Military Review

The actions of the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet in the first period of the war

31



In the first period of World War II, the Black Sea Fleet covered and supported the coastal flank of the ground forces, provided for its own and violated enemy naval communications. The battle in the communications were submarine and surface ships, as well as the Air Force fleet.

Organizationally, the submarines were reduced to two brigades and a separate training division. The 1 Brigade consisted of four divisions, in which there were 22 large and medium submarines. The submarine brigade 2 consisted of small submarines 18, which were divided into three divisions. A separate training division included 7 submarines of the type "Y" and "M". As of 22 in June, 1941 of 55 submarines was 32 in service, 15, 8 of “L”, “Sh”, “C” and “M” type boats were under repair in a separate division of submarines under construction and capital repairs.

It should be noted that the geographical and hydrometeorological features of the Black Sea had a serious impact on the use of the submarine fleet. In particular, in the western and northwestern regions, it was distinguished by shallow depths, which allowed the enemy to place dense minefields here (before 1943, along the western coast of the Black Sea, and also near the southern coast of Crimea, the enemy placed about 4950 mines, of which around 1700 deepening 10-12 m against submarines and 2795 mine defenders), make it difficult to submarine torpedo attacks and post-attack maneuvering. Calm weather unmasked the submarine when using its periscope. The great difficulty was that our fleet did not have sufficient data on the enemy’s fairways, minefields, and detailed descriptions of coastal areas. This required commanders to carefully analyze the situation, taking cautious and at the same time decisive action.

Already on the first day of the war, Soviet submarines began deploying to predetermined positions. The battle account opened "U-211" under the command of Lieutenant-Captain A.D. Nine. In the evening of August 5, this boat left the base with the task of destroying enemy transport ships and warships. For several days “U-211” persistently searched for the enemy and on the tenth day after reaching the position, she found two large vehicles on the communications of the enemy. Having approached the 3 cable course, the commander produced a two-torpedo salvo in transport with an 5700 tonne displacement, which soon sank.

September 21 "U-211" once again went to sea. From the first day of his tenure as captain-lieutenant Devyatko, he persistently carried out a search, which was crowned with success only on the morning of September 29. Finding the enemy convoy, marching with a cargo of oil products from Constanta to Italy, the commander decided to attack the main transport. He began maneuvering to get closer to the enemy. In the meantime, torpedoists prepared three nasal torpedo tubes for shooting. One and a half minutes remained before the volley when Devyatko noticed a patrol boat going straight to the submarine. The commander lowered the periscope, and when he raised it, the lead angle to the target was missed.

This failure did not discourage Nine. He decided to fire the tanker, which was second in the wake column, with a stern torpedo tube. The submarine increased the speed, crossed the line of enemy ships, and from a distance of about 2 cable produced a volley. The torpedo hit the tanker with a displacement of 7000 t. However, its explosion was not enough to sink the ship, which, having been damaged, remained afloat.

The next day, the commander returned to the area of ​​attack to finish off the tanker. But this intention was not carried out: the patrol boats discovered the boat and were attacked by depth charges. Actively maneuvering, Nine broke away from the enemy. In the evening, he again approached the damaged tanker and sank it with a two-torpedo gulp from a distance in the 6 cable.

The actions of the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet in the first period of the war


Success was achieved by the submarine of Captain-Lieutenant V.Ya. Vlasov "Shch-214". 30 October, she went on a military campaign. The persistent search was crowned with success: at dawn 3 in November, the signalman reported on the discovered schooner. The submarine went to rapprochement. Vlasov decided to destroy the ship with artillery fire, which was opened from a distance of three quarters of cable. Komendory hit the target with the first shot. After several hits, the schooner caught fire and began to sink. On the night of November 5, being in a cruising position (this is a surface position in which the tanks were quickly submerged, and the middle and main ballast were not filled, in this position the submarine is ready for urgent immersion), “U-214” discovered a large tanker. Commander, after maneuvering from a distance of 4-x cable, he fired a shot from his nose. The Italian tanker Torcello with a displacement of about 3500 t sailed from the Bosphorus to Constanza. The loss of two of the five tankers that delivered fuel from Constanta to Italy forced the enemy to stop the delivery of fuel for the Italian fleet until mid-May 1942.

Fighting with sea transportation and submarines "Sch-210", "Sch-215", "M-34", "M-35." Disrupting communications, the Black Sea forces forced the enemy to allocate significant ship forces and aviationkeep them in constant readiness to protect their shipping. This submariners contributed to the defense of Odessa. Thanks to their actions, almost the entire enemy fleet was occupied by anti-submarine defense, which, of course, increased the danger for our submariners, who required an exceptionally great strain of forces, high combat skill, and the ability to overcome numerous and unexpected difficulties.

