Most commentators and experts associate this action with Ukraine and consider this move to be an incentive for the Kiev regime to refuse to pay 3 billions of dollars of debt, which is due on December 20. At first glance, this is exactly the case, but there are a number of nuances that make one doubt it.
First, talk about such a change in the IMF charter has been going on for several years, and began even when Moscow did not have any Kiev debt.
Secondly, this amendment to the charter expands the boundaries of the fund’s capabilities, rather than increases its responsibilities. That is, the IMF "may", but not "obliged." Otherwise, such a change could be used by any problem countries, starting with Greece and ending with Portugal and Argentina.
Thirdly, since the fund “can”, but is not “obliged”, this does not mean that after the declaration of default of Ukraine, he will continue to lend it. Moreover, in recent months, he is clearly in no hurry to do this even without a default.
The main questions that I constantly ask skeptics who believe that the IMF is playing against Russia:
What prevented the IMF from crediting the Kiev regime for three billion so far? Moreover, the IMF has already violated the previously established schedule for providing trenches to Kiev, and then, under various pretexts, transferred the next tranche several times (and, as it was said recently, “this year Ukraine will not receive anything from the IMF”). As we see, the IMF is not eager to give money to the Kiev regime.
What prevented the IMF from acting as a guarantor of the return of Ukrainian debt to 3 billion, as suggested by Vladimir Putin? The IMF also did not want to do this.
I certainly admit that such a change in the IMF charter among its goals may also contain an attempt to pressure Russia to restructure debt. But this attempt is not at all convincing and, according to Russian officials already voiced by statements, did not bring any results - since no one went to restructuring Russian conditions, Russia will not accept other conditions.
Moreover, neither the fact of amending the IMF charter, nor the potential opportunity for the Kiev regime to receive loans after a default does not cancel the fact of default, which will occur ten days after December 20, Kiev refuses to pay its bills.
As one of the options, the Russian government can obtain a court decision, according to which any receipts of finances to the accounts of the Kiev regime will be arrested and transferred directly to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to repay the loan. International practice, among other methods of debt collection, provides for such an option. So even if the IMF decides to lend to the Kiev regime after the default, this money can go not to Kiev, but immediately to Moscow. Or, as another option to London, to insurance companies that guaranteed this issue of Eurobonds.
If the abstract “West” decides to consistently destroy its own judicial and financial systems built over the centuries for the sake of momentary support for the unviable Kiev regime, I personally will not pay.
This will not save the regime, and for discrediting and the collapse of several institutions of the world imperialist system, three billion dollars is not too much of a price. Especially since, as Bismarck used to say, “Russians always come for their money. And when they come - do not rely on the Jesuit agreements that you have signed, supposedly justifying you. They are not worth the paper they are written on. Therefore, it is worth playing with Russians either playing honestly or not playing at all. ”