America vs England. Part of 17. Big bets Big games
Speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt before the 6 Congress in January 1941
After the defeat of France, America got a real chance to realize its long-held dream of building a world empire Pax Americana. In order for the United States to become a world hegemon, they needed a long-lasting conflict, “defeating opponents and weakening the allies” (How Roosevelt provoked the Japanese attack // http://www.wars20century.ru/publ/10-1-0-22). England at that time alone confronted Germany and Italy. Japan is stuck in a war with China. Only the USA and the USSR remained the neutral players of the Big Game. Having organized the German attack on the Soviet Union, and Japan on America, the Americans (since neither Germany nor Japan alone could cope with the USSR and the USA) gave the war a protracted and extremely ruinous character for its participants. Moreover, if Britain and the USSR weakened this situation to a considerable extent, then Germany and Japan simply destroyed it.
At the same time, America, with its help from the "arsenal of democracy" both of England with the USSR and Germany, gradually inevitably became an economic and financial leader, and having led the anti-Hitler coalition, among other things, it was also a political leader.
Concentrating the efforts of the Allies in the defeat of Germany first, followed by Japan, America came out of the war as a superpower along with England and the USSR. The attempt of Britain to crush the USSR at the root of the USSR was stopped by America, which did not intend to divide world domination with anyone, reasonably believing to take over the world’s authority “by right of conqueror”. Having crushed England, America with the help of the USSR, rallying the West under the slogan of confronting the "Soviet threat" and using all its power, together with the USSR destroyed the bipolar world, finding at last so much desired by it single-handed global domination and becoming the leading power on the planet.
Meanwhile, forcing Germany and Japan to attack the Soviet Union and America, and even more at odds with each other, was far from easy. The example of the Great War showed the impossibility of simultaneous military confrontation of Germany with the West and the East. In “Mein Kampf”, Hitler, without hiding anyone, paraded his plan to conclude an alliance with either England or the USSR to conquer new lands in Europe, or the USSR against England to conquer colonies and strengthen Germanic trade (Fest I. Hitler. Biography. Way up / Translated by AA Fedorov, N. Letnevoy, A. Andropov, M. - Veche, 2006., C. 355. For the first time, the question of delimiting the sphere of influence in the Balkans between Germany, Italy and the USSR, as well as the participation of the USSR in the war with England, was raised by Germany 4 March 1940 of the year, during the preparation of the occupation of Norway, Holland, Belgium and France (Lebedev S. America v. England Part of 16. Crossroads stories// http://topwar.ru/73396-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-16-perekrestok-dorog-istorii.html). After the defeat of France, Churchill continued the confrontation with Germany and got help from America. Rudolf Hess’s attempt to negotiate with pro-German forces in England ended in a complete fiasco. It would seem that Germany was literally doomed to conclude a full-fledged union with the Soviet Union. In addition, Germany with respect to the USSR had obligations to friendly Japan as well.
“When France suffered a crushing defeat in the summer of 1940, Belgium and Holland were occupied, and England’s situation seemed hopeless, Tokyo felt that extraordinary opportunities had opened up before Japan. The vast colonies of the European powers were now "abandoned", there was no one to protect them. ... The growing aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists can only be compared with the size of the booty they intended to capture in the South Seas region ”(Yakovlev NN FDR is a man and a politician. Pearl Harbor Riddle: Selected Works. - M .: International Relations, 1988. - C. 577-578).
“In June, 1940 ... German and Japanese representatives agreed on a preliminary plan for“ strengthening harmony ”between Germany, Japan and Italy based on the division of spheres of influence. The plan established that Europe and Africa would fall under the domination of Germany and Italy, and the South Seas area, Indochina and the Dutch East India (Indonesia) would be within Japanese influence. It was envisaged that close political and economic cooperation would develop between Germany and Japan ”(History of the Second World War. 1939 - 1945. In 12 t. T. 3. - M .: Voenizdat, 1974. - C. 244-245). At the same time, “in the Japanese leadership, the view was increasingly expressed that it was necessary to“ neutralize ”the Soviet Union for the period of movement to the south” (Koshkin AA “Kantokuen” - “Barbarossa” in Japanese. Why Japan did not attack the USSR). - M .: Veche, 2011. - S. 97-98).
