Military Review

The role of aircraft carriers and submarines in the war in the Pacific

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For a long time the leading role of aircraft carriers in stories World War II in the Pacific seemed self-evident and was not seriously disputed by anyone. However, for some time now, in the disputes that have already become traditional for "VO", "who is stronger, whale or elephant ... I mean an aircraft carrier or a submarine?", Supporters of the underwater weapons began to make a very interesting argument: statistics conclusively prove that American submarines sank much more tonnage than the deck aviation.

Indeed, having studied the loss of trading fleet In Japan, we will see that Yankee carrier-based aircraft sank 393 ships with a total tonnage of 1 tons, while American submariners chalked up 453 ships with a tonnage of 135 tons (if dissimilar forces took part in the destruction of the vessel, for example - aviation and submarines, then their joint trophy when counting was divided in half - hence fractions in the number of ships). At the same time, the American submarines inflicted severe damage to the Japanese navy, they destroyed 1154,5 high-speed battleship (the battlefield cruiser), the Congo, four large aircraft carriers and five escort ships, seven hydro-air carriers, three heavy and ten light cruisers, thirty-six destroyers, fourteen destroyers ... and that's not counting the numerous air transport, auxiliary cruisers, frigates, submarines, and all in all - about 4 warships. So maybe the laurels of the winner of the Japanese fleet and the main naval force of that war should be given to a submarine? Let's try to figure it out.

For a start, look at the pre-war plans of the parties. The US doesn’t interest us much, because they still didn’t come true, but the Japanese ... In essence, the plan for the Yamato sons was as follows - to occupy many distant territories from the southern seas with a series of attacks in the southern seas and create a defensive fortified line along the Kuril line and Marshall Islands, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, Burma. All this was necessary to the Japanese in order to provide the metropolis with a sufficient amount of scarce raw materials and, in the first place, oil, without which it was simply impossible to fight. The occupation of such a territory inevitably led Japan to war with England, Holland and the United States. Japan was not afraid of the first two - the British got bogged down in the European war with Germany, their fleet was torn between the defense of the metropolis, the defense of the Atlantic communications and the Mediterranean, while Holland did not have any significant naval forces. But the US ... America - that was serious.

The Japanese had some idea of ​​the American military plans (“Orange”, “Rainbow-5”), according to which in the event of war the American fleet had to move forward, taking successively the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. After this, the squadron of the United States was to inflict a final defeat on the imperial fleet in the waters immediately adjacent to the Japanese metropolis. The only question was how fast will the US move.



The Japanese believed that they were unable to win the protracted war with the United States, so if the Americans chose a slow and cautious movement forward, their industrial power would certainly ensure victory - and it was this understanding that determined the military plan of Japan. In essence, the Japanese imperial fleet had a choice between two strategies. The first is to gather all the forces into a fist, to wait for the American fleet in the waters of the metropolis, and there, hoping for individual superiority in the quality of the ships and the best training of the crews, to defeat the US Navy in the general battle. The second is to deliver a preemptive, preemptive strike of such power as to immediately smash the US Pacific Fleet, and if not break, then weaken enough to prevent its intervention at the stage of the formation of the “defensive perimeter”.

Why did the Japanese choose a preventive strike strategy? The answer is very simple. Japan had to seize territories far from each other and do it as quickly as possible — in order to master the resources there and not give the opposing forces time to prepare for repelling an invasion. To do this, the capture should be made in the form of a series of operations carried out at the same time. But the Japanese fleet did not have the slightest opportunity to cover operations in Malaya, Java, and the Philippines simultaneously. The appearance of American squadrons in any region where the main forces of the Japanese fleet were not concentrated automatically led to the defeat of the imperial forces operating there, which the Japanese could not afford. Therefore, Japan could not give up the initiative to the enemy and wait for the Americans to come forward, especially since time worked for the United States. The entire Japanese plan of war was based on the rapid mastery of resources, for this it was necessary to quickly capture many remote territories, and for this it was necessary to destroy the US Pacific Fleet. This became the key task of the Japanese fleet at the initial stage of the war.

That's how the Japanese decided on a preemptive strike. Apply it should have aircraft carriers ... and, surprisingly, submarines.

Taking into account what we know today, the participation of submarines in such an operation looks at least strange. But this is today, and then the Japanese admirals expected very much from submarines. Word of S. Fukutome, Chief of Staff of the United Fleet of the Japanese Imperial Navy:

During the 18-20 period of November 1941, the submarines of the newest types under the command of Vice Admiral Shimizu selected in the United Navy 27 came from Kure and Yokosuka. Having replenished the fuel and food reserves at the Marshall Islands, they headed forward as the vanguard of Admiral Nagumo's strike force. Submarines had to sink enemy ships that could have avoided strikes by our aircraft, and also did not allow the delivery of reinforcements and supplies from the United States and thus contribute to the completion of operations in the Hawaiian Islands. The headquarters in Tokyo expected that long-term submarine operations would produce more significant results than a one-time air strike. In fact, the results were completely different. For the entire operation, only one submarine from 27 managed to attack the enemy vessel. In his work, Morison writes the following on this issue: “The active patrols and depth bombing conducted by squadrons and other ships reduced to zero the attempts of large Japanese submersible ships with an 1900 displacement to attack our ships. They failed to torpedo any of the many ships and vessels that came to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu and went back. Most of the 20 submarines of type "I", which were located south of about. Oahu, a few days later headed back to Japan. About 5 boats were sent to the west coast of the United States. One of them, “I-170”, was sunk on an airplane crossing from the aircraft carrier Enterprise, while the rest of the states of California and Oregon managed to sink several of our vessels. So, the avant-garde expeditionary compound failed completely. He failed to sink a single ship, it lost 1 large and 5 ultra-small submarines ... Both the imperial headquarters and the headquarters of the United Fleet of Japan were severely impressed and bitterly disappointed by the insignificant results of the operations of submarines at the Hawaiian Islands, as a result of which faith in their submarines was shaken. "


So, even greater hopes were pinned on submarines than on deck aircraft, but they were completely wrong. Moreover, the Japanese submarine fleet almost blew off the whole operation. The fact is that the Japanese submarines deployed around Hawaii were repeatedly seen from American ships and more than that - an hour before the air attack began, the American destroyer Ward fought submarines attempting to get to Pearl Harbor. If the American commander would have taken the report of the destroyer commander more seriously, then the US Navy, aviation and anti-aircraft guns of Oahu could meet planes with red circles on their wings in full combat readiness ... who knows how it would turn?

However, exactly what happened happened - the Japanese carrier-based aircraft dealt a terrible blow, the American surface fleet suffered terrible losses and ceased to be a force capable of suppressing Japanese plans to seize southern territories. As for the submarine fleet, the Yankees never considered him capable of solving problems of this magnitude, and his number was not at all amazing. Total US submarine fleet consisted of 111 submarines, of which 73 were on the Pacific Ocean. But the 21 PL (of which only 11 was combat-ready) were based at Pearl Harbor — too far to make a significant contribution to the struggle for the southern seas, and the 22 PL was also located on the Pacific coast of the United States. And only 29 PL located on Cavite (Father Luzon, Philippines). Nevertheless, it was logical to assume that the existing forces could at least complicate Japanese naval operations.

Alas, nothing like this happened. American submarines did not take part in the battles for Guam and Wake, probably because these islands were located too far from the submarine base sites and were captured too quickly (although T.Rosko writes about patrolling the submarines from Wake). But when it came to the Philippines, the submariners of the United States could not oppose anything to the Japanese landing forces.

The admirals of the United Fleet divided the operation into two stages - first, three detachments of ships landed troops to capture key airfields in order to carry out the main landing under the cover of their aircraft. Forces landing at the Aparry included the old light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 3 minesweeper, 9 anti-submarine ships and 6 transports. The 1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 9 minesweepers, 9 anti-submarine ships and 6 transports went to Wigan. And finally, the third connection that attacked Legaspi consisted of 1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 2 hydraulic base, 2 minesweeper, 2 patrol vessel and 7 transports. All three assault forces were crowned with complete success, and the Japanese proceeded to the main thing - the landing in Lingen Bay. Seventy-three vehicles, grouped in three groups, transported the 48 Infantry Division. Not all of the Japanese did it right: by the dawn of 22 December, on the day of disembarkation, the Japanese warships and transports lost formation and were scattered on 20 miles (37 km).