By mid-November 1941, due to the danger of losing the Crimea, submarines moved from the Crimean ports to the ports of the Caucasus, this significantly lengthened their passage to the enemy communications area, reduced the time spent in positions and interrupted the actions of the M-type boats. only 7-8 days. In December, after stabilization of the situation in Sevastopol, the group of M-type boats of the second brigade returned to Sevastopol and resumed its activities.



The main method used by submarines in the fight against enemy communications was positional. In positions representing rectangles with sides of 15x20 miles, boats passively awaited the enemy. In the autumn, when new positions were cut into submarines, cruise was introduced in a limited area, in which the commanders were given some freedom of maneuvering for a more active search for the enemy. However, this method in 1941 was not widespread due to stormy weather and the loss of submarines on enemy mines.

Just before the start of 1942, Soviet submarines made 103 combat campaigns, sank 8 ships (22405 brt) and damaged 4 (14250 brt).

In 1942, the enemy strengthened the defense of communications. The number of warships in convoys and search and attack groups, patrols that flew near naval bases increased. In the spring of 1942, the 20 high-speed barges (BDB) used for escorting convoys were commissioned. BDB were armed with depth charges and artillery. The short length and draft of the BDB did not allow our boats to successfully attack them. BDB participated in the search and strike groups that went to search our boats at night. Yet the main danger remained mine. For the period from October 16 1941 to July 3, the opponent 1942 put 2018 mines to cover communications.

In 1941, the enemy did not subject our submarines to long pursuit. In 1942, the situation changed, the persecution became persistent, lasted for several hours. The enemy dropped hundreds of depth and aerial bombs on them, but this did not stop the Black Sea people.

New in the search tactics were the following: groups of submarines in operations in the area of ​​Odessa Bay and in the Sulin-Bugaz segment of communication, due to the complex mine-navigation situation, used the enemy's waiting method. When parked without running at night in the surface, and in the daytime in a submerged position, carrying out visual and noise-guided observation. They made the transitions only to change the place of observation or when they received intelligence data on the movement of convoys. Also in the first half of May 1942, joint actions were carried out in 12 miles from Fidonisi Island of the submarines M-117 and M-118, with the task of identifying enemy communications. Total 8 days of the boat performed the task according to a specially composed instruction, which provided that during the day one of the boats was at the indicated point at anchor in a submerged position, the second one charged the batteries at night and moved under the periscope during the day to take a new position. At the same time reconnaissance aircraft monitored the enemy, and its data were transmitted to the boats.

During the first half of 1942, “U-213”, “A-3”, “A-5” and others acted on the lines of enemy communications. The greatest success fell on the submarine Shch-205, the captain of the rank 3 PD. Sukhomlinov. In the evening of May 18 north of Cape Karaburun, she discovered loaded enemy transport with a displacement of 1500 tons. Since the torpedo attack was impossible to produce due to the large course angle and unacceptably shallow depth, the commander decided to destroy the enemy with artillery. For some time, the Black Sea people were pursuing transport underwater. As the sun went down, "U-205" surfaced and began to quickly overtake the enemy. Seeing that the boat did not leave, the transport turned sharply toward the shore and ran aground. In the same direction, the signalman noticed a large two-masted schooner. The commander ordered the gunners to destroy it. With a fourth salvo, the gunners covered the target and went down to defeat. The schooner caught fire and sank. Then the artillery fire was set on fire and discarded vehicles. After 5 days, the Shch-205 submarine, having approached the 3 cable distance, sank another vehicle with two torpedoes, and then returned safely to the base.

29 in May was accompanied by the success of the submarine A-3, commanded by Senior Lieutenant S.A. Tsurikov, who destroyed two torpedoes fired at an interval of 8 seconds in the area of ​​Odessa, transporting the enemy Sulina with a displacement of 4000 tons.



Thus, the Soviet submarines inflicted significant damage to the enemy. Acting in shallow water and in mined areas, submarine commanders used the following tactics: monitoring areas during periods of stay at an underwater anchor, torpedo firing at small depths of the sea (for example, the successful actions of the A-3 and A-5 boats "In Odessa Bay).

Along with the violation of enemy communications, the Black Sea submarines carried out other tasks. So, in April 1942 of the year, it was decided to use the submarine fleet to ensure the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food to besieged Sevastopol. The use of submarines for transport purposes was caused by the situation: low-speed ships could not break through to Sevastopol, and the fleet management decided to entrust the transportation to the Black Sea warships. To increase the cargo capacity and payload of submarines, they left such a supply of fuel, engine oils and fresh water, which provided the transition to Sevastopol and the way back, removed half of the standard ammunition, large and medium submarines, carried only 2 torpedoes. All this made it possible to bring the capacity of large boats to 95 tons, medium-sized ones to 50 tons.

Cargo acceptance was made in Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The transfer of the boat was usually carried out on the surface; they sank only when danger appeared. In Sevastopol entered at dusk, in the dark time they were unloaded and before the dawn they set off on their way back.

