In recent years, much attention has been paid to the development and modernization of the naval forces of Russia on the part of the country's leadership. At the same time, and this should be discussed frankly, the construction of new warships is carried out using outdated technologies that call into question the very concept of combat readiness of a whole type of armed forces. Professional sailors, on this statement, may notice that the author, as a private, uninformed person, using only open sources of information, exaggerates everything and, trying to earn cheap credibility of a superficial naval expert, uses laconic, unsubstantiated phrases. Nevertheless, let’s calmly figure out everything in order, armed only with incontrovertible facts and logical reflections. Moreover, everything set forth here was at one time the subject of repeated critical discussions of the author with military specialists who have many years of experience in various military posts on surface ships of the Russian naval fleet.
So, statement number one, which is obvious and related to the fact that in most of the most developed countries of the world there is a widespread introduction of new systems in the fleets weapons, including anti-ship missiles (PKR), with enhanced combat performance. The appearance of such missiles as means of air attack on surface objects represents a real threat, since they have a very small effective area of dispersion (about 0,1-0,01 sq. M), and their flight takes place at ultra-low altitudes with a sufficiently high speed; in the final part of the trajectory, they, in addition, perform complex maneuvering in both vertical and horizontal planes. All this creates significant difficulties in combating them and necessitates the immediate deployment of research and developmental works to create sufficiently reliable means of protection against this type of weapon.
At the same time, and this is an irrefutable statement number two, indicating that, within the concept of the echeloned air defense, airborne formations and groups, when the nearest zone of the line of defense of any ship (extending from 300 m to 4 km) falls on 1-th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, up to 30% of all targets involved in a raid on a ship, are considered to be an important means of hitting these targets with automated short-range anti-aircraft artillery systems (ZAK) with short-range artillery kali guns. rum from 20 to 40 mm and autonomous fire control systems. The use of such ZAK is all the more justified in a real combat situation, when, in the process of conducting a fleeting sea battle, a potential enemy will carry out massive rocket attacks on the ship with small time intervals between the rockets in the salvo and from different course angles, including also appearing "from behind." No less remarkable is the fact that in recent years (to which particular attention was paid at the international maritime exhibitions “Euronaval-2012” and “Euronaval-2014”) against the background of constantly increasing threats to ships in the near zone (such as: defeat of crews of ships small arms from small-sized, high-speed ships, the bombing of ships with powerful improvised explosive devices mounted on boats - “kamikazes”); the world’s shipments of remotely-controlled combat modules — relatively new sa sea weapons systems.
An analysis of the experience of combat operations at sea, for example, during the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in April-June 1982, shows that small-bore rapid-fire artillery capable of creating a tight fire curtain on the course of the air target in the shortest time may, in fact, be in a number of cases a more effective means of combating naval targets than an anti-aircraft missile defense system. The high rate of fire and the relatively short response time of modern ZAK short-range (up to 5000 shots / min and no more than 3-5 seconds, respectively) make it possible to achieve very good results in repelling attacks from the enemy, seeking to destroy the combat surface ship.
In this connection, a completely natural question arises: does the modern Russian ZAK, which are deployed on surface warships of the Russian Navy, possess all the above qualities? Unfortunately, this too should be stated as an indisputable fact that practically no warship of the Russian Navy, both in service and being put into operation, does not possess these qualities. Worse, the developed prospective warships are supplied with deliberately outdated, ineffective and, in fact, useless in combat conditions sea ZAK. At the beginning of the last century, British sailors used to say about such ships “Five minutes ships” (ie, “five-minute ships”, i.e., such ships whose sinking should take no more than five minutes). The picture is, of course, unsightly and even somewhat depressing. Nevertheless, this is the 100% prospect of the existence of the Russian military surface fleet in the coming years. If, of course, nothing is done, or, wandering in the dark, to demonstrate cosmetic, meaningless half-measures, or rather, actively simulate a violent activity with zero end result. Than now, to one degree or another successfully, representatives of the country's defense industry are involved in the development and production of naval anti-aircraft artillery complexes. This, first of all, is about the OJSC “Instrument Engineering Design Bureau” (KBP), the city of Tula, JSC “Tochmash named after A.E. Nudelman ", Moscow, and PO" Tulamashzavod ", Tula.
