Military Review

New Year's fight. The end of the German Grand Fleet

33
New Year's fight. The end of the German Grand Fleet

Admiral Hipper in Norway



Hitler circled the study in a rage, like a zeppelin over London in the last war. The stream of derogatory epithets, stinging comments, stated in an emphasized irritated tone, did not stop. Not only Kriegsmarine got it - Kaiser Fleet The high seas were remembered both inaction and revolution. The Führer emphasized the contribution that submarines made in both wars to the struggle at sea. In a more calm tone, he added that he considered it necessary to disarm all German heavy ships. Their artillery should be used to strengthen coastal batteries in Norway and France, and the teams should be distributed among the remaining small ships and submarines. Such was the payment for the “New Year’s battle disgrace.” Listening to these streams of reproaches and reasoning, Grand Admiral Raeder asked for permission to speak privately. When Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers came out, he asked for his resignation. It was January 1943.

"Russian route"


One of the polar convoys


The German command took quite a bit of time to appreciate the full significance of the Allied convoys that came to the northern ports of the USSR. The fate of the war was decided on the Soviet-German front, and the arrival of each caravan, according to the military leadership of the Reich, increased the Red Army’s ability to resist. Hitler considered the very possibility of maritime communications of the Western allies and the Soviet Union through the Arctic waters unacceptable and demanded that a set of appropriate measures be taken to disrupt or completely cease enemy navigation in the North. Germanic forces in Scandinavia gradually increased. Initially, submarines and Luftwaffe units were sent there, and then, in addition, surface ships. The ground forces grouping in Norway was also increased, since for a long time Hitler was convinced of the danger of the British landing force. The defeat of the PQ-17 caravan, not least because of the insolvency of the British naval command, and the serious losses of the next one - PQ-18, led the Western allies of the USSR to impose a moratorium on the wiring of new convoys. The Admiralty was justified by the fact that in the summer and early autumn in the Arctic the polar day lasts, facilitating reconnaissance and detection of ships of convoys. As a last and very solid looking argument, the lords had a frighteningly mystical horror spell called Tirpitz.

Only at the end of autumn - the beginning of the winter of 1942, when the polar night begins in the Arctic, could something be said about the resumption of convoys in the USSR. There is impenetrable darkness over the sea, visibility is limited to just a few miles. The sea, which does not differ in serenity, begins to stormy - it is difficult for the ships to keep the line, they suffer from waves and freezing of superstructures. However, these same factors prevent the enemy from detecting and attacking a caravan approaching the Soviet port. The situation on the Soviet-German front was not easy, and the allies decided to set off the operation of sending the convoy in December. The landing in Algeria and Morocco in the framework of the implementation of the “Torch” plan was successfully carried out, and the British had the opportunity to free up a certain number of warships and transports for other purposes.

Metropolitan Fleet Commander Admiral Sir John Tovey expressed some skepticism about the possibility of sending one large caravan. In his opinion, a large ship connection would be a difficult to manage and cumbersome structure in conditions of constant weather and polar night. There was a serious threat of scattering of ships and, as expected, an easy destruction of them by German submarines. Tovi proposed to form a compact convoy of ten ships maximum, in the protection of which would be the destroyers. But the Admiralty has already opposed such microgroups, fearing their excessive vulnerability. The result of the debate on a technical solution to the issue was a compromise: two convoys were sent to the sea, not as huge as the same PQ-17, but not as small as Admiral Tovi had proposed. The first of them, consisting of 16 transports guarded by 2 destroyers and two cruisers of Rear Admiral Barnett’s detachment (Sheffield and Jamaica), left Loch Yu (Iceland) and arrived safely in the Kola Bay ten days later. The second convoy, JW-51B, was smaller than the first - it had 14 transports, on which 202 were loaded tank, more than 2 thousand vehicles for various purposes, 87 bombers, 33 fighters and 54 thousand tons of cargo. Assuming that there was a threat of any action on the part of the Germans who had overslept the first convoy, the JW-51B escort was larger. It consisted of the 17th destroyer flotilla under the command of 1st rank commander Robert Saint Vincent Sherbrooke (6 destroyers), 2 corvettes, 1 minesweeper and 2 armed trawlers. At the most dangerous section of the crossing, in the vicinity of Bear Island, the convoy was supposed to meet the cruiser Barnett, who would come out of the Kola Bay on December 27. In the event of force majeure (for example, the appearance of the nightmarish Tirpitz), the ships of the Metropolitan Fleet under the command of Admiral Fraser were involved in the operation - the newest battleship Anson, the heavy cruiser Cumberland and two destroyers.

22 December 1942, the convoy JW-51B left Lough Yu and headed for Russia.

From that side

On the same day, thousands of kilometers from Iceland, in the concrete bunker of the Fuhrer's headquarters in Wolfschanger, the next meeting of the top of the Reich was held. In addition to Hitler himself and Keitel's frequenter, the fleet commander, Grand Admiral Raeder, was present. Knowing Hitler’s heightened attention to Norway, which he called the “field of fate”, Raeder, speaking on a report, described the state of the ship grouping in the north of Scandinavia and indicated that he was ready to move to immediate action. The grand admiral stressed that despite the ever-worsening fuel situation, the fleet will try to fulfill the assigned tasks. For example, it was stated that the “pocket battleship” of the “Lutz” was preparing to enter the Atlantic to attack single ships and allied convoys. Hitler responded with a lengthy tirade about the growing threat of landing in Norway - he was obsessed with the idea of ​​the need to more actively use heavy ships. Fuhrer added that he knows about the fuel situation, and the necessary resources for the shock squadron will be allocated.


"Lutzov" based in Alten fiord


The fleet command drew the proper conclusions from this meeting, at which Raeder was last present as fleet commander. It was necessary to undertake something, especially as agent intelligence reported on the formation of a new convoy in Iceland. The command of the naval group "North" at an accelerated pace developed a plan of operation "Regenboden" (Rainbow). A heavy cruiser “Admiral Hipper” and several destroyers were involved in the strike at the Allied convoy. Joining the “Luttsov’s” raider strike group heated up the telephone lines between the headquarters of the maritime warfare headquarters (Rear Admiral Fricke), the North headquarters group (Admiral Carls) and the squadron commander Vice-Admiral Oscar Kümetz in Alten Fiorde . On the one hand, the fleet commanders "did not object" to the participation of Lyuttsov, on the other, it was emphasized that this is possible only with an "acceptable" risk. And where the line between the risk of “permissible” and “unacceptable” ran was not understood, obviously, even in Berlin.

