Cruiser "L"

110
Cruiser "L"


On one of the weekdays of April 1958, the port tugs deployed a huge hull of a metal cruiser written off with their noses toward the Sea Canal and slowly took it to the last pier - to the Kronstadt ship graveyard. The bright spring sun gently warmed the sides, reflected in numerous portholes, the remnants of the dismantled superstructures cast fancy shadows on the deck, where from under the torn-off ball paint, in some places dimly reflected the armor of the Votan brand. The combat service of one of the most unusual ships of the Soviet Navy is over.

At the beginning of the 30-s, most of the leading maritime powers entered the so-called "cruising race" - the construction of well-armored cruisers that are not subject to the restrictions of the "Washington agreements". 16 March 1935, Adolf Hitler announced the denunciation of the peace treaty signed by defeated Germany after the end of the First World War, and set about to rush the Third Reich. The Kriegsmarine leadership was clearly aware that it would not be possible to catch up with the main potential enemy at sea — Britain in terms of the number and strength of combat surface ships. Therefore, instead of building monstrously expensive and resource-consuming dreadnoughts, the Germans developed the concept of building heavy cruisers and “pocket battleships” capable of long hikes and actions as single raiders. Officially, Germany was not bound by the framework of the “Washington Treaty” in the tonnage of ships and artillery caliber, however, in order not to cause irritation of the leading Western states, the Führer and head of the Kriegsmarine Grossadmiral Erich Roeder officially announced plans to build 5 cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with a displacement of 92.9% tons with guns of the main caliber in 10 mm. The development of this type of ships was begun in the fall of 000, however, when implementing the plan, it became clear that it was not possible to meet the stated framework. The installation of lighter “hundred millimeters” did not give a big reduction in tonnage, however, it significantly reduced the armor penetration parameters, there were also periodic questions about the choice of the type and methods of mounting the main power plant, there were unresolved many other minor, but no less significant, technical problems. Having finally spat on various agreements and restrictions, the Reich leadership decided to build Solomon's ships with a displacement of thousands of tons in 150-1934, to return to the classic caliber of 15 mm with an arrangement of two guns in 20 gun turrets, the minimum thickness of armor of the main belt 203 mm. The lead ship of this project (symbol “cruiser H”) was laid in July 4 at the Bloom and Foss shipyard in Hamburg, in August the Deutsche Werke in Kiel proceeded to build a second ship from the same series (cruiser G), the third order (cruiser J) was taken over by the company Germany, belonging to the Krupp family. The fourth (K) and fifth (L) cruisers began to assemble at the Deshimag AG Wesser in Bremen respectively in December 80 and in August 1935 of the year.

With the advent of Hitler to power, close cooperation in the economic and military sphere, which was between the young Soviet state and the Weimar Republic, began to decline. In order to defuse the tension between the two powers, the USSR began to look for ways of rapprochement with Germany, by concluding a number of trade and economic contracts. As a result of the efforts made, 9 on April 1935 was signed an "Agreement between the USSR Government and the German Government on additional orders of the USSR in Germany and the financing of these orders by Germany." In accordance with it, the Soviet side received the right to place orders for German industrialists for 200 million marks under the guarantee of the Reich government. These orders were supposed to be equipment for factories, machinery, apparatus, products of the electrical industry, equipment of the petroleum and chemical industry, vehicles, equipment for laboratories, etc. This included technical assistance. In fact, under this loan, the USSR received from Germany factory equipment and other goods for 151,2 million marks. The supply of Soviet goods in the loan coverage was to begin at the end of 1940, and end in 1943.

19 August 1939, a few days before Joachim von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow to sign the famous “Nonaggression Pact”, the Soviet government received a principal agreement of the German side to allocate another loan worth about 200 million marks, including , the possibility of purchasing the most modern weapons in Germany. At the end of September, a representative delegation from 48, including not only diplomats, but also many leading experts in the field of tank building, aircraft building and other industries, arrived in Berlin to familiarize themselves with the latest models of German military equipment. The delegation was headed by the People's Commissar I.F. Tevosyan Following Stalin’s very reasonable decision that “a ship bought from an alleged enemy is two: one more from us and one less from the enemy,” special attention was paid to attempts to acquire large warships. Many options were considered, but the German side reluctantly made concessions and, after lengthy negotiations, Germany sacrificed only one ship - the heavy cruiser Lutzow being built at the Bremen shipyard. As a result, the Soviet Union received, albeit in 50% readiness, but a completely modern combat unit. And on February 11 of 1940, the signing of the purchase agreement for Luttsova, which received the name “Project 53” from the Soviet side, took place for 104 million marks. On April 15, “purchase” accompanied by two sea tugs slowly pushed off the extension wall of Deshimag and on May 31 was moored in Leningrad at the pier of the Baltic Plant No. XXUMX. Together with the cruiser, a team of German engineers and technicians arrived, numbering about 189 people led by Rear Admiral Otto Feige.

According to the German-Soviet plans, the final launch of the cruiser was scheduled for 1942 year, however, the planned schedules of work suddenly began to be disrupted due to the disruption of supplies of equipment and materials by the German side, as well as the facts of direct non-performance of their duties and the deliberate red tape of German technical specialists. In Soviet and Russian historiography it was repeatedly stated that the Germans deliberately went on a dishonest game. The war with Soviet Russia was practically solved, and Germany was clearly not going to help the future enemy to arm. Numerous witnesses and eyewitnesses point to intentional sabotage by the Germans. The deputy chief of the Baltiysky Zavod plant, B.P. Favorov, in his book of memoirs, “On the stocks under fire,” wrote the following: “So, gradually, day after day, the work on the ship was delayed, the planned deadlines were disrupted. Such tactics of representatives of German firms, naturally, led us to the idea that all this is being done with a certain intent, in order to delay as much as possible the completion and commissioning of the cruiser. At the same time, the calculation was this: without the Germans, we ourselves, they say, cannot cope with the completion of Luttsov. He is echoed by former petty officer S.Ya Prikot, who served as a boiler driver until July 1941 on the ship: “The Germans failed to provide a number of important details. For example, the joints on the pipelines are corrugated. And the steam pressure there was 52 kg. It was impossible to manufacture such joints in a short time at our plants. And do not give steam! So, the ship without a turn. One pump to power the boilers was not delivered, the pump was from the old cruiser, we discovered this, and the pump was sent back to Germany. New did not deliver. So they did it intentionally. ” Documentary evidence of the German side suggests otherwise. For example, the German Foreign Ministry official Karl Julius Schnure, who oversaw Soviet-German economic relations, in a memorandum prepared for his superiors from 15 in May 1941, reported the following: “Construction of the cruiser“ L ”in Leningrad continues as planned, German supplies arrive according to the schedule ”(The bodies of state security of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.) T.1. On the eve of. Book 2. "January 1 - June 21 1941 g." The Germans rightly explained the occasional supply disruptions for objective reasons: the continuing war with England, which caused difficulties with the materials, the flow of which was urgently redirected to the needs of the front, and the shortage of skilled labor because of the massive recruitment of industrial workers to the army.

Nevertheless, the work on putting the ship into service continued. In the bow and stern towers, 203 mm guns were installed in the regular places, 20 and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns arrived from Germany, and the necessary power equipment was gradually commissioned. Despite the massive departure of German specialists and the lack of necessary details, the workers of the plant and the team, led by the captain of the 2 rank A.G. Vonifatyev, made every effort to bring the cruiser in combat readiness. The 22 1941 cruiser was in 70% readiness, by which time the first level of the superstructure, the bow and stern lower towers, the base of the navigating bridge, the tube and the lower part of the mainmast, rose above the hull. Trials were scheduled for August. Petropavlovsk was staffed by 100% officers and 60-70% by foremen and sailors, the total crew size was about 1000 people.

On the night of 21 on 22 on June, the ship’s crew was alerted: it was announced that it was necessary to take and place a man from the sunken destroyer Gnevny on the 50 cruiser. Exhausted people began to descend from the arriving trucks, many half-divisions, some could not walk themselves, and comrades led them by the arms. To the questions of the alarmed sailors, about what happened, one of the new arrivals breathed a short breath: "War ..".

From the first days the Baltic Fleet was actively involved in the fight against the invaders. In Leningrad, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova, 5 July 1941 was organized by the Maritime Defense Headquarters of Leningrad and the Ozerny District, and Rear Admiral F. I. Chelpanov was appointed commander. Vigorous measures were taken to equip additional positions of coastal batteries, to accelerate the commissioning of warships who were under repair, to form marines. Two companies of "Petropavlovsk" joined the ranks of the marines. Starshina S.Ya.Prikot recalled this in the following way: “So, the cruiser decided to suspend. To prepare the main caliber for shooting, specialists of the electromechanical part - to the front. And right there in the yard they read: "... List of the battalion of the Petropavlovsk cruiser. The battalion commander is lieutenant commander Socheikin. Three steps out of order! First company: company commander senior engineer-lieutenant Schaefer. Three steps out of order! First platoon. Platoon commander Lieutenant Ershov! ... "Literally, the order was read to us, and so everyone went out. "The first branch, Pomkomvvod - foreman Prikot!" Came out, got up. My sailors, subordinates also read. Twelve people under my command. Everyone knew each other, and therefore kept together. From the next day we went to the factory, preserved the cruiser, poured everything with oil, attached tags. And in the evening - with training rifles to the Kirov Palace, to where they went to the dances - for ground training. It lasted until July, about twenty days. And after that issued weapon: on the 12 man of the 2 branch of the machine guns, the rest all, except the squad commander, received SVT rifles plus grenades. As a squad leader, I have PPD, as in Finnish. ” Of course, sending highly skilled specialists, whose training the fleet spent more than one year, privates to the infantry - the top of wastefulness, but the Soviet command had no choice: the enemy rushed to Leningrad. Only the gunners and a few sailors from various ship services needed to maintain the life support of the vessel remained on the cruiser. The shipboard power plant was hastily mounted, the completion of the projectile feed mechanisms and other necessary work for successful artillery fire continued. 15 August 1941 of the cruiser, named Petropavlovsk, was raised by the RKKF naval flag and, in accordance with its condition, the vessel was included in the detachment of ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet together with the destroyers Experimental, Strict and Stroy.


