measures to ensure and protect shipping were not taken, except for some expansion of the construction of anti-submarine ships. The overall composition of escort forces continued to be insufficient. In the 1943 year, the anti-submarine forces of the Japanese fleet [9] had only 50 ships, including several destroyers built by the 1920 – 1925 years. Four escort aircraft carriers that were part of the anti-submarine forces began to participate in escorting convoys only in the 1944 year. The organization of escort forces was sometimes random. For escorting transports, ships that were usually free from other tasks were allocated. In addition, a significant number of anti-submarine ships and ships periodically involved in escorting ships did not have radar and sonar systems in service. As before, almost no aviation was used for anti-submarine defense. All this created very favorable conditions for the actions of American submarines on sea and ocean communications against Japanese merchant shipping. Submarines did not experience any significant permanent influence of forces and means of anti-submarine defense.


      If the Americans did not have such a powerful surface fleet, the Japanese would have been able to spend more energy on creating an anti-aircraft defense and the success of American submarines. Those. surface forces and aviation in fierce battles made it possible for submarines to operate on supply lines, thereby submarines provided invaluable assistance to the surface fleet. US admirals used all the tools they had to win and found the most vulnerable link - supply tankers.

      German submariners have made outstanding strides in the Atlantic. But the Allies were able to allocate sufficient resources to create a fleet of escort ships (including aircraft carriers), to develop new means of detecting and destroying submarines, and as a result, "wolf packs" were expelled from the Atlantic.
  13. Taoist
    Taoist 20 January 2016 11: 07 New
    +2
    They like to argue with us ... even when there is nothing to argue about.

    After all, in fact, it's all about the same ... The fleet is needed:

    1) Balanced. (separately, submarines or aircraft carriers ... armadillos ... destroyers you can’t solve all the problems and you can’t cover all the holes)

    2) Optimized for the task (and this especially means that you need to start with the statement of this very problem)

    Then they started about the small successes of our submariners with relatively large losses ... But what was there to expect from the actions in those theaters? The Baltic is shallow and almost all of it is blocked by mines. Again, the impact of enemy aircraft is constant. Black Sea - yes, there are simply no goals for submarines. To shoot torpedoes at the BDB? (By the way, this is typical for all theaters - transportation is mainly coastal, small-tonnage - there is simply no such choice of targets as in the Atlantic or the Pacific. The largest warship of the enemy is a destroyer ...) Only in the north is a bit more spacious - but there is also the weakest fleet ...

    So everything needs to be considered in context.