While the admirals were shouting each other through interference and kilometers of distance, on the morning of December 30 1942 from the U-85 submarine patrolling in the Barents Sea, an urgent radiogram was received about the enemy’s 10 with an insignificant escort. Later this news duplicated U-354. The words “with a minor escort” had a very calming effect on skeptics and anxious personalities, and the German squadron, which was ready for three hours, was given the go-ahead. The crews of the German ships in the Alten fiord languished from idleness: the exits to the exercises were rare and even more rare - military operations, after which weeks and months of anchorage lasted. Unlike their British counterparts, for whom the sea was a boring house, where they felt they were masters, the Germans were only infrequent guests of the ocean expanses. The discipline fell, the professional qualities which were not supported by practice decreased. The panacea for this was only a hike, but the command was almost always determined not to take risks.

Rainbow sunrise


Battlefield


In 17 hours 45 minutes, December 30 1942, cutting the cold Norwegian water with sharp pockets, Kümetz’s ships left Alten Fjord. The squadron consisted of the flagship heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper", heavy cruiser "Lutz" and 6 destroyers. According to the plan of operation "Hipper" and 3 destroyer struck the first strike on the convoy, diverting the forces of the escort. At this time, "Lutz" and the rest of the destroyers were supposed to attack the remaining vehicles without protection. On paper, everything was quite logical and correct. With the exception of one nuance: the Germans had no idea about the cruisers of Admiral Barnett - "Sheffield" and "Jamaica", who went to meet the convoy. The Germans managed to go unnoticed - none of the British submarines, lounging around the entrance to the Alten Fjord, found them - the stormy weather, coupled with snow charges, had a bad effect on visibility. At night, Kümetz’s ships rebuilt into a marching order, keeping 18 nodes running. The construction chosen by the German commander was original - it was a long line of the front, on the flanks of which were heavy cruisers. Between them at a great distance from each other were destroyers. The total width of such a "net" reached 15 miles and was supposed to provide, according to Kumetz, the greatest surprise when meeting with a convoy. The noticeable disadvantage was that Hipper and Lutz were far from each other, which made interaction difficult. In addition, the destroyers in conditions of poor visibility was not easy to immediately recognize in an obscure blurred silhouette, whose cruiser is next - your own or enemy. Perhaps, if the Germans had enough reconnaissance aircraft capable of detecting and escorting a convoy, while directing a squadron at it, Kümetz would refrain from such experiments. But the polar airfields were almost empty - the Eastern Front was devouring all the Luftwaffe resources.

The long-awaited contact took place on the 7 20 X-minute minutes of December 31 - at a distance of 6 miles from Hipper two unclear targets were discovered. Kümetz ordered an increase in the speed to 24 nodes, while simultaneously turning his nose towards the enemy, in order to impede recognition. New targets appeared, and the German admiral immediately radioed a squadron to all ships of the squadron to begin the operation. As a result, Friedrich Ekoldt, Richard Beitzen and Z-29 remained with Hipper. The rest of the destroyers began to turn to the "Lyuttsov." The guarding of the convoy noticed the presence of strangers later: approximately at 8 hours of 20 minutes, one of the escort ships noticed a couple of destroyers, but took them as Soviet ones (in conditions of poor visibility, obviously, the Friedrich Echoldt was classified as a ship of the 7-Y project) and took no action. After another 10 minutes from the English destroyer Obdyureit, unknown ships were seen for the second time - the captain reported this to Robert Sherbrooke and, at his order, went to meet him. On the 9 clock, the 15 minute of Obdureit requested an identity and an identification signal, still considering that it was in front of the Russians. But in response, shots rang out - along with the settling fountains of water, the last doubts were scattered: a German squadron attacked the convoy. And it is unlikely that her destroyers acted alone. A combat alarm was played on the British destroyers, they began deployment according to a predetermined plan. 4 of the ship, led by the flagship "Onslow" gathered in a group and began to go towards the enemy, the destroyer "Ekites" began setting smoke screen between the convoy and the attackers. With the Admiral Hipper, the British destroyers recorded 9 hours in 10 minutes, but so far they could not determine their numbers - the commander of the cruiser, Captain 1 of rank Hans Hartmann, proceeded from a submarine report about the "insignificance" of escort. In 9.23, on the right, a Ekatees smoke screen was found on the board. The Hipper immediately opened fire with the main caliber, which was soon joined by the 105-mm anti-aircraft guns. For the next 10 minutes, the cruiser fired five volleys, without having achieved, however, a single hit. From the cruiser, two more destroyers were spotted on the course, also from the starboard - it was the flagship of Sherbrooke, Onslow and Orwell. Finally, the 17 commander of the destroyer flotilla and the escort commander of the convoy saw with their own eyes their main enemy. A large unknown ship was heading straight for him, after a while he made a maneuver, allowing him to see his silhouette. The British saw four towers of the main caliber and a massive chimney - the distinguishing features of the German heavy cruiser. There was no point in storing the radio silence, and in 9.39 the cruisers of Admiral Barnett, Connection R, flew a radiogram that the convoy was attacked.

Meanwhile, "Hipper" moved the fire to the British destroyers, rightly believing that they are a more dangerous goal than busy setting smoke "Ekites". The flagship of Sherbrooke, together with his partner, disappeared into the smoke. For the Germans, the shooting conditions were very difficult - the main Hipper radar failed due to a concussion after the first volley. The artillery officer had to rely only on optics, directing the guns to small and quickly maneuvering targets. Sleet in combination with strong gusts of wind turned out to be very harmful for range finders and sights - after each gust the instrument lenses were covered with a thin layer of ice. I had to stop the observation and targeting and wipe them. Then a few minutes to shoot, after which the whole process was repeated anew. This could not but affect the accuracy and speed of the Admiral Hipper artillery fire. Visibility was very poor, and this meant that the German cruiser could not stay a long distance from the convoy and shoot transports with impunity - he needed to shorten the distance, while increasing the threat of being torpedoed with destroyers. Several times "Hipper" had to turn away when the British, emerging from the smoke, appeared in a convenient position for a torpedo attack. By 10 hours of the morning, the cruiser spent almost 90 high-explosive shells, achieving just one hit at Ekatejs, which caused the destroyer some damage.

After 10 in the morning, the mortal bullfighting of the British destroyers against the German heavy cruiser continued. In 10.06, "Hipper", after the smoke, again saw his opponents and resumed a rare shooting. The captain of the 1 rank, Sherbrooke, sent two of his weakest ships, the Obediant and Obdureit, armed with 102-mm guns, back to the convoy, which was going all the way southeast to the waiting Lyuttsov. Sherbrooke himself tried to hold the enemy as long as possible and give the convoy time to depart. "Hipper" in the meantime maneuvered and put into operation its stern radar, the result of which soon affected. In 10 hours 20 minutes 203-mm high-explosive projectile from the cruiser touched the chimney "Onslow". The blast knocked down the radar antenna, fragments riddled the bridge, Sherbrooke being there was wounded. A few minutes later two more shells hit the English destroyer - both nasal guns were put out of action, a fire started in the engine room. A total of 47 people died and were injured by German fire. Wounded Sherbrooke handed over command to lieutenant commander (2 captain of rank) Kinlock, commander of the "Orwell". The destroyers disappeared into a smoke screen. The condition of “Onslow” was heavy: water flowed through a hole in the body, a roll appeared. The fire continued on deck - the turn had to be reduced to 15 nodes. A little later, Orwell received a radiogram from the former flagship that the bow cellars were flooded, there was a fire in the engine room, and that Onslow was moving to the convoy.