May 9 1942 and D-4 boats were delivered to the defenders of the city 4 tons of food. Through 112,8 weeks, submarines of type “C” were brought in for transportation, and from June 2, on the orders of the fleet commander, all submarines that were in service were used to transport cargo to Sevastopol. Until the end of the defense, they carried out 20 flights, during which they delivered about 78 tons of ammunition, foodstuffs and gasoline, removed more 4000 wounded and civilians, and also about 1300 tons of various valuable cargoes. The intensive use of submarines for transportation purposes, on a large scale, was a new form of transportation for the Navy.

Submarine campaigns were extremely difficult, the Nazis sought to prevent these campaigns at all costs. So, on the submarine "L-24", 26-29 June 308 bombs were dropped. The X-LUMEN X-NUMX submarine, which made the transition from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, was subjected to prolonged prosecution on June 30. During the pursuit, 23 bombs were dropped on L-23. During the first four days of July, enemy ships dropped our submarines, part of the 800 Brigade, on 5, more than 1 depth charges.



The supply of the besieged Sevastopol demanded tremendous moral and physical tension from the submariners. In the final days of the defense, the enemy resistance on the way to Sevastopol turned out to be so strong that only M-8 and A-112 could penetrate the 2 submarines heading into it. The crews of these boats showed extraordinary skill and courage. So, on the transition "A-2" several times made an urgent dive, evading aircraft. During the day, she was hit by more 200 bombs. On the approaches to besieged Sevastopol, the submarine was discovered and attacked by patrol boats. Having gone to the depth, "A-2" forced a minefield, 6 once having a touch with the body of the miniprep. On the shore, the boat was shelled by the Germans from small weapons. Taking from the shore aboard people, the submarine 5 July came to Novorossiysk.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Sevastopol, submarines resumed operations on the Black Sea communications. From July to August, they performed 13 combat campaigns. 5 August 1942, the Shch-205 submarine, being in the surface position, attacked transport east of Cape Olinka, accompanied by two patrol boats, causing serious damage to it. Two days later, in the Sudak area, the M-62 submarine from a submerged position with two torpedoes fired at a time interval attacked the German high-speed landing barge. On August 17, in the Gulf of Odessa, the submarine M-36 destroyed enemy transport, and after 6 days east of Cape Burnas, M-36 increased the number of destroyed ships by sinking another transport vessel. In September, the Black Sea submarine fleet carried out 14 exits to combat enemy communications. Boats began to more actively use the method of cruising in a limited area, night attacks, volley torpedo firing and firing with a time interval.

During the battle for the Caucasus, Soviet submarines sank transports with troops, equipment, ammunition, fuel and food. They had to perform combat missions in difficult conditions of shallow-water areas, air supremacy of enemy aircraft and powerful antisubmarine defense.

The success was accompanied by the boat "U-216". On October 10, she sank the enemy vehicles with a displacement of 4500 tons. On October 21 increased the number of destroyed M-35 ships. The Nazis dropped bombs on the 32 submarine, but they could not hurt the boat. From the beginning of October until the end of the year, the divers had 50 encounters with warships and enemy transport ships, 25 once went on the attack. For 1942 a year, Soviet submarines made 133 combat exits, had 102 encounters with enemy ships and ships, made 40 torpedo attacks. Black Sea submarines sank 16 transports, as well as 3 landing barges and one tug.

Naturally, the main weapon of the Soviet submarines were torpedoes. However, in the fight against enemy communications, they also used mine weapons. Over the 1941-1942 years they delivered on enemy communications about 460 min. Mine set-ups were carried out covertly from a submerged position, into a line or according to a combat order, which indicated the coordinates and time of the statement. Until 1942, submarine barriers went into the sea only with the task of mine settings, later, after the laying of mines, they remained in a given area and were used in a torpedo version. For example, 4 in October 1942, the boat "L-24" put a minefield line consisting of 20 mines, and then, at the position, October 7, three torpedoes fired at a time interval of 12 seconds, attacked and damaged the enemy vehicles.

In the course of combat operations on sea lanes, submariners used artillery, both at night and in the daytime, taking into account the situation and possible opposition of the enemy. In 1942, they sank 7 of enemy schooners with artillery fire.

In addition to fighting on the lines of sea communications and transportation of cargo to besieged Sevastopol, the Black Sea submariners in the first period of the war performed a number of other tasks: they carried out patrol service, conducted reconnaissance, landed amphibious groups, fired ports with artillery. The most difficult was the task of navigation support, since the submarine usually anchored, lost its maneuverability, and thus put itself in grave danger. The first special exits for navigation support were made in December 1941, during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation

For example, the submarine "Shch-203" landed the officers of the hydrographic department who installed the manipulator lights. "U-201" and "M-51" set up two luminous buoys on the approaches to Theodosia. The same boats illuminated the approach to the city from the sea with searchlights and lights, ensuring the movement of ships and ships with a landing force.