Fig. The destroyer "Experienced" firing at the enemy


The city’s defense headquarters decided to transfer Petropavlovsk to a shooting position in the area of ​​Coal Harbor. Since the cruiser did not have high superstructures, it was able to disguise it relatively well: the hull of the vessel was “lost” among various coastal installations. The ship was brought to the pier and connected to the onshore power station, because by the beginning of the active phase of the fighting for the city, to the limit, the reduced crew of the vessel managed to fully put into operation only one diesel generator station.

When the Germans approached Leningrad in early September, work was found for the 203 mm cruiser guns. Artillery observers were sent ashore in advance, and on September 7 they received their first target designation on the cruiser: in front of the 21st NKVD division there was a large concentration of German troops and equipment. The guns of Petropavlovsk opened fire for the first time, sending 122 kilogram shells to the enemy. The Germans swept over and began to retreat in panic. New goal: in the vicinity of the station Uritsk unloading the composition with the troops. The Kruppen guns of the cruiser barked again. Within a few minutes, the composition was destroyed. Probably, the soldiers of the 36th motorized division of the Wehrmacht would have been quite surprised to learn that the former German cruiser “Lutz” from German guns was doing it with German shells. In just the first week of fighting, the cruiser fired 676 shells, causing significant damage to the troops of the 18th German Army, in particular, Petropavlovsk very effectively fought a counter-battery fight, several attempts of the German troops to break through the defense in the vicinity of the railway to Leningrad and the shortest ways to enter the city. As Admiral recalled in his book, “Towards Victory,” fleet N.G. Kuznetsov: “The unfinished cruiser Petropavlovsk annoyed the Nazis with their artillery fire.” On September 11, an accident occurred on the ship: during live firing, on a 22-shot shell explosion in the barrel channel, the barrel of the left gun of tower No. 1 was torn apart. When examining the scene of the incident, a defect was discovered: the shell on the barrel carefully sealed and painted over by the Germans. Intentional sabotage or factory marriage? The exact answer is unlikely to ever be received. On September 10, the army of the Army Group “Sever” came ashore in the Gulf of Finland, which enabled them to more carefully adjust the fire of their long-range artillery, and to shoot through the field guns through the main waterway between Kronstadt and Leningrad - the Sea Canal. Enraged by the successful actions of the sailors of Petropavlovsk, the Germans decided to destroy the cruiser at all costs. A series of air raids followed, which were successfully repelled by anti-aircraft gunners of the ship. However, from the dropped bombs, which, although they did not cause the "ex-Luttsov" any harm, the port buildings covering him from enemy eyes caught fire, and the coastal power substation was disabled. The position of the lost course and now in direct visibility of the enemy cruiser became threatening. The commander of the ship, captain of the 3rd rank A.K. Pavlovsky, urgently called for tugboats, and so far the cruiser continued to fire all night.

September 17 heavy 210 mm howitzer 768-th motorized division of the Wehrmacht attacked the first projectiles on a fixed ship. The Petropavlovsk Komendory tried to answer, but the Germans saw the target perfectly and fired very accurately. Practically one of the first projectiles, the room of generators No. 3 was put out of operation - the last remaining source of energy and the vessel was completely de-energized. The cruiser turned into a defenseless target, which began to mercilessly beat the enemy artillery. During the day, Petropavlovsk received more than 50 hits from projectiles of various calibers, mostly 210 mm, which is quite enough to sink almost any vessel. There was a fire on the cruiser, which could not be extinguished due to numerous damages in the fire lines. Outboard water began to flow through the holes. The team hastily left the sinking ship, after evacuating all the wounded. September 19, taking a huge mass of water, a warship sat on the ground, heavily leaning overboard on the mooring wall. Crew lost 10 people killed and 30 wounded. However, the cruiser did not give up. At night, observing all precautionary measures, the remaining crew members climbed aboard, together with the arrived specialists of the ship repair plant No. 189. Concealedly, they carried out the dismantling of anti-aircraft weapons, which were essential for equipping the vessels of the Ladoga military flotilla.

The difficult situation at the front forced the Soviet command to further reduce the crew, from the sailors of Petropavlovsk one more company of marines was formed, hastily sent to the front, to the landing party at Peterhof ..

The city’s defense headquarters decided not to abandon the shot cruiser, it was decided to work to lift and tow it to a safe place. The small crew and EPRON specialists for a year fought to save the ship. It was especially hard for people in the winter: cold, hunger, and even before the front edge of the German troops there was only three kilometers. Noticing the slightest perturbation in the area of ​​the forced parking of the vessel, the Germans opened massive artillery and mortar fire. Keeping all measures of light and noise masking, in the flooded rooms of the cruiser there was an unprecedented struggle. The Baltic seamen pumped water from the compartments with weak portable pumps, divers sealed holes outside the hull, and mechanics restored pipelines and electrical wiring. Things went faster when ship specialists managed to “revive” some ship pumps. And now 10 September 1942, the iron machine, 212 long and 22 wide, meter has finally surfaced. It was possible to repair the damage in that part of the hull that was resting on the pier, by the morning a plaster had been started, cement boxes had been installed on the holes. Beginning to dawn, the Germans might have noticed that the warship came to life and again to fall asleep with shells, so the order was given to open the Kingston and again to sink the cruiser.

The next attempt was repeated a few days later. Powerful ship pumps quickly pumped out almost 1600 tons of water, imperceptibly creeping up the tug picked up a steel whopper and quickly dragged it into the Neva. However, here again the sailors were in for a failure: the fairway changed a lot over the year and the cruiser ran aground. Work on the break-off continued until dawn, and in the morning, before the eyes of the German observers, the familiar picture was again: the tilted cruiser stood calmly in its place. On a moonless night, 17, September, 1942, another attempt to save the ship was a success. In the morning the dumbfounded Germans saw an empty jetty, and the securely moored Petropavlovsk was already standing at the pier of the Baltic Shipyard.

In December 1942, repairs on the ship were completed, and the day before the new, 1943, the cruiser was towed to the iron wall of the Trade Port, from where it opened fire on the enemy. "Petropavlovsk" was introduced into the 2 th artillery group of the fleet, which also included the battleship "October Revolution", the cruiser "Kirov", and "Maxim Gorky", as well as several destroyers. The artillery of the cruiser was commanded by senior lieutenant J.K. Grace. The guns of the warship continued to smash the enemy, assisting land forces. The German equipment did not let down, the fire was fired extremely accurately. “KP of the enemy at the height of 112 (east of Red Village). Two direct hits in the concrete pillbox. The corner of the dota was demolished, the upper overlap was destroyed. In 100 radius 31 meters funnel. The shooting of the cruiser "Petropavlovsk" "- testifies in the book" Soviet surface ships in the Great Patriotic War "G.I. Ferrets. Petropavlovsk took part in the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya offensive operation, firing 15 of the year, 1944 shells on the very first day, 250 January. From 15 to 20 in January, this number increased to 800 with a factory guarantee of barrel survivability on 300 shots. In total, 31 shells were fired at the enemy for 1036 shelling. The guns of the crippled ship were not too sorry: about a third of the firing and the shells fired by the 2 artillery group of the fleet fell to his account, especially the Germans for some reason put almost double ammunition before the war. “According to reports of coastal observation groups and our troops, the actions of the artillery of Petropavlovsk turned out to be very effective. Only for 19 in January, 3 guns, 29 vehicles, 68 vehicles and 300 dead soldiers and officers of the enemy were recorded at the expense of the cruiser battery, “quoted by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet V. Kofman in the book Princes Kriegsmarine. But gradually the front was moving away, and firing became more and more difficult. The last volleys of the ship produced 24 on January 1944 of the year. At this military service "Petropavlovsk" ended. 19 September 1944, the cruiser was renamed "Tallinn".


Fig. Heavy cruiser "Seidlits" in Pillau


After the war, several options for completing the ship were considered, one of which was very original. In 1945, in the Pillau Bay (now Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation), the Seidlits cruiser, captured by the Germans “classmate” “Lyuttsova”, was captured by Soviet troops. Now it is possible, using one ship as a “warehouse of spare parts,” to bring the started 5 years ago to the logical end. However, having considered all the options, the command of the Navy considered the costs of restoring a foreign and already obsolete cruiser excessive. In addition, the hybrid power plant, standing on this type of ships, was difficult to operate and repair, and did not meet the requirements of the post-war domestic shipbuilding.

After the war, Tallinn began to be used as a non-self-propelled training ship until March 11 1953, when it was renamed Dnepr again. The cruiser was turned into a floating barracks, in which the crews of warships being repaired at Leningrad docks resided. The next wave of renaming was not long in coming, 27 December 1956, the former combat ship was named PKZ-112.
3 April 1958, the former "Lutz" was excluded from the fleet lists.


