Incorrect comparison
Recently, all the domestic media has gone around another loud statement from the mouth of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General-Army Nikolai Makarov. According to him, most of the domestic military equipment is hopelessly behind foreign. It happened at a meeting of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, in the presence of a large number of invited experts.
Actually, military reform was discussed. About weapons and military equipment was mentioned casually, in the context of the presentation, one of the slides of which contained the notorious "comparison". It was this slide that illustrated the "facts" of the backwardness of Russian weapons.
But WHAT was that slide? Yes, here it is:
No, dear reader, this is not a fake, trying to make the Chief of General Staff a fool! This is a slide (No. 17) from the real presentation of General-Army Makarov, made in the program "Microsoft PowerPoint". The original presentation can be found on the official website of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation and download (total 8.7 megabytes): http://www.oprf.ru/files/Prezentaciya_mioboroni.ppt
In addition to obvious mistakes - photos of Chinese tank Type 80 instead of T-90 and Merkava Mk3 instead of Mk4 - I consider it necessary to critically examine all the described tactical and technical characteristics of the presented types of BT, show the obvious absurdity of the statements of the high military rank and refute a number of "facts". I will only touch upon the technology of the Ground Forces.
First comparison: Merkava Mk4 and T-90.
T-90A Photo from otvaga2004.narod.ru
"The presence of armored capsules". Comparison of this parameter is a priori absurd: there are no armored capsules on the T-90, of course, there is no armored 4 on the Merkava! And on any other Merkava or any other foreign and, unfortunately, domestic SERIAL tank. Because the “armored capsule” as applied to a tank is an isolated compartment of the crew’s habitat, structurally separated from the combat compartment (tower) of the vehicle, its ammunition load (BC) and fuel. Calling an armored 4 Merkava compartment as an armored capsule, where a significant amount of space is allocated to a loader, manually feeding 120-mm ammunition shells is incorrect, and the automatic loader (AZ) (including all 10 projectiles), including detonation protection equally placed in the habitable compartment, as well as non-mechanized ammunition of 38 shells. The presence of individual protective closure of shells does not negate the fact that the ammunition is not removed from the habitable volume.
Actually, the criticism of the Russian MBT comes down to criticism of modifications of the 1993 model of the year (T-90) and T-90А, in which the BC in AZ and part of the non-mechanized ammo pack in tanks-racks were partially protected, and 10 shells and 7 charges in BO were placed openly.
But it is worth considering the fact that the T-90A tank last control tests - during which he was mercilessly shot with all sorts of ammunition and undermined by an anti-tank mine - withstood with honor and even met the requirements for the protection of the PERSPECTIVE TANK. In addition, the tests found that the overall level of compliance of the tested T-90 tank to the requirements of the prospective tank was 60% - and this is the tank, serially produced from the 2002 year (information from expert V. Murakhovsky, voiced at the VIF2NE forum).
The latest modification of the Russian tank - T-90MS - protection is even better. All ammunition is protected by a special Kevlar-type ballistic fabric and armor: 22 shots in AZ, 8 shots in a protected rack on the MTO wall, the rest 10 shots are completely removed from the habitable volume in the tower niche.
T-95.
And on which tank did the notorious “armored capsule” still be installed, you ask? On the tank Object 195 (T-95) - the one that was rejected by the Defense Ministry. The crew, completely isolated from the BO (with the BC) and the MTO (with fuel), is located in the titanium “broncapsule” in the front of the hull under the protection of powerful frontal armor. Made in metal, armored capsule exists for about 10 years, just like the tank itself. And on the "Armata" it still has to appear. By the way, here it is, indicated in the patent (taken from the site btvt.narod.ru) under the number 6 as “highly secure, fire and explosion-proof control module”:
Target detection range. The cited data - in 4500 meters in Merkava 4 and 3300 meters in T-90 - require decoding. Available in the network (zelezki.ru) TTX of the T-90M tank there is such a point “target identification range like“ tank ”at night, m - 4300”, it is a characteristic of the panoramic sight (commander) equipped, including, with a thermal imager. Note: not “detection”, but “recognition”. Because the “Essa” sight provides detection of a “tank” target at a distance of more than 5 kilometers at night already on the T-90А tank, the indicator in 3300 meters corresponds to the target identification range of the “Essa” gunner on the T-90A. Therefore, it is quite possible that 4500 meters is the target identification range of the “tank” type of the Merkavy OMS. As you can see, the superiority over the T-90M (MS) has almost been leveled out by the new Kalina SUA (if 4500 m is really the detection range, then there is no superiority of the Israeli MBT to the Russian at all).