From the beginning of the war until the end of 1942, the submarines carried out 14 trips for navigational support. In addition, in seven campaigns, these activities were carried out simultaneously with other tasks. For example, in the middle of September, X-NUMX launched C-1942 for operations on German communications. In addition to the attacks of ships, she was also assigned the tasks of artillery, shelling of transports in the port of Yalta and navigational support for the raid of our torpedo boats into Dvuyakornaya Bay (Feodosia region). From 31 September, C-14 conducted reconnaissance of Dvuyakornaya Bay and adjacent areas for 31 days, and at night, on 6 September, navigated the boats, and then switched to the position, attacking enemy vehicles with torpedoes.



Thus, the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet, constantly acting on the sea communications in the first period of the war, often forced the enemy to abandon the escort of convoys, separate transports, to take serious anti-submarine defense, delivered sensitive blows to the enemy and kept him in constant tension.

The submarine fleet control system, which was carried out directly by the brigade commanders through its headquarters in accordance with the instructions of the Military Council of the fleet, justified itself. Radio was the main means of controlling submarines at sea. Usually, at night, submariners received information about the enemy, about changes in the situation through the fleet communications center. The radio reception on the Black Sea submarines began immediately after leaving the base and rushed continuously until the dive. At positions, submarines were allowed to use radio communications exclusively for reception, and the transmission was allowed only when they returned to the base.

The experience of military operations showed that the refusal of submarine forces from the positional method in the fight against enemy maritime transport was correct, but it occurred gradually as the combat experience increased and the changing situation was taken into account. So, in August 1941, when hostilities were transferred to enemy bases, submarines were allowed to charge batteries to go to designated areas outside the position. In the autumn, the size of the positions increased, which made it possible to use boats in limited areas. At the same time, the commanders received more initiative and began to act more actively: they searched for ships off the coast or behind the edge of the supposed minefields. The number of meetings with the enemy has increased significantly. In 1942, submariners were recommended to maneuver off the coast in daylight, and to go out at night to replenish energy resources over a line of minefields. These changes were prerequisites for the subsequent, more advanced methods of cruising in a wide area and maneuvering positions.

During the fighting, the tactical skills of submarine commanders, who improved torpedo firing methods, grew. It is worth noting that in 1941, the Soviet submariners used mainly the method of aiming firing with one torpedo, and in 1942, they increasingly began to switch to shooting with two or three torpedoes with a time interval. The use of this method made it possible to overlap the mistakes made in determining the parameters of the movement of the target and increase the effectiveness of attacks.

The growth of tactical skills of commanders affected the use of submarines in the most difficult conditions of hostilities on coastal enemy communications, which were characterized by small length, shallow depths, dense minefields, strong protection from the coast, and the use of shallow and high-speed vessels by the enemy. All this affected the losses. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, 18 Soviet submarines were killed in the Black Sea fleet during the first period of the war, including 8 at minefields.



Sources:
Olkhovatsky O. To act with arms unlimited ... Underwater war in the Black Sea in documents and memoirs. Part of 1. SPb .: Maritime Heritage, 2015. C. 32-40, 164-187, 231-244.
Morozov M., Kuznetsov A. The Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. Short course of fighting. M .: Eksmo, 2015. C.34-38, 65-66.
Vorobyov V. Combat operations of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1977. No. 6. S. 49-54.
Basov V. The combat path of the Soviet Navy. M .: Voenizdat, 1988. C. 362-365.
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  1. oldav
    oldav 11 December 2015 06: 23 New
    +2
    But how did the Germans end up in the Black Sea? Did their Turks let them through, were they neutral?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 December 2015 10: 32 New
      +4
      Quote: oldav
      But how did the Germans end up in the Black Sea? Did their Turks let them through, were they neutral?

      The Germans at the World Cup were in various ways. They transferred submarines along inland waterways (in this case, part of the route had to be done overland). TKA transported.
      The BDB and KFK universal boats were built on the Black Sea itself - while the pace of construction was so high that some of the ships built were transferred to Middle Mediterranean. The straits passed without weapons - as formally civilian vessels. Fortunately, the same KFK in their ancestors had a small seiner.
      Here are the data from Morozov for 1943:
      During the campaign, three submarines, three torpedo boats, 10 motorized minesweepers, 56 airborne infantry ships arrived at the theater or were built directly on the Black Sea shipyards (three military infantry regiments were transferred to the Romanian Navy in October and December, four were transferred via the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean Sea), seven military transports CT (six of them were completed as large submarine hunters), 30 multipurpose ships of the KFK type (two went through the Bosphorus, the rest were completed as hunters). The mobilization and conversion into civilian warships continued.
    2. chunga-changa
      chunga-changa 11 December 2015 10: 46 New
      +3
      Quote: oldav
      But how did the Germans end up in the Black Sea?