Fig. Landmarks for shooting German artillery


In some works of modern authors on this topic, the Soviet government often censures the purchase of an unfinished cruiser, they say, the price is too high, and it was possible to buy or build something more necessary for the spent currency. This judgment shows only one thing: their superficial knowledge of the realities of the beginning of the war. In 30, by evil intent or incompetence, Marshal Tukhachevsky, now in charge of the innocent victims of Stalinist repression, was directly responsible for armament, concentrated his efforts on the weapons bazaars and directed the means and power of weapons factories to implement various fantastic ideas like "universal anti-tank anti-aircraft guns "or air gun caliber under 250 mm. The development of long-range artillery was stopped by them, and the USSR approached the beginning of the war with a few units of field guns firing at distances over 30 km. The artillery systems that were then part of the Leningrad Front, had the maximum range of 20-25 km, regular German guns of infantry and motorized divisions confidently hit targets at 25-30 km. It turned out that the Germans could completely with impunity level the city with the land by the actions of one artillery. However, it turned out that the fleet blocked in September of the Markov Puddle in September turned out to be the savior of Leningrad: for example, guns of battleships of pre-revolutionary construction could send a heavy projectile at a distance of 1941 km. Eight-inch "Luttsov" shot at 44 km, which allowed to effectively carry out a counter-battery struggle against any type of German guns. During the war, the cruiser fired more shells on the enemy than any other ship of the Baltic Fleet, thus saving many thousands who have no cash equivalent to the lives of Soviet soldiers and civilians of the heroic city on the Neva.
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  1. +12
    16 December 2015 08: 24
    Great article. I learned a lot. They even mentioned my friend’s grandfather.
    1. 0
      16 December 2015 22: 20
      And who, if not a secret?
  2. +3
    16 December 2015 08: 51
    It’s a pity, however, that we didn’t have time to complete it .. It would be useful in the North.
    1. 0
      16 December 2015 18: 37
      Combined power plant. The service is very expensive. And the technology stepped forward.
  3. +13
    16 December 2015 10: 16
    Excellent publication "+"By and large, Leningrad survived thanks to the large-caliber artillery of the fleet and forts of Kronstadt.
    1. +6
      16 December 2015 17: 21
      Plus, Krasnaya Gorka and an experimental training ground (from there even 406 mm "gifts" flew in to the Germans).
  4. The comment was deleted.
    1. +9
      16 December 2015 13: 36
      Quote: swertalf
      About Tukhachevsky is no longer relevant - now the dead commander is accused in almost every historical article. It's "trendy".

      Look at the requirements for divisional artillery approved by Tukhachevsky, Grabin’s recollections of his work on the F-22 gun. On recoilless guns, which the author himself refused: due to their lack of prospects. Polygonal guns for ultra-long range shooting. And there were a lot of ideas that were rejected by the mid-30s as dead ends or unpromising.
      1. -2
        16 December 2015 15: 57
        Quote: Amurets
        Look at the requirements for division artillery approved by Tukhachevsky, Grabin’s recollections of his work on the F-22 cannon

        Grabin in this case is a biased person. Especially considering that he really needed to shield his not very successful F-22, writing off all its problems as "stupid versatility".
        Well, do not tell him that he made a divisional gun, incapable of firing shells of "military release" (the so-called "French" shells, manufactured using a simplified technology), which for 3 years after being put into service was never brought to mind - and I had to do a new SPM.

        As for the universal tool, then do not forget - when it was issued TK. More precisely, the situation with anti-aircraft guns in the early 30s. In those days, the main anti-aircraft gun of the army was ... a three-inch field gun on Ivanov’s machine.

        There were very few specialized anti-aircraft guns. And no one could guarantee that the same 3K would fit into a normal series (especially if we recall the fate of the other "Germans" - the Lubok howitzer, the Reinmetall machine gun, the NM mortar, as well as the problems with the 37-mm and 45 -mm PTP). So we decided to make a universal divisional gun.
    2. +8
      16 December 2015 16: 10
      Quote: swertalf
      About Tukhachevsky is no longer relevant - now the dead commander is accused in almost every historical article. It's "trendy".

      And what to do if the Red Army really ended up at the beginning of the war without long-range artillery. Three dozen 6 "Br-2 cannons throughout the country.
      As a result, it was necessary to involve ships and coastal artillery of the fleet in solving army problems.
      1. +7
        16 December 2015 18: 47
        That's right. And because of the bias in the planning of the order and the production of ammunition, the department under the vigilant guidance of Comrade In 1941, Tukhachevsky had to shoot converted with a high-explosive fragmentation grenade and an armor-piercing projectile with firing shots from almost the time of the Crimean War. And now this is an innocent victim of Stalinist repression. The more I learn, the more confident I think that it was necessary to shoot at 10 earlier.
        1. -3
          16 December 2015 20: 27
          Quote: Pomoryanin
          And now this is an innocent victim of Stalinist repression.

          But do not remember why he was tried and shot? If for specific errors in the service is one thing, and would we discuss everything that happened differently. And it was done like this: you (let me; or we together) stole a carriage of jam, and we were convicted of polygamy, and during the investigation we admitted that we were digging a tunnel from Bombay to London. At the same time, the “fans” say that they should have killed us even before that.
          therefore
          Quote: Pomoryanin
          innocent victim of Stalinist repression
          1. +1
            16 December 2015 21: 59
            For participating in the conspiracy.
            1. 0
              18 December 2015 08: 12
              So I say: you and I are participating in a conspiracy (jam, polygamy, a tunnel), sincerely admitted this (admittedly - or do you deny? - so you are lying, you want to stay clean before history (since you can write here, and he can't), with due attention, you admit that you are the Pope and at the same time mom), we were spanked in the basement, and the nerd descendants wrote that you and I were traitors to the Motherland and worked for British intelligence (like Beria).
              1. -1
                18 December 2015 12: 33
                Sorry, but this is talk in favor of the poor. The conspiracy of senior military leadership was. However, even if we assume that he was not there, comrade. Tukhachevsky needed to be neutralized for outright wrecking. And unsuitability.
                1. +1
                  18 December 2015 18: 51
                  Quote: Pomoryanin
                  if we assume that he was not

                  Quote: Pomoryanin
                  it was necessary to neutralize

                  So without question, if I stole a carriage of jam, then I must be judged for stealing a jam, and not for polygamy. And here I note that from my point of view, it is necessary to rehabilitate Beria (and not only), as an agent of British intelligence (which he was not), and condemn for (as you say) sabotage (this is relatively arbitrary, I am not such a connoisseur of the Criminal Procedure Code 53 year, the wording must be carefully selected). It is possible that for the plot. And what would Tukhachevsky and his ilk, yes, in the 37th year, knowing about the situation in the country that anyone would be informed, and scammers would line up whoever is faster - this should be a painful imagination, assuming that the USSR Marshal would risk their position - conspiracies are being prepared by colonels, not marshals.
                  1. 0
                    18 December 2015 20: 38
                    And what is the situation in the country? Stalin received real power in 1936, his position was not very strong, why did not Mikhail become Bonaparte? Please tell me, here is Comrade. Tukhachevsky writes an article about communications in the 1936 year, listing in order how communications between battalions and regiment headquarters were to be carried out !. Messengers, 2. Pigeon mail and service dogs 3. Phone 4. Rockets. 5. Radio. Is it sabotage or incompetence?
                    1. +1
                      18 December 2015 21: 40
                      And what exactly guarded you so much? Pigeons? And you read about the pigeon mail in WWII.
                      The enemy’s radar service already had powerful mobile radar systems at that time and, of course, the broadcasting of our scouts using radio stations was completely ruled out. The data of reconnaissance groups were the main source of information for the preparation of such a large-scale military operation as the assault on the "Eastern Wall" and securing on it. Therefore, in almost every reconnaissance group, a pigeon breeder was included with 20-30 pigeons placed in baskets woven from willow.- this is about forcing the Dnieper
                      For information, for participation in the defense of Moscow, about 30 blue-collar soldiers were awarded military orders and medals.- it’s clear about what.
                      And that's just with us. And it is understandable, because 1. There are a lot of people 2. Pigeons (less than a dog) will travel longer distances than people 3. A phone is good if you have one. 4. "Red rocket is taking off ..." - what does not suit you? 5. Radio - in '36 it is almost fantastic.
                      Where is incompetence or sabotage here? Do you think that they should have talked on cell phones like 08.08.08? Maybe. you have more competent proposals, but in hindsight we are all strong - and here I am saying that Dzhugashvili had to be shot at 37 (you suggested in 36th - so I do not mind).
                      And Stalin's positions became (funny, right?) Strong (conditionally) when Krupskaya was told that "we will find another wife for Lenin" ...
                      And the repressions were very noticeable in the 20s ("The Master and Margarita" - the beginning of work 29 years old - already the arrests, "Heart of a Dog" - "You should be arrested - For what? - And you do not like the proletariat" - 24 years )
        2. +2
          17 December 2015 11: 30
          Quote: Pomoryanin
          And because of the bias in the planning of the order and the production of ammunition, the department under the vigilant guidance of Comrade In 1941, Tukhachevsky had to shoot converted with a high-explosive fragmentation grenade and an armor-piercing shell with firing shots from almost the time of the Crimean War.

          And here Tukhachevsky is not to blame. smile
          The "armor-piercing crisis" of the beginning of the war has much deeper roots. The fact is that until the second half of the 30s, the domestic 45-mm anti-tank rifle was considered and was quite sufficient to defeat the vast majority of those tanks that could come to us. Yes, and "shrapnel to strike" 3 battalions - too. 20-30 mm of armor theoretically and practically penetrated them without problems - which was shown by tests of 45-mm BBS on domestic armor.
          For the remaining 10% there were small-scale 3 "BB shells, anti-aircraft and corps artillery. 122-mm would have taken out both the B-1bis and the Matilda."
          So, in those days I did not develop and produce specialized large-caliber PTPs and large-scale BBSs for Soviet divisors (it was not necessary and too expensive).

          But in the late 30s, light and medium tanks of reinforced reservation massively went into the army of potential opponents. In addition, it suddenly became clear that the protection of the tanks of our most likely enemy, although it has 30 mm thickness, was not made of medium-hard armor (which was used to test our shells), but of cemented Krupp. The shooting of Polish trophies and tanks bought in the Reich turned out to be a shock: 30 mm KC our 45 mm penetrated from just 150-200 m.

