Of course, these requirements are fundamental to the government and military authorities of Russia in assessing the state and prospects of development of the US SNA and other nuclear powers, planning the construction of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the implementation of its treaty obligations by the Russian side. This will ensure the creation of conditions for maintaining a real balance and equal opportunities for Russia and the United States in the field of strategic offensive arms, the development of asymmetric and adequate measures to counter various threats.
At the same time, the START Treaty that entered into force, to the detriment of Russia's security, creates favorable opportunities for the continuation of US cooperation with Great Britain in the area of START and does not exclude such cooperation with France, which completed its entry into the military organization of NATO, including as a nuclear power. . At the same time, the military-political leadership of Great Britain and France is upgrading the existing ones and is preparing to adopt new types of strategic weapons, while not intending to join the treaty process to limit and reduce them.
Therefore, the American side has the opportunity to reduce its strategic offensive weapons to the level of 1550 warheads and lower, since the outfit of nuclear weapons to destroy targets of a potential enemy is updated annually by engaging the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. Russia has no nuclear allies and, naturally, it does not have such capabilities.
USA - UNITED KINGDOM
Let us turn to the content of Article XIII: “The Parties shall not transfer to the third parties strategic offensive arms falling within the scope of this Treaty. This provision does not apply to any existing at the time of the signing of this Treaty, the practice of cooperation, including obligations, in the field of START between one of the parties and a third state ".
It should be noted that when ratifying the START Treaty, the flaws in Section II of 7 of Section II of the Protocol to the Treaty were unnoticed: “Notification provided no later than five days after completion of the transfer of SLBMs to a third state or receiving SLBMs from a third state in accordance with the existing practice of cooperation”. It would be absurd that Russia will transfer its naval strategic missiles to some third state. Of course, we are talking about cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom on the transfer and reception of Trident II SLBMs in the interests of maintaining and developing British NSNFs, and at the expense of the security of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the composition, content and boundaries of cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in the field of strategic offensive arms are not defined in the Treaty. Why, for example, should these notifications be provided after the completion of the transfer of missiles, and not before? According to the provisions of the previous START Treaty, this cooperation should consist only in the reception and transfer of missiles, which was confirmed by a special agreed Statement of the Parties, which the Americans constantly violated. In response, the Soviet side even declared the possibility of withdrawing from this Treaty, which did not happen. At the same time, the government and military authorities of Russia are well aware that the cooperation of these states was not limited to the reception and transmission of Trident II SLBMs, which ensured a high level of combat readiness of the British strategic nuclear forces.
Currently, the military-political leadership of Great Britain, with the participation of the United States, implements the program provisions of the White Paper (“Assessment of the state and prospects for the development of the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain for the long term”). The document notes that "the British strategic nuclear forces are designed to deter the aggressor from harming British interests and to increase the effectiveness of the impact of the allied nuclear forces, which will strengthen the security of the country and its NATO allies." As is well known, the British SNF is represented by the 1 squadron of submarines, which includes four SSBNs of the Vanguard type, equipped with Trident II SLBMs. Each SSBN has 16 launchers of SLBMs with a MIRVT IN, capable of carrying up to 8 warheads with a capacity of 0,1-0,15 Mt, having a range of 9000 km. In total, 464 nuclear warheads are in the combat force of the NSNF of Great Britain.
In peacetime, three of the four SSBNs are in the composition of the combatant group. One of them carries out combat patrols, and two are on combat duty at a basing station. The fourth SSBN is in overhaul or modernization. On the boats, leading combat patrols, really load 12 missiles, warheads put no more than 4 units on them. It is appropriate to recall that American-made Trident II SLBMs have high tactical and technical characteristics. In addition, this rocket passed flight design tests with 12 warheads. To improve the accuracy of the destruction of targets of a potential enemy, the Trident II SLBM provides for the use of a US satellite navigation system GPS.
Thus, a significant return potential for missiles and warheads is also seen, which is necessary to increase the combat capabilities of the British NSNF. As for the prospects for their construction, the White Paper stresses: “The government decided to participate in the US program to extend the life of Trident II missiles, which will keep these missiles in service with British nuclear forces until the beginning of the 2040s. Cooperation will continue with the United States in servicing these SLBMs on the American naval base Kings Bay. The US guarantees that any missile systems being developed to replace the Trident II will be compatible with the combat control system for launching new British SSBNs or can be upgraded. The decision on the replacement or modernization of warheads must be taken by the British Parliament. ”
USA - FRANCE
The results of the analysis of foreign and Russian information materials show that at the time of the signing of this Treaty, there is no practice of cooperation, including obligations, in the field of strategic offensive arms between the United States and France. At the same time, the START Treaty does not provide for the mutual exchange of such information between Russia and the United States, which is its serious shortcoming. Therefore, the above-mentioned fragment of Article XIII is of strategic importance in the interests of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation, and the Russian side is obliged to fix this in various military diplomatic documents and skillfully use it in monitoring the implementation of the START Treaty.