      The Germans in the Black Sea had only light forces. Everything was delivered by rail and the Rhine-Danube river system. Plus construction on site. Large ships of the Black Sea Fleet were drowned by German aircraft.
      Subsequently, at the World Cup, several auxiliary ships and vessels were transferred through the Bosphorus. Formally, the Turks did not violate anything. After the war, this helped them defend their territory from the USSR’s claims to Kars and the straits.
      As for mine productions, the minefields near the Crimea were mainly ours, this greatly complicated the actions of the fleet and led to losses. German-Italian-Romanians exposed minefields from the Bosphorus to the Romanian ports, and under their cover conducted caravans of ships.
  2. Good cat
    Good cat 11 December 2015 06: 51 New
    +2
    The Turks were not only neutral, they were waiting in the wings, to participate in the attack on the USSR, they did not wait thanks to the actions of the Soviet Army and Navy, thanks for the article, it is very informative!
    1. Cap.Morgan
      Cap.Morgan 11 December 2015 08: 59 New
      +3
      And the navy?
      Or thanks to the occupation of Iran? With the subsequent possible invasion of the allied army in Turkey from the east.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 11 December 2015 10: 44 New
        0
        Quote: Cap.Morgan
        Or thanks to the occupation of Iran? With the subsequent possible invasion of the allied army in Turkey from the east.

        Not only from the East. After the capture of Iran, the entire Asian part of Turkey, in fact, found itself in a "continental encirclement" - all border countries were either controlled by the Allies or belonged to this bloc.
        In the south, in Syria, there were Gaullists and limes, who drove out the Vichy from there in 1941. In Iraq, after the suppression of the 1941 revolt, they again sat in limes. From the north loomed the Transcaucasian Front of the USSR. There was only one neutral Iran - and it was occupied.
      2. Amurets
        Amurets 11 December 2015 13: 17 New
        +2
        Quote: Cap.Morgan
        Or thanks to the occupation of Iran? With the subsequent possible invasion of the allied army in Turkey from the east.

        Yesterday in one of the posts I already answered a similar question. L.P. Beria did not allow to remove and defended the 5 border and security divisions of the NKVD, which were guarding the border with Turkey. These divisions were supposed to remove from the border with Turkey and guards bridges and coasts and transfer to the defense of the North Caucasus. If he didn’t do this, then the Turks, incited by the Germans, could strike Baku’s oil fields from the South, as well as Batumi’s naval base, which was the Black Sea Fleet’s rear base. Such a plan. By the way, the British were muddying the water there.
        1. Warrior2015
          Warrior2015 4 August 2016 22: 10 New
          0
          Quote: Amurets
          If he didn’t do this, then the Turks, incited by the Germans, could inflict a blow on Baku’s oil fields from the South, as well as Batumi’s naval base, which was the rear base of the Black Sea Fleet. The plan was like that. By the way, the British were muddying the water there.

          Well, Beria is probably smart for you and well done?
          And England is such an enemy for the USSR and not an ally at all? Oh well...
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 11 December 2015 08: 03 New
    +2
    Thank you, we touched on a very interesting topic ...
  4. Talgat 148
    Talgat 148 11 December 2015 08: 50 New
    +2
    Some small German warships hit the Black Sea by rail through Romania.
  5. Cap.Morgan
    Cap.Morgan 11 December 2015 08: 56 New
    +4
    Only it is not clear with whom we fought?
    There was no German fleet. Italian too. Only boats.
    The Germans have high-speed barges with 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, for the fleet, where they use calibers of 300 - 400 mm, this is not a weapon. Where was our fleet? Hiding in Georgia?
    We had a cruiser there, there were plenty of boats, even type A - American Galand of the 17th year of release. At the same time, tankers go quietly from Romania to Crimea. And back.
    1. Walking
      Walking 11 December 2015 09: 47 New
      +3
      The Germans had aircraft, which was the main force in the Black Sea, especially after the capture of Crimea.
    2. Serg65
      Serg65 11 December 2015 09: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Cap.Morgan
      Only it is not clear with whom we fought?

      We fought with the 100-th bomber squadron and .... from Oktyabrsky Komflot! If you are so interested in the fighting of the KChF, take and read it, just consider the features of the war at the Black Sea Theater.
      1. cobalt
        cobalt 11 December 2015 18: 37 New
        +3
        And it was especially striking to me that the Germans, having no warships on the Black Sea, but only light and auxiliary forces, managed to evacuate most of their group from the Crimea in 1944, with small losses, and the Black Sea Fleet, with all its strength and power, did not I could really prevent this.
    3. qwert
      qwert 11 December 2015 10: 18 New
      +1
      They forgot about the Romanians. They were on the Black Sea the main force of the Axis allies. And about the Italians.
      During World War II, Italians deployed six ultra-small submarines of the SV type and ten torpedo boats of the 500 type to the Black Sea. All of them were delivered to Constanta by rail.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 December 2015 10: 59 New
      +2
      Quote: Cap.Morgan
      The Germans have high-speed barges with 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, for the fleet, where they use calibers of 300 - 400 mm, this is not a weapon. Where was our fleet? Hiding in Georgia?