Now it seemed that the German plan was starting to work - the escort forces were shabby, the convoy himself retreated right into the clutches of the "Lutzow", whose presence the British did not even suspect. "Hipper" continued to follow to the east, when in 10 hours 36 minutes noticed all the same starboard ship, like a destroyer. However, to the Germans in constant tension, the destroyers seemed everywhere as a source of mortal danger in the form of their torpedo tubes. In fact, an ocean minesweeper Bramble, a small (875 tons, one 102-mm cannon) ship that was on the way of a heavy cruiser, was discovered from a cruiser. From the distance of the entire 3 mile, the Hipper opened rapid fire at his victim, mistaking him for another destroyer. After 6 minutes, Kümetz ordered Ekoldt and Baytzen to finish off an enemy hiding in a smoke screen. The destruction of the Bramble took a long time, and it was only in 11 hours of 20 minutes that Hartmann turned his cruiser south, where, according to the Germans, the convoy was located.

Wolf and watchman

Approximately in 20 minutes before the flagship of Sherbrooke was damaged, the rhododendron corvette in the direct guard of the convoy reported that it sees smoke at a distance of 7 miles. After some time, he also said that he had discovered an unknown ship, which was heading north-east. Lieutenant-Commander Kinlock, who had joined the security forces command, at first considered these data to be erroneous. But soon the second corvette noticed a stranger, accompanied by two destroyers. Two towers of the main caliber, one chimney - it was "Lutz". His commander, Captain 1 of rank Hose, began a rendezvous with the convoy discovered, unaware that the only obstacle on his way was a tiny corvette. Having simply overwhelming fire superiority plus three destroyers with full torpedo tubes, Shlange could not identify the target, as he subsequently reported on in his report, made after the battle, due to poor visibility, smoke and a snow flurry. With the corvette, allegedly, they saw flashes of shots. Remembering Kümetz's order, which actually came from Berlin, “to be careful,” Hose was too careful and scrupulous to observe it. He lay down on a parallel course of the convoy and soon lost sight of him because of a snow flurry. At 11.27, a radio was sent to the Hipper stating that the convoy was lost in smoke and snowstorms. "Lutz" increased speed to go around the zone of bad weather. He missed his opportunity to strike at defenseless vehicles.

Meanwhile, the Hipper speeding up to the 31 node resumed contact with the enemy — it was the destroyer Ekatees that had been damaged earlier. This time the Germans quickly adjusted themselves: already the fourth volley reached the goal - the bridge was destroyed, a large hole appeared in the engine room. More than 40 people were killed. Seeing the position in which the Ekateys found himself, Kinlock rushed to the rescue with his three destroyers, imitating a torpedo attack. In 11 hours 30 minutes German cruiser, sharply turning, gave a volley at the enemy - one projectile landed in the "Obedient". The damaged Ekateys began to sink, in 12.54 its roll reached critical 60 degrees, in 13.15 the destroyer sank - the remaining 80 crewmembers were taken off by the trawler. The decisive moment of the battle has arrived. Escort forces were already significantly weakened, the British destroyers had almost no torpedoes left. In 11 hours 36 minutes Kümetz radioed to the “Lutz”: “I fight with the forces of the escort. There are no enemy cruisers. ” Three minutes later, around the "Hipper" stood a few pillars from ruptures. Their size showed that these were not small guns of the escort destroyers - the caliber was quite large. A new force has entered the battle - Barnett's cruisers were on the way.

"Cavalry" because of the hills


Cruiser Sheffield


Having recently received a Sherbrooke radiogram about a convoy attack, Sheffield and Jamaica were in full swing to the scene of the battle. Arriving in Murmansk with a previous convoy, they stood for some time in the Soviet port. According to an English eyewitness, it was “a terrible hole with a complete lack of entertainment.” Perhaps the proud son of foggy Albion was saddened that the frontline Murmansk is so unlike any gay port in the colonies where you can find "women and wine."

English cruisers to the events described already had a perfect radar equipment, superior to the German one. The operators recorded a lot of glare on the radar, but Barnett decided to still get close to clarifying the situation. As the distance was reduced among the small marks, one large one began to appear on the screen. It was Admiral Hipper. The first from the cable 60 distance of his opponent was Sheffield. In 11.31, the British opened a quick fire (according to German data, it happened in 11.39). The paling of bursts on both sides of the Hipper came as a complete surprise to Kümetz and Hartmann. Visibility in the area where the heavy cruiser was located was so bad that at first the enemy was not even noticed - the ship’s towers were turned south against the British destroyers. Hartmann ordered a sharp turn to leave new forages on the stern. Performing the maneuver, the Hipper lurched, and at that moment the 6-inch projectile hit the starboard below the edge of the armor belt that had risen from the water - it exploded in the fuel tank opposite the boiler compartment No. 3, damaging the internal bulkhead. Boiler rooms - first number 3, and then number 2 - began to gradually fill with water. 8 boilers failed, the Hipper speed dropped to 15 nodes. He took about 1000 tons of water. In 11.34, according to the records of the British, the Germans returned fire - it was very inaccurate. The fact is that now the ship was going against the wind, and the optics of the nose of the PDC was quickly covered with ice. A few minutes later, two more British shells landed in the Hipper: the first landed on the port side, destroying several rooms, the other one exploded in the hangar - the plane that was there was set on fire, riddled the other, and the other Arado. The smoke from the fires closed the optics of the fuel supply control valves - the fire had to be stopped. Meanwhile, while the “Hipper” fought back from the English cruisers who were suddenly attacking him, the Lutzov, still loafing around, intercepted the caravan that was leaving at full steam to the southeast. And the lead ship was from the German ship at a distance of no more than 3 miles, and the last - about 7 miles. The distance is basically a dagger. “Lutzov” opened frequent fire, but, according to the English sailors, Santa Claus who lived nearby intervened (until the New Year remained 12 hours) - the “pocket battleship” launched 87 283-mm and 75 150-mm shells and did not achieve one hit, only one merchant ship was damaged by shrapnel. Obviously, the matter was not at all in Santa Claus, who had enough worries, simply because the German artillerymen had forgotten how to shoot even for short distances from long standing in fiords.