What did the American submarines do? One destroyer and two small vehicles were sunk. In fairness it is worth noting the attack "Sivulf" on the Japanese hydro-avian carrier "Sanya Maru" - of the four torpedoes fired by the Americans, one still hit the target. If this torpedo had exploded, then the list of Japanese casualties would probably have been more than one aquifer carrier. But the torpedo did not explode.

What conclusions can be drawn from all of the above? The Japanese conducted four amphibious operations with a relatively small force in the immediate vicinity of the American submarine base and the American submarines 29 could not oppose anything to this. The same thing happened with the defense of Java. To protect the Dutch East Indies, the Allies concentrated significant forces, although the sources do not converge in their numbers. For example, S. Dall writes about 46 submarines - Dutch 16, American 28 and British 2. T. Rosko points out that “the submarine forces consisted of twenty-eight American, three British and nine Dutch submarines.” Be that as it may, the total number of submarines reached or even exceeded four dozen ships. From January to the beginning of March, the Japanese 1942 r successively seized Bangka Rhodes (on Celebes), Kemou, Menado, Kendari, Ambon Island, Makassar, Bali Lombok, Dutch and Portuguese Timor, Borneo ... and finally Java itself. Allied submarines could not stop, detain, or even seriously scratch the invading forces of the Japanese. S.Dall points out the following losses of amphibious caravans and their escort from American submarines - one destroyer sunk (“Natsusio”), another - torpedoed, but not sank (“Suzukaze”), and another transport (“Tsuruga Maru”) killed Dutch submariners. T.Rosko is more loyal to the American submarines, he reports the sinking of “Meeken Maru”, “Akito Maru”, “Harbin Maru”, “Tamagawa Maru” and the former gunboat “Kanko Maru”, as well as damage to several warships ( which is extremely doubtful). But even so, the achieved result is still completely unsatisfactory!

In total, American submariners in January-February 1942 sank 12 of merchant ships with tonnage in 44 326 tons, but the fact is that part of these ships was destroyed in completely different places. The Americans sent their submarines to the Japanese communications and even to the shores of Japan (in the indicated period 3 PL operated there). But in no way can one assume that all submarines did not have an order to repel the Japanese invasion, but instead were sent to distant areas. The commander of the ABDA fleet, Admiral Hart, considered the use of submarines for antiamphibious defense to be a priority and tried to place their patrol routes on "dangerous-danger" directions. Despite this, the Japanese quickly and methodically seized one island after another.

In a short time, the United Fleet delivered a series of strongest blows and captured many territories. Many made way for them: base aviation in the Philippines, British battleships from Singapore, ABDA command cruisers from Java, submarines — they all tried, but no one succeeded. And only in one case, the Japanese could not succeed. "Operation MO", during which the Japanese planned to take Port Moresby, was planned no worse than the previous ones, but this time the Americans opposed their aircraft carrier forces to the United Fleet.

The first naval battle in history, in which the opponents did not exchange a single shot - the battle in the Coral Sea, the Americans lost "on points", exchanging their heavy aircraft carrier "Lexington" for a light Japanese "Seho". Yes, and the second US aircraft carrier, Yorktown, one might say, miraculously escaped death. However, the losses of the Japanese aircraft were heavy, and one of their heavy aircraft carriers received such damage that did not allow him to take further part in the operation - and the Japanese turned back. The capture of Port Moresby did not take place.



The following two operations of the Japanese fleet — Midway and the seizure of the islands of Attu and Kyska — are also very indicative of the capabilities of submarines and aircraft carriers to counter enemy landing operations. American submarines were used both there and there, aircraft carriers - only at Midway. In this battle, the four aircraft carriers Nagumo crushed the Americans' air force, based on land airfields, but was defeated and destroyed by deck bomber bombers of the United States. Of course, the "land" aircraft played a huge role, "pulling out" Japanese fighter jets, so that by the time of the attack of carrier-based aviation, they simply did not have time to stop them, and indeed in that battle, US aircraft carriers were very lucky. But you can't throw the words out of the song - it was the aircraft carriers who crushed the color of the Japanese 1 th air fleet - the 1 th and 2 th aircraft carrier division, which was a turning point in the war in the Pacific.

And what about the submarines? Twenty-five submarines were ordered to wait for the Japanese squadron at Midway, but in fact only nineteen could be deployed, of which twelve were located at the approach of the Japanese aircraft carriers. However, in that battle, the American submarines did not sink a single enemy ship. True, we should mention the partial success of the submarine "Nautilus" - she managed to attack the Japanese aircraft carrier "Kaga", and if it were not for defective torpedoes, then it is quite possible that this attack resulted in the death of the Japanese ship. But, first, the attack took place two hours after the Kaga was hit by the American dive bombers' bombs, and if this had not happened, the aircraft carrier would have been completely different from where it had actually been at the time of the Nautilus attack and the ships just did not meet. Secondly, even if the Kaga and Nautilus courses crossed, it’s far from a fact that the submarine of the Americans would be able to go on the attack - being in a submerged position it is almost impossible to get close to the fighting ship moving at least by the 20 hub (except that he accidentally put himself under attack, passing close to the submarine). Thirdly, hitting an already damaged and mortally wounded ship is not an example easier than an intact one (the same speed), so one cannot say that the torpedo attack of the Nautilus on the intact Kaga was just as effective (shortly before the attack on Kaga "" Nautilus "tried to attack the Japanese battleship. Unsuccessfully.) And finally, even if everything worked out well and" Kaga "was sunk, the death of one of the four aircraft carriers could not save Midway from the invasion.

But it cannot be said that the participation of the US submarine in the defense of Midway turned out to be completely meaningless. Four Japanese heavy cruisers, sent to Midway for its bombardment, suddenly discovered an American submarine and was forced to sharply turn off, causing the trailing Mogami to ram Mikumu. Both heavily damaged cruisers were slowly dragged home, but a day later, the Mikumu sank the Enterprise and the Hornet.

Japanese submariners also did not shine in this battle - the veil of 13 submarines, which were supposed to find (and with luck - and attack), the US aircraft carriers, going from Pearl Harbor to Midway, turned too late - by that time, the American aircraft carriers were already stationed at Midway. Naturally, the Japanese submarines did not find anyone that inspired some Japanese commanders confidence in an easy victory ... The only success of the Japanese submariners - the sinking of "Yorktown" - can be attributed to the outcome of the battle for Midway only with very large reservations. In fact, the Japanese lost this battle on 4 June, when all four Japanese aircraft carriers received deadly damage from US carrier-based aviation. In response, Japanese carrier-based aircraft severely damaged Yorktown, but it could still be dragged to the shipyards. The Americans did so in towing the damaged ship, but on June 6, after the battle of Midway ended, the Yorktown fell under the torpedoes of a Japanese submarine. This could not affect the outcome of the battle in any way, and indeed the Yorktown was in danger only because it was badly damaged by the Japanese batchers, but the fact remains - it was thanks to the submarine that America missed the heavy aircraft carrier at the very moment when its fleet extremely in need of ships of this class. Remember this.

And one more interesting fact. Both submarines attacking enemy aircraft carriers (the Nautilus and the Japanese I-168) were launched to the target by the aircraft — reconnaissance aircraft detected the enemy’s position and then the coordinates / courses / speeds of the enemy formations were reported to the submarine commanders.

So, the American aircraft carriers won the battle, and the US submarines again did not achieve anything. But the Americans were aware of the Japanese desire, at the same time as Midway’s attack to capture several Aleutian islands. The Yankees could not send aircraft carriers there - they were all needed by Midway, therefore the Aleut defense was entrusted to the submarines. There (in Dutch Harbor) were deployed 10 old submarines of type "S". As a result, the Japanese inflicted several strikes of carrier-based aviation on Dutch Harbor and captured the islands of Attu and Kysk without any interference — not to prevent, but even to detect an enemy for ten US submarines turned out to be an impossible task.