      As the experience of 1943 (Operation Verp) showed, outside the effective range of their fighter aircraft, the ships of the fleet are floating targets for backlash. Even speed and maneuver do not help. By "effective radius" I meant the ability to keep at least a squadron above the ships for a couple of hours. And then in "Verpa" a regiment of long-range workers on "axes" was able to cover the ships simultaneously with no more than 4 vehicles.

      And the second: the fleet in Georgia survived. Having lost all the pre-war shipyards and shipyards and fairly knocked out a resource during the supply of Sevastopol. Lack of repair facilities led to the fact that the existing fleet composition already by mid-1942 was reduced to 1-2 CR, 3-5 EM and 2 TFR.

      And about "calibers of 300 - 400 mm" - this is not for the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet had the only LC with a 12 ", built by the last war. And the project of this LC was ... peculiar.
      1. Captain45
        Captain45 11 December 2015 12: 42 New
        +3
        Quote: Alexey RA
        As the experience of 1943 (Operation Verp) showed, outside the effective range of their fighter aircraft, the ships of the fleet are floating targets for backlash. Even speed and maneuver do not help. By "effective radius" I meant the ability to keep at least a squadron above the ships for a couple of hours.

        Yes, in October 1943, the Luftwaffe frolicked for some 5-6 hours, drowning one by one the leader of "Kharkov" and EM "Merciless" and "Capable" 90 miles from Gelendzhik, where the command post of the commander of the fleet Vladimirsky with the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, they looked at each other: “It just so happened that at the time of the sinking of the ships at the Command Post of the Black Sea Fleet, in addition to the entire leadership of the Black Sea Fleet, there was also the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov. Navy General Zhavoronkov. The case itself in the history of the Great Patriotic War is unique. "(C) V. Shigin" Sea dramas of the Second World War. "
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 December 2015 14: 18 New
          0
          Quote: Captain45
          Yes, in October 1943, the Luftwaffe frolicked for some 5-6 hours, drowning one by one the leader of "Kharkov" and EM "Merciless" and "Capable" 90 miles from Gelendzhik, where the command post of the commander of the fleet Vladimirsky with the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov looked at each other

          Duc ... what else can they do? There are few airfields on the coast and they are far away. The only regiment of long-range fighters of the Black Sea Fleet can send a squadron of "axes" ready for combat. This means that there will be a maximum of 2 pairs above the order (to the question of why we need AB - we will cover it from the shore. ") Against them, the Germans first put up equal and then superior forces of the IA.
          Plus, Negoda hesitated, deciding to pick up a downed German.
          By the way, they usually write that because of this order, the Germans bombed a standing "Kharkov". However, according to the report of Negoda, it follows that at the time of the raid, all ships were at 28 knots:
          EM "Merciless" and LD "Kharkov" at a speed of 28 knots walked around EM "Capable". EM "Capable" at full speed approached the floating pilots, backed up, without lowering the boats, approached the port side, gave a throwing end and took them on board. According to my observations and the statement of the commander of the EM "Capable", it took 5-7 minutes to complete this maneuver. EM "Capable" picking up pilots, developed a course of up to 28 knots, lay down on the course 115 °. EM "Merciless" walked at full speed, providing PLO EM "Capable" at the moment of giving the move EM "Merciless" remained on the EM "Capable" bearing of about 50 °. LD "Kharkiv", with a stroke of 28-30 knots, lay on a course of 115 °, EM "Merciless", with a stroke of 28 knots started to go out in the head.

          At 9:00 AM "Merciless" noticed a group of planes coming out of the sun and immediately opened fire on them. Enemy planes turned to LD "Kharkov". I noticed enemy aircraft at the moment when they began to dive onto the ship. As a result of the raid, the LD "Kharkiv" received a direct hit from one bomb in the area of ​​the 1-2 boiler rooms and the first turbine compartment.
      2. Captain45
        Captain45 11 December 2015 12: 49 New
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Outside the effective range of their fighter aircraft, fleet ships are floating targets for backlash. Even speed and maneuver do not save.