"By 12 June 1940 g ... The Japanese Navy General Headquarters prepared ... a plan for the" policy of the empire in the face of weakening of England and France ", which provided for" a general diplomatic settlement with the Soviet Union "and aggression in the South Seas. 2 July 1940, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, S. Togo, in an interview with V.М. Molotov makes a far-reaching proposal to conclude a treaty on neutrality between Japan and the USSR, which lay within the framework of the new strategic concept of Tokyo. In addition, Togo proposed to include in this agreement a reference to the Soviet-Japanese 1925 agreement of the year and as an annex to it a secret note on the Soviet Union’s refusal to help China ”(Mitrofanov A., Zheltukhin A. Refusal Gromyko, or Why Stalin did not seize Hokkaido / / http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/147136/5/Mitrofanov,_Zheltuhin_-_Otkaz_Gromyko,_ili_Pochemu_Stalin_ne_zahvatil_Hokkaiido.html).
“A new international situation demanded a new government. 16 July 1940, under pressure from the army, a relatively moderate cabinet, formed in the thick shadow of Khalkhin Gol, resigned. The new government was headed by 49-year-old Prince Fumimaro Konoe "(NN Yakovlev. Decree. Op. - C. 578). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Konoe, appointed Matsuoka. “July 26 The 1940 of the year, on the fourth day of its existence, the Konoe Cabinet decided on Japan’s creation of a new order in the great East Asia. Matsuoka published this decision as a government communique. "Japan, Manchukuo and China will be only the core of the bloc of countries of the great East Asian sphere of common prosperity," it said. “Complete autarky is the goal of the bloc, which, apart from Japan, Manchuku and China, will include Indochina, Dutch India and other countries of the South Seas. To achieve this goal, Japan should be ready to overcome all obstacles in its path, both material and spiritual ”(Matsuoka Esuke // http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/bio_m/macuoka.html).
31 July 1940, Roosevelt, under the ridiculous pretext of shortage, banned the export of aviation gas to Japan, interrupting the main source of fuel for Japanese combat aircraft. “Having struck at the power of the Japanese air force, Roosevelt continued unfriendly to Japan, transferring 1940 million to China in the summer of 44, 25 million in September, and 50 million in November. The money was used by the Chinese government to fight Japan "(How Roosevelt provoked the attack of Japan. Ibid.). After joining the government of Konoe, “the process of consolidation of the German-Japanese military alliance accelerated markedly. In August 1940, both sides continued negotiations ”(History of the Second World War. Decree. Op. - S. 245). Since Moscow did not respond to the proposals from July 2, August 5 Matsuoka telegraphed to the Japanese Ambassador Togo about the need for the earliest conclusion of an agreement on neutrality between the two countries, which he stated to Molotov on the same day. 14 August Molotov responded to the positive attitude towards the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality (A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin Ibid.).
4 September 1940 at a meeting in Tokyo with the participation of Konoe, Matsuoka, War Minister Tojo and Navy Minister Oikawa Matsuoka expressed the idea of developing the “pact of three” into “pact of four” and “giving” the Soviet Union the territory of India and Iran. ... At the meeting it was decided "to restrain the Soviet Union in the east, west and south, thus forcing it to act in a direction advantageous to the common interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, and try to force the Soviet Union to spread its influence in such a direction in which it will have the most insignificant, direct impact on the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, namely in the direction of the Persian Gulf (it is possible that, if necessary, it will be necessary to agree with the expansion of the Soviet Union in the direction of ndii). " Thus, everything Ribbentrop proposed to Molotov in November 1940 of the year was thought out and formulated at a meeting of four ministers in Tokyo ”(Matsuoka Yesuke, ibid.).
September 22 was occupied by northern Indochina by Japanese troops. Thus, “Japan actually embarked on the implementation of the southern variant of expansion” (Koshkin A. A. Decree. Op. - C. 97). “A few days later ... 26 September 1940 of the year, President Roosevelt, on behalf of the American government, announced that it was banning the export of scrap metal, iron and steel to foreign countries, with the exception of Great Britain, Canada and South America. Japan was not included in this list of consumers of American scrap. Consequently, Roosevelt understood perfectly well that he was forcing her to attack the United States ”(O. Pearl Harbor’s buzina — Roosevelt’s substitute // http://www.buzina.org/publications/660-perl-harbor-podstava-rusvelta.html) .