A new way of "mastering" the budget with the old methods
After all, no matter how unpleasant it is to realize, a foreign ZAK “Goalkeeper” is now “running the ball” in the world’s oceans (Photo # 1), developed and put into service in NATO countries back in the 80s of the last century and having one of the the most powerful and most accurate to date 30-mm anti-aircraft gun. And instead of developing something worthy of the “Goalkeeper” as opposed to “NATO members” and trying to surpass them in this field, our leading weapon enterprise KBP named after AG Shipunova didn’t find anything better than for decades (starting from 1994) to engage in “combat toys” of the anti-aircraft-artillery complex (SCRA) type “Armor - С1”, popular with the first persons in the Russian government and selling very well to third world countries , but never accepted by the Land Forces of the country as the main ground defense system of the near zone. At the same time, the unique automatic gun AO-18, designed at the time by V.P. Gryazev and A.G. Shipunov has not improved since the end of 70-s of the last century (except for increasing the length of barrels in the AO-18K gun from 54 to 80 calibers), being in oblivion and discrediting its patriarchal nature, quite good in its essence. 630M. Designers - weapons at the same time, already some year in a row, are only concerned about which of the new anti-aircraft missiles to hang on the shoulders of the next “raw”, now sea, PANA-M SARK (Photo No. 2), which, as it turns out , entered service with the Russian Navy already in 2016 year! At the same time, I just want to ask the developers of this “miracle of technology”, and where, dear gentlemen, is your report about conducting serious naval, and not land tests of this complex? They, as always in such cases, will answer you: this is a closed topic, but you do not have the appropriate access. I have experienced similar experiences ...
Picture No. 2. CRAFT "Pantsir-M"
Please think about this profanation: the tactical and technical characteristics of the ultra-modern (as the developers claim!) Sea SAME are based on the results of tests under the conditions of the Kapustin Yar ground test range !? And where is the impact on the work of the ship’s radar system (radar) of the so-called underlying surface, in other words, water? After all, it is 3-5 times stronger than on earth, reflects radio waves (at sea, the reflection coefficient is equal to one, and on land, in the same Kapustin Yar -0,2-0,3). There are also purely physical problems. Specialists in maritime weapons know that the low altitude of modern RCC (no more than 3-5 m from the sea surface) leads to the fact that almost the entire route of radiated microwave radar passes through the zone near the water. The inverse (that is, increasing with height) distributions of humidity and air temperature that occur in it under certain weather conditions lead to the well-known phenomenon of anomalous radio wave propagation disturbing the normal operation of the radar. How can these nuances be taken into account and worked out under the conditions of a stationary earth surface, for example, the surface of a steppe test site, is unclear? And everything that happens, oddly enough it sounds, is carried out with the tacit consent or connivance of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and members of the Expert Council under the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Their vigilance and professionalism, apparently, were euthanized by the fact that for the first time in the Pantsire-M, a passive phased-array antenna (PAR) was used as a radar system on the sea. The presence of this complex in the complex seems to the author to be quite redundant and unreasonable Since, along with the advantages inherent in the radar under discussion, it also has a very significant disadvantage, primarily due to the narrow sector of the review, in which it is inferior to both parabolic and slot antennas. Of course, from the point of view of firing naval targets with anti-aircraft missiles, the use of radar with phased array is certainly advisable. And what about the artillery component of the Pantsir-M complex, for which, exactly, the review sector is not a secondary factor, but a decisive factor?