        What the Luftwaffe proved on October 6 by drowning the leader "Kharkov" and the destroyers "Merciless" and "Capable" in 5-6 hours in turn, practically in front of (90 miles) from the command post of the Black Sea Fleet, where the commander of the fleet Vladimirsky and the commissar of the fleet Kuznetsov were Chief of Staff of the Navy and the Commander of the Navy Air Force.
  6. Serg65
    Serg65 11 December 2015 09: 41 New
    +6
    The article is unambiguously +, the fighting of the Black Sea submariners deserves respect. The composition of submarines at the KChF was rather motley, these were AG-class boats launched back in 1916, these boats were built in Canada for the British Navy, and then purchased by Russia. Submarine type "D" (Decembrist), the first submarines of Soviet construction, submarines of type "Sh" V-bis, X and X-bis series, Shch-211 on August 11, 1941 landed a group of Bulgarian communists in the area of ​​Cape Karaburun, Sh-214 3 November 1941, she sank the Turkish schooner "Kainakdere" - this schooner became the first of 14 Turkish ships destroyed by Black Sea submarines in the Great Patriotic War. submarine minesagh type "L" (Leninist). Near Evpatoria, at a depth of 20 meters, lie the remains of two ships, which became a favorite place for local drivers. One of these ships is the Romanian transport "Santa Fe", on November 23, 1943, it was blown up by a mine, there is an assumption that the mine can was set by L-4 ... Due to the secrecy of the cargo, Santa Fe is still legendary. Submarine type "C". The most numerous were submarines of the "M" type, the fate of the M-32 submarine is interesting. The episode with the delivery of gasoline to Sevastopol and lying on the ground has been described by many authors, but the dispatch of this boat from the Black Sea to Gorky for repairs is little known and deserves more fame! To drag the wounded submarine along the route Novorossiysk-Baku-Krasnovods-Dzhusaly-Kinel-Krasny Knot-Arzamas-Gorky had to suffer a lot. M-32 was just that boat in the steppes, though not in Ukraine, but in Kazakhstan!
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 December 2015 11: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: Serg65
      The episode with the delivery of gasoline to Sevastopol and lying on the ground has been described by many authors, but the dispatch of this boat from the Black Sea to Gorky is little known and worthy of greater fame! In order to drag a wounded submarine along the route Novorossiysk-Baku-Krasnovods-Dzhusaly-Kin
      spruce Red Knot – Arzamas – Gorky had to suffer a lot. M-32 was just that boat in the steppes, though not Ukraine, but Kazakhstan!

      Well ... with the "M", the matter was facilitated by the fact that these submarines were designed based on the railway dimensions. They were initially sharpened for an inter-theater maneuver along the railway.
      1. Serg65
        Serg65 11 December 2015 13: 39 New
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        these submarines were designed based on the railway gauge.

        I do not argue Aleksey, but the Transcaucasian railway is very unlike the flat railway of the USSR, and in Baku, several houses had to be demolished to move the M-32 from the station to the port.
  7. Nikita Gromov
    Nikita Gromov 11 December 2015 09: 59 New
    0
    Glory to the Black Sea submariners!
  8. qwert
    qwert 11 December 2015 10: 14 New
    +4
    Quote: oldav
    But how did the Germans end up in the Black Sea? Did their Turks let them through, were they neutral?

    There was no German fleet. Italian too. Only boats.
    The Germans have high-speed barges with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns


    Turkey’s neutrality during the Second World War theoretically excluded the passage of warships of the warring states into the Black Sea. True, for some classes of ships (for example, the MFR high-speed landing barges), this prohibition was easily dispensed with by disarming the barges and assigning them “civilian” names. By the way, this method was used not only by the “axis” countries, but also the USSR, when at the end of 1941, the Mikoyan icebreaker, previously considered an auxiliary cruiser, was withdrawn from the Black Sea. Submarines became the largest German ships in the theater. Their transfer was carried out in a combined way: first on automobile trailers, then in tow along the Danube. Because of these difficulties, they could not catch the storm of Sevastopol. Total to the Black Sea in 1942 – 1943. Six submarines arrived in the 30 flotilla. By the beginning of June 1942, the 1 flotilla of torpedo boats (S-26, S-27, S-28, S-40, S-72, S -102). The fully disarmed boats were transported from Dresden on the Elbe to Ingolstadt on the Danube on special heavy-duty automobile platforms, after which they launched, assembled and marched under their own power into the Black Sea. Almost simultaneously, the 3 and 30 fleets of minesweepers operating earlier in the English Channel were transferred to the theater. The 1, 3, and 23 I fleets of anti-submarine ships performed escort functions. 1 Uj-Fl formed in June 1943 on the basis of the Danube Flotilla Sulina, a group of anti-submarine ships from the Danube Flotilla that existed since September 1942. In addition, the theater had two flotillas of small KFK submarine hunters. In April 1943, formed 23 Uj-Fl. This flotilla was manned by members of the Croatian maritime legion, although the officers remained German. As in other theaters of war, on the Black and Azov Seas in the main bases and ports there were small compounds of basic patrol ships and boats. But the main force of the Germans was the dominant aircraft in the sky. And by the way, in the conditions of such dominance of enemy aircraft, even the American Pacific fleet could not conduct active operations. So, reproaches from the height of the 21 century for any passivity of the command of the Black Sea Fleet are not entirely correct
  9. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 11 December 2015 10: 52 New
    +5
    The article is very informative and interesting. But she would have a little specificity. For example, it is indicated that the Shch-211 sank something, and what was not said. I’ll supplement it a bit by 1941.
    On 5.08.41 Shch-211 sank the Romanian transport Peles, built in 1923. Tonnage - 5708 brt, walked in a ballast, 5 people died on it as a result of an attack.
    29.09.41/211/1923 Shch-6154 sank the Italian tanker Superga in 1800, 2350 brt, with a cargo of 2 tons of gasoline and XNUMX tons of crude oil. XNUMX people died.
    5.11.41 Shch-214 sank the Italian tanker "Torcello" 1892, 3336 brt, in a ballast, 3 people died.
    3.11.41 Shch-214 sank the Turkish schooner "Kainakdere", 95 brt with a load of cotton with artillery.
    Also, the article is not indicated and I would like to supplement:
    18.11.41/215/428 Sh-12 sank the Turkish transport "Yenice", XNUMX brt, in the ballast, XNUMX crew members were killed
    26.10.41 M-35 was sunk by artillery German self-propelled ferry Siebel SF-25, 1941, 140 brt.
    If necessary, I can continue to 1942. Contact.
  10. Isk1984
    Isk1984 11 December 2015 11: 34 New
    +3
    To be honest, the heroism of submariners and ordinary sailors was at an unattainable height, but the command of the fleet clearly shook, having a battleship, cruisers, leaders, destroyers, submarines, and by the way its own aviation, the Black Sea Fleet was used very inefficiently, it was too much blood for nothing it was, young strong guys, it was a pity that the formidable force was not fully realized, there was no interaction between the fleet aviation and surface forces ...
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 December 2015 14: 36 New
      +2
      Quote: Isk1984
      but the command of the fleet clearly shook, having a battleship, cruisers, leaders, destroyers

