A blow to Russia, myth or reality?
A disarming non-nuclear strike on our strategic nuclear forces is possible, but purely theoretically.
Today it is already clear that large-scale NATO aggression against Russia is impossible. For this, the alliance has neither military resources, nor psychological readiness, nor intelligible goals. Approximately 3-4-the multiple superiority of NATO over Russia in conventional weapons is, in fact, purely paper, given the "smearing" of NATO's potential throughout Europe, a very large proportion of obsolete weapons (in fact, it is higher than in the Armed Forces) and uninterrupted reductions in the combat strength of the armies of all European NATO countries (except Turkey and Greece, "closed" against each other), which will continue with acceleration due to the economic crisis.
These factors are greatly enhanced by the complete psychological "demobilization" of Europeans, which is very clearly manifested in Afghanistan. The operation in Libya is no less indicative: the unexpected US withdrawal through 2 a week after the start of hostilities showed the military helplessness of Europe. Acting in fact, in range conditions, without countering the enemy’s air defenses, the air forces of European countries have not yet been able to seriously defeat even the most mediocre Gaddafi army from all points of view.
THREAT WITH THE WEST?
Therefore, the only conceivable threat to our country from the West is the US disarming strike on Russia's strategic nuclear forces (SNF) with the help of non-nuclear precision weapons (WTO). The purpose of such a strike is obvious - to eliminate the only real threat to the United States today. Resources for this blow are needed relatively limited, the determination of the Americans, unlike the Europeans, seems to be not to occupy.
However, for the successful implementation of such a blow there is a very rigid framework, going beyond which makes it impossible or meaningless.
1. The strike should be non-nuclear. First, for environmental reasons. Even if Russia does not give an answer, several hundred nuclear explosions on its territory will still lead to the fact that radioactive clouds will scatter around the world, including the United States. Already because of this, the game will not be worth the candle. In addition, if we imagine that Russia as a result of a non-nuclear strike lost, say, 90% of its strategic nuclear forces, and the US strategic nuclear forces remained intact, then Russia may simply not risk applying the remaining 10%, since the response will be guaranteed to be destroyed. If the disarming strike is nuclear, then Russia will respond in any case. And even one nuclear explosion on its territory is totally unacceptable for the United States.
2. The strike should be one that completely destroys all Russian strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, it should be calculated in such a way that units of minutes pass between the first and last explosions at the positions of the SNF. No further exploration and a re-strike are possible, since the surviving Russian missiles will have time to go to the United States during this time, which, as was said above, is fundamentally unacceptable for the States. That is, if everything is not destroyed, nothing is destroyed.
3. Based on the previous one, the strike should be absolutely sudden. The fact of its application, the Russian military should know at the time of the explosion of the first American rocket.
Obviously, cruise missiles of sea and air basing are the main means for such an attack. The corresponding potential of the United States seems at first glance almost limitless.
More than 80% KR (BGM-109 Tomahawk of various modifications) falls on the US Navy, where their carriers are 7 ship types:
- Ohio SSGMs (4 units, capable of carrying cruise missiles) - 154 CR on each in special mines installed instead of mines for SLBMs;
- Virginia-type PLA (7 units, 30 will be built in total) - on each of 12 KR in special mines, even before 38, they can, along with Harpoon torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (PCR), be part of an ammunition designed for firing through torpedo tubes (TA);
- Seawolf type PLA (3 units) - on each of the 50 KR as part of the ammunition fired through the TA;
- PLA of Los-Angeles type (43 units, 2 - in reserve, gradually being withdrawn from the Navy) - on each of 12 KR in special mines (on 31 PLA) and up to 37 as part of ammunition fired through TA;
- Ticonderoga-type cruisers (22 units) - on each up to 122 KR in two vertical launch installations (WAD) Мк41;
- Destroyers of the Arleigh Burke type (59 units, will be built from 62 to 70) - up to 90 CR in 2 ATC Mk41 on the first 28 ships, up to 96 - on the next;
- destroyers of the Zumwalt type (2 or 3 will be built) - on each up to 80 CR in 2 UVP McNXNX.