While “Lutzov” was emptying its cellars, scorching into milk, in the cabin of the “Hipper” they received a very untimely radiogram from the Alten-fjord, ordering “to act without much risk”. But the fact is that the risk, from the point of view of the rarely German expeditions, was at that moment more than enough. Formally, Kümetz's ships had the advantage in firepower over the British: six 283-mm, eight 203-mm and six more 150-mm guns against 24 British 152-mm. But this is only if the Germans fought at long distances, striking the enemy with impunity beyond the reach of his guns. In conditions of poor visibility, when the distance between the two squadrons decreased, the advantage shifted to more rapid-fire English guns. To this we must add the indisputable superiority of the British in equipping their ships with more sophisticated radar and tactically unsuccessful from a tactical point of view Kümetz to divide his forces. After weighing the pros and cons, the German commander decided to withdraw. In 11.37, all ships of the group receive a radio to stop the operation and leave the battlefield. The German destroyers "Friedrich Ekoldt" and "Richard Beitzen" were not lucky, who together completed the massacre of the Bramble trawler. Suddenly, two obscure silhouettes emerged from the darkness, and while “Ekoldt” found out from “Hipper” whether he saw him, “Sheffield” and “Jamaica” (and they were) in 11.43 opened a quick and accurate fire on the head “Ekoldt” “, Turning it into a burning wreck in a few minutes. Soon the German ship sank from damage received. "Baytzen" turned away to the left and, having put a smoke screen, disappeared. "Hipper", connecting with the "pocket battleship", began to retreat to the south-west, slowly firing back from the English cruisers pursuing him. The British achieved the cover of Luttsov, but Barnett did not insist on continuing the battle - he fulfilled his task: the convoy defended and forced the stronger opponent to retreat. In addition, the Lyuttsov 283-mm guns were much more dangerous for his ships. At about 14 hours, contact was lost. The battle is over.

"Hipper" experienced all the great difficulties due to a very painful for him first hit - flooding the boiler department number 3 led to the stop of the left turbine. Water got into the fuel supply lines to diesel generators, and three of them had to be stopped. Soon the fireboxes in the boiler room No. 2 went out. It remains to be seen how this would all end if Sheffield and Jamaica continued their pursuit. Having met the new 1943 year at sea, “Hipper” hobbled da Kaa-fjord in the morning of January 1. During the battle, six people died and died. Together with “Ekoldt”, 340 people died and drowned. Losses of the British reached 250 officers and sailors - from the crews of the sunk "Ekites" and "Bramble". The main thing was that the convoy did not suffer any losses and safely reached the goal.

Storm in Wolfschanger

The New Year's battle had great consequences for the German surface ships, and the consequences are very unpleasant. While the report from the fleet management itself was late, Hitler listened to a news report from the Reuters news agency about the unsuccessful attempt to attack the polar convoy and about the successful actions of the British ships. The Fuhrer was furious. At the most inappropriate moment, when the negative emotions curve went up sharply, a rather brave message was put on the table from the headquarters at sea — it was based on a fragmentary message from the U-85 submarine: “I continue to see red ...” The admirals obviously thought the boat could see a red glow of burning transports, and right there in all instances a message was sent about victory. This dispatch simply caused a storm of rabies in the Fuehrer, who showered the surface ships with a whole squall of mocking nicknames like "useless piles of scrap metal." The Fuhrer ordered to send all surface ships for scrapping and stop building new ones. Fleet Commander Raeder resigned. He was replaced by the "underwater admiral" Karl Dönitz. However, when the waves of anger subsided, Dönitz managed to persuade the Fuhrer to leave the few surviving battleships and cruisers in the ranks - most of them were used as training for the 1944 year in the Baltic Sea, until they had to be used as floating batteries to try to stop the Red Army’s unstoppable offensive. And soon, along with the Third Reich, all the ambitions of the Big Fleet have sunk into oblivion.
Author:
33 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. parusnik
    parusnik 5 January 2016 08: 42 New
    17
    Thanks Denis! Your articles, you sometimes do not give room for comments ..
    1. KakoVedi
      KakoVedi 5 January 2016 09: 57 New
      +7
      Why?! You can, for example, talk for the weather ... Comment on the insufficiently ironed pants of Comrade Raeder ...
      1. bulvas
        bulvas 5 January 2016 11: 52 New
        +3
        Many thanks to the author.

        Just got the books Tsaregorodtseva, very useful to read how it was in reality


      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Aleksandr72
        Aleksandr72 5 January 2016 13: 37 New
        11
        Впрочем, еще японо-американские разборки на Тихом океане в 1942-1943 гг вокруг Гвадалканала и Соломоновых островов, где бои как правило происходили в ночное время и на коротких дистанциях, убедительно доказали превосходство более скорострельной (и более многочисленной) 6-ти дюймовой артиллерии ГК на американских легких крейсерах над формально более мощной, но менее скорострельной (к тому же уступающей в числе) 8-ми дюймовой артиллерией тяжелых крейсеров японского флота. Что касается эсминцев Кригсмарине, то во Второй мировой войне они показали практически полную бесполезность при действиях в открытом море в условиях северных широт, особенно в свежую (я не говорю уже о штормовой погоде) - сказалась их низкая мореходность. Немногочисленные их успехи типа потопления "Эдинбурга" - то самое исключение, что подтверждает правило. Одной из причин гибели "Шарнхорста" в бою с британским флотом явилось то, что германские эсминцы ввиду штормовой погоды не смогли сопровождать линкор в его последнем походе. Британским же эсминцам штормовая погода препятствием не являлась. Отвратительная подготовка комендоров больших кораблей Кригсмарине в годы Второй мировой также стала еще одной никуда не годной традицией - дошло до того, что "Тирпиц" пробежался к Шпицбергену, чтобы главным калибром раздолбать шахтерские поселки - самая что ни на есть цель для 380-мм ГК линкора. Это уже стариной Фрейдом попахивает. Причина одна - немецкие корабли после 1941 (и особенно после 1942) редко выходили из родной гавани в море - отсутствие морской практики сказывается на всей подготовке в целом.
        And the weather in the North on the sea, and also on land, is rarely good. But it is well known that it interferes with the bad dancer and the German sailors in that war ...
        I have the honor.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 January 2016 23: 55 New
          0
          Quote: Aleksandr72
          However, even the Japanese-American showdown in the Pacific Ocean in 1942-1943 around the Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands, where battles usually took place at night and at short distances, convincingly proved the superiority of the more rapid-fire (and more numerous) 6-inch artillery of the Civil Code on American light cruisers over the formally more powerful, but less rapid-fire (and also inferior in number) 8-inch artillery of the heavy cruisers of the Japanese fleet