Meanwhile, the possibility of such cooperation has already become apparent. Thus, the President of France during the International Conference on Security in Munich in 2009, said: “The XXI century will be the century of cooperation and solidarity. That is why I am committed to friendship with the United States - the friendship of independent and respectful allies. France will keep the nuclear deterrent along with the British, with whom we want to work hand in hand. How can you imagine that the two only nuclear powers of Europe do not talk and do not work together? This will raise the question of the complementarity of the two nuclear powers. Therefore, France will remain a nuclear power. ”
It should be noted that foreign information documents show that the United States provided assistance to France on the design of ballistic missiles and to ensure the technical safety of nuclear materials. France, in turn, provided the United States with a variety of information on the results of nuclear tests. There is a “Memorandum on reaching an agreement” between the states on cooperation in the field of ensuring nuclear safety and protecting against unauthorized access. ” The document has a section “Monitoring the state of the nuclear arsenal”, which regulates cooperation in the field of theoretical, numerical and experimental modeling methods. The section “Nuclear technical safety and protection against unauthorized access” defines the procedure for the exchange of information on the design of nuclear weapons, research, development, testing, manufacturing, transportation and dismantling of components from nuclear and explosive materials. Within the framework of the Memorandum, there is also an agreement “Long-term participation of technical personnel in joint projects and mutual visits to facilities”.
It would seem that there are no restrictions for the deployment of trilateral cooperation between the United States and its nuclear allies. It is known from foreign sources that, bypassing the START Treaty, one of the states is an intermediary in the transfer of information between the other two. At the same time, there are tendencies to increase the volume of information exchange on nuclear issues. It is emphasized that after the signing of this Treaty, nuclear cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and France focused on analyzing and assessing the state of nuclear arsenals and developing measures to extend the life of nuclear weapons without conducting full-scale nuclear tests. It also provides information that France has made significant progress in the field of computer modeling of nuclear warhead testing processes to confirm their reliability and safety, ahead of other nuclear powers. According to experts from these countries, information from the field of nuclear armory programs of the three powers can be combined into a single database.
At present, France’s SNF includes naval and air components. At the same time, the NSNF is designed to solve the tasks of intimidation and defeat strategic targets of potential enemies. France has four Triomphant SSBNs with an M45 SLBM (for 6 warheads up to 150 CTs). Total 48 carriers (up to 16 SLBMs on each SSBN) and up to 288 nuclear warheads. The firing range of the missiles is about 6000 km, the accuracy of the delivery of the warhead to the target is about 500 m.
The air component is designed to solve operational-strategic and strategic tasks. It includes 60 airplanes Mirage 2000N Air Force and 12 Super Etendard Navy airplanes that are equipped with ASMR air-to-ground medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads of 300 kt each. Total - 72 carrier and 72 nuclear warheads. Modernization plans provide for four SSBNs: three submarines with the M45 SLBMs and one Terrible SSBN, armed with new missiles.
M51 with split heads. In general, the French nuclear forces 2015 will consist of 120 carriers and 360 nuclear warheads. The new Rafale aircraft, the new ASMP-A rocket and the new aircraft carrier will be introduced into the Navy's combat strength. Thus, the US-UK cooperation and, in the future, the US and France in the field of nuclear weapons, the START Treaty is not clearly regulated and needs urgent detailed analysis. and the adoption of relevant supplementary agreements within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (DCC).
In addition, the United Kingdom and France concluded in November 2010. historical military cooperation agreement. In particular, it envisages cooperation in maintaining nuclear arsenals and the creation by 2015 of two research centers. In one of them, research will be conducted, in the second - nuclear tests will be simulated, which is especially important in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. France and Great Britain are also planning a joint development of technologies for nuclear submarines, which will not concern power plants and nuclear weapons yet, but will cover all other components and types of equipment. It is also noted that both states will independently control their nuclear forces, although cooperation in the development of specific types of strategic offensive weapons is not ruled out.
As the general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, Yuri Semenovich Solomonov, said, "the last decision made by the governments of England and France, speaks of a rapprochement in the field of strategic weapons and the creation of joint industries."