Is it not for this reason that the modernization of ZAK Goalkeeper, currently being carried out by the Netherlands Ministry of Defense and the French corporation Thales, does not involve making any changes to the radar unit, represented by the classic Cassegrain antenna, and does not affect in any way the existing slit antenna. In the course of the modernization, it is assumed that the existing capabilities of the “Goalkeeper” (which, in terms of accuracy of fire, already surpasses the Russian ZAK AK - 630М by almost 3,5 times!) Will be significantly expanded due to the use of a more modern electronic-optical tracking system that the French, by the level of capabilities of tracking systems of this type, are now superior to everyone in the world!) and the introduction of new control and combat algorithms. That is, at that time, while the representatives of the Russian defense industry, together with the 1 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, continue to endlessly exploit the outdated idea of the SAIL, the depravity of which was recognized by marine experts all over the world as early as the 70-80 years of the last century, our opponents slowly, logically meaningfully extend the life to 2025, also in general, the patriarchal ZAK “Goalkeeper”, getting the opportunity with its help to intercept the new generation supersonic anti-ship missiles and use it against speedy malomer s surface vessels, which is particularly important in recent years as against Russian warships carried out a provocation by the Turkish marine craft. Now imagine the following situation, even for a second: on the spot of the Turkish seiner who maliciously attacked 13 in December 2015 in the Aegean Sea sentry ship "Sharp-witted", there could well be a similar high-speed small-sized vessel armed with a whole set of anti-ship weapons used instantly (within fractions of seconds!), and disappearing from the zone of probable damage at a speed of more than 50 nodes. Possible consequences for our warship would be catastrophic ...
The idea of the SIDECUS, rooted in special terminology at the suggestion of the respected Tula designer Vasily Petrovich Gryazev, passed over the relay to the fleet from the constructive-layout scheme of the famous "Tunguska" and invariably operated exclusively by Soviet and then Russian armaments for almost three decades. It is, unfortunately, an anachronism, inherited from the twentieth century. The concept of a combat module “with two suitcases” (transport and launch containers with anti-aircraft missiles and cannons, separated for some reason from each other by 3 m in the horizon), which is not amenable to technical understanding in the 21st century both in terms of logic and from the point of view of the tactics of conducting a modern transient sea battle, in fact, it slows down the normal development and improvement of promising domestic ZAK, in fact, necessary for our modern surface warships. This idea with spaced trunks at the household level can be particularly clearly demonstrated by the example of a hunter who would have ventured to hunt a wild boar or, even more so, a double-barreled bear, whose trunks were originally separated from one another. a strange whim centimeters, commercials, at thirty - forty. The question is: will the hunter return home with loot? The answer is unequivocal: both the wild boar and the bear can sleep peacefully ... For reference: from January 2016, according to information from KB Nochmann's Tochmash, the next state tests of Palma began (Photo No. 3), although according to the reports of the “Voennoe obozrenie” Internet portal, www.topwar.ru, from 21 in March 2014, it is known that the previous state tests of the Palash CRAFT (this is the modified name of the same Palma CRAW) were “successfully failed” in the 2007 year, and he was then accepted only in trial operation ...
Picture No. 3. CRAFT "Palma"
The bleak prospects of the Russian Navy
Thus, from the previous narration, we found out that our probable opponents, as it turns out, with much more attention and perseverance than we could expect from them, relate to the improvement of anti-aircraft combat weapons in the near-air defense zones of their surface ships.
And now we will discuss how this business is organized here, on the Russian navy? Yes, almost nothing. Surface warships are designed, built and leave from the stocks without any consideration of the organization of the layered air defense of the near zone of the ship. Moreover, it is not typical for individual instances of military surface watercraft, but is present almost everywhere. It seems that the development and combat equipment of the ships were engaged not by experts, but by randomly invited amateurs. Not to be unfounded, consider, for example, the head corvette of the 20380 project.
Picture No. 4. The main corvette project 20380 "guarding"
Steregushchy (Photo No. 4), designed by St. Petersburg Almaz Central Securities and Design Bureau. According to his general designer, Alexander Shlyakhtenko, "This is a multi-purpose patrol ship with unique technical parameters and weapons for conducting operations on the high seas." How much is this score true? Let's try to analyze the information on this account, published in the open press. So, the air defense and missile defense (PRO) of the corvette is provided by the DIRT 3М87 "Dirk" (Photo No. 5) in the bow of the ship.