In the battles for Guadalcanal, both the Americans and the Japanese faced the same tasks — to ensure that their own transports carrying reinforcements and supplies to the island were wired, not to allow the enemy to do the same and, if possible, to break the enemy fleet. US aircraft carriers played a role here, repelling the attack of the United Fleet, covering a large convoy (the second battle near the Solomon Islands) and repeatedly (albeit unsuccessfully) fought with the Japanese in the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. However, their efforts did not interrupt Japanese communications — the Americans retained the ability to deploy reinforcements in the afternoon, and the Japanese organized night flights of high-speed ships that carrier aircraft could not prevent. Finally, the Japanese fleet was stopped in the third battle near the Solomon Islands, when the battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the United States defeated the Japanese squadron, and land and deck aircraft (using the Henderson airfield as a jump airfield) successfully finished the Japanese ships damaged during night battles and attack forces. On the whole, American aircraft carriers played a very important role, if not a key one - they, together with Henderson Field, provided air supremacy during daylight hours, under which the Japanese fleet, even if perfectly trained in night sea battles, was not I could win. At the same time, if the American aircraft carriers had been destroyed, and the Japanese had retained a sufficient number of aircraft carriers and trained pilots, the fate of Guadalcanal would have been decided, and, by no means in favor of the United States. By providing air cover to their transports, the Japanese could quickly transfer sufficient reinforcements to the island. American submarines ... have traditionally achieved nothing. Even such a singer of the American underwater power, as T.Rosko states:

However, for several reasons, the final successes of the boats were insignificant.


The Japanese submariners succeeded more - they destroyed one of the three heavy aircraft carriers remaining with the Americans - the “Wasp”. In essence, it was the actions of the Japanese submarines that provided a period of unprecedented weakness of the American carrier-based aircraft — when the Japanese pilots turned into a flaming Hornet ruin, later finished by Japanese destroyers, the US Pacific Fleet remained with only one operating aircraft carrier! If the Japanese submarines had not sunk the "Yorktown" at Midway and "Uosp", then in the battle of Santa Cruz the Americans already had four heavy aircraft carriers instead of two and it is very likely that the Japanese fleet at Santa Cruz would have suffered a serious defeat ... In other words, the actions of the Japanese submariners caused serious losses and weakened the American fleet quite a bit, but this did not bring the Japanese victory - despite the obvious success, the Japanese submarines could not be a decisive factor in the battle of Guadalcanal (the Japanese still lost this battle) have demonstrated their usefulness.

We can say the same about the American submarines at the Battle of the Mariana Islands. After all, what happened there? The Americans decided to land on Saipan, a strategically important island, the seizure of which not only cut the Japanese defense in two, cut off the air bridge to Rabaul, gave the American submariners an excellent base, but also allowed the newest B-29 strategic bombers to attack Japan. The Japanese understood perfectly the significance of the Mariana Islands in general and Saipan in particular, and were ready to enter the decisive battle for the possession of these islands. Therefore, 500-600 basic aviation aircraft were deployed on the islands themselves and at any time they were ready to support approximately 450 deck-based aircraft of the Ozawa Mobile Fleet.

Of course, no submarines in such conditions could provide for the landing of amphibious convoys and the landing of marines on Saipan. Another thing - aircraft carriers. American carrier-based aviation delivered powerful blows at Saipan, Tinian and Guam airfields, turning them into ruins and destroying about a third of Japanese base aviation. Then, two American carrier groups went north, attacking the airfields of the Iwo Jima and Titijima islands, leveling them with the ground and destroying up to a hundred aircraft at the airfields and ordering 40 fighters in the air. After that, the base aviation of the Mariana Islands was not just defeated, but it also lost hope of getting reinforcements ... except for the deck aircraft of the Mobile Fleet. But the Japanese could not come so quickly, so the landing of the Americans on Saipan was supported by the strikes of hundreds of aircraft carrier planes, which to a certain extent predetermined its success.

The battle between the fleets was near, and the submarines of the Americans showed their best. It was they who discovered the exit of Ozawa’s ships to the Mariana Islands and thereby warned the American commander that a battle with the Japanese fleet was inevitable. It was the submarines who discovered the exact location of the Japanese fleet, which had deployed its orders to attack (Spruence’s aircraft could have done this much later) and were the first to attack the enemy aircraft carriers, drowning the Sekaku and Taiho.

But not this decided the outcome of the battle. 19 June, the Japanese launched 4 shock waves, a total of 308 airplanes - and the vast majority of them were destroyed. Of the 69 aircraft of the first wave survived 27, of the second 110 machines - 31, but the surviving aircraft that attempted to land on Guam were subsequently destroyed by American aircraft. American submarines sank "Taiho" through 10 minutes after raising the second wave, and the Sekaku died even after raising the fourth, so that their death had little impact on the power of Ozawa's strikes - it is unlikely that these ships carried more 40-50 planes to the bottom . At the same time, even after the death of Sekaku, Ozawa had not yet considered the battle lost, although he had only the 102 plane left (according to other data, 150). He was preparing to resume the battle the next day, but on June 20 the Americans found the Japanese earlier - and delivered their first (and last) blow to the Japanese ships. The 80 raised in the air of the Japanese aircraft could not do anything and after the American strike (during which the aircraft carrier “Hye” was sunk), only 47 aircraft remained at Ozawa’s disposal.

The battle of the Mariana Islands was lost by the Japanese for two reasons - they could not resist the landing of the US on Saipan, and in the general battle of the fleets the Japanese carrier-based aviation was finally destroyed. Both that and another - achievements of deck aircraft of the USA. As a result, the Japanese fleet formally had impressive forces in the battle of Leyte Gulf consisting of five heavy and four light aircraft carriers (not counting escort ones), but only one heavy and three light aircraft went into battle - because all the numerous Japanese aircraft carriers had only a hundred -As trained pilots. What could the presence of "Taiho" and "Sekaku" decide if the American submarines would not have sent them to the bottom of the Mariana Islands? Nothing.

In the war in the Pacific, submarines showed their complete inability to achieve dominance at sea, and also to independently solve offensive or defensive tasks — in no case did their attempts to independently use against the enemy warships led to the success of the operation as a whole. However, submarines proved to be an important component of a balanced fleet - their competent use in conjunction with aircraft carriers and other surface ships made it possible for the enemy to cause sensitive (though not decisive) losses. In addition, submarines proved to be an absolutely indispensable means of fighting on enemy communications — their greatest successes were achieved in the fight against enemy cargo transportation, while using submarines on communications forced the enemy either to spend significant resources to protect their own merchant ships, separating them from combat operations, or put up with the hardest, irreplaceable losses in tonnage (in fact, the Japanese had to do both). And it must be admitted that not a single type of armed forces has coped with the destruction of enemy trade tonnage as well as the submarines did.

At the same time, aircraft carriers have become the main means of gaining dominance at sea and ensuring both amphibious and antiamphibious operations. It was the aircraft carriers that played the main role in the defeat of the imperial fleet of Japan and in the crash of the defensive perimeter created by it. However, aircraft carriers were not at all universal ships capable of solving absolutely all the tasks of war at sea. Torpedo-artillery surface ships (night battles at Guadalcanal, and Leite too) and submarines (fighting for communications) also demonstrated their usefulness and ability to do inaccessible for deck aviation.

In general, it can be stated that winning a war is not achieved by a separate class of ships, but by a balanced fleet, which, in essence, was demonstrated by the Americans, who fused battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines into an invincible combat vehicle. However, if you still look for the “first among equals”, then “His Majesty the aircraft carrier” should be titled “The Destroyer of Japan’s naval power”.



1. S.Dall Battle Path of the Imperial Japanese Navy
2. T.Rosko Fighting US submarines in World War II
3. F. Sherman War in the Pacific. Carriers in combat.
4. M.Hashimoto the Flooded
5. Lockwood Swamp them all!
6. W. Winslow Forgotten Fleet
7. L.Kascheev American submarines from the beginning of the twentieth century to the Second World War
8. V.Dashyan Ships of the Second World War. Japanese Navy
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  1. ICT
    ICT 11 January 2016 07: 14
    +2
    However, submarines proved to be an important component of a balanced fleet - their competent use together with aircraft carriers and other surface ships allowed to inflict sensitive (although not decisive) losses on the enemy

    at the end of the war in the SF, the blow to the German convoys by the diverse forces of the fleet brought the best results. but even there was a problem of communication and coordination
    1. Scraptor
      Scraptor 11 January 2016 07: 54
      +1
      And immediately above, among others, there was also this misinformation:
      In the war in the Pacific Ocean, submarines showed their complete inability to achieve dominance at sea, as well as independently solve offensive or defensive tasks - in no case did attempts to use them independently against enemy warships led to the success of the operation as a whole.