          The development of 107-mm, 85-mm and 57-mm anti-tank guns was ordered. As a safety net for the 57-mm, at the suggestion of Kulik, it was decided to make a "long" 45-mm (the future M-42). The militants were given an order for a massive 3 "BBS for work on the KC - BR-350A.
          But the industry was unable to repeat the manufacturing technology of German BBS (welded head). And I had to be perverted either with copper soldering (!), Or with uneven hardening of the head part of the case - "fungus" (at first, the marriage reached 80%). Worst of all, the "fungus" head of the new projectile, instead of destroying the cemented layer, sometimes simply split off and the projectile smashed against the armor.
          The industry thwarted the production plan for the Br-350A. At the beginning of the war, none of the mechanized corps of the border districts had a BR-350A (shells in the "armor-piercing" column turned out to be shrapnel when studying the documents). Moreover, even in the spring of 1942, the manual on firing at tanks with various types of shells admitted that this manual was issued because there are very few BBS in the units.
          What about the 45mm? And before the war, it was recognized as obsolete, removed from production (fortunately, there were more than 14 of them in the army), and no action was taken to increase its armor penetration - everyone was waiting for a 000-mm anti-tank gun. But before the war, they did not have time to put the 57-mm into the series - and after the start of the war it turned out to be too expensive (instead of 57 1-mm it was possible to make 57-4 much more necessary and universal 5 "divisions). In addition, the 3-mm was absent. the most frequently consumed fragmentation projectile is a paradox, but the 57-mm anti tank guns 2/3 of the projectiles fired were OS.
          I had to improvise. And in November 1941, a solution appeared - stress localizers ("undercuts"), which removed the problem of complete destruction of the projectile body. In fact, such a projectile pierced armor, but left too much of its mass in front of the armor - so formally, according to the criterion of armor penetration, this could not be considered a penetration. That is why such shells were not produced before the war.
          1. -2
            17 December 2015 20: 03
            What are you! I don’t want to google, I’ll say as a keepsake: all the planning of the defense order was carried out by the first deputy of NCO Comrade. Tukhachevsky.
            Well, now do not blame me, as a keepsake I will try to smash you a bit., 1.45 mm shells did not penetrate the armor due to over-heating. They broke. But there is no question about VET, Tukhachevsky ordered shells for recoilless, in truth I’ll say that they were still used in guns of the 1927 model of the year.
            2. 107 mm gun was developed under the king. Cooley quite correctly regarded the caliber for this gun inappropriate. To rebuild plants - fire .. Expensive.
            3. Long-range artillery Tukhachevsky frankly oppressed. 45 mm gun - normal unit. The shells were bad due to wrecking. The rest you wrote is just one of the opinions.
            1. +2
              18 December 2015 19: 23
              Quote: Pomoryanin
              The shells were bad due to wrecking

              Correctly I understand your point of view that the Soviet industry was sabotaging the release of bad shells? And who was engaged in sabotage: a metallurgist at a casting, a turner at a machine, a foreman / head of a workshop, a plant director, a developer from a research institute, a people's commissar, secretary of the defense committee Molotov (Scriabin), general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Stalin (Dzhugashvili)? If the whole country was engaged in sabotage, then who was the "non-pest"? That is, the country is sabotagingly producing bad products "under the leadership of the party and the government," and Tukhachevsky was shot (conditionally)? Then it was necessary to start from above, to decapitate the leadership of the pests, to put Stalin (Dzhugashvili) against the wall for having spread such sabotage in the country. These are the sad conclusions from your statement ...
              And here I completely agree with you - Stalin (Dzhugashvili) had to be shot for sabotage, moreover, in 1937 along with Tukhachevsky (well, since Tukhachevsky is such a pest).
              You see, my paternal grandfather and maternal great-grandfather would be alive - not now, of course, but then ...
              1. 0
                18 December 2015 20: 18
                One was a sabotage party-thousand as an economist, and he sabotaged as an economist, and then sabotage forced to spend at least one cartridge on himself in a prison in Kuibyshev, and the second sabotage bridges across the Volga built (in Zelenodolsk and Stalingrad), a railway in Bugulma into a civilian and in general " Nauraganil "in construction, and as a result, he died of sabotage from starvation in the prison of Stalingrad named after Dzhugashvili - he was a large man, the prison ration was not enough to survive ...
              2. 0
                18 December 2015 20: 41
                Write some nonsense. And what about workers, metallurgists and plant directors? They sent the order and technical documentation - please do it. And the fact that the core of an armor-piercing projectile is overheated and will break, only a very narrow circle of people knew about it.
                Quote: alex86
                And here I completely agree with you - Stalin (Dzhugashvili) had to be shot for sabotage, moreover, in 1937 along with Tukhachevsky (well, since Tukhachevsky is such a pest).

                And you, like Svanidze, avenge grandfathers. I consider the discussion pointless. I have the honor!
                1. +2
                  18 December 2015 22: 05
                  knew only a very narrow circle of people - among whom should be the leaders of the industry and the country, and if they are not in the know, then their first to the wall, because they are incompetent - i.e. they don’t know how to do what they have undertaken — that is, to rule the country.
                  Quote: Pomoryanin
                  avenging grandfathers

                  But where is the vengeance? The law does not order revenge - my dad gave me this subscription when I got acquainted with the case and found out who the scammer was. Revenge is to dig up a scammer and throw it in a landfill.
                  Quote: Pomoryanin
                  I think the discussion is pointless
                  - unconditionally. Because besides a blind faith in the executioners (because of ideological closeness), you have nothing to show. It would be funny to see you when they arrive at night - but I hope that the country will not reach this point (although it would be useful for you).
                  Quote: Pomoryanin
                  I have the honor!
                  - Did you decide this yourself or who told you?
                  And it’s also interesting - they sent mine to the other world, and you protect the executioners like that - isn’t it yours by chance?
                  1. -2
                    19 December 2015 00: 06
                    Go to the Echo of Moscow. There you will wipe away the tears. Good luck.
                    1. 0
                      20 December 2015 19: 47
                      That is, the discussion continues.
                      Quote: Pomoryanin
                      There you will wipe away the tears
                      - And where did you see the tears?
  5. +3
    16 December 2015 16: 13
    Nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten. Eternal memory and Glory.
  6. +1
    16 December 2015 17: 06
    -In some works of modern authors on this topic, the government of the USSR is often criticized for the purchase of an unfinished cruiser, saying that the price is too high, and you could buy or build something more necessary for the currency spent .-

    Maybe you should have paid attention to the Scandinavian experience? For example, the Finns in my opinion had very successful battleships "Väinämöinen" and "Ilmarinen". Instead of one Luttsov, one could build a couple of battleships, if the ship stood the whole war in the city, then it does not need to have a large hull with seaworthy contours. IMHO
    1. +5
      16 December 2015 18: 12
      Quote: Denimax
      Instead of one Lyuttsov, it would be possible to build a couple of armadillos, if the ship stood the whole war in the city, then he does not need to have a large hull with seafaring contours. IMHO

      Ahem ... You see the difference between the completion of the ship from imported components at the factory wall and the construction of a new ship from scratch by the forces of domestic plants.
      "Luttsov" is a screwdriver assembly from ready-made parts that does not require a slipway or the efforts of subcontractors.

      And there were problems with its own production - not only did the "Big Fleet" take up all the capacities of the shipyard and its subcontractors, but also had to share armor with the tank industry, whose appetites rose sharply along with the growth of tank armor and a sharp increase in plans for their release.

      It came to the point that the factories simply refused to conclude contracts - for example, for the supply of GTZA for the battleship, etc. 23. And this plant did not have anything for it - because it was a monopolist and was inundated with orders for GTZA for EM and KR.

      The factories of the USSR were so loaded that ours even ordered in Germany towers GK (380 mm) for KRT, project 69 - redoing the project in 69I.
    2. +1
      16 December 2015 18: 42
      I dare not agree. "VankaManka" and "Ilmarinen" are coastal defense battleships. And "Luttsov" was conceived as an oceanic raider. Used to be completed in the Baltic, north or Far East. It would be very useful there.
    3. Alf
      +2
      16 December 2015 21: 25
      Quote: Denimax
      if the ship has stood the whole war in the city, then it is not necessary for him to have a large hull with seafaring contours.

      And how did our command know that Leningrad would fall into the ring?
      1. -1
        16 December 2015 21: 33
        And how did our command know that Leningrad would fall into the ring?

        Well, why did you know?
        After all, they bought essentially long-range artillery. And not a cruiser.
        1. +5
          16 December 2015 21: 40
          Quote: Lexi2
          After all, they bought essentially long-range artillery. And not a cruiser.

          Essentially we bought a cruiser. Thanks to the purchase, we expected to get acquainted with the design of modern German warships, gain experience in operating an unusual EI, and, of course, artillery - if we recall what seams we had in marine art, then the German 203-mm and especially 105-mm artillery systems were extremely interesting.
          1. -1
            16 December 2015 22: 05
            Thanks to the purchase, we expected to get acquainted with the design of modern German warships, gain experience in operating an unusual ES,

            What does this have to do with the difficult situation in 1941? According to the laws of wartime, this is sabotage. To study what the result will be equal to 0.
            No one disputes that the engineers got acquainted with German developments live.
            Of course, artillery - if we recall what seams we had in the sea art, then the German 203-mm and especially 105-mm artillery systems were extremely interesting.

            I agree. However, interest was nevertheless applied in the more immediate future.
            Sorry for such funds, it was easier to buy all the drawings. Yes, and engineers in addition.
            1. +1
              17 December 2015 11: 35
              Quote: Lexi2
              What does this have to do with the difficult situation in 1941?

              What does buying a cruiser in February 1940 have to do with a difficult situation in 1941?
              They bought the cruiser to study and use German novelties on the ships of the "Big Fleet". At the time of purchase, no one could even imagine that in a year and a half the army would surrender the entire Baltic region in a couple of months and roll back to Leningrad.

              If they were to buy long-range artillery, artillery, then they would first of all require the installation and installation of all the towers, spare barrels and SUAO. In real life, the KRT met the beginning of the war with half of the GK trunks.
              1. +1
                17 December 2015 12: 21
                Alexey RA
                They bought the cruiser to study and use German novelties on the ships of the "Big Fleet".

                Alex ... well then it's ... sabotage.
                In its pure form laughing
                Of the two evils, it is customary to choose the lesser.
                If they were to buy long-range artillery, artillery, then they would first of all require the installation and installation of all the towers, spare barrels and SUAO. In real life, the KRT met the beginning of the war with half of the GK trunks.