Target engagement range. The figure of 6000 m, exceeding the detection range of the Merkava 4 MSA, is most likely tied to the firing range of the LAHAT tank guided missile (TUR). As you know, this rocket can be launched from helicopters and in this case has a firing range of 13 km, and when firing from a tank - 8 km. At the same time, it is forgotten that such a maximum firing range is achieved only by using target designation from a third-party source - a reconnaissance officer, another tank or a special UAV. When firing only with the use of laser illumination of its own MSA, the Merkava-4 can launch the Lakhat at a distance of no more than 6 km (these data are given in the Jane's handbook).
T-90MS (photo by Alexey Khlopotov).
For T-90 sighting range of shooting, m (not more):
armor piercing projectile - 4000;
armor-piercing cumulative projectile - 4000;
using a night sight TPN-4-49 - 1500;
when firing from closed firing positions using a side-level high-explosive fragmentation projectile -10000.
The T-90 in the BC also has an Invar and Invar-M TOUR, with a range of up to 5000 meters.
It is true that Israeli tank crews learn to shoot at very long ranges with armor-piercing shells, but in this case we are talking about the destruction of only fixed targets. Yes, and record the distance of the defeat of some Arabic tractor belongs to the British tank gun and the skill of the gunner, but not technical superiority (and certainly not the "Merkava 4"). In addition, there is a decrease in armor penetration of the projectile with increasing firing distance (no wonder, standard armor penetration is indicated on the range in 2 km). In reality, in a battle between the discussed OBT using OBPS, the effective firing range of both will be approximately the same.
As a result, the superiority of the “Merkava 4” is provided by the more advanced complex of guided missile weapons with the Lakhat TOUR, which allows for external target designation. But it is not as large as it appears from the slide of General Makarov.
For the more “earlier” T-90 ROSM, there simply were no requirements like the Israeli one. But there is reason to believe the existing similar to Lakhat TUR at the Object-195, which also had a rather advanced SLA, which implemented new principles of combat control (TIUS with ESU TK with the possibility of external target designation).
Merkava Mk4.
Mine protection. Undoubtedly, the “Merkava 4” design itself is more resistant to undermining: firstly, it has a pronounced V-imagery of the bottom, and secondly, the design of the tank itself is optimized for “counterguerrilla” actions. The T-90 mine protection is worse not only because of the flat bottom, but also because of the characteristic feature of the Soviet third-generation tanks with AZ in BO (in the case of T-72 / 90 - right on the bottom in the form of "carousel"). Of course, both the tank and the "carousel" must withstand a certain power of detonation when hitting a pressure anti-tank mine, the bottom deflection is also taken into account, but ... Paradoxically: the T-55 and T-62 tanks of the second post-war generation had mine protection above, in many respects due to the absence of “carousels” and “baskets” of AZ / MH in the BW, and also because, taking into account the Afghan experience, sets of consignment notes of mine protection were installed on them. This is one of the reasons for such a “longevity” of old tanks, including participation in hostilities in the North Caucasus and Georgia, the “old men” were more adapted to counter-guerrilla actions than the more modern T-72 and T-80. There is some evidence that steel mills similar to the “Afghan” mine protection kits were developed for the T-72 / 80 / 90 tanks, but these developments and attempts to introduce them occurred during the period of chronic underfunding of the military industrial complex and therefore were not implemented. Moreover, the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation considered sufficient protection provided by mine trawls and electromagnetic protection systems (SEMP - premature detonation of electronic mines and IEDs).