The capabilities of the US Air Force are much more modest. The only carrier of the CD in them is the B-52 strategic bomber, capable of carrying up to AGN-20 and AGM-86 missiles up to 129. The number of B-52 in the Air Force theoretically reaches 90, but of these, about 20 are stored at the Davis-Montana airbase.
If we sum up all of the above to the maximum, then theoretically submarines, surface ships and US bombers can simultaneously raise more than 13 thousands of cruise missiles. Naturally, no SNF and no air defense will withstand such a strike. True, the real situation has nothing to do with this apocalyptic figure.
THEORY, NOT CONFIRMED BY PRACTICE
Firstly, on the submarines “guaranteed” are only those missiles that are located in special mines (for a total of 4 submarines and 38 submarines this is 1072 missiles). As for the ammunition fired through torpedo tubes, torpedoes and anti-ship missiles obviously make up its base, otherwise the boat will not be able to conduct a naval battle for which it is intended in the first place. This is acceptable against a country that does not have a navy, but Russia is not one of them yet. Actually, in this ammunition the number of missiles is at most several units, and sometimes they are not at all. The same can be said about cruisers and destroyers. Each UVP cell can contain either Tomahawk missile launcher, or Standard anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM), 4 Sea Sparrow missiles, or ASROC anti-submarine missile. A full load of Tomahawks is only possible in a war against a country that has neither fleetOr aviation. During the first Iraq war, there was a precedent for the launch of 122 Tomahawks by one cruiser, but precisely because Iraq could not reach the cruiser with its aircraft, and had no submarines at all.
Secondly, a significant part (from one-third to one-half) of submarines and ships is at each moment in inter-line or overhaul, and also at the transition to the bases. All of them, naturally, fall out of the overall combat potential.
Thirdly, in the USA a little less than 5 thousands of sea-based cruise missiles (SLCMs) were produced, of which up to 2 thousands were spent on trials and wars. Currently, the newest Tactical Tomahawk modification is the basis of the stock of offshore ships of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2,2’s are manufactured in thousands. This modification cannot be launched through torpedo tubes, respectively, on the submarines in total they simply cannot be more than the above-mentioned 1072 units. The total number of SLCMs available in the US Navy is now, apparently, 2,5-2,8 thousand. As for air-based cruise missiles (ALCM), there are no more than 1,6 thousand of them in the Air Force (there were a total of about 2,1 thousand manufactured). Thus, in reality, the United States does not have not only the 13 of thousands, but even the 5 of thousands of cruise missiles. And of these, it is hardly possible to deploy quickly at the same time more than half. That, however, is also quite a lot.
However, there is another limitation, determined by the aforementioned need for a complete surprise strike. In order for this surprise to be achieved, Russian intelligence should not notice anything unusual. If the cruisers and destroyers of the US Navy suddenly begin to stick to the shores of Russia (now they appear extremely rarely near our shores), and all or most of the B-52s rise into the air and fly towards Russia, there simply cannot be any talk of surprise. Accordingly, the whole concept of "safely" collapses. Because of this, only a few units of cruisers, destroyers and bombers can be involved in the strike, moreover, those who are at the time of the strike as far as possible from Russian territory. Here we must also note the fact that if the surface ships fit, and the B-52s fly too close to our borders, even if there are few of them, the RF Armed Forces will begin to track them. And inevitably they will fix a massive launch of the CD, which will immediately eliminate the suddenness and guarantee a retaliatory strike, i.e. global nuclear catastrophe.
Therefore, the main role in the disarming strike will have to be played by American submarines. Their mission is facilitated by the fact that even during the heyday of their combat power, the Soviet Navy solved the tasks of the PLO, to put it mildly, with great difficulty. Now the Russian Navy, apparently, can carry out PLO relatively effectively except in close proximity to its bases. In the rest of our territorial waters and, moreover, outside of their borders, the SSGN and SSNPs will be able to operate more or less freely.
Destroying the naval component of our strategic nuclear forces enemy will be quite simple. One B-52 from the Arctic and from the region of the Aleutian Islands outside our airspace will be “shipped” by 3-5 CR of each of the Russian RPLSN, which, alas, will be quite enough. Instead of the B-52, a cruiser or a destroyer can be used, and in this case even the standard loading with “Tomahawks” will suffice (it is usually from 8 to 16 KR on one ship), and in the Pacific Ocean it can be one of PLA.