      Because due to the fact that the Japanese neglected the convoy system, the Americans knocked out all the Japanese tankers with their submarines and left the Japanese Navy and Air Force without fuel, depriving him of mobility. One large surface ship consumes a lot. That is how they won the war at sea. But it was still impossible for them to approach and land in Japan due to the action of coastal aviation, so they did not find anything better than to start destroying Japanese cities with carpet bombing from February 29 from captured islands within the range of the B-1945 (Japanese fighters simply do not it was possible, due to lack of fuel, to rise to intercept most bombers, they saved it for anti-ship kamikaze). They burned about one Japanese Hiroshima a week or two. At the end of the war then the USSR, on the contrary, did not get a single Japanese aircraft carrier submarine because it already got all the Japanese bacteriological weapons of mass destruction in Detachment 731, which the Japanese barely had time to use from them across the United States. And as for the war and not the destruction of civilians - it was from the coastal bases that the B-17 and B-29 raids destroyed most of the Japanese large warships, the aircraft carriers had almost nothing to do with it. Therefore, AB in that naval war is in third place after submarines and strategic aviation. If the Japanese weren't even more fools than the Americans, it might have happened differently. B-17 before WW2 was developed as a Coastal Defense bomber.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        11 January 2016 22: 22
        +3
        Quote: Scraptor
        Because due to the fact that the Japanese neglected the convoy system, the Americans with their submarines knocked out all the Japanese tankers and left the Japanese Navy and Air Force without fuel, depriving it of mobility.

        Well yes. Due to the lack of fuel, Nagumo's planes showered with sakura petals directly on the decks of his aircraft carriers, piercing them through with their polished katanas, which the samurai pilots could not part with. We can say that the Japanese aircraft carriers made themselves seppuku out of contempt for an insignificant enemy ... And then the immobile Japanese fleet entered the state of "satori" and by the power of thought and samurai spirit alone did not allow the Americans to approach Guadalcanal. Everything was ruined by the bad Adimral Mikawa - having persuaded several shoals of Pacific cod, he forced them to push their cruisers to Savo and threw a fun party there for the allies.
        The army perked up, the Japanese paratroopers on seahorses were walking towards Guadalcanal, and they were guarded by specially trained Japanese kamikaze guinea pigs who gnawed the bottoms of American cruisers near Tassafarong ... Out of grief, the Yankees sent battleships, but suddenly emerged at the behest of Amaterasu Godzillatom, crying out chewed on the South Dakota poop.
        In general, if King Kong hadn’t been urgently discharged from Africa, the Americans would not have taken Guadalcanal.
        And so - the Japanese fleet was broken by the ridge at Midway, and the last chance to break the American fleet (although this would not have changed - given the ships being built in the USA) were lost at Guadalcanal. Surprisingly, the fact - the maximum of oil imports to Japan, the Yamato sons achieved in the first quarter of 1943 - i.e. just when the United Fleet lost its war.
        Quote: Scraptor
        But it was still impossible for them to approach and land in Japan due to the action of coastal aviation.

        Because the emperor Hirohito knew the magic word. But the Japanese on the same Mariana Islands and so on did not know the Magic Word, so the US aircraft carriers carried coast aviation there with propellers. But to Japan - no, no laughing
        Quote: Scraptor
        it was from coastal bases that the majority of Japanese large warships were destroyed by B-17 and B-29 raids

        Yes, the B-29 secretly, crawled up to the Japanese ships along the bottom of the Mariana Trench, thrust them into the bomb bay, then took off and dropped Japanese battleships in the area of ​​the North Pole. From this a huge hole formed up to New Guinea, into which oil from the Japanese flowed to Alaska ... Damned Rothschild!
        1. Scraptor
          Scraptor 12 January 2016 05: 20
          -2


          Quote: Andrew from Minnesota
          the Japanese fleet broke the ridge in Midway


          After the careless loss of all the tankers and not part of the aircraft carriers at Midway, the Japanese fleet sat outside the "islets" and the remaining fuel was shore.
          Climbing to Guadalcanal this loss of aircraft carriers did not stop him.

          In 1943 even tried to transport oil by plane? What year was the decisive battle in Leyte Gulf? Isn't it in 1944?
          The Japanese Ocean Fleet, like their air defense, quietly died of oil starvation, then he was already in a state of hungry zombies and had funerals in the Indonesian and Philippine straits (and not in the ocean zone) with fireworks.
          Before the era of supersonic aviation, civilian ships easily converted into aircraft carriers (as was the case with the advent of the SQUID). This civilian ship cannot be converted into a battleship.
          Therefore, for the "wise" Japanese, only their polished katanas and super-battleships inflated by imperial propaganda (which also never fired) mattered, since they compensated for the lack of size elsewhere.
          Now many others have the same with "Nimitz" ...
          And it's better to fly with fishing rods and with a gun and not with a katana. Why is she? To make big holes in an inflatable boat or according to the old Japanese fun of "fighting" dolphins?

          You can fight a group of aircraft carriers with islands, because only one or two airdromes must be crushed before landing.
          Landing on the sparsely populated part of the Philippines almost fell off, and climbing into densely populated Japan with a large number of airfields is not comme il faut. From the coast of the kamikaze, even without such aircraft (which could already consume synthetic kerosene from Manchurian coal), all aircraft carriers, and even more so military transports (UDC), will be destroyed before the infantry enters the landing barges.
          Only the USSR from Sakhalin could land and capture Japan on small amphibious assault forces, so the dirty Japanese (so you don’t get to Ivan) just lost their WMD under the Americans in Manchuria, letting them into Yokohama almost a week before the official surrender.
          But of course you didn’t learn all this Carnegie at the Rockwell Center ... They teach such people six to raise the flag in Ivo-Jim and their first companion (which weighed much less than the Soviet one) three.

          King Kong was somewhat earlier among the Japanese and not among the Americans. It was used by Freemasons to raise the Japanese spirit against the background of Russian gunpowder soaked "on the advice of the British" in Tsushima.
          1. Scraptor
            Scraptor 12 January 2016 06: 00
            -2
            This act of the near-Masonic Japanese shameful aristocracy was, of course, quite in the "spirit of Bushido" - to take and surrender to those who just annihilated their civilian population, and not to those who really defeated them, and even inflicting such a disarming blow in every sense. So that the people could, in place of seppuku, continue to fap on such "Godzillas" and on tsushima, grin at the "northern territories", and immediately begin to teach his children in schools that the USSR used nuclear weapons on them, which was decided by them even when the Emperor did not say from the prepared speech that there were two bombs and not one and who dropped it. Moreover, against the background of another 67 cities destroyed by ordinary lighters, it was almost imperceptible, but it is noticeable that the USSR had just entered the war.
            While the fighting was still going on in the Kuril Islands, the only ordinary Soviet liaison officer at the American headquarters, who was given the next rank, was present at the "Japanese surrender". And no Soviet delegation (in the person of Zhukov as it was in Berlin or the commander Vasilevsky there) flew to Japan for this wonderful "event".
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            12 January 2016 07: 09
            +2
            Quote: Scraptor
            What year was the decisive battle in Leyte Gulf?

            In no way, since the battle in Leyte Gulf did not solve anything. You better say that the last exit Yamato was a decisive battle :)
            1. Scraptor
              Scraptor 12 January 2016 15: 22
              -2
              General naval battle does not solve anything?

              This is you writing.
            2. Scraptor
              Scraptor 12 January 2016 16: 53
              -1
              It’s better to sign in your illogicality that Midway decided something, after which the Japanese climbed to Guadalcanal and the biggest battle happened two years later (can you convert a ship into an aircraft carrier in two years? Can you even have a super linkor and then sell it like everyone else), and not the Americans they were sent by aircraft carriers to finish off immediately. The Japanese had airplanes, there were pilots, airfields can be built in the jungles of the Philippines and Indonesia, but now there was nothing to refuel planes by 1944. Therefore, even the aircraft carriers in Leyte were not with a complete wing.
              And all because they were pumping katanas to pump oil and transporting it with naked tankers to Japan for processing, and then gasoline for aircraft and fuel oil for ships were brought back to the battlefield, instead of separating its fractions immediately at the place of production. That was all ... laughing

              And at the same time write that the Americans split the codes and not just them from the Japanese dressing room he stuck his fagot about them, as is usually the case. laughing

              And just immediately write how with those planes (which is in the photo and not in the video) the American screw decks would decisively fight. In Europe, they sometimes caught them on take-off landing (as did the MiGs in Korea later), but they themselves were based on land bases, which are not afraid of a bomb from such a deck.

              Okinawa is a symbol of Japan, if Yamato did not take part in the battle, the people would simply not understand. Japanese statehood began in Okinawa. And then, if he had not been taken to Iturup, then he would simply be gouged by the B-29 in the base. He also had one way fuel before Okinawa.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                12 January 2016 17: 43
                +1
                Quote: Scraptor
                General naval battle does not solve anything?