          ??? And the defeat of the cruising compound Doorman, he also - also confirmed the priority of 6 dm over 8 dm? Or were the American light cruisers able to demonstrate something similar to beating the Allied cruisers at Savo? The battle near the Komandorski Islands (or the Attu Islands) when Salt Lake City was whipped alone for four hours with heavy Japanese cruisers from a distance of 20 km - how is it?
          In fact, 8-dm turned out to be clearly preferable to 6-dm, since they could work long distances, while in night battles they were not inferior to the 6-dm degree due to the greater power of the projectile.
          Quote: Aleksandr72
          The disgusting preparation of the commandants of the large ships Kriegsmarine during the Second World War

          Тяжелый крейсер "Эксетер" и линейный крейсер "Худ" с Вами категорически не согласны.
          На самом деле отвратительной эта подготовка стала у кораблей, которые фюрер согнал в Норвегию - проводить им там курс полной боевой подготовки не получалось от слова "никак" - а самые тренированные команды в отсутствие постоянных упражнений быстро теряют навык.
    2. alexej123
      alexej123 5 January 2016 22: 57 New
      0
      Точный и ёмкий комментарий - как выстрел. Статья "зеер гут". Читаешь не просто "сводку боевых действий" - читаешь как рассказ баталиста, бывшего в гуще событий.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  2. Rash
    Rash 5 January 2016 09: 22 New
    +4
    Very interesting, informative and artistic article! It turns out that the Germans, too, were defeated in attacks on the British convoys.
  3. Gray 43
    Gray 43 5 January 2016 09: 55 New
    +4
    Автору спасибо-статью прочёл на одном дыхании. В книге А. Маклина "Крейсер "Улисс"" был описан похожий бой,творческий вымысел я учитываю,но кое что сходится
  4. D-Master
    D-Master 5 January 2016 10: 15 New
    +5
    Great article. Many thanks to the author and request to continue writing.
  5. Krsk
    Krsk 5 January 2016 11: 40 New
    +4
    I join a very good article thanks Denis
  6. NIKNN
    NIKNN 5 January 2016 12: 04 New
    +4
    The article was impressive, thanks! good
  7. Aitvaras
    Aitvaras 5 January 2016 13: 41 New
    +1
    Очень хорошая статья . Одновременно информативная и интересная .Литературный уровень также высок ,как и у произведения Пикуля " Реквием по каравану PQ-17".
    1. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. 5 January 2016 14: 12 New
      -2
      Quote: Aitvaras
      Очень хорошая статья . Одновременно информативная и интересная .Литературный уровень также высок ,как и у произведения Пикуля " Реквием по каравану PQ-17".

      1. Article, really. good one.
      2. And it’s written well.
      3. Но причем здесь сравнение с книгой В.С. Пикуля "Реквием каравану PQ-17"? тем более, что Вы даже название книги указали не точно. И, как понимаю, содержание книги не очень хорошо знаете. А главное, суть книги В.С. Пикуля, о том, что лорды британского Адмиралтейства сделали ошибку, равную предательству, и о том, как в ужасающей ситуации вопреки всем смертям и лордам сохраняли достоинство и побеждали советские моряки.
      4. Этот самый "новогодний" бой показал, что западники в очередной раз постреляв друг в друга, разошлись без больших претензий... Это не восточный фронт, где не было пощады врагу...
      5. "Тирпиц" на бой не явился. И ни слова о нашем герое-подводнике Н.А. Лунине и "К-21"... Изложена западная версия военно-морского эпизода без контекста Великой Отечественной войны.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 5 January 2016 15: 02 New
        +5
        "Изложена западная версия военно-морского эпизода без контекста Великой Отечественной войны."////

        The context, in my opinion, is understandable: this was the last attempt of the German surface fleet
        prevent the passage of naval convoys with military assistance for the Red Army.
        The victory of the more experienced Agli fleet over the German.
      2. Plombirator
        5 January 2016 15: 03 New
        +8
        Quote: Sergey S.
        "Тирпиц" на бой не явился.

        Прошу прощения, уважаемый коллега, но "Тирпиц" изначально не предусматривался к участию в операции "Регенбоден". А действия Лунина и К-21 - это июль 1942 года, за полгода до описываемых событий. Что касается англичан - они свою задачу выполнили: конвой сохранили, немцев (превосходивших их в силах, кстати) отогнали. То, что Кюметц пассивно использовал свои 6 эсминцев, опасаясь "трудности их распознавания", - так это проблема его и недостаточно натренированных сигнальщиков.
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. 5 January 2016 16: 30 New
          +3
          Quote: Plombirator
          Прошу прощения,уважаемый коллега но "Тирпиц" изначально не предусматривался к участию в операции "Регенбоден". А действия Лунина и К-21-это июль 1942 года,за пол года до описываемых событий.

          And I'm about the same.
          If N.A. Lunin missed ...
          Would such further events be.

          ... But the English story about this:
          1. Официально опровергает результативность атаки "К-21". Корабельный журнал "Тирпица" с явными пробелами приводит в качестве аргумента... Спелись в этом вопросе с фашистами.
          2. Дальнейшие действия планирует так, как будто знает, что "Тирпиц" в море не выйдет...
          3. With a clear superiority in naval forces, it conducts an operation without a real result at the operational level.
          4. I will not introduce a discord in the pro-Western assessment of this operation, but please take into account that the German fleet did not suffer real damage. As a result, the British squadrons continued to burn fuel oil in the North Seas, and the northern convoys continued to experience the danger of an attack by the Nazis ... And thank God that in the future, due to Hitler's manic fear of losing ships, there were no big losses ...
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 5 January 2016 18: 27 New
            +4
            You wrote beautifully:
            "а северные конвои продолжали испытывать опасность нападения фашистов"

            Есть большая разница - "подвергаться нападениям" (до 31/12/42)
            и - "испытывать боязнь нападений" (после 31/12/42) laughing
            1. Sergey S.
              Sergey S. 5 January 2016 23: 37 New
              +2
              Quote: voyaka uh
              You wrote beautifully:
              "а северные конвои продолжали испытывать опасность нападения фашистов"

              These are not beautiful words. but clear terms.
              Quote: voyaka uh

              Есть большая разница - "подвергаться нападениям" (до 31/12/42)
              и - "испытывать боязнь нападений" (после 31/12/42) laughing

              There is a difference - emotional, but not operational-strategic.