True, there is one very important caveat. It is about the destruction of the RPLN, stationed at the berths in their bases. But at least 2 Russian missile submarines are always on duty in the ocean, carrying on-board 16 SLBMs with 3-4 warheads on each. A volley of one such boat across the USA is enough - and the entire American game with a disarming strike turns into a complete collapse and catastrophe. Accordingly, American submarines must track our every RPFNS from the moment it leaves the base and before returning home. It is extremely difficult to say how realistic this is. If this task is not solved, then the whole concept of a disarming strike loses its meaning and cannot be implemented.
The least problem with a disarming strike is delivered to the enemy by the aviation component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. According to Engels (Saratov region), you can shoot "Tomahawks" from anywhere in the Black Sea, in the Ukrainian (Amur region) - from the Pacific Ocean off the eastern shores of Japan. In this case, it will suffice to spend all on 1 KR on a bomber, since these are large and, at the same time, completely unprotected targets. Moreover, even if a few Russian planes survive in some way after a strike, this will not be a problem for the United States. After all, they will be knowingly ready for a retaliatory strike and simply will not allow our bombers to reach the line of launching their missiles on American territory.
Of course, the Strategic Missile Forces represent the most problems for the enemy. Not so much because of the number, but because of the dispersion of the gigantic Russian territory, the size of which is, in fact, the best means of air defense.
In Russian sources, there are values of the maximum range of the “Tactical Tomahawk”: 2400 or even 2900 km. Where these numbers come from is not very clear. American sources give for this rocket the standard range of 1600 km and the maximum - 1800 km. Why such radical discrepancies have appeared is not clear, therefore we will be guided by the value of the maximum range of the US SLCM 1800 km. Probably, it can be increased, but only by reducing the power of the warhead. In the case of a disarming strike, a reduction in the power of warheads is unacceptable, since it is necessary to pierce the walls of the Topol 's hangars or, even worse, the lids of the mines of various Russian ICBMs. And not the fact that this can be done even with a standard warhead.
Of course, 1800 km is also a very long range. The advantages of "Tomahawk" are relatively low price, very high accuracy and very low visibility (due to the small ESR and altitude). But there is a missile and disadvantages - the complete absence of defensive capabilities (REP, maneuver) and subsonic flight speed (about 900 km / h). Accordingly, the flight to the maximum range takes about 2 hours. During this time, both the air defense forces and the fighters can knock down the Tomahawk — the problem is only in detection.
Because of this, the Russian air defense system becomes the second factor of uncertainty for the adversary (after the RPLSN on duty). Theoretically, the United States could try to suppress it - by striking at positions of air defense systems and airfields of fighter aviation by the same “Tomahawks” and simply by depleting the ammunition of the air defense system, which is relatively limited. However, in fact, this option is not feasible. If you hit both the SNF and the air defense system simultaneously, then, firstly, the Tomahawks are not enough, and secondly, it is pointless, because if the SNFs are destroyed, then what harm from air defense? If you first destroy the air defense system, then the surprise of a strike on the SNF, which, as was repeatedly noted above, is one of the decisive factors for a disarming strike, is lost. As a result, the enemy can only hope that, thanks to the huge "holes" in our current air defense system, all the "Tomahawks" will reach the goal unnoticed. Alas, it is impossible to completely exclude this, however, the risk for Americans is exceptionally great. It is enough to detect and identify at least one Tomahawk in flight - and, again, suddenness is canceled and a global catastrophe occurs.
If you still imagine that the US decided to carry out a disarming attack, of course, they will use several cruise missiles (3-5 units) for each ICBM, only in this case it will be possible to more or less reliably guarantee the defeat of the target.
Our rocket divisions in Kozelsk (Kaluga region) and in Vypolzovo (Tver region) will have the worst. They are located too close to the western border and are not covered by any air defense. Practically the same can be said about the division in the Teikovo region (Ivanovo region), which was the first to receive the last year 6 PGRK RS-24. Three Ticonderoga-type cruisers, provided they are fully loaded with Tomahawks (122 each), will be enough to completely destroy these three divisions. In this case, ships can shoot from the safe for themselves the North and Norwegian Seas.