                Well, the press was Comrade Stalin! The press!
                No, to immediately demand to sell panserdivisia lol crying with a full fleet of vehicles.
                Sorry. (Not for terry Stalinists)
                At the time of purchase, no one could even imagine that in a year and a half, the army would surrender the entire Baltic in a couple of months and roll back to Leningrad.

                Yes, even in the city of "Mukh-ke" there is something in case something goes wrong.
                And here is Leningrad ... In the past, the capital of the empire.
                Did Stalin have the opportunity to demand? They demanded a Lend-Lease. Like from the Allies.
                A slightly different case.
  7. +4
    16 December 2015 17: 51
    The article is very competent, thanks, there are only a couple of comments. Dear author, writes
    Officially, Germany was not bound by the “Washington Treaty” in the tonnage of ships and artillery caliber, however, in order not to irritate leading Western states, the Führer and the head of the Kriegsmarine, Grossadmiral Erich Röder, officially announced plans to build 5 Admiral Hipper cruisers with a displacement of 10 tons with guns of the main caliber of 000 mm. The development of this type of vessel was started in the autumn of 150, however, when implementing the plan, it became clear that it was not possible to keep within the declared framework.

    Generally speaking, the story with the 150mm caliber was very ... confusing. After the decision to build a large fleet, consisting of ships of all classes, the Germans came to the conclusion that the "pocket battleships" which the whole world admired very badly fit into the very same fleet - they have too low speed to "work" in a squadron, and too long range a move that other ships will not have.
    At first the Germans turned to light cruisers, but soon came to the conclusion that they needed heavy cruisers, capable of fighting on equal terms with any eight-inch Washington. So initially, Hipper type cruisers were designed specifically for 203 mm guns.
    But it soon became clear that 10 tons of 000-mm guns, acceptable armor and normal speed categorically did not fit - one of the options to save on scales was the proposal to return to the 203-mm caliber. However, he was quickly rejected - a gain in weight did not justify a fall in the combat power of the ship. Then they examined 150 mm guns ... but nevertheless settled on a 190 mm gun.
    But that's not all. For the sake of the political moment, the fourth and fifth cruisers of this type were initially planned to be built for three-gun 150-mm towers - so as not to increase the number of heavy cruisers. Of course, the 150-mm towers were designed so that instead of them it would always be possible to put 203-mm two-gun turrets ... in general, the "Mogami" principle :))) But it never came to implementation - in the end, they were going to be built right under 203 mm guns.
    Well and the second - the Hippers were nevertheless built in the framework of creating a balanced fleet, by the time of their creation the cruising concept did not have much support from the admirals
    1. +4
      16 December 2015 18: 20
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      But that's not all. For the sake of the political moment, the fourth and fifth cruisers of this type were initially planned to be built for three-gun 150-mm towers - so as not to increase the number of heavy cruisers. Of course, the 150-mm towers were designed so that instead of them it would always be possible to put 203-mm two-gun turrets ... in general, the "Mogami" principle :))) But it never came to implementation - in the end, they were going to be built right under 203 mm guns.

      EMNIP, the Germans were pressured by limes - and the Reich at first formally agreed to limit itself to the construction of three MRTs and complete the 4th and 5th corps as formally a KRL with 15-cm guns. For this, they even began to showcase the development of a new tower with dimensions that suspiciously resembled a tower for a twin 8 ".
      But in the agreement the Germans made a reservation - in the absence of special circumstances. And then there appeared domestic ave. 26 and 26 bis ...
      The Germans immediately announced that the Kriegsmarine urgently needed to restore the parity of forces and respond to the sharp strengthening of the USSR BF with new MRTs (and 26/26-bis according to the London Treaty were just MRTs because of the 180-mm main battery) - and therefore 4 and 5 corps completed as 8 "KRT. smile
      1. +3
        16 December 2015 21: 18
        Quote: Alexey RA
        EMNIP, the Germans crushed lime

        It’s more like that there - it’s not that the limes were particularly crushed (in those years they were not seen at all under pressure on Germany), rather, the Führer himself decided to bend slightly for a look, so as not to irritate the Britons ahead of time.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        For this, they even started to showy design a new tower

        Here I can lie, but in my opinion they were not even planning to develop it - Germany also did not refuse 150-mm cruisers and in the future seemed to be planning to build them too. In my opinion, the latest projects of the 150th cruisers are already wartime. Another question is that the width and dimensions of the barbet were uniquely unified with the 203 mm barbette :)))
        Quote: Alexey RA
        But in the agreement the Germans made a reservation - in the absence of special circumstances. And then there appeared domestic ave. 26 and 26 bis ...

        But this, with all due respect, is somewhat doubtful - the decision to build the fourth and fifth cruisers with the 203-mm artillery was made in 1937. hi
  8. 0
    16 December 2015 19: 55
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Ahem ... You see the difference between the completion of the ship from imported components at the factory wall and the construction of a new ship from scratch by the forces of domestic plants.
    "Luttsov" is a screwdriver assembly from ready-made parts that does not require a slipway or the efforts of subcontractors.

    Wasn’t it possible to order a pair of armadillos in the same way, and why exactly a cruiser?
    1. +1
      16 December 2015 20: 20
      Quote: Denimax
      Couldn’t it be the same to order a pair of armadillos

      You can ask - why?
      1. 0
        16 December 2015 20: 33
        For defense of course. It’s better to have two than one, it’s easier to disguise, it’s easier to throw them around. There is more interest .. what they should have been, by design. It's my opinion.
        1. +1
          16 December 2015 21: 38
          Quote: Denimax
          For defense of course.

          Sorry, defense of what? And from what? If you are talking about Leningrad, then the cruiser is obviously better, because he participated in this very defense, but the 2 battleships you described did not have the slightest chance to catch her. If we had ordered them a pair of coastal defense battleships with the funds that we would have received from the Germans, they, of course, would not have been built before the outbreak of hostilities. Yes, and I don’t think that with the money for a heavy cruiser, 2 armadillos could be ordered.
          Quote: Denimax
          easier to mask, easier to flip around

          Masking is obviously not easier, two ships nevertheless, and not one. And to transfer to places - what places are there? The problem is that the Baltic Fleet turned out to be locked up in a blocked base, and even with a cut-off access to the sea (the Finnish throat was not ours).
  9. 0
    16 December 2015 19: 59
    Quote: Pomoryanin
    They built it in the Baltic, to the north or to the Far East. He would be very useful there.

    And what could he use there?
    1. +1
      16 December 2015 20: 42
      Quote: Denimax
      And what could he use there?

      And escort and meeting convoys PQ and QP! And this is only one of the tasks!
      1. 0
        16 December 2015 20: 53
        That would be the main task. Well, a couple of times they would have chased him and realized that against submarines and aircraft it comes out a little expensive. And they would send destroyers, they and the region will cover more.
        1. +4
          16 December 2015 21: 22
          Quote: Denimax
          And they would send destroyers, they and the region will cover more.

          Destroyers? More? Take a look at the ranges of our destroyers. what's "more" ...
          Quote: Denimax
          and realized that against submarines and aircraft it comes out a little expensive.

          Yes, the same British for the Soviet cruiser (and the ability to at least partially shift the convoy to Soviet ships) would feed him 30 times in the stern and refuel exclusively at their own expense. And secondly - the operation of a heavy cruiser, it is NOT expensive. I would say that the myths about the high cost of large ships cost the state much more
        2. Alf
          +1
          16 December 2015 21: 36
          Quote: Denimax
          That would be the main task. Well, a couple of times they would have chased him and realized that against submarines and aircraft it comes out a little expensive. And they would send destroyers, they and the region will cover more.

          But the British did not know that there was nothing for the cruisers to do in convoys. So they included even battleships in the escort. A heavy cruiser as part of an escort convoy gave stability to lighter ships. And the chances of fighting off the cruiser from the German destroyers were much greater.
    2. 0
      16 December 2015 22: 03
      How could it come in handy in the north? The ocean raider, oh, how useful .. the Barents Sea is not Markizov’s puddle, but the ocean. Secondly, it was a little taut with the ships in the north, the largest are destroyers of the Novik type and sevens licked from the Italian model, poorly adapted for sailing in the Arctic and generally in the ocean.
      1. +2
        17 December 2015 11: 45
        In the north, KRT (especially German) would not have crawled out of repairs. The conditions of basing in the Naval Fleet of the Northern Fleet were such that even domestic ships could not stand it: a third of the EM Northern Fleet was constantly under repair.
        In peacetime, the ships at the base were forced to keep the boiler under steam or drive diesel generators - because there was no steam, water and even electricity from the shore. And how long would the Luttsova power plant, which was considered capricious even by German standards, have lived in such conditions?
        I'm not talking about air defense ... remember July 20, 1941? Above the raid of the main base of the fleet, Ju-88s suddenly appear in broad daylight and sink the destroyer "Swift". The air defense slept through.
        1. 0
          17 December 2015 21: 05
          Well, damn it, but I didn’t know that. And you, excuse me, how many years have you lived in Murmansk or Polyarny?
  10. +3
    16 December 2015 20: 42
    The author is smart! Thank you for remembering and talking about the ONLY heavy cruiser in the history of the Russian fleet! Even if it wasn’t even completed, it brought more benefits than many other completed and equipped ships! Write more, and good luck in your work!
    1. +1
      16 December 2015 22: 04
      Thank you. I’ll post something else at the end of the month.
  11. 0
    16 December 2015 21: 58
    Quote: Alf
    And how did our command know that Leningrad would fall into the ring?