The second comparison: Tornado and HIMARS.
HIMARS launches ATACMS.
Probably the most absurd on the slide. Because the range of 150 kilometers from HIMARS has an ATACMS rocket, tactical missilelaunched from MLRS / HIMARS launchers. Why are compared MLRS and OTR, you ask? Well, here is such a slide.… I will add: the usual NURS М26 / М26А1 have a range of 32 / 45 kilometers. NURS with GPS-guided (GMLRS) M30 have a range of up to 70 kilometers. The largest range has a modified ATACMS Block 1A Unitary - up to 270 kilometers. For our part, the old (1987 year) MLRS "Smerch" with missiles with a range of up to 70 kilometers are compared.
BM-30 Tornado.
BUT! And if you compare without juggling? Thus, the upgraded Smerch missiles have an increased firing range - up to 90 kilometers. And this is all with the same fully autonomous inertial navigation system (INS). The task of increasing the range while maintaining high accuracy (using satellite navigation) was not set, so, firstly, there was no notorious navigation system (GLONASS fully earned only recently), and secondly, this would greatly increase the cost of rockets.
"Hurricane-1M". As you can see, the rockets are laid in quick-release TPK.
Why not compare HIMARS with the latest MLRS Tornado / Hurricane-1М, which probably uses GLONASS guidance? Why not compare the GMLRS, which delivers 70kg, to 90 kilometers, with 9М528 with a range of 90 kilometers and a GF weighing 250 kilograms? Why not compare the area of destruction with a full salvo: MLRS (half as much in HIMARS) -12 hectare, in Smerchis the 40 hectare ... Why not compare the ATRMS ATRMS, reaching 270 km with Iskander, whose range (500km) limits only INF Treaty? I'm not saying that the ATACMS charges the maximum of a single-block high-explosive warhead, the main load is the M-74 light anti-vehicle “bombs”, while the Iskander is a possible carrier of a “special” head part.
Iskander
The disadvantage of our MLRS is that they can not apply the OTP, you ask. That's right - why didn’t General Makarov and other representatives of the Ministry of Defense demand such an option during the creation / refinement of the Tornado / Smerch-1M? By the way, the new MLRS also have a batch deployment of missiles and quickly reload. It is incorrect to demand a quick recharge from a Soviet-made car that has been older than 20 for years.
The third comparison: PzH-2000 and Msta-S.
PzH-2000.
Again, there is a distortion. The specified maximum range of the 24 kilometer for Msta-S corresponds to the firing range of a conventional high-explosive high-explosive fragmentation projectile. For the PzH-2000, the maximum firing range was indicated by a “record” V-LAP projectile, which was indeed fired at the South African test site at 56 kilometers. Serial shells have a smaller range: from 30 to 40 km, the increase in range is achieved by a bottom gas generator (the so-called base bleed). The reality is generally somewhat less bright - the Dutch PzH-2000 in Afghanistan noted the low accuracy of projectiles with a gas generator (Rh-40), which were fired at a distance over 30km. Excess accuracy was more than 1 kilometer. The accuracy of firing the usual Rh-30 projectile at a distance of 22 km was noted as good. By the way, the Germans themselves do not buy Rh-40, prefer the usual Rh-30 (Netherlands plans renewed to improve PzH2000 accuracy).
The rest is in the same spirit. By the way, according to the slide, there is no high-precision adjustable laser-guided projectile "Krasnopol".
Msta-M.