              The actions of several fascist raiders kept in tension the many times greater forces of the British fleet.
              Nevertheless, the convoys continued to suffer losses ...
              I have no desire to blame the British for cowardice and stupidity, on the contrary, they showed intelligence, endurance and foresight.
              Only now all these qualities were concentrated in order to maintain naval superiority after the war ...
              For a very long time, the British more than Germans were afraid of losing large ships ...
              После "Худа", "Принца Уэльского", "Рипалза"...
              In addition, they did not want to destroy the Germans either - they dreamed of incapacitating them with a couple of torpedoes. or apert in skerries ...
              They dreamed that after the war these ships would get them for reparations ...
              And only a tough stance I.V. Stalin's division of the Italian fleet and the tough stance of F.D. Roosevelt on the need to destroy trophy ships, introduced the British into the likeness of a belligerent.
              And if the British ruled, the war would end in the surrender of all German technology in their hands ...
              It’s a pity you won’t ask Hess about this, and the English archives on this subject were closed before 2045.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 00: 01 New
                +3
                Quote: Sergey S.
                In addition, they did not want to destroy the Germans either

                And so the Lancaster with six-ton ​​bombs threw at Tirpitz ...
                1. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. 6 January 2016 19: 56 New
                  +3
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

                  And so the Lancaster with six-ton ​​bombs threw at Tirpitz ...

                  So it was already in November 1944 ...
                  And Tiprpitz came to Norway in January 1942.

                  For two and a half years, the British could not sink one immobilized ship ...
                  Something is not believed ...
                  And drowned due to lack of understanding who will occupy Norway.
                  There was a chance that Russians would be in Northern Norway.
                  What actually happened.

                  But ours did not reach Trems, but they were near.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 22: 00 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    So it was already in November 1944 ...

                    The bombs that destroyed Tirpitz were put into service in June 1944 :)))
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    For two and a half years, the British could not sink one immobilized ship ...
                    Something is not believed ...

                    Well, read how many operations the British took to destroy Tirpitz and what forces were deployed. Also a sham? :)
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    And drowned due to lack of understanding who will occupy Norway.

                    Знаете, есть такое правило - бритва Оккама называется. "Не умножай сущностей сверх необходимого".
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 00: 53 New
                +4
                Quote: Sergey S.
                Only now all these qualities were concentrated in order to maintain naval superiority after the war ...

                Over whom, interesting? After the war, Germany, Japan and Italy would have lost any fleet, the USSR could not say that there was no fleet, and the British could not catch up with the United States anyway, they did not dream.
                Quote: Sergey S.
                For a very long time, the British more than Germans were afraid of losing large ships ..

                И поэтому то Черчилль требовал от АБС чтобы тот блокировал Триполи путем затопления линкора, то сам АВС со своим знаменитым: "Держаться! Мы можем и должны их превозмочь. Для того, чтобы флоту построить новый корабль нужно три года, для того, чтобы создать новую традицию нужно 300 лет!" бросал свои линкоры под сотни самолетов люфтваффе... Другой адмирал (не помню, кто, гадство) гонялся на Ринауне за линкором типа "Литторио"...
                1. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. 6 January 2016 20: 08 New
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Over whom, interesting? After the war, Germany, Japan and Italy would have lost any fleet, the USSR could not say that there was no fleet, and the British could not catch up with the United States anyway, they did not dream.

                  And what happened after the First World War?
                  The situation was similar, but the British tried to appropriate the German fleet ...

                  The London and Washington treaties limited the arms race for some period.
                  But then, in 1918, it seemed to the British, or the English, that all attempts to strengthen the fleet were pointless.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 22: 03 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    The situation was similar, but the British tried to appropriate the German fleet ...

                    NOT tried. On the contrary, they puzzled over how to share it.
                    Quote: Sergey S.

                    The London and Washington treaties limited the arms race for some period.

                    Yeah. And the British voluntarily agreed to abandon the two-armed standard and parity with the United States. And they sent for scrapping a bunch of dreadnoughts, far more formidable than the German ones who came to them
                2. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. 6 January 2016 20: 49 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  И поэтому то Черчилль требовал от АБС чтобы тот блокировал Триполи путем затопления линкора, то сам АВС со своим знаменитым: "Держаться! Мы можем и должны их превозмочь. Для того, чтобы флоту построить новый корабль нужно три года, для того, чтобы создать новую традицию нужно 300 лет!" бросал свои линкоры под сотни самолетов люфтваффе... Другой адмирал (не помню, кто, гадство) гонялся на Ринауне за линкором типа "Литторио"...

                  You can, of course, enthusiastically repeat such spells after the British ...
                  Battleships for hundreds of German aircraft, when and where ???
                  Is this not Gloucester, Fiji and Calcutta?

                  So let beautiful words remain words ...
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 21: 24 New
                    0
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    You can, of course, enthusiastically repeat such spells after the British ...

                    And these are not spells. These are the words with which ABC sent its ships to continue evacuation from Crete.
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    Battleships for hundreds of German aircraft, when and where ???

                    Well, you don’t even know that. Why am I not surprised? :) Of course, this is a Cretan operation, when ABC sent 3 battleships to 430 bombers of 8 air corps
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    This is not Gloucester, Fiji and Calcutta

                    They were sunk in that operation
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    So let beautiful words remain words ...

                    You may ask, what are you saying? ABC risked the entire Mediterranean squadron, its battleships and many other ships suffered severe damage, many died. Nevertheless, not a single naval landing on Crete landed while the battle was on, and the fleet evacuated almost all from Crete - and contrary to the direct instructions of their Lordships, who preferred to abandon their soldiers on Crete, but not risk ships.
                    And yes, do you like to compare English with Soviet ... compare Crimea and Crete? Specifically - the actions of the Soviet and British fleets?
                    1. Sergey S.
                      Sergey S. 7 January 2016 08: 04 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And yes, do you like to compare English with Soviet ... compare Crimea and Crete? Specifically - the actions of the Soviet and British fleets?

                      By the standards of the British, in the Black Sea we generally did not have a fleet, but a flotilla ..
                      This is bitter ...

                      If you are about June 1942, then the situation was hopeless ...
                      And there was already almost nobody to send ...

                      The question was only about whether the leadership had the right to evacuate without an army.
                      But this is an ethical and rhetorical question ....
                      Граф Орлов и адмирал Спиридов тоже покинули горящий "Святой Евстафий", не дожидаясь взрыва...
                      This is under the Charter.
                      However, veterans of Sevastopol Oktyabrsky spoke in person ... They were there and had the right to it.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 January 2016 19: 56 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Sergey S.
                        By the standards of the British, in the Black Sea we generally did not have a fleet, but a flotilla ..
                        This is bitter ...

                        The British sent their ships to Crete, despite the presence of a very powerful Italian fleet, comparable in strength to the English squadron that they had there. The Soviet fleet had absolute dominance at sea, because there was simply no enemy fleet opposing it. Yes, the Luftwaffe allocated quite significant forces, but unlike the British, we could cover the evacuation with our own fighters - the distances there were small and the dominance of enemy aircraft was not absolutely (some of the command personnel were transported by air)
                        Quote: Sergey S.
                        If you are about June 1942, then the situation was hopeless ...
                        And there was already almost nobody to send ...