    Could you suggest? In the WWI, the Baltic Fleet also did not swim very well.
    1. 0
      16 December 2015 22: 07
      Normally, the fleet showed itself. For example, when defending Moonsund, raiding operations, mine war. Not a single fleet has so successfully laid mines as the Baltic one at Essen, so that in 7 day the newest, smelling Kaiser destroyers are lured into a minefield and drown.
      1. 0
        16 December 2015 22: 14
        Quote: Pomoryanin
        Normally the fleet showed itself

        Yes, how to say ... he showed himself poorly. Only active mine productions are in the asset (sorry for the tautology), Moonsund defended very hesitantly, raiding operations were disgusting - remember Admiral Bakhirev with his heroic drowning Albatross ... Rurik turns away from the armored cruiser and does not dare to resume the duel ... the cruiser when he meets with the Germans constantly retreated ... In general, unlike the Black Sea, the Baltic Fleet, to put it mildly, did not distinguish itself.
        Quote: Pomoryanin
        so that in a day, 7 newest, smelling of paint Kaiser destroyers, lure into a minefield and drown everything

        This is not the merit of the Russian sailors, but the result of the exceptional alternative talent of the German admiral, who sent destroyers to Russian minefields at night.
        1. 0
          16 December 2015 22: 49
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Monsund defended very hesitantly

          That is, the old battleships, the ancient gunboats against the fleet several times superior, correctly using minefields and coastal batteries - do you think they defended indecisively? The collapse of discipline, and not some indecision, led to defeat, and even then it’s hard to call it defeat. Like the battle of Borodino, for example.
          1. 0
            17 December 2015 08: 44
            Quote: Pomoryanin
            That is, the old battleships, the ancient gunboats against the fleet several times superior, competently using minefields and coastal batteries

            Are you talking about 1917, right? When did the Germans take half an hour to crush Russian artillery and land in the key bay of Tag? When the commander of the defense of the islands (Sveshnikov) and the chief of staff of the submarine division fled with the beginning of the battle in an unknown direction? The surrender of Tserel, Dago, Moon almost without a fight (meaning the actions of land garrisons)?
            There were some heroic pages that we are justly proud of - the battery at Cape Tofri, the battleship "Slava", but in general the term "hesitant" about Moonsund is still very mildly said
            1. +4
              17 December 2015 09: 27
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              This is you about 1917 year so?

              what Oh, Andrey, I would not consider the topic of the Baltic Fleet and the 17th year! Complete collapse in the troops and in the heads. At that time, cowardice and betrayal were both at the top and at the bottom. Remember the betrayal of the "comrades" from "Pripyat", the appearance of crippled minefields among the Germans after the pogrom on the "Krechet"! After the Helsingfor and Kronstadt massacres, few patriotic officers remained in the navy. At a time when "Slava" and "Tsarevich" were bleeding to death, on 6 battleships in Helsingfors they voted for days ... to go to the rescue or fraternize with the Germans! Therefore, I do not consider the 17th year as an indicator in military operations.
              1. +2
                17 December 2015 16: 36
                Quote: Serg65
                Oh, Andrew, I would not consider the topic of the Baltic Fleet and the 17th year!

                That's right, I agree. To the "external enemy" was added the "internal enemy". One can argue for a long time about whether the revolution was good or bad for the Russian Empire, but in those specific circumstances, the decomposition of the crews was terrible, and this greatly interfered. More precisely, I can't find the right word at all, "strongly interfered" does not at all reflect the nightmare of the situation for naval officers who did not understand where they were coming from - a German splinter in the forehead, or a bayonet from a ship's gun in the back? I would not want to be in their place - to go into an almost hopeless battle against a multiply quantitatively and qualitatively superior enemy and still manage to lead propagandized crews ... Yes, there were people in our time, not like the current tribe ... soldier
            2. 0
              17 December 2015 21: 03
              So the loss of 26 ships by the Hans and the infliction of serious damage to as many more is "half an hour" to win ?? People, I don't understand a little: what should have been done? Raise the flag over the Reichstag ??
              1. 0
                17 December 2015 21: 24
                Quote: Pomoryanin
                So the loss of 26 ships by the Hans and the infliction of serious damage to as many more is "half an hour" to win ??

                You know, even Soviet sources did not give such figures. And so, for reference, the results of Operation Albion are as follows:
                Russia has lost a battleship (I will not call it a battleship, although it should be) and the destroyer "Grom"
                The German fleet lost the destroyers S-64, T-54, T-56 and T-66, the patrol vessels Altair, Dolphin, Guteil, Gluckstadt and the minesweeper M-31.
                The total German losses amounted to: 184 sailors and soldiers killed, 202 wounded. Russian troops alone captured 20130 soldiers, trophies amounted to 2000 horses, 10 aircraft, 141 guns, 130 machine guns and many other military equipment
                Quote: Pomoryanin
                The people, I do not understand a little: but what had to be done?

                Well, maybe now it will be clearer to you?
                1. +1
                  17 December 2015 23: 12
                  Duc, that's it. I am not strong in Soviet sources, but vota tsYtata: "The German fleet lost 26 warships, including 15 destroyers, 25 ships (5 battleships, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers and 5 other ships) were damaged. Having met such decisive resistance and having suffered such heavy losses, the enemy was forced to stop further offensive actions. "
                  History of the First World War vol. 2, p. 337, M., Science, 1975 year. Anti-Soviet source. However, if you count the number of horses captured in a maritime operation, then yes, you are right.
                  Let's leave unnecessary bickering. I now believe that my great-grandfather from 1915 to 1918 heroically beat the German. Like the entire Russian imperial army and navy. And if anyone is against this, then he can go through the woods.
                  1. +2
                    18 December 2015 07: 10
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    Let's leave unnecessary bickering. I now believe that my great-grandfather from 1915 to 1918 heroically beat the German. Like the entire Russian imperial army and navy. And if anyone is against this, then he can go through the woods.

                    smile Vladimir, if you have already taken up history, then you should not be nervous! You wrote a good article for which you are definitely a plus, but excuse me, the truth is born in an altercation! An interesting contingent of readers has gathered on the pages of VO, including "seasoned historians", so when you write ..

                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    The German fleet lost 26 warships, including 15 destroyers, 25 ships ( 5 battleships, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers and 5 other ships) were damaged.

                    then to protect yourself from smart and not smart questions, give the numbers or names of the ships .. laughing especially battleships, otherwise, God forbid, a well-known lover of armor and battleships will read this to everyone .... you won’t be guilty! drinks
                    1. 0
                      18 December 2015 12: 39
                      Numbers with names are also possible. I will write an article for next year - and I will cite everything there. Not to do it right away is a long work, one or two editions will not do. And the number in a fairly solid edition: A.S. Pukhov. "The Battle of Moonsund and the History of the First World War 1914-1918 (volume 2) edited by Rostunov give just such figures. The numbers of the ships, tonnage, the number of guns and what the Hans ate for breakfast for some reason forgot to indicate these citizens ..
                  2. +2
                    18 December 2015 11: 26
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    Let's leave unnecessary bickering.

                    Let's:)))
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    I now believe that my great-grandfather from 1915 to 1918 heroically beat the German.

                    And who is arguing?
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    Like the entire Russian imperial army and navy.

                    It never happened that the whole army or the entire fleet of any country showed exclusively examples of heroism.
                    In WWI, the Black Sea Fleet demonstrated just the same exemplary skill. The fleet completed practically all the tasks facing it. In the presence of "Goeben", having only old battleships, the navy organized systematic combat operations on enemy communications (by the way - a new word in naval tactics, before that all over the world it boiled down to rare battles of fleets). The two battles of "Goeben" with old battleships both times ended in the flight of the Germans, the Russians demonstrated a very high class of shooting. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is the ONLY one of all the fleets in the world who succeeded in a successful landing, which became an integral part of the army operation and led to a major defeat for the Turks on land. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was the first in the world to organize battle groups of diverse fleet forces (when cruisers, destroyers and battleships not only acted together, but were also based together and were listed in a single structure) - which was a big step forward in naval war (the ships of the formation are based together, train together, etc.). Such is the prototype of the American TF, but a quarter of a century earlier.
                    The Baltic Fleet also in some cases was distinguished by combat skills and heroism of the crews, but on the whole, alas, the assessment of its actions in the WWII is negative.
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    And if anyone is against this, then he can go through the woods.

                    I’d better go and continue to gnaw at the granite of science, which I advise you to :)) History does not tolerate an approach based on emotions. Of course it's nice to read about
                    Quote: Pomoryanin
                    German fleet lost 26 warships

                    but in principle, it is not so difficult to trace the fate of most of them. When we understand that the "lost" ships fought in the future, then this is more than sufficient reason to question the source.
                    1. +1
                      18 December 2015 20: 43
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      but in principle, it is not so difficult to trace the fate of most of them. When we understand that the "lost" ships fought in the future, then this is more than sufficient reason to question the source.

                      I will not dive so deep into the subject. What is written in the book, in which I quoted above, then I voiced. If you have other data - let me know, I will be grateful to you.
                      1. 0
                        18 December 2015 23: 07
                        Quote: Pomoryanin
                        If you have other data - let me know, I will be grateful to you.

                        Regarding the German losses - I gave them above, but according to the description ... I would gladly recommend "The First World War at Sea" by A. Taras and "The Tragedy of Errors" by A. Bolnykh. The latter writes very caustically and is not entirely correct, but ... it is worth reading. hi
                      2. 0
                        19 December 2015 00: 04
                        Thank you I'll see what he has there is interesting.
          2. +2
            17 December 2015 12: 10
            Quote: Pomoryanin
            That is, the old battleships, the ancient gunboats against the fleet several times superior, correctly using minefields and coastal batteries - do you think they defended indecisively?

            And you can find out - why did all this deal old battleships and ancient gunboats? Where were the main forces of the BF? wink

            5 years to build the defense of the Baltic - and not to worry about the deepening of the Moonsund ... while having the Irbensky Strait from the enemy’s side. * double facepalm *
            Quote: Pomoryanin
            The collapse of discipline, and not some indecision, led to defeat, and even then it’s hard to call it defeat.