Picture No. 5. The Kortik-M ZRAK and two 30-mm anti-aircraft artillery systems AK-630М (Photo No. 6) in the stern of the ship
Corvette, the main purpose of which is to conduct operations on the high seas, even in the near-sea zone, in the event of the outbreak of clashes, will have to operate in the conditions of the overwhelming superiority of the potential enemy in the air and rely only on its own air defense and anti-missile systems. And what do we have to ensure that the situation with the 20380 Corvette does not repeat the situation, similar to that which occurred on May 17 in the Persian Gulf with the American frigate "Stark" when the Iraqi Fighter "Mirage" F-1987 struck the warship from the bow in connection with the fact that the 1-mm ZAK "Vulcan - Phalanx" was installed only at the stern of surface facilities? Yes, to practically defend against anti-ship missiles either from the stern or from the bow, both the head corvette Steregushchy and his associates on the 20 Soobrazitelny project (Photo No. 20380), Boiky and Stable (note newest corvettes!)
Picture No. 7. Corvette Project 20380 "Savvy"
cannot under any circumstances, since AK-630М and its Vympel radar are spaced apart on 10-15 m (for ZAK Golpiper, for example, the radar is on the same platform with the complex, on the aiming axis, 10 cm! From the barrel block), which directly affects the accuracy of determining the angular coordinate system of the complex, and, consequently, the accuracy of its shooting at the target. Especially a lot of questions are caused by Photo No. 7-1, on which ZAK is placed, or rather, hidden in some onboard recess, which, apparently, should make it invisible to the enemy.
And for what it is necessary, I just want to ask the designers of this “unique technical solution”? After all, the main idea of the existence of any ZAK in a battle is to die, save a battle ship from defeat. How will the ship be saved by an artillery complex with a limited sector of shelling, moreover, “hidden” in an onboard recess?
The accuracy of the AK-630M complex, or rather the circular probable deviation (CVT) of its projectiles according to the estimated information given in the special literature, is within the limits of 4,0-4,28 mRD. This means that at a range of 1500 m, the actual random spread of shells from the aiming point will be from 4 to 4,28 m, and the scattering area will reach 40 square meters. In a word, for every 1000 shots fired from ZAK, no more than 0,1-x shells will fall into the midsection (the cross section of the body moving in water or air) with the maximum area of 4 square meters. On the other hand, in order to launch 1000 shells on a target, a time of at least 12 seconds is necessary (at a rate of fire of the order of 5000 rounds per minute). During this time interval, even the slowest subsonic CRP of the sample of the end of 60-x - the beginning of 70-s of the last century will fly no less than 3000 meters. And all this despite the fact that here we are not discussing in detail the speed of the reaction of the complex to the emerging sea targets. On the effectiveness of the DIRECT "Dirk" can not argue at all, it is below even the estimates of the complex AK-630M: think of the boar, the bear and the hunter with its fake double-barreled bar mentioned above. At the same time, the fact that the Admiral Nakhimov nuclear-powered missile cruiser, which is currently undergoing repair and deep modernization, assessed by the Army Herald website (www.army-news. Ru) from 07.04.2014, cannot but be regretted and regretted. In 50 billion rubles, it is supposed to place as the air defense complex of the near zone as many as six KORtik-M PSRAK. Comments, as they say, are superfluous ...
Unfortunately, a similar situation is observed across the entire line of ships commissioned in the last 10-12 years. Again, in order not to be accused of bias, we now turn our eyes to the frigate of the project 22350 (Photo No. 8) or
small artillery ships of the 21630 project based on the Caspian Sea and which became famous after the 7 October 2015 of the missile attacks on Syria (Photo No. 9 and 10). The air defense and missile defense of the near zone on the ships of these projects is not just ineffective, it is, in fact, completely absent ...