                        And where did the Black Sea fleet go?
                        Hopeless situation was by no means. It was possible to organize an evacuation - but it was NOT even planned.
                    2. Sergey S.
                      Sergey S. 7 January 2016 08: 37 New
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Of course, this is a Cretan operation, when ABC sent 3 battleships to 430 bombers of 8 air corps

                      Этим фактом Вы подтверждаете, что кроме торпед Н.А. Лунина не было причины "Тирпицу" возвращаться...
                      Under his protection ...

                      And further. When evacuating from Crete, it was wax, and abandoned ships, too, and a large number of prisoners ...
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 January 2016 20: 12 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Sergey S.
                        Этим фактом Вы подтверждаете, что кроме торпед Н.А. Лунина не было причины "Тирпицу" возвращаться...

                        У "Тирпица" ,было 2 причины для возвращения
                        1) The order of the German squadron contained such instructions
                        Report immediately if ships are detected by enemy aircraft. If the situation is doubtful - do not hesitate to stop the operation. In no case do not allow the success of the enemy in operations against our ships.

                        After the attack, Lunin gave a radiogram and most likely she was received on German ships. After his attack, the German squadron was discovered by our scouts and the British submarine, which also radiated about the discovery of the German squadron. Since the Germans had a normally developed radio interception service, they knew by the intensity of the radiograms that their ships were found, which obliged them to interrupt the operation.
                        2) From reports of German submarines and aircraft, it became clear that the convoy was dispersed. Accordingly, the output of German heavy ships lost all meaning - chasing individual vehicles on the battleship is the top of naval stupidity, single ships will be easily destroyed by aircraft and submarines - which really happened.
                        Quote: Sergey S.
                        And further. When evacuating from Crete, it was wax, and abandoned ships, too, and a large number of prisoners ...

                        It was that the fleet suffered heavy losses - 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers sunk. 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers were seriously damaged, and it was impossible to repair them in Alexandria. Another 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers received minor damage.
                        The Black Sea Fleet did not evacuate.
                      2. The comment was deleted.
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 00: 00 New
            +3
            Quote: Sergey S.
            If N.A. Lunin missed ...

            So he missed.
            Quote: Sergey S.
            .. But the English story about this:
            1. Официально опровергает результативность атаки "К-21". Корабельный журнал "Тирпица" с явными пробелами приводит в качестве аргумента... Спелись в этом вопросе с фашистами.

            Угу. "Явные пробелы" наличествуют не в боевом журнале "Тирпица", а в Ваших познаниях. Допустим, кто-то взял да и потер журнал (ерунда, но допустим). А с остальными документами как быть? Или, по Вашему, немцы старательно вымарывали все документы о ремонте линкора после торпедного попадания?:)) А зачем, позвольте спросить? Вот про повреждения от английских ПЛ и саомлетов - все пожалуйста, а от советских кораблей - строго секретно?:))
            1. Sergey S.
              Sergey S. 6 January 2016 21: 02 New
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Quote: Sergey S.
              If N.A. Lunin missed ...

              So he missed.

              You are deeply mistaken ...

              Explosions of two torpedoes were heard.
              The Germans turned home.
              The Tirpitz speed during retreat was significantly lower than the usual squadron speed.

              After this, Tirpitz was repaired for a long time, and no longer participated in the hostilities.
              ON THE. Lunin EXPLODED Tirpitz from the war ... FOREVER!

              Yes, if he hadn’t gotten, would the Germans have allowed themselves such passivity.
              Тем более, что "Шарнхорст", "Адмирал Шеер" и "Лютцов" после торпедирования "Тирпица" еще пытались совершать набеги.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 21: 54 New
                0
                Quote: Sergey S.
                You are deeply mistaken ...

                I'm deeply right
                Quote: Sergey S.
                Explosions of two torpedoes were heard.

                from which it does not at all follow that:
                1) Torpedoes really exploded
                2) Torpedoes were torn as a result of getting into Tirpitz
                And yes, after the explosion
                Quote: Sergey S.
                The Germans turned home.

                3 hours after the attack of Lunin.
                The Germans themselves did not notice the attack. Subsequently, the fact of the movement of German ships forward was confirmed by the English submarine, which observed the German squadron after the attack of Lunin.
                Quote: Sergey S.
                Tirpitz’s speed during retreat was significantly lower than normal squadron

                And where does this information come from? :)))
                Quote: Sergey S.
                After this Tirpitz was repaired for a long time

                Which was not recorded either by German reports or by any documents, or by British reconnaissance aircraft, which regularly observed the battleship
                Quote: Sergey S.
                and no longer participated in the hostilities

                Ага. А операцию Sizilien осуществляла спешно построенная копия линкора "Тирпиц", обстрелявшая Шпицберген муляжами 380-м снарядов
                Quote: Sergey S.
                ON THE. Lunin EXPLODED Tirpitz from the war ... FOREVER!

                But Admiral Kuznetsov does not agree with you. He wrote
                “Fascist ships were discovered by the K-21 submarine under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union N.A. Lunin. Lunin launched an attack, firing four torpedoes at the Tirpitz. The Hitler command, worried that the connection of their ships was discovered by an English plane and a submarine, after a few hours ordered their ships to turn back. "(N.G. Kuznetsov." The course towards
                Victory ", Moscow, 1987 p.207)

                However, what do you some Soviet admiral? laughing
                1. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. 7 January 2016 07: 51 New
                  0
                  Moreover, I will add.
                  Nikolay Aleksandrovich himself never said that he was in Tirpitz.
                  And generally circumvented this topic.
                  It was a sore point.

                  N.G. Kuznetsov, undoubtedly, authority and specialist.

                  BUT
                  As the sailors told, his opinion about the Victories and, especially, the WINNERS, drifted over time ...

                  Komflota A.G. Golovko unequivocally writes - N.A. Lunin hit! Tirpitz - crawled away! And this is a donsque aerial reconnaissance.

                  And about the fact of the discovery of Tirpitz.
                  Having already passed the veil of submarines, what was the point of returning?
                  On the contrary, to attack.
                  As for the danger of aviation, then away from Britain, German ships felt quite confident.
                  Admiral Scheer's raid is an example of this.
                  And here is a full squadron ...

                  The Germans did not show cowardice ...

                  As for the Sizilien operation, it was more than a year after the torpedoes of N.A. Lunin. Refurbished ...
                  And it’s difficult to call it an operation.
                  The real military results are close to zero and they did not influence the course of the war.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 January 2016 21: 14 New
                    0
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    Moreover, I will add.
                    Nikolay Aleksandrovich himself never said that he was in Tirpitz.
                    And generally circumvented this topic.
                    It was a sore point.

                    Well, for Nikolai Alexandrovich, she’s sick, but everything is clear to you.
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    Komflota A.G. Golovko unequivocally writes - N.A. Lunin hit! Tirpitz - crawled away! And this is a donsque aerial reconnaissance.