September 27 The Berlin Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin on September 13th. “The Pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the Axis countries in establishing a new world order and military mutual aid. Germany and Italy were destined to lead in Europe, and the Japanese Empire in Asia ”(Berlin Pact (1940) // https://ru.wikipedia.org). Regarding the Soviet Union, it made a special reservation about its nondirection against the USSR, which in essence was an invitation to expand the pact to four main member countries. “In secret letters exchanged between Japan and Germany when they signed the“ pact of three ”, Germany agreed to involve the Soviet Union in this pact” (Matsuoka Yesuke, ibid.).
In November, 1940 of Mr. Molotov went to Berlin with the goal of "finding out the real intentions of Germany and all the participants in the 3 Covenant ... in implementing the plan to create a" New Europe ", as well as a" Great East Asian Space "; the boundaries of the “New Europe” and the “East Asian Space”; the nature of the state structure and the relations of individual European states in “New Europe” and “East Asia”; the stages and deadlines for the implementation of these plans and at least the nearest ones; the prospect of other countries joining the 3 Pact; place of the USSR in these plans at the moment and in the future. " He had to “prepare an initial outline of the sphere of interests of the USSR in Europe, as well as in near and central Asia, having tested the possibility of an agreement on this with Germany, as well as with Italy, but not to enter into any agreement with Germany and Italy at this stage of negotiations, having in view of the continuation of these negotiations in Moscow, where Ribbentrop was to arrive [SL] in the near future ”(USSR Foreign Policy Documents. In 24 T. Tom 23. Kn. 2 (part 1). 1 in November 1940. - March 1 (1941) - M .: International Relations, 1998. - C. 30-31).
In the negotiations, “based on the fact that the Soviet-German agreement on the partial delimitation of the spheres of interests of the USSR and Germany was exhausted by events (with the exception of Finland),” he was instructed to “ensure that the USSR’s interests were attributed to: a) Finland - the German agreement 1939, in the fulfillment of which Germany should [was - SL] eliminate all difficulties and ambiguities (the withdrawal of German troops, the cessation of all political demonstrations in Finland and in Germany, aimed at harming the interests of the USSR); c) Bulgaria - the main issue of the negotiations should be, in agreement with Germany and Italy, referred to the sphere of interests of the USSR on the same basis of guarantees of Bulgaria by the USSR, as was done by Germany and Italy against Romania, with the introduction of Soviet troops in Bulgaria ” (Documents of the USSR foreign policy. Decree. Op. - S. 31).
In the event of a favorable outcome of the main negotiations, it was supposed to “propose to make a peaceful action in the form of an open declaration of 4-s powers ... on the condition of preserving the British Empire (without mandated territories) with all those possessions that England now owns and subject to non-interference in European affairs and immediate withdrawal from Gibraltar and Egypt, as well as with the obligation to immediately return Germany to its former colonies and immediately grant dominion rights to India. ... Regarding China in the secret protocol, as one of the paragraphs of this protocol, to talk about the need to seek an honorable peace for China (Chiang Kai-Shek), in which the USSR, perhaps with the participation of Germany and Italy, is ready to take on mediation, and we do not object to Indonesia being recognized as the sphere of influence of Japan (Manzhou-Guo remains with Japan) ”(Documents on USSR foreign policy. Decree. Op. - C. 32). On November 11, Stalin sent Molotov on a special train in which he was heading for Berlin, for the immediate delivery of a telegram in which he asked not to raise the question of India because of fear, “that counterparties may perceive the paragraph about India as a trick to stir up a war” (Documents USSR Foreign Policy (Decree. Op. - S. 34).
Ribbentrop, in the very first conversation of 12 in November of 1940, suggested Molotov to think about the form in which Germany, Italy and Japan could come to an agreement with the USSR. “During Molotov’s conversations with Hitler, the latter bluntly stated that“ he invites the Soviet Union to participate as the fourth partner in this pact. ” At the same time, the Führer made no secret of the fact that it is a question of uniting forces in the struggle against Britain and the United States, saying: “... We are all continental states, although each country has its own interests. America and England are not continental states, they only seek to set European states at each other, and we want to exclude them from Europe. I believe that our success will be greater if we stand back to back and fight with external forces than if we stand against each other by breastfeeding and fight against each other. ”
On the eve Ribbentrop set forth the German vision of the geopolitical interests of the participants of the “projected” union as follows: “Germany’s interests go to East and West Africa, Italy –– North-East Africa, Japan –– to the south, and the Soviet Union –– in the south –– to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea ... ”Ribbentrop proposed to negotiate a USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan in the form of a declaration against the expansion of war, as well as the desirability of a compromise between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. In response to this information, Stalin gave Molotov to Berlin the following instruction: “If the results of the further conversation show that you basically can agree with the Germans, but for Moscow the end and the design of the case will remain, then so much the better ... As for the declaration, to give principle consent without turning points "(Koshkin AA Decree. Op. - S. 109-110).