The problem is that the old Soviet (1989 of the year) and the newest German self-propelled guns are compared, and Msta-S is taken with the usual barrel of 47 caliber length, with a new projectile chamber, without ASUNO. But the upgraded 2C19М1 has a new ASUNO that reduces deployment time — self-propelled guns in the battalion after the march are ready to fire a volley after 3 minutes, and after receiving the finished coordinates — after 30 seconds. And with a new, long barrel in the 52 caliber, the radically upgraded Msta-M shoots an upgraded projectile at 41 kilometer.
True, there is a nuance: the Ministry of Defense will buy upgraded self-propelled guns at least from 2012 of the year, but improved projectiles - only from 2015, and according to other sources - from 2017 of the year. And without new shells, the firing range, even from a long barrel, will not exceed 32 kilometers, the increase in range is no more than 10%. MO explain this by the fact that the warehouses filled up with old shells. No wonder - after all, Msta-S has a standard caliber 152 mm, back unified with the 152-mm SAU 2C3 Acacia - and further along the line of Soviet 152-mm artillery systems .... right up to the naval guns of the Kane system, which were mounted on cruiser "Aurora"! This "advantage" - you can even shoot pre-revolutionary shells. This is a drawback - the chamber has a smaller volume than the NATO counterparts of 155-mm caliber. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to switch to a completely new projectile, like that of the Hyacinth self-propelled gun, which did not have backward compatibility with other 152-mm ACS?
"Coalition-SV"
According to rumors, SAU "Coalition-SV" also uses new, not unified projectiles with significantly increased range and accuracy of fire (including guided by GLONASS). The very "Coalition-SV", which was seemingly closed when the notorious Popovkin was the deputy defense minister. As it turned out, not really.
Conclusion.
What is the result? Yes, with some points you can agree. Only with some. The ostentatious and overwhelming advantage of foreign designs is clearly overrated. Our weapons are covered in mud. In fact, by chance the abandoned words reached their goal. Our military industrial complex, in Russia as an international arms exporter, was dealt a serious blow (once again).
Definitely - the compiler of the slide had extremely dubious knowledge about the performance characteristics of the samples presented. Or CONSCIOUSLY distorted facts. And our Makarov did not blink his eyes with ease. He COULD NOT KNOW about the wild bloopers in the slide.
Or?
Actually, military reform was discussed. About weapons and military equipment was mentioned casually, in the context of the presentation, one of the slides of which contained the notorious "comparison". It was this slide that illustrated the "facts" of the backwardness of Russian weapons.
But WHAT was that slide? Yes, here it is:
No, dear reader, this is not a fake, trying to make the Chief of General Staff a fool! This is a slide (No. 17) from the real presentation of General-Army Makarov, made in the program "Microsoft PowerPoint". The original presentation can be found on the official website of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation and download (total 8.7 megabytes): http://www.oprf.ru/files/Prezentaciya_mioboroni.ppt
In addition to obvious mistakes - photos of Chinese tank Type 80 instead of T-90 and Merkava Mk3 instead of Mk4 - I consider it necessary to critically examine all the described tactical and technical characteristics of the presented types of BT, show the obvious absurdity of the statements of the high military rank and refute a number of "facts". I will only touch upon the technology of the Ground Forces.
First comparison: Merkava Mk4 and T-90.
T-90A Photo from otvaga2004.narod.ru
"The presence of armored capsules". Comparison of this parameter is a priori absurd: there are no armored capsules on the T-90, of course, there is no armored 4 on the Merkava! And on any other Merkava or any other foreign and, unfortunately, domestic SERIAL tank. Because the “armored capsule” as applied to a tank is an isolated compartment of the crew’s habitat, structurally separated from the combat compartment (tower) of the vehicle, its ammunition load (BC) and fuel. Calling an armored 4 Merkava compartment as an armored capsule, where a significant amount of space is allocated to a loader, manually feeding 120-mm ammunition shells is incorrect, and the automatic loader (AZ) (including all 10 projectiles), including detonation protection equally placed in the habitable compartment, as well as non-mechanized ammunition of 38 shells. The presence of individual protective closure of shells does not negate the fact that the ammunition is not removed from the habitable volume.