FEATURES OF JOINT NUCLEAR PLANNING
Joint nuclear planning of the United States and its allies is becoming increasingly important due to the need for the American side to fulfill its treaty obligations to reduce carriers and warheads.
Nuclear planning for the United States and its allies includes:
- coordination of nuclear planning guidance documents;
- selection of targets;
- development of data for aiming;
- distribution of targets between carriers and warheads, taking into account their tactical and technical characteristics and reduction of the combat strength of the US SNA in connection with the fulfillment of contractual obligations;
- selection and coordination of the ballistic flight path of carriers through the territory of other states;
- the formation and accounting of the proposals of the commanders in the theater for the destruction of objects by tactical nuclear weapons;
- transfer and input of combat use data into control systems of nuclear weapons carriers;
- identification of options for the use of nuclear forces;
- evaluation of selected options for feasibility, organization of interaction, support and management;
- execution, coordination and approval of planning documents.
In the United States, the main operational plan is the OPAN 8044 document, which is developed by the Joint Strategic Command (USC) of the US Armed Forces. The same military control authority directs the development and coordination of operational documents of the Allies. The combat use of British strategic nuclear forces is provided in conjunction with the US SNA: they are included in the US nuclear operational planning system OPLAN 8044. The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the British Prime Minister, if necessary, it is coordinated with the US President. At the same time, the White Paper notes that the combat use of the British SNF is assumed to be independent of the United States.
According to the provisions of the French nuclear doctrine, the combat use of nuclear forces is carried out independently. If necessary, it will be consistent with the combat use of the US SNA and the UK strategic nuclear forces.
Thus, joint nuclear planning provides the American side with military-strategic superiority, since as the carriers and warheads are reduced, the targets of potential enemies planned for destruction will be reassigned to the allies' nuclear assets. It is quite realistic to create a unified system of command and control of troops and nuclear weapons and unified documents of command and control.
WHAT CAN RUSSIA DO?
The results of the analysis show that the START Treaty creates favorable conditions for cooperation between the United States and its nuclear allies. It is planned to contain 464 and 288 nuclear warheads, respectively, in the combat strengths of the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. According to the START Treaty, the level of warheads to which the Russian Federation and the United States must reach seven years after its entry into force will be 1550 units. It is easy to determine that the total nuclear potential of the United States and its allies is 2302 nuclear warheads, i.e. predicted superiority in strategic nuclear forces will be significant. At the same time, the non-strategic nuclear weapons of the United States, located on the territory of a number of NATO states, which is not to be withdrawn from Europe, have not been taken into account.
It is legitimate to ask: will the implementation of the above requirements of the Russian National Security Strategy and the Law on Ratification of the START Treaty be ensured after the entry into force of the START Treaty? What are the results of the simulation of nuclear deterrence options for the parties with different ratios of the number of carriers and nuclear warheads in the United States, taking into account their allies and Russia? Some leaders, officials and experts now believe that one should not strive for parity of missiles and warheads between the Russian Federation and the United States. But why then does the UK, France and China not count?
In this regard, Russian experts within the DCC should initiate the inclusion in the text of the START Treaty or its Protocol a draft statement regulating only the reception and transmission of Trident II SLBMs to equip the UK strategic nuclear forces and their return after the expiration dates old "START Treaty). In the Notification Supplement, Americans should provide the Russian side with information on separate storage sites for British and American SLBMs, special identification marks, the deadlines for submitting and returning missiles, the location of each of the missiles, the timing and methods for eliminating British missiles and other agreed information. Invite Americans to notify on launches of British SLBMs from the US Eastern Rocket Test Range, as well as provide telemetric information on their results. In addition, in the Annex on Inspection Activities, it is advisable to determine the procedure for the control by Russian inspectors of British SLBMs when they are stored at the US Navy. The most important task of the state and military government of Russia is to receive from the United States an official Statement that at the time of signing the new START Treaty, the American side did not have any cooperation with France in the field of START, as well as trilateral cooperation with the participation of the United Kingdom and France, since START does not provide for the functioning of such a "triangle". Further work on identifying, examining and analyzing possible violations of Article XIII through the United States - France and the projected consequences for the national security of our state to highlight in the key activities of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Ministry and the relevant defense industry structures.
In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall the need for nuclear deterrence of the PRC. Beijing is intensively developing its nuclear forces, paying particular attention to mobile strategic missile systems, and most of the critical and strategic facilities in eastern Russia are within the reach of Chinese missiles. At the same time, the system of regional nuclear deterrence needs to be clarified, since Soviet (Russian) medium-range missiles have been destroyed according to the “zero” version of the INF Treaty.