                (heavy sigh) Scraptor, go learn the story already :)) What was the purpose of the Japanese fleet in Leyte Gulf? DESTROY THE AMERICAN landing. For this purpose, they drew up a plan that came down to the following (roughly) - half of the Japanese fleet perishes, distracting the Americans, and the second half at that time destroys transports with an assault force, after which it also perishes, because it will still be intercepted on departure.
                Well, let's say everything worked out. Then what? The Japanese have no more fleet, and the Americans are able to land a second landing in a few months.
                Toeda rightly said why this operation was undertaken. There simply was no point in saving the fleet at the cost of the Philippines.
                The Japanese had a "rich" choice - to surrender the Philippines and lose the war 3-4 months earlier, or ditch the fleet and lose the war 3-4 months later. That was all that the Battle of Leyte Gulf decided.
                By the way ... Scraptor, since you decided that the battle in Leyte Gulf was the Most Important Decisive battle of that war, and the Japanese fleet was sunk by "fortresses", then tell us in all chilling details - how many Japanese ships were sunk in that battle B-17? And the B-29? :))
                1. Scraptor
                  Scraptor 12 January 2016 19: 39
                  -1
                  Teach her yourself - what happened as a result? The largest naval regurgitation during the war. And what about your plan, I don’t know, it looks like it’s at the State Drug Control Service.
                  Look on the Internet, ask the Americans. Read on Wikipedia what the B-17 was created for.

                  Quote: Andrew from Minnesota
                  The Japanese had a "rich" choice - to surrender the Philippines and lose the war 3-4 months earlier, or ditch the fleet and lose the war 3-4 months later. That's all,

                  And how exactly would Japan lose the war (without the accession of the USSR to which the United States so insisted) that earlier, 3-4 months later?
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    12 January 2016 20: 37
                    0
                    Quote: Scraptor
                    Teach her yourself

                    Yes, I’m teaching you unlike :)
                    Quote: Scraptor
                    Largest naval regurgitation during the war

                    You still haven't learned to distinguish between the meanings of the words "largest" and "most important"? I sympathize.
                    Quote: Scraptor
                    Read on Wikipedia what the B-17 was created for.

                    Yes, I know, therefore, such nonsense
                    Quote: Scraptor
                    It was from coastal bases that most Japanese large warships were destroyed by B-17 and B-29 raids, the aircraft carriers had almost nothing to do with it

                    my comments do not contain. Unless I quote you laughing
                    Quote: Scraptor
                    And how exactly would Japan lose the war

                    And you read the link that you threw about the possibility of landing in Hokkaido :)) Maybe that will come, although it’s unlikely
                    1. Scraptor
                      Scraptor 13 January 2016 10: 17
                      -1
                      Teach, then when you learn it - write articles, quote and comment.

                      It was the most important, because then Japan lost what it started the war with the United States for - the oil "Philippine fields". Although all its acquisitions during this time on the continent remained
                      The decisive battle in Manchuria deprived Japan of WMD, and then only the battle on Sakhalin, which opened the way to it.
                      You have already answered your shitty links. The landing in Hokkaido, in a state of collection and landing on amphibious assault forces, was canceled (this is in the military-historical documents) and went urgently and unplannedly to engage in more strategically important Kuril Islands, because the United States, breaking the agreement on the division of Japan, gathered after Japan separately surrendered to them to land and there.
                      Before that, it was planned to land in Hokkaido and cut off the Japanese in the Kuril Islands.
                      Quote: Andrew from Minnesota

                      And you read ...

                      And let’s all the same, stop fussing from your Rockefeller Center and write here how the United States would be going to defeat Japan in the light of that black-and-white photo above and how Hornet skidded from its coast after the Dullittle raid, as well as what kind of "success" was still in the Japanese piston the era was achieved by the American 38th connection. laughing
                      The loss of Philippine oil to these aircraft was not terrible, their engines were powered by synthetic kerosene from Manchurian coal.

                      Maybe America would continue to simply bomb Japan (including nuclear, which it did not have)? So, she would have received bacteriological weapons of mass destruction from Japanese submarines, including aircraft carriers, including I-400, from week to week for her six-month fanaticism. Or were the Japanese needed, of course, only for organizing in California calves of gophers from forest fires?
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        13 January 2016 11: 32
                        -1
                        Quote: Scraptor
                        Teach, then when you learn it - write articles, quote and comment

                        Scraptor, you yourself write at least something other than crazy comments :)) Then you will teach others.
                        Quote: Scraptor
                        It was the most important, because then Japan lost what it started the war with the United States for - the oil "Philippine fields".

                        Regardless of whether the Japanese succeeded in the operation of Ce-1 or not, the Philippines could not keep it. If successful, they would be kept there for another 4 months from strength
                        Quote: Scraptor
                        You have already answered your shitty links. The landing in Hokkaido in a state of collection and landing on amphibious canceled

                        Those. you didn’t read anything. Why am I not surprised?
                        Quote: Scraptor
                        But let’s stop all the time from your Rockefeller Center and here you’ll write how the United States would be going to defeat Japan

                        And let’s you study history a little and understand that Japan capitulated after it became clear that the USSR would not be an intermediary between Japan and the United States in establishing a world acceptable to the Japanese :)
                      2. Scraptor
                        Scraptor 17 January 2016 06: 09
                        0
                        That they, like the articles, do not shine with your mind.

                        Your America could not defeat Japan - large ocean ships against coastal aviation are very vulnerable (and even partially reactive), so after six months of the genocide of carpet bombing, she finally poked at it with two of the two warheads and began to watch the USSR take away bacteriological WMD from it and then the Japanese came to them themselves to ask them to occupy so that they could not be allocated a suicide bombard from Sakhalin using small amphibious assault forces (each of which could not be identified as a military transport or aircraft carrier) The Soviet Union.
    2. goose
      goose 12 January 2016 10: 07
      +1
      Quote: Scraptor
      At the end of the war then the USSR, on the contrary, did not get a single Japanese aircraft carrier submarine because it already got all the Japanese bacteriological weapons of mass destruction in Detachment 731, which the Japanese barely had time to use from them across the United States.

      And what prevented them from using this weapon in 1943? Everything was in stock.
      1. Scraptor
        Scraptor 12 January 2016 19: 42
        -1
        Not enough accumulated amount of powder and fleas, as well as the fact that America has not yet begun to destroy their civilians. And she could answer both chemical and radiological WMD.
      2. Scraptor
        Scraptor 12 January 2016 19: 58
        0
        1,5 million interned American citizens of Japanese descent in the US in hostage camps

        according to international laws, those who also had Japanese should have been sent through third countries to their homeland
  2. The comment was deleted.
  3. Aleksandr72
    Aleksandr72 11 January 2016 11: 42
    +3
    The whole essence of this certainly interesting article fits in one paragraph:
    In the war in the Pacific, submarines showed their complete inability to achieve dominance at sea, and also to independently solve offensive or defensive tasks — in no case did their attempts to independently use against the enemy warships led to the success of the operation as a whole. However, submarines proved to be an important component of a balanced fleet - their competent use in conjunction with aircraft carriers and other surface ships made it possible for the enemy to cause sensitive (though not decisive) losses. In addition, submarines proved to be an absolutely indispensable means of fighting on enemy communications — their greatest successes were achieved in the fight against enemy cargo transportation, while using submarines on communications forced the enemy either to spend significant resources to protect their own merchant ships, separating them from combat operations, or put up with the hardest, irreplaceable losses in tonnage (in fact, the Japanese had to do both). And it must be admitted that not a single type of armed forces has coped with the destruction of enemy trade tonnage as well as the submarines did.