                    Have you carefully read Golovko? He's writing
                    A day later, our air reconnaissance aircraft found Tirpitz, "Scheer" and the destroyers accompanying them not far from the Norwegian coast. The fascist squadron was far from the course that could lead it to the meeting place with PQ-17; no, she went south, and she did not go at the usual speed in such cases.

                    Day after. The operation was canceled almost a day ago. Where to rush something?
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    And about the fact of the discovery of Tirpitz.
                    Having already passed the veil of submarines, what was the point of returning?

                    I wrote to you above, but again - firstly, this decision was not made on the battleship, they were ordered to return, because according to the radio interception it became clear that the battleship was detected and this was considered critical for the operation. And the second - and it also became known that the convoy was dispersed - the target of the attack ceased to exist.
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    As for the danger of aviation, then away from Britain, German ships felt quite confident.
                    Admiral Scheer's raid is an example of this.

                    Immensely strangled by such a statement. Scheer’s raid was when? And the Bismarck British intercepted by decks when? And how many raids of the Kurpa surface ships into the Atlantic did the Germans make after the sinking of Bismarck? :))
                    Quote: Sergey S.
                    As for the Sizilien operation, it was more than a year after the torpedoes of N.A. Lunin.

                    But it was the same. So you are somehow more historic, please, with your statements.
          3. veteran66
            veteran66 6 January 2016 16: 54 New
            +2
            Quote: Sergey S.
            because of Hitler’s manic fear of losing ships, there were no big losses ...

            and where did Hitler's manic fear come from? Not from scratch, it was precisely such successes of the Allies that led to erroneous decisions on the use of kriegsmarine.
      3. Aitvaras
        Aitvaras 6 January 2016 12: 01 New
        0
        Эту книгу Пикуля я читал примерно в 1995 г.Точное название,возможно и запямятовал , но сльное впечатление осталось и до сих пор.Недавно была в Литве передачя по ВВС НISTORY - про морские сражения Второй Мировой ,вот линкоры " Бисмарк " и "Тирпиц" именно союзники на дно отправили. В немецком подводном флоте, по родам войск ,были самые большие потерии.
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. 6 January 2016 21: 06 New
          +2
          Quote: Aitvaras
          Эту книгу Пикуля я читал примерно в 1995 г.Точное название,возможно и запямятовал , но сльное впечатление осталось и до сих пор.Недавно была в Литве передачя по ВВС НISTORY - про морские сражения Второй Мировой ,вот линкоры " Бисмарк " и "Тирпиц" именно союзники на дно отправили. В немецком подводном флоте, по родам войск ,были самые большие потерии.

          And the Allies had the biggest losses of transports ...

          And more.
          It is not at all surprising that air force programs are shown in Lithuania, and that allies win in English television programs.

          But who captured Berlin and Koenigsberg in those programs?
      4. The comment was deleted.
    2. Bear52
      Bear52 6 January 2016 22: 35 New
      -1
      IMHO Pikul in this tme nothing to do. Artificially ruined the translation of an old English book about the North Convoys
      1. reservist
        reservist 8 September 2017 17: 04 New
        0
        And which English book was spoiled by Valentin Savvich Pikul, who fought as a steering-signalman on the destroyer destroyer "Terrible" of the Northern Fleet?
  8. Ulysses
    Ulysses 5 January 2016 18: 57 New
    -1
    The Germans are not warriors at sea.
    Старенькая "Слава" в Моонзунде показала.

    Включая беспомощных "волчат" Деница.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 00: 15 New
      +2
      Quote: Ulysses
      The Germans are not warriors at sea.

      But the British do not know :)))
      Quote: Ulysses
      Старенькая "Слава" в Моонзунде показала.

      Showed WHAT? How to die heroically in battle, never once hit the enemy?
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. reservist
      reservist 8 September 2017 18: 22 New
      0
      Quote: Ulysses
      The Germans are not warriors at sea.

      it is possible that not all English sailors, if they could, agreed with this statement ...

      of the Huda team, only three survived ...
  9. Sergey-8848
    Sergey-8848 5 January 2016 21: 33 New
    +3
    Надувание щёк во все стороны непобедимым рейхом привело к тому, что эти щёки с разных сторон стали лопаться. Будь-то военно-морская составляющая, будь-то "прогулка" в Африку, будь-то "Дранг нах Остен" имени Рыжего Фридриха. Так вот и отгребли со всех сторон. С нашей стороны и по нашей земле завоевателям дольше и кровавей всего отползать пришлось. Здесь 1000-летний Рейх на 12-ом году мы и закрыли.
    Well, at sea, through the same meat grinder - the same well-known profile. Why is a Nazi at sea better than a reptile in the field?
  10. Plombirator
    6 January 2016 01: 04 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Другой адмирал (не помню, кто, гадство) гонялся на Ринауне за линкором типа "Литторио".

    Очевидно,речь идет о адмирале сэре Э́ндрю Бра́уне Ка́ннингеме и его любимом флагмане "Уорспайте")
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 January 2016 01: 16 New
      0
      В том-то и дело, что нет:))) Может, Соммервил? Там был эпизод, когда конвой под прикрытием Роднея и Ринауна куда-то шел (на Мальту?) и вдруг объявились итальянские линкоры (ЕМНИП один типа Литторио и один "Чезаре"). Конечно, бравые итальянцы отступили... очень быстро:))) Поскольку старина Родней был явно не в состоянии их догнать британский адмирал отправился в погоню на Ринауне:))
      Lazy to look for this episode, but probably have to :)
    2. The comment was deleted.
  11. mitya1941
    mitya1941 6 January 2016 13: 53 New
    0
    There may be a battle at Cape Matapan on March 27-29, 1941. The Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto was damaged by torpedo attacks. Three heavy cruisers of the Italians as well as two destroyers were sunk by British artillery fire.
  12. unknown
    unknown 6 January 2016 19: 59 New
    +1
    According to experts, the war could not give an unambiguous answer to the question, which is preferable: 8 * 203mm or 12 * 152mm.
    At the same time, it is worth remembering that 1.) heavy cruisers, with rare exceptions, were built 20x-beginning 30x, and light ones from 12 * 152mm-end 30x, which 2.) light ones with 6-9 * 150-155mm in terms of fire performance are unlikely - whether they were superior to heavy ones, even in spite of the high rate of fire.

    Doorman in his last battle did not dare to get closer to the Japanese on the firing range of light cruisers.
    Regarding the fact that the Germans are not warriors at sea. And the battle of Jutland? And the actions of the German submarine fleet?
    And the action of our fleet in the war? Starting from the Tallinn Crossing-Baltic Tsushima.
  13. Pomeranian
    Pomeranian 11 January 2016 11: 51 New
    0
    Excellent, informative article. I read it in one breath. Such a suspicion that large surface ships with the advent of aviation somehow became out of work.