Actually, the criticism of the Russian MBT comes down to criticism of modifications of the 1993 model of the year (T-90) and T-90А, in which the BC in AZ and part of the non-mechanized ammo pack in tanks-racks were partially protected, and 10 shells and 7 charges in BO were placed openly.
But it is worth considering the fact that the T-90A tank last control tests - during which he was mercilessly shot with all sorts of ammunition and undermined by an anti-tank mine - withstood with honor and even met the requirements for the protection of the PERSPECTIVE TANK. In addition, the tests found that the overall level of compliance of the tested T-90 tank to the requirements of the prospective tank was 60% - and this is the tank, serially produced from the 2002 year (information from expert V. Murakhovsky, voiced at the VIF2NE forum).
The latest modification of the Russian tank - T-90MS - protection is even better. All ammunition is protected by a special Kevlar-type ballistic fabric and armor: 22 shots in AZ, 8 shots in a protected rack on the MTO wall, the rest 10 shots are completely removed from the habitable volume in the tower niche.
T-95.
And on which tank did the notorious “armored capsule” still be installed, you ask? On the tank Object 195 (T-95) - the one that was rejected by the Defense Ministry. The crew, completely isolated from the BO (with the BC) and the MTO (with fuel), is located in the titanium “broncapsule” in the front of the hull under the protection of powerful frontal armor. Made in metal, armored capsule exists for about 10 years, just like the tank itself. And on the "Armata" it still has to appear. By the way, here it is, indicated in the patent (taken from the site btvt.narod.ru) under the number 6 as “highly secure, fire and explosion-proof control module”:
Target detection range. The cited data - in 4500 meters in Merkava 4 and 3300 meters in T-90 - require decoding. Available in the network (zelezki.ru) TTX of the T-90M tank there is such a point “target identification range like“ tank ”at night, m - 4300”, it is a characteristic of the panoramic sight (commander) equipped, including, with a thermal imager. Note: not “detection”, but “recognition”. Because the “Essa” sight provides detection of a “tank” target at a distance of more than 5 kilometers at night already on the T-90А tank, the indicator in 3300 meters corresponds to the target identification range of the “Essa” gunner on the T-90A. Therefore, it is quite possible that 4500 meters is the target identification range of the “tank” type of the Merkavy OMS. As you can see, the superiority over the T-90M (MS) has almost been leveled out by the new Kalina SUA (if 4500 m is really the detection range, then there is no superiority of the Israeli MBT to the Russian at all).
Target engagement range. The figure of 6000 m, exceeding the detection range of the Merkava 4 MSA, is most likely tied to the firing range of the LAHAT tank guided missile (TUR). As you know, this rocket can be launched from helicopters and in this case has a firing range of 13 km, and when firing from a tank - 8 km. At the same time, it is forgotten that such a maximum firing range is achieved only by using target designation from a third-party source - a reconnaissance officer, another tank or a special UAV. When firing only with the use of laser illumination of its own MSA, the Merkava-4 can launch the Lakhat at a distance of no more than 6 km (these data are given in the Jane's handbook).
T-90MS (photo by Alexey Khlopotov).
For T-90 sighting range of shooting, m (not more):
armor piercing projectile - 4000;
armor-piercing cumulative projectile - 4000;
using a night sight TPN-4-49 - 1500;
when firing from closed firing positions using a side-level high-explosive fragmentation projectile -10000.
The T-90 in the BC also has an Invar and Invar-M TOUR, with a range of up to 5000 meters.
It is true that Israeli tank crews learn to shoot at very long ranges with armor-piercing shells, but in this case we are talking about the destruction of only fixed targets. Yes, and record the distance of the defeat of some Arabic tractor belongs to the British tank gun and the skill of the gunner, but not technical superiority (and certainly not the "Merkava 4"). In addition, there is a decrease in armor penetration of the projectile with increasing firing distance (no wonder, standard armor penetration is indicated on the range in 2 km). In reality, in a battle between the discussed OBT using OBPS, the effective firing range of both will be approximately the same.