    The mistakes of the Japanese in the fight against American submarines have long been known and sucked from all sides, this is also a general underestimation of the ASW as one of the combat missions of the fleet, not the introduction of a convoy system, the absence of a well-developed and successful project of an escort ship by the beginning of the war (which is responsible for solving PLO tasks) - all available projects of all kinds of "kaybokans type A, B, C", etc. this is a wartime palliative, precocious, raw and unsuccessful, and there was no time for development and, most importantly, introduction into a large series of a successful project - there was a war, during which it was necessary to dramatically increase the production of both warships and transports (especially tankers) so that at least somehow to make up for the losses, for the massive construction of escort patrols, there was no longer enough shipbuilding capacity, and materials too.
    At the same time, the success of American submarines is explained not only by the weakness of the Japanese submarine, but also by the strategy of using American submarines - mainly aimed at destroying the Japanese merchant fleet and the famous "swamp them all" - when the captains of the submarine of the US Navy fired torpedoes at any "merchant" or warship that got into their periscope, often not even making sure that it is an enemy, and not a neutral or an ally (in this regard, the "Doenitz boys" can only envy the captains of US submarines, not bound by restrictions in submarine warfare). Not very successful activities of American submarines in the initial period of the war, incl. due to the useless magnetic fuses of their torpedoes (the same problems with the reliability of torpedo fuses at the beginning of the war pursued the Germans). This problem was successfully solved only in 1943, and even then two American submarines in the Pacific Ocean in 1944 became victims of their own torpedoes, during an attack on an enemy ship they described the circulation and sank their own submarine.
    The Japanese, initially, their not very successful submarines focused on the destruction of enemy warships in order to reduce the gap between the Japanese military fleet and the enemy fleets. But not too successfully, moreover, this tactic predetermined the great losses of Japanese submarines.
    I have the honor.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 January 2016 15: 16
      +1
      Quote: Aleksandr72
      Mistakes of the Japanese in the fight against American submarines have long been known and sucked from all sides, this is a general underestimation of the PLO as one of the combat tasks of the fleet, not the introduction of a convoy system, the absence of an exhausted and successful escort ship project (which is assigned to solve the problems of the PLO) by the beginning of the war

      In short, Japan’s main mistake is the war with the United States. smile
      Because everything listed by you could be done only at the cost of refusing anything done in real life. Because the navy and the Japanese shipbuilding industry did not have free money.

      It was only the United States that could simultaneously wage two radically different wars at sea: the Battle of the Atlantic, with emphasis on escort ships (AVE, EME, FR) and the mass construction of transports, and the Battle of MOT with the same massive construction of the fleet’s strike forces - AB, LC, KR, EM.
      1. Scraptor
        Scraptor 12 January 2016 07: 29
        -1
        The main mistake of Japan is the beginning of the war in China from 1931 to 1937.

        There is nothing easier than to conduct convoys protecting them only from submarines in their in fact become inland sea beyond the Pacific Rim, which they then controlled.
        In the Atlantic and the Arctic, the British had to keep in mind the German NK and aviation. Americans usually went only to Iceland.
  • Mera joota
    Mera joota 11 January 2016 07: 33
    +3
    Absolutely true article. Aviation is more important, it must be understood. It is aviation that raises awareness and allows the efficient use of the same submarines, and not only. Deck aviation allows this to be done in any part of the world, regardless of the presence of air bases.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 January 2016 22: 27
      +1
      Thanks for your kind words! drinks
  • Per se.
    Per se. 11 January 2016 07: 44
    +3
    In general, it can be stated that victory in the war is achieved not by a separate class of ships, but by a balanced fleet
    It is difficult to disagree with this. But, the States needed a war and they got it, whether Japan needed it, in particular against the United States, is another question, but it was the United States that somehow provoked Japan to attack. It is unlikely that the Japanese had a chance to win, the collapse of Japan in the war was natural, the potentials of the United States and Japan are too incommensurable. Nevertheless, the Japanese did not consolidate their success at Pearl Harbor, if the landing operation was behind the blow, all the Hawaiian Islands could go to the Japanese. The dispersal of forces by the Japanese on countless islands in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean was also hopeless, no "perimeter" would have saved Japan. It is much more interesting if the Japanese made the main attack not an attack on Midway, but on the Aleutian Islands, with the subsequent capture of Alaska and Canada, how the history of the war in the Pacific would have developed, the question, especially if Pearl Harbor had been captured. The Kwantung army was languishing idle, almost a million soldiers, if there were such a force in North America, probably brave cowboys would be greatly puzzled before the enemy invaded the States themselves, especially when they were bombed from new Japanese bridgeheads. It is worth adding here that victory in a war is achieved not only by a balanced fleet, but also by a generally balanced armed forces, the interaction of combat arms, plus the talent of commanders and politicians. Thank you Andrey for the interesting article.
    1. Mera joota
      Mera joota 11 January 2016 08: 12
      +2
      Quote: Per se.
      Much more interesting, if the Japanese made the main blow not an attack on Midway, but on the Aleutian Islands, followed by the capture of Alaska and Canada, as the history of the Pacific War would have developed

      Yes, exactly the same. But what should the Japanese do in Alaska and Canada? At that time, it was 90% deserted land without any communications with severe weather conditions ...
      Quote: Per se.
      Kwantung army idle, almost a million soldiers

      Fuck yourself, idle ... To control such territories with a multimillion population and a million is not enough, and given the fact that the two groups of the KPK and Chiang Kai-shek (battles with which were carried out until the surrender of Japan) were not broken there.
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 11 January 2016 09: 05
        0
        Quote: Mera Joota
        Fuck yourself, idle ...
        A powerful grouping of the Japanese army was needed not for police functions, and not as occupational garrisons, right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan allowed a war against the Soviet Union, which, after the attack on the United States, receded into the background. In addition, considerable resources were sprayed on the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese, if they could defeat, it was precisely during attacks like Pearl Harbor, directly against the objects of the territory of the States, and using the superiority that they managed to capture after a preemptive strike on the US fleet. Time was lost, the initiative was lost, the pogrom of Japan with its tactics was inevitable.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 January 2016 10: 42
      +3
      Quote: Per se.
      However, the Japanese did not consolidate their success at Pearl Harbor; if the landing operation were to strike, all the Hawaiian islands could go to the Japanese.

      If you find 3 divisions with the Army, the Fleet has the tonnage needed to transport them across half the Pacific Ocean and land on a bank bursting with fire (about 100 transports and 20 tankers), and you can secretly navigate this armada to Pearl Harbor ... then the question arises - which of the main operations will have to be donated? smile

      For the blow to Pearl Harbor, for all its entertainment, was only auxiliary the operation of the Japanese fleet, whose task was to ensure the Pacific flank of the main operation in Southeast Asia from an attack from the US Pacific Fleet.
      Quote: Per se.
      Much more interesting, make the main blow to the Japanese not an attack on Midway, but on the Aleutian Islands, followed by the capture of Alaska and Canada

      Ahem ... Do you seriously offer the Japanese to compete on land with all the might of the US Army, and on its territory? Moreover, taking into account the presence in the rear of the Yankees of a chain of air bases invulnerable to attack from the sea.
      Well this is not Midway, where the Yankees were limited by the size of the atoll.

      Oh yes, the traditional question is - where will you find the tonnage for this operation (both for the landing and for supplying the group)? Let me remind you that after the mobilization of civilian vessels in 1941, Japan had only 2,5 million tons left in the civilian fleet - with a minimum need of 10 million tons. Moreover, all the plans for the demobilization of 1942 failed miserably - on the contrary, the army and navy requested additional tonnage to ensure its own operations.
      1. saturn.mmm
        saturn.mmm 11 January 2016 12: 20
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        For the blow to Pearl Harbor, for all its entertainment, was just an auxiliary operation of the Japanese fleet,

        Perseus offers to consider the situation.
        When the Japanese capture Pearl Harbor, the main US Navy in the Pacific with a strategic supply of fuels and lubricants, create a bridgehead in Canada and transfer the Kwantung army to this bridgehead, suppose that they succeeded in 1941, how could events develop under these conditions, the US is powerful industrial country but they did not have experience of military operations at that time.
        Thanks to the author for the article, but
        However, if you still look for “the first among equals,” then “His Majesty the aircraft carrier” should be titled “The Crusher of the Naval Power of Japan”.

        probably still the decisive role was played by the powerful industrial and economic potential of the United States.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 January 2016 16: 53
          +1
          Quote: saturn.mmm
          When the Japanese capture Pearl Harbor, the main US Navy in the Pacific with a strategic supply of fuels and lubricants, create a bridgehead in Canada and transfer the Kwantung army to this bridgehead, suppose that they succeeded in 1941, how could events develop under these conditions, the US is powerful industrial country but they did not have experience of military operations at that time.

          And at the same time they completely abandon the war in Southeast Asia, remaining with empty oil tanks. smile

          Understand, I am not against alternatives. But any alternative should be based on the real state of the economy, industry, infrastructure and the armed forces of the country at its beginning. And not to hypothetical Japan with a fleet like the United States, human resources like China and the Persian Gulf deposits right on the Islands. smile

          In fact, we have a poor country, the economy of which in peacetime operates in a mode close to wartime, and 40% of shipping at sea goes on "foreign" ships (mostly from Britain, Holland and the United States). Moreover, for tankers, the percentage of "foreign flags" reached 70-80%. With the outbreak of war, naturally, these "alien" ships disappeared from the balance of tonnage, and 60% of their ships were taken into the army and navy.