            Was discipline collapsing in 1915-1916? Then the command of the forces of the Gulf of Riga first forgets 2 gunboats in Riga, and when the Germans are already in charge of the Gulf of Riga - gives them the order to break through. Either Bakhirev, having superiority in forces, cannot even drown the mine. Either the headquarters of the fleet and Kolchak are planning a raid on the German convoys, and they choose ... no, not transports, but escort ships. The same raid, in which the officers of the "best mine school of the RIF" repeatedly shoot torpedoes from 1 cable - and are surprised: Why aren’t they exploding?
            1. 0
              17 December 2015 16: 45
              Greetings, dear Alexey! hi
              Quote: Alexey RA
              5 years to build the defense of the Baltic - and not worry about deepening Moonsund ...

              This is a very difficult question. On the one hand, our dreadnoughts could not enter Riga from Finnish, but, on the other hand, the opposite is also true ...
              In general, when it became clear that Gelsinki was not a cake as the base of the fleet, and the question of where to be the main base of the Baltic Fleet was discussed, a solution was proposed - Moonsund! As for me - a very correct decision. But alas, they still chose Revel.
              And yes, they would have worked as excavators, the dreadnoughts and the First-Called would have been based on Moon ... That would have been the case then :)))
              Quote: Alexey RA
              That Bahirev, having superior power, can not drown even a minzag.

              In general, a terrible disgrace. Having an overwhelming superiority in forces, he started a difficult maneuvering, without risking getting close ... And "Rurik II"? Wow ... yes, it looks like the guns were completely shot by that moment, but still, but still ...
              1. +1
                17 December 2015 20: 36
                So to completely disable the minelayer "Albatross", store a torpedo in the armored cruiser "Prince Albert" and drive the "Prince Henry" home - is this a terrible SHAME? And what is not a terrible disgrace: to arrive in Berlin along the Spree and demand surrender ?? and
            2. +1
              17 December 2015 20: 52
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And you can find out - why did the old armadillos and the ancient gunboats do all this? Where were the main forces of the BF?

              Can. We were engaged in other matters. A well-organized defense by mine-artillery barriers did not require large forces for the defense of the Gulf of Riga. Did the Germans break through in the 1915 in the Gulf of Riga? Nope.


              Quote: Alexey RA
              Was discipline collapsing in 1915-1916? Then the command of the forces of the Gulf of Riga first forgets 2 gunboats in Riga, and when the Germans are already in charge of the Gulf of Riga - gives them the order to break through. Either Bakhirev, having superiority in forces, cannot even drown the mine. Either the headquarters of the fleet and Kolchak are planning a raid on the German convoys, and they choose ... no, not transports, but escort ships. The very same raid in which the officers of the "best mine school of the RIF" repeatedly shoot torpedoes from 1 cable - and wonder: why are they not blowing up?

              Nonsense. Until 1917, the Germans did not enter the Gulf of Riga. I repeat: nonsense, therefore, either deal with the dates, or take it for granted. Bakhirev incapacitated a mine-layer and put under the torpedoes of the British two armored cruisers, one of which was disabled. After that, did Bahirev need to demand surrender from Wilhelm Friedrichich with a sword in his hands ?? Comrades, what do you need? One battle and surrender of Germany?
              1. +1
                17 December 2015 21: 28
                Quote: Pomoryanin
                Germans break through in the Gulf of Riga in 1915? Nope.

                Hello .... Listen, well, you would somehow teach a story at least a little bit. the Germans in 1915 even broke into Riga, it happened on August 19th.
                Quote: Pomoryanin
                Nonsense. Until 1917, the Germans did not enter the Gulf of Riga. I repeat: nonsense,

                URGENT TEACH THE MATCH !!! am
                1. +1
                  17 December 2015 22: 08
                  Guilty, confused the raid with victory. I realized and went to sprinkle ashes on my head. You're right. The breakthrough did take place, at the cost of the loss of 5 ships and damage to four for two ancient cannon boats. This is a victory for the Eurocarriers over the wild Russians !!
                  We teach. TsYtata: “Taking into account the unsuccessful outcome of the operation, the German command came to the conclusion that in the future a REPETITION of the breakthrough would make sense only if the army first captured Riga and Ust-Dvinsk, and in this connection there would be a need to firmly hold the gulf.” History of the First World War in two volumes, vol. 2, Moscow, 1975, p. 126.
                  I don’t understand what the Germans did in the Gulf of Riga in 1917, if they broke into the Gulf of Riga two years ago? Or did I mess up something with the hardware ??
        2. +2
          17 December 2015 07: 13
          But how to say ... he showed himself badly. In the asset - only active mine productions (sorry for the tautology ...
          This is not the merit of the Russian sailors, but the result of the exceptional alternative talent of the German admiral, who sent destroyers to Russian minefields at night.

          Well, yes, mine production for effective military operations cannot be recognized. What is this merit - to put mines on which to destroy a whole detachment of ships.
          Everything needs to be beautiful - in a linear system, with smoke, bursts of shells. Like in Chemulpo, right?
          1. +1
            17 December 2015 07: 43
            Quote: Moore
            What is this merit - to put mines on which to destroy a whole detachment of ships.

            Andrey, who doesn’t belittle the success of the Baltic Fleet’s mine productions, it’s our fleet that turned to the WWII the most developed in the plans for a mine war. But strangely enough in 1914 in the minds of Russian admirals the sign of Tsushima still hung. As a result, at the beginning of the war, at a time when the Germans suffered the blockade of England, with complete superiority in the Baltic theater, the fleet was inactive in Helsingfors.
            1. 0
              17 December 2015 12: 21
              Quote: Serg65

              As a result, at the beginning of the war, at a time when the Germans suffered the blockade of England, with complete superiority in the Baltic theater, the fleet was inactive in Helsingfors.

              They "suffered" in a very specific way - the activity in the Baltic of the old "Keysers", cruisers and destroyers seems to have never been questioned. As for our First Detachment in Helsingfors, we can argue differently. One of the versions: the last argument in defense of Peter.
              There is a good book: GK Count Fleet and War. The Baltic Fleet in the First World War - it was brought by Pikul in the "Moonzund" under the name Grapf. Description and conclusions of the direct participant.
              1. 0
                17 December 2015 17: 29
                Quote: Moore
                They "suffered" in a very specific way - the activity in the Baltic of the old "Keysers", cruisers and destroyers seems to have never been questioned.

                Correctly. Two light cruisers are pirating with might and main - in the face of the entire Baltic Fleet. Does this characterize our fleet well? They could have fought with the Wittelsbachs, Essen seemed to want, but somehow did not grow together.
                Quote: Moore
                As for our First Detachment in Helsingfors - here you can talk differently

                Well, Essen was going to use them very actively and prepared for the battle with the Germans (he thought of piracy by light forces under the guise of Sevastopol) But ... he didn’t live. For the umpteenth time - well, why as soon as a more or less decent admiral appears, he dies all the time before he could realize his plans? Very sensible Admiral Kerber, who just commanded our dreadnoughts, was pushed back, because he was German by birth ... Well, alas, one could not expect much from naval commanders like Kanin and Bakhirev
            2. The comment was deleted.
            3. 0
              17 December 2015 20: 33
              And what had to be done ??
          2. +1
            17 December 2015 16: 57
            Quote: Moore
            Well, yes, mine production for effective military operations cannot be recognized.

            In this case, no, it’s impossible.
            For the Baltic people, mine installations were defensive (when they blocked the straits to Moonsund and the passage to the Finnish) and active when mines were secretly placed on German communications. So, in terms of active mine installations, the Baltics really distinguished themselves, but the death of the German destroyers has nothing to do with them - it was blown up at defensive barriers. And the Germans KNEW that they were going to the minefields - and still they went.
            In general, if you built a fortress, the enemy approached it, and instead of besieging it or taking an assault there, you took it — and it struck your head against the wall — it's nice, yes. But is this victory achieved through skillful defensive tactics? :)
            Quote: Moore
            Everything needs to be beautiful - in a linear system, with smoke, bursts of shells. Like in Chemulpo, right?

            Why, as in Chemulpo? You can, for example, how "Panteleimon" caressed a "Geben" near the Bosphorus - the first salvo from a distance of under 100 kbt ... Or how the same Baltic "Novik" nailed 2 German destroyers ... Like "Ekaterina", from which "Goeben" ran away at all blades ...
        3. The comment was deleted.
        4. +1
          17 December 2015 07: 30
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          the result of the exceptional alternative giftedness of the German admiral, who sent destroyers to Russian minefields at night.

          hi Hello Andrey !!! Losing 7 out of 11 destroyers just for nothing, you really have to be a gifted naval commander! Although it is a sin to conceal, ours also suffered from "giftedness", in the battle of Gotland, many questions also arise for Bakhirev. drinks
    2. 0
      16 December 2015 22: 07
      Quote: Denimax
      Could you suggest?

      To do this, you had to be a complete schizophrenic. And to abandon the construction of the Baltic fleet altogether - with such initial ones, it is simply not needed.
      Quote: Denimax
      In the WWI, the Baltic Fleet also did not swim very well.

      He was afraid of many times superior to his German.
      1. 0
        16 December 2015 22: 18
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        He was afraid of many times superior to his German.

        What kind of fantasies? They drove the Germans as they wanted.
        1. +1
          17 December 2015 07: 05
          Quote: Pomoryanin
          What kind of fantasies? They drove the Germans as they wanted.

          Vladimir, carefully study history, read about the breakthrough of the Germans into the Gulf of Riga in the summer of 1915, about the actions of the Baltic Fleet at that time, about admirals V.A. Kanine, N.F. Grigoriev, about the fate of the heroic "Glory", about how officers and sailors wrote their wills on the first day of the war. If we are already talking about history, then it is unnecessary to take facts out of context.
          1. 0
            17 December 2015 20: 25
            Let's go through the course together. It became 1915. Please, I am writing from memory, so some numbers may slightly differ. Moonzund 1915 Hans, silushka: 7 battleships, 24 destroyers, 4 cruisers, 25 minesweepers and other vessels. Our mighty silushka: battleship "Slava", 4 ancient cannon boats, minesag, 5 submarines. The results of the breakthrough of the great strategists, bearers of European values, sorry for the cynicism: Hans: 2 destroyers and 2 minesweepers drowned, got a torpedo smelling of paint "Moltke" and some other solid ships, I don't remember. Ours: TWO gunboats from the times of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea. This one, and what needs to be done to protect the victory? CAPTURE KAISER ALIVE ??
            1. +1
              18 December 2015 07: 40
              Quote: Pomoryanin
              This, and what needs to be done so that you defend the victory? KAISER CAPTURE ALIVE ??