Picture No. 9. Small Artillery Ship (MAK) Project 21630
Picture No. 10. MAK project 21630 (view from the stern)
It is interesting, in this regard, to discuss how things are in this regard on the surface ships of our probable friends and equally probable enemies? Let's start with the ships of the NATO bloc (Photo No. 11).
It is a light aircraft carrier of the British Navy Invincible. Notice how the 30-mm ZAK "Goalkeeper" and aircraft carrier anti-aircraft missiles are placed on the deck of a warship XNUMX-mm ZAK: combat means to the bow of the ship. In addition, anti-aircraft missiles placed behind ZAK, without interfering with artillery, have their own, independent sector of fire.
Now compare how much the NATO members are losing to them, in this regard, the “Chinese comrades”, who, in fact, put an not entirely successful “Goalkeeper” clone ZAK H / JP-14 on their squadron “Liuzhou”, positioning it along the contour of the ship the same as it was done in Russia. That is, how God put his soul (Photo number 12).
Yes, they, of course, diligently study and collect, if possible, all the best around the world, but in this case not only imagination should work, but also something else ... This also applies to ZAK, which they design independently. Take at least their projects ZAK Type 730 or Type 1130 (Photo 13),
in which the features of the American - Dutch “Goalkeeper” are clearly visible, but that’s what ends up, because, all the same, you cannot literally follow the Chinese saying “If you can copy the Master exactly, then you yourself are the Master”. In an effort to increase the firepower of Type 1130, the Chinese, having assembled 11 trunks into a single block (mind bogus!), As it turns out, violated the fundamental principle of the universe, the principle of the "golden section", which sounds like this: "The best is the enemy of the good" Therefore, Type 1130, this monster, the Chinese weapons and decided to install, apparently, only on its not very successful, and so far the only aircraft carrier "Liaoning". There are three of them there and at the same time they overheat when shooting.
Thus, finally, one disappointing conclusion can be made concerning the next, with the pomp, ongoing modernization of the Russian navy: we wanted it better - but it turned out as always. Are the new Tsushima and Port Arthur really needed to finally remember the testament of the unforgettable Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, calling to his descendants, you and me, from the stele of the monument in Kronstadt - “Remember the war!”. Never belittle your opponent, no matter who he is, and always be ready not only to deal a crushing blow to the foe, but also to effectively reflect a possible answer on his part.
Based on the foregoing, it seems appropriate to implement a set of the following urgent measures:
1. It is necessary, and as soon as possible maximum within the next one and a half - two years, to rethink the whole scheme of the organization of air defense / missile defense of each of the surface ships, both in combat formation and designed and under construction, with the issuance of specific, rather than contrived, recommendations on its change in accordance with the requirements dictated by the realities of today, when, together with the elaboration of the issue of creating a layered defense of a combat surface ship, the dilemma of breeding into different zones of responsibility will naturally be resolved and in different profiles of the watercraft of its artillery - zenith and rocket - zenith components. As we observed above, when discussing the structure of an air defense system and a missile defense system in the near zone of the English light aircraft carrier Invincible.
2. In a short time (no more than 5-7 years) to design and adopt a completely new naval anti-aircraft artillery complex, which has unique combat characteristics, namely:
- instantaneous response (no more than 0,1-0,3 seconds) to the appearance and shelling of emerging naval targets threatening a combat surface ship;
- accuracy of anti-aircraft guns with a KVO no more than 0,05 mRad.
3. The designed complex, as a rule, must be unified with ZAK AK-630М (AK-630М1-2 "Duet") according to their installation on surface warships. The radar guidance system and control of the complex, as expected, will be located on the axis of aiming, on a single platform, in the immediate vicinity of the block trunks. A laser triaxial gyroscope with fiber-optic circuits should be installed on the platform seat of the complex, which will eliminate problems when specifying the angular coordinate system ZAK when carrying out combat shooting at sea targets.
4. It is assumed that the designed ZAK has an autonomous and at the same time adaptive (self-adaptive) guidance and control system included in the common information field of a modern surface ship and having the ability to reconfigure when the range of tasks solved by the ship changes at the current time.