          And now, with all this, we will try to conduct 3 strategic landing operations near the bases of the Allied fleet. Oh yeah, do not forget that in the real world, forces that returned from under Pearl Harbor were also involved in the capture of Southeast Asia.
          1. saturn.mmm
            saturn.mmm 11 January 2016 23: 51
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And not to hypothetical Japan with a fleet like the United States, human resources like China and the Persian Gulf deposits right on the Islands.

            Actually, there were strategic fuel and lubricant reserves in Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have had enough for the first time, especially since American aircraft carriers would have had to leave for the USA without replenishing fuel, and if such a base were available, the Japanese would have made it easier to resolve issues with Southeast Asia, the Japanese remained in Pearl -Harbor is now their base.
            In other situations, the Japanese have no chance, they needed Napaleon, a swift and unpredictable commander, but this did not happen.
            1. Assistant
              Assistant 12 January 2016 00: 16
              +1
              In general, in Pearl Harbor there were strategic fuel and lubricants reserves, the Japanese would have had enough for the first time


              Even if you imagine that you would have captured PX - do you think the Yankees before the retreat would not have found a way to burn their fuel and lubricants?
              And then the kawaii would remain sitting on a suitcase without a handle.
              1. saturn.mmm
                saturn.mmm 12 January 2016 10: 03
                0
                Quote: Assistant
                Even if you imagine that you would have captured PX - do you think the Yankees before the retreat would not have found a way to burn their fuel and lubricants?

                Suppose that the fuel was not set on fire, an element of surprise worked, they left quickly, they all left. The Japanese base, fuel and lubricants in place, is being restored by the most surviving American ships in repair shops. Scouts explore the American coast, look for weaknesses and objects for sabotage (airfields, power plants, central communications centers), submarines mine US naval bases and main ports, a million-strong army is preparing for landing, Americans are licking their wounds and declaring war on Japan.
                1. Assistant
                  Assistant 12 January 2016 12: 00
                  +2
                  Suppose that the fuel was not set on fire, an element of surprise worked, they left quickly, they all left.


                  Then a little different thing. But the likelihood of such an event ... IMHO, is extremely small. According to reviews, the American infantry, located in the Hawaiian Islands, was driven in the tail and mane before the attack on PX.
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 12 January 2016 15: 19
                    0
                    Quote: Assistant
                    According to reviews, the American infantry, located in the Hawaiian Islands, was driven in the tail and mane before the attack on PX.

                    Not just driven. Some took the war as a relief - these damn teachings will finally end.

                    Actually, the army team was waiting for the Japanese on Oahu. Things got to the point that they began to strengthen the antiamphibious defense with field fortifications (which is done only before the war), and the army men patrolling the island began to issue machine guns with a full ammunition (in peacetime!). Moreover, at the points of permanent deployment, machine guns and their ammunition were stored not in warehouses and in arsenals, but directly in the barracks. It was these machine guns, immediately taken away by crews throughout the entire territory of Schofield Barracks, including the roofs of buildings, that formed the basis of infantry air defense in the first hours of the "Day of Shame".
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 12 January 2016 15: 10
                  +1
                  Quote: saturn.mmm

                  Suppose that the fuel was not set on fire, an element of surprise worked, they left quickly, they all left.

                  Comrade, the landing of three divisions, preceded by an air raid on the base and airfields, eliminates any element of surprise.

                  Leaving quickly from where? The tanks are located at the base, in fact in Pearl Harbor. And the fleet and the army will keep this base to the last. Because the naval stocks of ammunition are concentrated there and the main artillery power of the defenders is located - ships and forts sitting at the bottom with long-range guns covering the entire island.

                  And the landing in the harbor of the base ready for battle is a meat grinder. Why ready for battle? And because the landing fleet can appear only in the afternoon. Otherwise, a cloud of smoke from the pipes of hundreds of transports will lift up the entire base on the ears in the morning, before the raid. smile

                  In addition, it is generally dangerous to approach Oahu from the south - there is a great chance to stumble upon the transition to the "Big E" or "Lex", or to fly into the Minneapolis spacecraft near the base.
                  25 miles south of about. Oahu in the combat training zone was the CA-36 "Minneapolis" and 4 EM-TSC (DMS-2, DMS-3, DMS-9 and DMS-11). Another 1 EM and 1 submarine (DD-336 and SS-200) conducted anti-submarine exercises 60 miles south-west of the island. Oahu.
                  TF-8 group, consisting of AB CV-6 "Enterprise", KPT CA-25 "Salt Lake City", CA-26 "Northampton" and CA-27 "Chester" and 9 EM (DD-363, DD-380, DD-382, DD-384, DD-385, DD-397, DD-398, DD-400 and DD-401), was returning from a hike to Wake Atoll. The ships were 200 miles west of Hawaii (21-11N, 161-00W).
                  Group TF-12, consisting of AB CV-2 Lexington, KPT CA-29 Chicago, CA-33 Portland and CA-34 Astoria and 5 EM (DD-356, DD-364, DD- 366, DD-367 and DD-368), followed to Midway Atoll and were 460 miles from it (23-30N, 170-30W).
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 12 January 2016 15: 00
              +1
              Quote: saturn.mmm
              In general, in Pearl Harbor there were strategic fuel and lubricants reserves, the Japanese would have had enough for the first time

              About 500 tons. In land tanks that would not survive the fighting.
              Moreover, they were located exactly between the Hickam airbase (the "nest" of army bombers), the anchorages of the ships and the submarine base.
      2. Per se.
        Per se. 12 January 2016 07: 42
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        and you can stealthily conduct this armada to Pearl Harbor ... then the question arises - which of the main operations will have to be donated?
        Well, first of all, the "armada" managed to reach Pearl Harbor and deliver a blow that was unexpected for the forces of the American fleet and the base garrison. The Japanese would not have had to sacrifice there, the attack on the main Pacific base of the US Navy was the main action, and not a secondary one at that time, only after the neutralization of the US Pacific Fleet was the freedom of action of the Japanese army and navy ensured both in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific the ocean in general. The second stage could be an amphibious operation, first to capture strategically important points of Pearl Harbor, as bridgeheads, then, with suitable transports. The Germans carried out the capture of Norway in more difficult conditions for themselves, using both transport ships and warships of the fleet. The Japanese could well prepare, in addition to the first strike from aircraft carriers on the US fleet, and a landing operation, which would be supported by the artillery of warships. The Japanese could well have used their submarines to land saboteurs and small assault groups. If such a task had been set, the solution could have been found by capturing the base and neutralizing the garrison de-paralyzed after the strike by aviation. The Japanese could not only obtain a foothold for terror in America, but also rich trophies from the American fleet, including damaged and blocked ships, huge oil reserves in storage facilities, airstrips, repair shops and docks. The Americans would hardly have had time to destroy all this. As for "competing on land with all the might of the US Army" ... Somehow they competed well with the Russian army in 1904-1905, I don't think that American warriors would then be a "powerful army" if the Japanese had come along the coast from Alaska to San Francisco and Los Angeles, before that, having arranged terror by aviation and raids-shelling of battleships and cruisers from Hawaii from the captured Pearl Harbor. Of course, it's easier to be ironic, the Japanese lost the war, the proposed plot is now fantastic, but it could have come true, had such a plan. In any case, only such a blitzkrieg in Japanese style could give a chance to win the war, forcing America, if not to surrender, then to sign a peace treaty beneficial to Japan with the Japanese. Otherwise, it was not worth the Japanese and all the porridge to brew, without invading the States, with the expectation of an eastern blitzkrieg, Japan had no chance of winning. I wanted to think about this after Andrey's article.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 12 January 2016 15: 41
          +2
          Quote: Per se.
          Well, first of all, the "armada" managed to reach Pearl Harbor and deliver a blow that was unexpected for the forces of the American fleet and the base garrison.

          Do you even see the difference between a naval unit and a convoy of mobilized "merchants"? wink
          Nagumo at the crossing constantly had to search and collect his tankers, for which he pulled EM cover. Now imagine that we have not 8 mobilized tankers, but 100-120. And God forbid, some civilian infection will get on the air ...
          Quote: Per se.
          The Japanese would not have to sacrifice anything there, the attack on the main Pacific base of the US Navy was the main action, and not secondary at that time, only after the neutralization of the Pacific fleet of the United States the freedom of action of the Japanese army and fleet was ensured both in Southeast Asia and the Pacific the ocean in general.