              Oh, Vladimir, the winner is the one who got his way! Did the Germans enter the Gulf of Riga? Did the Russians prevent the German breakthrough? I understand that the story is also a corrupt girl! But if we want to know the truth, then we must be based on facts, otherwise we have already reached the point where some of the Black Sea was dug up, and from others Adam appeared!
              Quote: Pomoryanin
              TWO gunboats from the time of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea.

              Big request, Vladimir, do not insult quite normal ships !!!! The canboat "Sivuch" was not even a bad ship for the tasks for which it was built, and after the battle you mentioned, it was nicknamed the Baltic Varyag.
              1. 0
                18 December 2015 20: 49
                Let the new gunboat Sivuch. I won't argue ..
                Quote: Serg65
                and after the battle you mentioned, she was called the Baltic Varangian.

                Well, yes, Varyag. And the unfortunate "Korean" was blown up again ...
      2. 0
        17 December 2015 20: 27
        This is when the Hansov fleet in the First World War in the Baltic Sea exceeded the Russian ??
  12. -1
    16 December 2015 22: 04
    Quote: Lexi2
    After all, they bought essentially long-range artillery. And not a cruiser.

    I’m here to my opponents and I am crucifying myself in explanation. Why put long-range artillery on the cruiser? Which stood on the pier and had little chance to go to sea.
    1. +1
      16 December 2015 22: 17
      Sea trials were scheduled for August. It was not enough a couple of months for the ship to be able to move independently.
  13. 0
    16 December 2015 22: 09
    Quote: Alf
    But the British did not know that there was nothing for the cruisers to do in convoys. So they included even battleships in the escort.

    I wanted to mention the British, who had enough fleets. And the cruiser there certainly would not have done the weather. Or do you think that the Allies would stop sending convoys if they didn’t find their cruiser there?
    1. +2
      16 December 2015 22: 16
      The trick is that the Anglo-American fleet covered the area of ​​responsibility to the meridian of Bear Island. To the east is the area of ​​responsibility of the Northern Fleet. And the heavy cruiser SF there was clearly not enough. Do you think that Admiral Scheer would behave so impudently, knowing that the Soviets have something to catch him with?
  14. 0
    16 December 2015 22: 30
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    To do this, you had to be a complete schizophrenic.

    Well, apparently it turned out.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And to abandon the construction of the Baltic fleet altogether - with such initial ones, it is simply not needed.

    He is needed, the only question is: What should it be.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    He was afraid of many times superior to his German.

    And then he became afraid of mines and aircraft. And just stood. After all, one must take geography into account.
  15. 0
    16 December 2015 22: 37
    Quote: Pomoryanin
    The trick is that the Anglo-American fleet covered the area of ​​responsibility to the meridian of Bear Island. To the east is the area of ​​responsibility of the Northern Fleet. And the heavy cruiser SF there was clearly not enough. Do you think that Admiral Scheer would behave so impudently, knowing that the Soviets have something to catch him with?

    We have already written about battleships in a convoy. The probability of a breakthrough of German heavy ships, of course, was, therefore, there was such a presentation of strength that there was no habit. And Scheer would have hit this cruiser, since it would be more powerful.
    1. 0
      16 December 2015 22: 45
      Is not a fact. A volley from Lyuttsov could calmly send Scheer to the cod. Or is it preferable for you to chase the battleship Noviki royal construction ??
    2. Alf
      +1
      16 December 2015 22: 51
      Quote: Denimax
      And Scheer would have hit this cruiser, since it would be more powerful.

      It is doubtful. Sheer would have caused damage to Petropavlovsk, but his odyssey would have ended, because, even dying, Petropavlovsk would have managed to shout over the radio about his coordinates. In addition, damage to the raider, even when he won the naval battle, deprives him of 2 main advantages: 1. Secrecy 2. Reduced mobility, after which the hunt for him became only a matter of time.
    3. +1
      17 December 2015 12: 19
      Quote: Denimax
      And Scheer would have hit this cruiser, since it would be more powerful.

      Langsdorf thought so too. As a result, he lost to Harwood, who had an under-KRT with 6 * 8 "and two budget KRL with 8 * 6" on each.

      If we compare Panzerschiff and "Hippers", then the latter and SUAO are better (the heaviest and most expensive of their contemporaries smile ), and more speed.
      1. 0
        17 December 2015 20: 14
        Absolutely reasonable and balanced answer.
      2. 0
        17 December 2015 21: 09
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Langsdorf thought so too

        Not that :))) At first, Langsdorf sincerely believed that he was dealing with Exeter and two destroyers :) When I realized that I was mistaken, it was a little late :)))
        Quote: Alexey RA
        As a result, he lost to Harwood, who had an under-KRT with 6 * 8 "and two budget KRL with 8 * 6" on each.

        Yes. But at the same time, the battle clearly showed how dangerous the battle of a Washington cruiser against an enemy with 280-mm artillery was. In fact, the Exeter's participation in the battle ended 20 minutes after its start - the rest of the time the heavily damaged cruiser fired from the only surviving tower “somewhere in the wrong direction”. Harwood won due to the fact that he had three ships and he used them very risky (but also skillfully), for which he earned 200% the gratitude of descendants.
        And so - all other things being equal, the duel of "Hipper" against "Sheer" would have ended quickly enough and not in favor of the 203-mm cruiser.
        Again - all other things being equal. The fact is that in Norway the large German ships did not have the opportunity to properly train their crews. The result is a rather weak shooting of the German gunners (the same "New Year's battle"). On the other hand, it is difficult to say how accurate ours were ... In general, Sheer's battle against Petropavlovsk (subject to the determination of both commanders) is rather difficult to predict.
  16. 0
    16 December 2015 22: 57
    Quote: Pomoryanin
    Is not a fact. A volley from Lyuttsov could calmly send Scheer to the cod.

    I presume that on Scheer the armor was thicker and a caliber of 280 mm, although two guns were less.
    Quote: Pomoryanin
    Or is it preferable for you to chase the battleship Noviki royal construction ??

    No one needs to chase, everything has already happened, and without a cruiser. Or do you think that the cruiser could change something? At least save that icebreaker?
    1. 0
      17 December 2015 20: 13
      Converted transport comrade. Hitler was sunk by the British destroyer Sydney under the Penguin raider. Heavy cruiser versus "pocket battleship" in your opinion, nothing at all ??
  17. +2
    17 December 2015 02: 10
    Everything is clear with the cruiser ... But I honestly am most interested in the ending of the article: Marshal Tukhachevsky and his project of an air gun with a caliber of 250 mm! belay How was he going to use it and why? Build a flying battleship? belay Can anyone enlighten on this subject? By the way, an interesting and quite promising topic for the article-projects of Marshal Tukhachevsky! what
    1. 0
      17 December 2015 07: 39
      As for the 250-mm author, I think, bent.
      The most "grandiose" project of Kurchevsky (the author of the idea) in terms of dynamo-jet air cannons is sort of like the 152-mm APK-9. The design of the gun was started in 1932. The weight of the gun was 500 kg. The store housed 6 unitary shots. The main shell was supposed to be a shrapnel weighing 25 kg. Shot weight is about 50 kg. According to the project, the initial speed is 500 m / s, the rate of fire is 10 rds / min, and the range is 13 km (?!).

      In total, in 1931 – 1935. factories produced over 5000 land, sea and aviation guns of Kurchchevsky, that is, from 30 to 50% of the number ordered. Military envoys received from the industry no more than 2000 guns, and only about 1000 fell into the troops. However, the tools that entered the service were quickly written off or transferred to the training category. By November 1 1936, the army had 563 Kurchevsky guns (BOD, SPK and RK), and in the fleet there were several dozen 76-mm CPC boat guns.
      As a result, by June 22, 1941, there was not a single Kurchevsky gun in the troops.
      1. 0
        17 December 2015 20: 08
        Actually, in the text "UNDER 250 mm". Well, if you like, I can admit the inaccuracy in the presentation.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. 0
      17 December 2015 20: 10
      Well, I tried to build. But most importantly, TWO plants were involved in solving this adventure, in practice they had been doing nothing for several years.
  18. 0
    11 January 2016 06: 38
    31 March 1921 year at the request of the crew "Petropavlovsk" was renamed "Marat". Or I'm wrong? I even have a copper ship plaque with a name.
    1. 0
      11 January 2016 10: 15
      Alas, you are mistaken. You confuse the battleship of the tsarist construction with the heavy cruiser purchased in 1940 in Germany.
  19. 0
    25 March 2016 21: 31
    Quote: alex86
    if they are not in the know, then their first to the wall, because they are incompetent - i.e. they don’t know how to do what they have undertaken — that is, to rule the country.

    that is, labeled with an alcoholic Boriska - it would have to be brought to justice - did I understand that? :))
    Quote: Lexi2
    Well, why did you know?

    Well, nifiga yourself ... where is it not a secret, if even on June 21, 1941 it turned out to be news even for the high command? all planning was based on the fact that the war would begin no earlier than 1942, and "luttsov" at the time of purchase were planned to be commissioned by May 1941 ?! so who was there that assumed - explain pzhlsta? preferably documented ... :)
    Quote: Lexi2
    What does this have to do with the difficult situation in 1941? According to the laws of wartime, this is sabotage. To study what the result will be equal to 0.

    again - the purchase was not in 1941, but a year earlier ... read the article or looked diagonally?
    Quote: Denimax
    It’s better to have two than one, it’s easier to disguise, it’s easier to throw them around.

    two light tanks instead of one t-34?
  20. 0
    4 August 2023 18: 22
    The cruiser must be completed according to project 83, not 53.

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