In the Yoshkar-Ola and Nizhny Tagil divisions, submarines can be shot from the Barents Sea, and in the Yoshkar-Ola, moreover, from the Black Sea. For the destruction of each division will need approximately 12 boats, (12 KR in the mines, and possibly 4-8 in the torpedo tubes on each).
The Tatishchevskaya (Saratov region) and Dombarovskaya (Orenburg region) divisions will create much more problems, the first of which is the largest in the Strategic Missile Forces - the 93 ICBM. To destroy them, the Americans will have no options to drive into the Black Sea all 4 SSGNs like Ohio. And one of these SSGNs will have to shoot at the Dombarovsk division, being near the Russian coast.
In this case, the United States has another, already the third (after the RPLSN on duty and air defense) uncertainty factor. These are mobile Topol, Topol-M and Yars ICBMs. If they left the hangars and left "in the field", cruise missiles, including the Tactical Tomahawk, which can be retargeted in flight, will be useless, even if using the US satellite group will be able to track the routes of the PGRK. At the same time, of the 7 listed divisions, the 3 is fully and alone partially equipped with mobile ICBMs.
Theoretically, the US could destroy Russian mobile missile systems with the help of special forces. US special operations forces are the largest in the world. Through our huge and almost completely transparent sea and land borders, it is quite realistic to drop several groups of “green berets” into Russia. A mobile ICBM outside the hangar is quite vulnerable to RPGs and heavy sniper rifles. But then there is the problem of synchronization of special forces with a missile strike. If “Topol” and “Yarsy” left their bases in advance, before striking, then the saboteurs, even if they find it, cannot attack, because a premature attack, again, destroys surprise. And run through the fields and forests (and, remaining undetected) for the left rocket they probably will not work either. The training of the US special forces is excellent, but still not so much.
There is one more subtle point. In the US Navy Command (formerly Atlantic Fleet), the 2 PLARK and 25 PLA, in the Pacific, 2 and 28. As mentioned above, some of them are obviously under repair. At the same time, in order to implement this scenario in the Pacific, only the 2-3 PLA will have to be used to monitor the Russian RPFMN going on combat duty. But in the Atlantic we need all the 4 SSGNs and around the 30 PLA. Accordingly, Americans will have to transfer 2 PLARK and at least 6-7 PLA from the Pacific to the Atlantic, since there will simply not be enough boats of one ATF. To drag as many submarines through the Panama Canal will not work, because this will be known to the whole world and will cause, to put it mildly, surprise. We'll have to move them submerged, either through the Bering Strait or through the Drake Strait. Both will take a lot of time, and in the first case there is a chance (albeit a small one) that they will notice what is happening in Russia. Of course, this problem is solved, but it additionally complicates life for Americans.
However, the most important problem in delivering a disarming strike are 4 Siberian missile divisions - Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Uzhur (Krasnoyarsk Territory) and Irkutsk. Not one of them will get SLCM from anywhere. The ALCM will not be saved either, since for their launch along the indicated divisions B-52 must penetrate deep into our airspace, and no less than 20 units will be needed. No matter how leaky our air defense would be, these giant low-speed vehicles will be discovered.
The USA, however, still has a “joker” - a strategic stealth bomber B-2. There are no special chances to find it in our air defense. In the USAF there are 20 of such machines, each can carry high-precision ammunition for 8 (GBU-27, AGM-154 JSOW, AGM-137 TSSAM, AGM-158 JASSM). In principle, this is enough to destroy all 4 Siberian divisions (5 B-2 for each). True, provided that almost every missile hits the target and one missile is enough to destroy one ICBM. Such accuracy in real combat conditions is hardly achievable. That is, such an operation is literally "walking on the razor's edge."
The second “joker” for the United States is a “prompt global strike” (prompt global strike) using ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with non-nuclear warheads. With reference to the problem under discussion, the ICBMs are, of course, useless, since their launch and flight from the United States will be monitored by the Russian missile warning system and perceived as a nuclear strike (regardless of the number of missiles launched). But launching an Ohio-type SSBN (the US has their 14, 24 missiles on each) the Trident II SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads in Siberian divisions from the Norwegian Sea or from the Indian Ocean. However, this option does not allow to solve the problem of mobile Topol and, moreover, Russian RPLSN on combat duty.