          The operation was auxiliary. The main blow was delivered in Southeast Asia.
          Even if it had not been possible to sink the LC in Pearl Harbor, they would have been met by the main aviation and the remaining ABs in Southeast Asia.
          Quote: Per se.
          Somehow they competed well with the Russian army in 1904-1905, I do not think that the American soldiers would then have been a "powerful army" if the Japanese had reached the coast from Alaska to San Francisco and Los Angeles, before that they had organized terror by aviation and raids-shelling battleships and cruisers from the Hawaiian Islands from the captured Pearl Harbor.

          Here are just the American army arr. 1941 was at the level of our time Khalkhin-Gol. Plus, the Yankees had no problems like "the only mainline railway in the theater of operations for 6-8 military echelons per day" or "the nearest railway station 500-600 km from the front line."

          And the "terror and raids" of the KUG are treated by long-range air reconnaissance. Why did the navy have "catalins", and the army had B-17 and LB-30.
          1. Per se.
            Per se. 13 January 2016 08: 06
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Do you even see the difference between a naval unit and a convoy of mobilized "merchants"?
            Yes, Alexey, I can see the difference. However, there is a difference between "mobilized" merchants "" and military transports with military crews. If the Japanese were planning an attack on Pearl Harbor, they could have worked it out in view of the possible success of a surprise strike. Let there not be a complete capture of the base, but, you see, the Japanese left after the strike untouched targets very important for the further course of the war - 11 submarines, huge oil reserves in storage facilities, warehouses, repair shops and docks. All this, if not captured, so it was necessary to destroy, by carrier-based aviation, artillery of cover ships, specially trained and secretly or openly parachuted sabotage and assault groups to the beginning of the attack. If the Americans had blown up all the Americans themselves out of fear from the assault, this would also be a good option. Of course, the Japanese in general could not be lucky with the attack on Pearl Harbor, but they were obliged to work out both options. It turned out to be a flaw, like the wise Admiral Togo, at one time, when attacking our squadron in Port Arthur, he sent only a part of the destroyers into the first attack, instead of all. Only this part achieved success with the factor of surprise, he sent all his destroyers, the Russian fleet would have suffered much greater losses in 1904, and perhaps fatal for the war at that time. As for your comparison of the Japanese army and the American one, at the level of Khalkhin Gol, it was more likely that the more experienced Japanese army was located, with a high morale, and the unfired American army was not even at the level of the experience of the Russian-Japanese war. Then the samurai would have piled on them, if they went to the Pacific coast of the United States, cowardly American soldiers, like the "tough" ordinary cowboys, would run to the eastern regions from the Wild West.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 January 2016 22: 30
      +2
      Quote: Per se.
      whether Japan needed it, in particular against the United States, is another question, but it was the United States that somehow provoked Japan to attack.

      A very difficult question. A good review was given by Yakovlev - in fact, Japan itself was looking for solutions to urgent issues by force of arms. Although there was a very good understanding that the war with the United States could end very badly for the Japanese.
      Quote: Per se.
      Thank you, Andrey, for an interesting article.

      You're welcome!
  • Alex_59
    Alex_59 11 January 2016 08: 12
    0
    Article plus, informative, competently.
    The conclusions are correct, but applicable to the United States or Japan. This experience is not very useful to Russia.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 January 2016 22: 31
      +1
      Quote: Alex_59
      The conclusions are correct, but applicable to the United States or Japan. This experience is not very useful to Russia.

      Difficult question. But you are right in the sense that in this article I considered exclusively the Japanese-American confrontation, without making far-reaching conclusions
  • Ingvar 72
    Ingvar 72 11 January 2016 10: 08
    0
    Andrey, thanks for the article, but there is a question.
    American submariners chalked up 1154,5 Ship
    What an interesting figure? belay
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 January 2016 22: 36
      +2
      So I wrote about this :))
      if diverse forces took part in the destruction of the vessel, for example, aviation and submarines, then their joint trophy was divided in half when counting - hence the fractions in the number of vessels
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 11 January 2016 10: 14
    +1
    First, let's look at the pre-war plans of the parties. The Americans are not very interested in us, because they still have not come true, but here are the Japanese ...

    He-he-he ... just the American pre-war plans came true, perhaps to the greatest extent. For the Yankees planned to first sit out on the defensive, disturbing the Perimeter with raids by AB and KR (the Philippines in this case, the fleet actually threw - "no plan is envisaged for the Asian fleetAt the same time, the submarine fleet was deploying unlimited submarine warfare. And only after the concentration of forces and the achievement of superiority over the enemy was it planned to begin a slow and systematic movement with "frog jumps" from atoll to atoll, approaching the Japanese Metropolis and luring the Japanese fleet into a general battle.
    All this was done in reality. Except that the general battle was "spread out" into several operations, from Midway to "Mariana turkey hunt".
    1. padded jacket
      padded jacket 11 January 2016 12: 01
      +1
      Aircraft carriers were undoubtedly then "kings of the oceans" and the only really effective means of dealing with them were submarines and ...... kamikaze smile
  • mitya1941
    mitya1941 11 January 2016 12: 02
    0
    The US Navy lost 7 heavy cruisers in the Pacific, and 3 light, of which only Indianapolis and Juneau were sunk by submarines, and Chicago by aircraft raids. The rest were artillery and torpedo ships.
  • Operator
    Operator 11 January 2016 12: 39
    -3
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk calls on the Russian Navy to prepare for the WWII (after 70 years) laughing
    In fact, the next MW at sea will steer nuclear missiles and attack submarines as its carriers.
    1. saturn.mmm
      saturn.mmm 11 January 2016 13: 55
      +2
      Quote: Operator
      Andrey from Chelyabinsk calls on the Russian Navy to prepare for WWII

      By WWII what do you mean?
      Andrey from Chelyabinsk in this article examined the period of the war of the USA and Japan of 1941-1945 at sea, where is there about the Russian Navy with nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines?
      1. Operator
        Operator 11 January 2016 21: 35
        0
        Generals / admirals, as you know, always prepare for the last war.
    2. Dart2027
      Dart2027 11 January 2016 21: 57
      +1
      Quote: Operator
      will steer nuclear missile weapons

      It will taxi for about half an hour, and then ballistic missiles will cover everything that is possible and STALKER will begin.
    3. Serg65
      Serg65 12 January 2016 06: 56
      +1
      Quote: Operator
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk calls on the Russian Navy to prepare for the WWII (after 70 years)

      The day to come is always preceded by the day ahead!
      Quote: Operator
      In fact, the next MW at sea will steer nuclear missiles and attack submarines as its carriers.

      Andrei, is Nastradamus not your ancestor by chance? you speak so confidently about a future war, as if you already know what kind of battles will be, how military operations will proceed. Andrey, calm my soul. tell me ... who will win the future war?
      1. Operator
        Operator 13 January 2016 02: 39
        0
        The strongest will win as always.
  • 27091965
    27091965 11 January 2016 23: 41
    0
    Both the imperial headquarters and the headquarters of the United Navy of Japan were greatly amazed and bitterly disappointed by the insignificant results of submarine operations off the Hawaiian Islands, as a result of which faith in their submarines was shaken. ”


    The tasks of the submarines were not many others.

    "The submarines received the following orders:
    1) establish a patrol in Hawaiian waters no later than the evening of December 6 (Hawaiian time). Upon arrival at the patrol point, launch dwarf submarines;
    2) scout the Hawaiian Islands before the attack; dwarf submarines enter Pearl Harbor and attack the US Navy after an air raid;
    3) an attack prior to the start of an operational unit strike is strictly prohibited.
    The use of dwarf submarines was an experiment. However, it was believed that they would provide some assistance to the task force. "

    M. Hashimoto's book "The Sunk" indicates the reason why the submarines left the Hawaiian Islands.

    The review is very interesting, thanks.
  • Nehist
    Nehist 12 January 2016 01: 12
    0
    An interesting article and comments are even more interesting! Regarding the shortage of escort ships in Japan: They simply do not need convoys for domestic transportation, and they could create escort ships from the same fishing schooners that the British and the USSR successfully completed. Regarding the transport of troops in battle boxes: such operations were carried out more than once and very successfully, as correctly noted above problems in the subsequent maintenance.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 12 January 2016 04: 42
    +2
    Why did you offend Kaptsov ?!
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Olezhek
    Olezhek April 6 2017 10: 56
    0


    Here is such a beauty ...