As a result, the superiority of the “Merkava 4” is provided by the more advanced complex of guided missile weapons with the Lakhat TOUR, which allows for external target designation. But it is not as large as it appears from the slide of General Makarov.
For the more “earlier” T-90 ROSM, there simply were no requirements like the Israeli one. But there is reason to believe the existing similar to Lakhat TUR at the Object-195, which also had a rather advanced SLA, which implemented new principles of combat control (TIUS with ESU TK with the possibility of external target designation).
Merkava Mk4.
Mine protection. Undoubtedly, the “Merkava 4” design itself is more resistant to undermining: firstly, it has a pronounced V-imagery of the bottom, and secondly, the design of the tank itself is optimized for “counterguerrilla” actions. The T-90 mine protection is worse not only because of the flat bottom, but also because of the characteristic feature of the Soviet third-generation tanks with AZ in BO (in the case of T-72 / 90 - right on the bottom in the form of "carousel"). Of course, both the tank and the "carousel" must withstand a certain power of detonation when hitting a pressure anti-tank mine, the bottom deflection is also taken into account, but ... Paradoxically: the T-55 and T-62 tanks of the second post-war generation had mine protection above, in many respects due to the absence of “carousels” and “baskets” of AZ / MH in the BW, and also because, taking into account the Afghan experience, sets of consignment notes of mine protection were installed on them. This is one of the reasons for such a “longevity” of old tanks, including participation in hostilities in the North Caucasus and Georgia, the “old men” were more adapted to counter-guerrilla actions than the more modern T-72 and T-80. There is some evidence that steel mills similar to the “Afghan” mine protection kits were developed for the T-72 / 80 / 90 tanks, but these developments and attempts to introduce them occurred during the period of chronic underfunding of the military industrial complex and therefore were not implemented. Moreover, the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation considered sufficient protection provided by mine trawls and electromagnetic protection systems (SEMP - premature detonation of electronic mines and IEDs).
The second comparison: Tornado and HIMARS.
HIMARS launches ATACMS.
Probably the most absurd on the slide. Because the range of 150 kilometers from HIMARS has an ATACMS rocket, tactical missilelaunched from MLRS / HIMARS launchers. Why are compared MLRS and OTR, you ask? Well, here is such a slide.… I will add: the usual NURS М26 / М26А1 have a range of 32 / 45 kilometers. NURS with GPS-guided (GMLRS) M30 have a range of up to 70 kilometers. The largest range has a modified ATACMS Block 1A Unitary - up to 270 kilometers. For our part, the old (1987 year) MLRS "Smerch" with missiles with a range of up to 70 kilometers are compared.
BM-30 Tornado.
BUT! And if you compare without juggling? Thus, the upgraded Smerch missiles have an increased firing range - up to 90 kilometers. And this is all with the same fully autonomous inertial navigation system (INS). The task of increasing the range while maintaining high accuracy (using satellite navigation) was not set, so, firstly, there was no notorious navigation system (GLONASS fully earned only recently), and secondly, this would greatly increase the cost of rockets.
"Hurricane-1M". As you can see, the rockets are laid in quick-release TPK.
Why not compare HIMARS with the latest MLRS Tornado / Hurricane-1М, which probably uses GLONASS guidance? Why not compare the GMLRS, which delivers 70kg, to 90 kilometers, with 9М528 with a range of 90 kilometers and a GF weighing 250 kilograms? Why not compare the area of destruction with a full salvo: MLRS (half as much in HIMARS) -12 hectare, in Smerchis the 40 hectare ... Why not compare the ATRMS ATRMS, reaching 270 km with Iskander, whose range (500km) limits only INF Treaty? I'm not saying that the ATACMS charges the maximum of a single-block high-explosive warhead, the main load is the M-74 light anti-vehicle “bombs”, while the Iskander is a possible carrier of a “special” head part.