      Due to the loss of the pre-war shipyards, shipyards, and Black Sea Fleet bases, one year after the outbreak of war, it had 1-2 missiles, 3-5 em and 2 missile systems.
      The repair of the Krasny Kavkaz and the torpedoed Molotov is just a song. Docking in a short dock with a suspended tip, self-made shaft alignment, docking of the project 26-bis hull and the project 68 stern ...
      Quote: Isk1984
      and by the way own aviation
      ... which was simultaneously used in the interests of the ground forces.
  11. holgert
    holgert 11 December 2015 12: 38 New
    0
    Thank you for the article !!!! Very informative.
  12. sazda
    sazda 11 December 2015 18: 38 New
    +2
    The entire Black Sea Fleet was extremely ineffective in the Second World War. The level of command of the Black Sea Fleet is below all criticism.
  13. Warrior2015
    Warrior2015 11 December 2015 19: 48 New
    +2
    Quote: Nikita Gromov
    Glory to the Black Sea submariners!

    Excuse me, but more specifically glory for what? Having against itself the weak forces of the Romanian Navy does not achieve any serious success?!? Or do you think that the sinking of some landing barges and parakhodikov with a load of cotton - serious victories?

    Quote: Alexey RA
    And second: the fleet in Georgia survived. Having lost all the pre-war CVDs and SRH and pretty much knocked out resources in the course of supplying Sevastopol.
    But he would have to rule, for he was the really dominant force on the Black Sea. But ... a small Reich Air Force corps trite it into pieces, after knocking out the Soviet Black Sea aviation ... Is that great?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 14 December 2015 11: 30 New
      0
      Quote: Warrior2015
      But he would have to rule, for he was the really dominant force on the Black Sea. But ... a small Reich Air Force corps trite it into pieces, after knocking out the Soviet Black Sea aviation ... Is that great?

      The British fleet would have to dominate, for it was a truly dominant force in the Mediterranean. But ... the Reich Air Force’s small forces ... smile
      The fleet could dominate if it had air cover. But here's the trouble: the air force of the fleet could not even provide air cover for its main base - Sevastopol. With the cover on the route, everything was also sad: the main fighter of the Navy Air Force - I-16 - had a combat radius of only 130-140 km. This made itself felt both in Balitika, in the Tallinn passage, and in the Black Sea. While the army held the coast, there were airfields, it was possible to provide air defense of ships (as in the evacuation of Odessa). As soon as the army rolled back to Kerch and Sevastopol, a "hole" appeared in which the ships could rely only on their own air defense. But already from the experience of Crete, it was clear that the air defense of the EM and KRL is unable to save them from the raid of backlash.
  14. fomin
    fomin 18 August 2016 15: 54 New
    0
    Critics of the low efficiency of the Black Sea Fleet must take into account the following point: the main rival of our fleet was not small boats and barges, but German aviation, it is no secret that the air defense of not only our ships but also those of our allies was weak and warships in real life were not able to withstand bombers ... Suffice it to recall the evacuation from Dunkirk when the British lost more than 280 ships in a few days, or Pearl Harbor, if you criticize the Oktyabrsky fleet commander, then only because he could not organize opposition to German bombers, and there were such opportunities. It was possible to use seaplanes that could land on the water waiting for a signal from ships going to Sevastopol and back, they could not shoot down the Ju-88, but it was quite within their power to prevent the bombing from being targeted, it was possible to use the PE-2 (just remember the episode with the last flight of the leader "Tashkent"), it was possible to use the autogyros that were available at the beginning of the war based on some converted dry cargo ship