Thus, at the moment, a disarming non-nuclear strike on our strategic nuclear forces is possible, but theoretically. It is accompanied by so many risks and uncertainties that they could be neglected in Washington only if relations with Russia reached almost the state of war. Needless to say, there is nothing close now, so there will be no blow. Although the idea of Americans as paranoid maniacs who only dream of destroying Russia is very common in Russia, the reality is far from that idea. Americans, at a minimum, are extremely pragmatic, they will not go for actions that carry the threat of catastrophe for their own country.
If we talk about perspective, then there are aspects of military and political. Of course, they are strongly linked to each other.
There will be no significant changes in the US missile potential. Submarines of the type Virginia, destroyers of the type Arleigh Burke and Zumwalt will be built, boats of the type Los Angeles and B-52 will be decommissioned. But this will have no effect on the real potential for a disarming strike, because the problem of the United States is not in the lack of cruise missiles, but in their insufficient range. It is very doubtful that it can be increased without reducing the power of the warhead and pointing accuracy.
Hypersonic battle platforms seem to be promising precision weapons, but their development in the United States is still at an early stage. In addition, it should be noted that this weapon does not differ by its stealth, and speed may not be a panacea - even the first C-300 modifications were already designed to combat such goals, although they simply did not exist at that time.
Among the new US military developments, the most formidable weapon of a disarming strike could be called the X-47V carrier-based stealth attack UAV, the creation of which is very active. It will have subsonic speed, like the Tomahawk, but the maximum range is almost 4 thousand kilometers. Of course, the combat range drone is half this value, but for the sake of the "higher goal" he can be sent one way as a "kamikaze". In addition, he will be able, apparently, to find PGRKs that have left "in the field." The main disadvantage of the X-47B, apart from low speed, is that it can only launch from aircraft carriers, which automatically attract increased intelligence attention. Therefore, it will not be easy to carry out a massive takeoff of dozens of drones unnoticed. In addition, these UAVs are not much smaller than a conventional aircraft in size, respectively, there will be a rather limited number of them on an aircraft carrier (hardly more than 50). At the same time, the appearance of at least two aircraft carriers in relative proximity to our shores will cause extreme alertness in Russia. Accordingly, in this variant, it will be practically impossible to ensure surprise and mass character.
Of course, you can allow the option when the 80-90% of the Russian strategic nuclear forces are destroyed in a disarming strike, and the rest is finished with missile defense. True, while this possibility is not visible. The missile defense system based on the GBI antimissiles, which is now deployed in Alaska and in California, is not able to fend off even 5% of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in terms of quantity or, most importantly, in terms of qualitative parameters. EuroPRO, about which there are so many conversations, does not have any relation to our strategic nuclear forces (not to mention the fact that it simply does not exist). The most promising is naval missile defense, deployed on the same cruisers like Ticonderoga and destroyers like Arleigh Burke. As was mentioned above, the Standard-level missile defense can be placed in the MCC41, whose individual modifications are capable of intercepting OTRs and even MRSDs and low-orbit satellites. True, the matter has not yet reached the interception of ICBMs and it is not known whether it will come up (for this purpose, the SPS should be raised very significantly). In addition, for the effective implementation of such interception, American ships must go to high latitudes, closer to the North Pole. The ice cover of the Arctic is melting fast enough, but still there is no guarantee that it will disappear and ice-free shipping will be possible anywhere in the Arctic Ocean.
Of course, it cannot be excluded that combat lasers will be created in the USA, which can be used for missile defense, but this cannot be guaranteed either, since the task is very complex.
USA NEEDS A NEW ALLY
But first and foremost, the feasibility of the concept of a disarming strike depends on us. In 2000-2009 The Russian leadership seemed to do everything to make this strike real. If by the beginning of 2000 there were 756 MBR with 3540 warheads in our Strategic Missile Forces, then by the middle of 2009 there were 367 MBR with 1248 warheads. In addition, under the START-1 agreement, signed by the USSR Gorbachev, our mobile ICBMs were “tied” to their bases, which practically meaningless their mobility and sharply reduced their combat stability. In parallel, the air defense system was falling apart. At the same time, relations with the United States rapidly deteriorated, and, frankly, not only the American side bore responsibility for this. With all these tendencies preserved over the years through 5-6, a disarming strike on us for Washington became quite real from a military point of view and expedient from a political one.