Iskander
The disadvantage of our MLRS is that they can not apply the OTP, you ask. That's right - why didn’t General Makarov and other representatives of the Ministry of Defense demand such an option during the creation / refinement of the Tornado / Smerch-1M? By the way, the new MLRS also have a batch deployment of missiles and quickly reload. It is incorrect to demand a quick recharge from a Soviet-made car that has been older than 20 for years.
The third comparison: PzH-2000 and Msta-S.
PzH-2000.
Again, there is a distortion. The specified maximum range of the 24 kilometer for Msta-S corresponds to the firing range of a conventional high-explosive high-explosive fragmentation projectile. For the PzH-2000, the maximum firing range was indicated by a “record” V-LAP projectile, which was indeed fired at the South African test site at 56 kilometers. Serial shells have a smaller range: from 30 to 40 km, the increase in range is achieved by a bottom gas generator (the so-called base bleed). The reality is generally somewhat less bright - the Dutch PzH-2000 in Afghanistan noted the low accuracy of projectiles with a gas generator (Rh-40), which were fired at a distance over 30km. Excess accuracy was more than 1 kilometer. The accuracy of firing the usual Rh-30 projectile at a distance of 22 km was noted as good. By the way, the Germans themselves do not buy Rh-40, prefer the usual Rh-30 (Netherlands plans renewed to improve PzH2000 accuracy).
The rest is in the same spirit. By the way, according to the slide, there is no high-precision adjustable laser-guided projectile "Krasnopol".
Msta-M.
The problem is that the old Soviet (1989 of the year) and the newest German self-propelled guns are compared, and Msta-S is taken with the usual barrel of 47 caliber length, with a new projectile chamber, without ASUNO. But the upgraded 2C19М1 has a new ASUNO that reduces deployment time — self-propelled guns in the battalion after the march are ready to fire a volley after 3 minutes, and after receiving the finished coordinates — after 30 seconds. And with a new, long barrel in the 52 caliber, the radically upgraded Msta-M shoots an upgraded projectile at 41 kilometer.
True, there is a nuance: the Ministry of Defense will buy upgraded self-propelled guns at least from 2012 of the year, but improved projectiles - only from 2015, and according to other sources - from 2017 of the year. And without new shells, the firing range, even from a long barrel, will not exceed 32 kilometers, the increase in range is no more than 10%. MO explain this by the fact that the warehouses filled up with old shells. No wonder - after all, Msta-S has a standard caliber 152 mm, back unified with the 152-mm SAU 2C3 Acacia - and further along the line of Soviet 152-mm artillery systems .... right up to the naval guns of the Kane system, which were mounted on cruiser "Aurora"! This "advantage" - you can even shoot pre-revolutionary shells. This is a drawback - the chamber has a smaller volume than the NATO counterparts of 155-mm caliber. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to switch to a completely new projectile, like that of the Hyacinth self-propelled gun, which did not have backward compatibility with other 152-mm ACS?
"Coalition-SV"
According to rumors, SAU "Coalition-SV" also uses new, not unified projectiles with significantly increased range and accuracy of fire (including guided by GLONASS). The very "Coalition-SV", which was seemingly closed when the notorious Popovkin was the deputy defense minister. As it turned out, not really.
Conclusion.
What is the result? Yes, with some points you can agree. Only with some. The ostentatious and overwhelming advantage of foreign designs is clearly overrated. Our weapons are covered in mud. In fact, by chance the abandoned words reached their goal. Our military industrial complex, in Russia as an international arms exporter, was dealt a serious blow (once again).
Definitely - the compiler of the slide had extremely dubious knowledge about the performance characteristics of the samples presented. Or CONSCIOUSLY distorted facts. And our Makarov did not blink his eyes with ease. He COULD NOT KNOW about the wild bloopers in the slide.
Or?
Information