However, in the past two years there has been a turn of unfavorable trends. So, by the end of 2010 in the Strategic Missile Forces there were already 375 ICBMs with 1259 warheads. The increase over one and a half years is extremely insignificant, but this is an increase, not a continuation of a landslide. There were successes in the testing of the new Bulava naval strategic missile. The START-3 agreement does not provide for restrictions on the size of the area of the PGRK deployment, which returns meaning to the existence of these complexes. It’s too early to talk about a turn in the field of air defense, but if plans for its rearmament before 2020 are realized at least by half, then the situation will change for the better.
The political situation has become much more favorable. Moscow and Washington have almost stopped senseless bickering on strange occasions, or at least reduced its heat. The START-3 agreement was an unprecedented concession to us from the United States. First, the Americans will have to reduce their strategic nuclear forces (although not very much), and we can even increase them. Secondly, the inspections at the place of production of missiles, actually carried out only by US representatives at the Votkinsk plant, disappeared. Thirdly, restrictions on the structure of SNF within general restrictions have been removed. Fourth, the restriction on the size of the position area of mobile ICBMs has been removed. All this is in our favor. The somewhat strange "declarative" system of counting the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, in fact, does not give advantages to any of the parties, in general, the problem of the return potential seems to be clearly far-fetched, since it is not very practical. Likewise, the system of defining bombers for one charge does not give anyone any noticeable advantages. In other words, Russia, being a much weaker side, did not yield to anything and achieved very significant concessions from the United States. After that, the statements of some domestic experts about some disadvantageous START-3 for us and about some kind of "disarmament" of Russia are simply amazing. If we are worried about something about this treaty, then perhaps it is because of this unique pliability of Washington: is there some kind of trick here?
In fact, the trick is probably not. By American standards, Barack Obama, without exaggeration, can be called a pacifist. But the United States seriously wants to get rid of nuclear weapons, for them it is morally obsolete and now only hinders. If it disappeared, then due to its geographical location and precision weapons the United States would be invulnerable.
The US military, judging by the content of the US National Military Strategy published at the beginning of this year, realized that they could not fight without allies, and NATO countries in this capacity are becoming increasingly useless. Therefore, the Americans would very much like to see Russia as their ally, inviting her to "play a more active role in ensuring security and stability in Asia." Here it is necessary to specifically emphasize that it is Asia that is seen by the USA as the new center of the world, which is absolutely correct.
In the US, there is clearly a tendency towards a fall in the military capabilities of the armed forces. With a delay of about 20 years in America, the same process begins as in Europe. But if the Old World is deliberately disarmed (due to the obvious absence of external threats and the pacifization of mass consciousness), in the States this process will be forced. Here two processes superimposed on each other - the exhaustion of forces due to the constant wars being waged almost without interruption since the spring of 1999, and a serious economic crisis, including a huge budget deficit. As a result, a significant reduction in military spending becomes inevitable. And it comes at the very moment when the US Armed Forces need a massive rearmament. First of all - in aviation. The average age of American combat aircraft was substantially over 20 years. At the same time, the program for creating the F-35 fighter, which was supposed to replace almost all the fighters of the Air Force and Naval Forces, faces significant technical problems and, most importantly, its cost is growing rapidly. Accordingly, the F-35 will go into service later than planned, and the volume of purchases of these fighters is likely to be reduced. This will inevitably lead to a decrease in the number of combat aircraft in the US Air Force, which will significantly reduce their combat capability. After all, as we well know, without achieving full air superiority, the United States does not lead wars.
Land forces are already suffering from cuts in promising programs - the most important program of the Future Combat System has been canceled. Marines will not receive a new amphibious combat vehicle. As for the Navy, the program for building destroyers of the Zumwalt type has been reduced from 32 to 2 or 3, apparently there will be no new cruisers to replace Ticonderoga, the Littoral Combat Ship coastal shipbuilding program has huge problems. The Pentagon objectively cannot afford all of its former “luxury,” which means its capabilities for global projection of power will diminish (in particular, this will also affect the topic of a disarming non-nuclear strike discussed in this article), and the development of promising weapons, including . Understanding this, the US military and begin to think about new allies. And Russia in this context is very attractive to Americans. First of all, the fact that our army, despite all the numerous problems, has a great experience of a ground-based contact war and psychological readiness for such a war. That is, it has exactly the potential that the US allies in NATO do not have.
If we return to the topic of parrying the threat of a disarming strike, then Russia in the field of the SNF must focus on increasing the number of carriers and reducing the number of warheads on each. The more carriers we have, the more the potential adversary will require means of destruction. In addition, in accordance with START-3, we can have no more than 700 carriers and no more than 1550 warheads. Therefore, the plans of creating a heavy multiply-charged ICBM recently announced by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation do not cause anything but confusion. It is very difficult to understand the motives that guide the authors of this idea, especially given the size of the cash infusions required for such a project.
With regard to the development of the Strategic Missile Forces, it seems that it is necessary to keep a balance of numbers between mobile and mine ICBMs. Mine rocket has a number of advantages over mobile. It is cheaper (if there is already a ready mine), saboteurs have no chance to get there, and it’s more difficult to hit the mine cover and pierce a cruise missile or bomb with a conventional charge than to hit the hangar of a mobile ICBM. Apparently, radio-technical and anti-aircraft missile regiments should be included in the composition of each missile division. It may even make sense for each ICBM (both mobile and mine) to give the “personal” air defense missile system or air defense missile system of a short range - “Thor” or “Armor”. Of course, it is necessary to preserve all the missile divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces and the RPFL, since not only the number of carriers is important, but also their geographic spread.
I would like to specifically emphasize that it is the strengthening of the SNF and air defense that should become the absolute priority of military construction in the next 10-15 years. In particular, the declared program of creating the aerospace defense system should in no case remain at the level of declarations or become only the missile defense / air defense system of Moscow. In the absence of full-fledged SNF and air defense, the defense capability of the country as a whole is not ensured.
ON THE THRESHOLD OF GLOBAL CHOICE
Finally, I would like to hope for the consolidation of changes in the political sphere, because it is they who can truly guarantee us against a disarming strike and any other forms of military influence. We emphasize that the aforementioned National Military Strategy of the United States with the invitation of Russia to the union is a purely military document, developed even not by the Pentagon, which is dominated by civilians, but by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Practice shows that the US military has always been much more realistic and adequate in assessing the situation than the American politicians. Probably the reason is that the military pays their lives for the mistakes of politicians. Politicians, especially Republicans, can continue to “contain” Russia, attributing to it non-existent “imperial plans” and turning it into an empty place from scratch. In this regard, it should be noted that we, apparently, need to get rid of the strange love of Republicans. It is easier to negotiate with them only if the United States and Russia continue to regard each other as enemies. If this situation changes, it will be easier to communicate with Democrats.
I would very much like realism from our politicians. If Washington can seriously suppress the “hegemonic instinct” characteristic until recently (this will greatly contribute to the inevitable reduction in military capabilities), we will have no reason to refuse to ally with him. Because there are currently no objective irreconcilable contradictions between Russia and the United States. But there is a completely objective threat from China. Moreover, for the United States in the foreseeable future, the defeat of the PRC threatens only with the loss of part of the sphere of influence. And for us - the loss of most of the territory and almost all natural resources.
It is necessary to understand that China will not be able to develop, and indeed survive, without the seizure of resources and territories. This is an objective reality, independent of the desires of the United States or Russia, as well as the fact that there are no other sources of territories and resources for it except Russia and Kazakhstan. Since the US still retains global ambitions, but can no longer realize them alone, an objective opportunity arises for the union of Washington and Moscow against Beijing. In this alliance, of course, it is very important for us not to become a blind ram, but this already depends only on us.
If this alliance does not take place now, then with the reduction of the US capabilities and the growth of China’s opportunities and ambitions (both are absolutely inevitable), Washington will push Beijing to expand into Russia, as this will help to neutralize it for a long time. These are the objective trends. They will not cease to be so, even if they are ignored. Therefore, they need to respond.
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