In exchange for joining the Tripartite Pact, Molotov requested the full control of Finland promised earlier by Germany, as well as the Straits to ensure the security of the southern borders of the USSR and Bulgaria to ensure the safety of the Straits. In response, Hitler began to impose unequal conditions on the Soviet side and limited Soviet demands. Instead of recognizing Moscow’s declared price for a full-fledged union, Hitler demanded that she “put up with Germany’s invasion of the Soviet sphere of interests in Finland, the formation of the German sphere of influence in the Balkans, and the revision of the Montreux Convention regarding the Straits instead of transferring them to Moscow. A. Hitler refused to say anything specifically about Bulgaria at all, citing the need to consult with partners on the Tripartite Pact - Japan and Italy. At the negotiations ended. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations through diplomatic channels, and I. von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow was canceled ”(S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria // http://topwar.ru/ 38865-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu.html).
Churchill admitted in his time that “it is difficult even to imagine what would happen as a result of an armed alliance between the two great continental empires with millions of soldiers, with the aim of dividing the spoils in the Balkans, Turkey, Persia and the Middle East, with India , and Japan - an ardent participant in the "sphere of Great East Asia" - as its partner "(W. Churchill. World War II // http://www.litmir.co/br/?b=81776&ShowDeleted=1&p=227). According to the memoirs of F. von Pappen, Hitler's decision could change the face of the world: “I could understand how tempting Hitler must seem to be the idea of opposing the British Empire and the United States with his alliance with the Russians” (von Papen F. Vice-Chancellor of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a Hitlerite Politician Germany. 1933-1947 / Translated from English by M.G. Baryshnikov. - M .: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. - S. 458). According to Hitler himself, "the coalition between Germany and the Soviet Union will be an irresistible force and will inevitably lead to complete victory" (F. von Papen, op. Cit. - p. 458). And although Hitler was dissatisfied with the guarantees that the USSR agreed to provide Bulgaria, "in order to resolve the main problem associated with the acquisition of colonies by Germany and victory over England, in principle he agreed to the demands of Molotov and was already inclined to an alliance with Moscow" (S. Lebedev, ibid. ).
In particular, according to Churchill, “among the captured correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry with the German embassy in Moscow, a draft pact of the four powers was found, on which no date was indicated. ... By virtue of this project, Germany, Italy and Japan agreed to respect the natural spheres of influence of each other. Since the spheres of their interests were in contact, they undertook to constantly consult in a friendly way regarding the problems arising in this connection. For their part, Germany, Italy and Japan have declared that they recognize the existing possession limits of the Soviet Union and will respect them. The four powers pledged not to join any combination of powers and not to support any combination of powers that would be directed against one of the four powers. They pledged to help each other in every way in economic matters and to supplement and expand the agreements existing between them. This agreement was to operate for ten years.
The agreement should have been accompanied by a secret protocol containing a statement by Germany that, in addition to the territorial revision in Europe, which was to take place after the conclusion of peace, its territorial claims are concentrated around the territory of Central Africa; Italy’s statement that, in addition to territorial revision in Europe, its territorial claims are centered around the territory of North and Northeast Africa; Japan’s statement that its territorial claims are concentrated in the East Asia area south of the Japanese Islands, and the Soviet statement that its territorial claims are concentrated south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean. The four powers declared that, postponing the resolution of specific issues, they would mutually respect each other’s territorial claims and would not oppose their implementation ”(Churchill U. Ibid.).
However, in the end, Hitler, “choosing between the inevitable leading coalition of Germany and the USSR and inevitably ending with the defeat of Germany on two fronts with Britain and the Soviet Union, ... chose the defeat of Germany” (S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5 Ibid.) "As noted after the war, its participant General G. Blumentrit," having made this fateful decision, Germany lost the war "(Meltyukhov MI Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 // http: // militera. lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/12.html). It must be assumed that the main goal of Hitler was still “not the creation of Great Germany and its acquisition of living space, and not even the struggle against communism, but the destruction of Germany in the battle with the Soviet Union for the sake of American national interests” (S. Lebedev) World War II. Part of 5. Ibid.). What is quite surprising when such curators attached to him at one time as Ernst Hanfstaengl and the Dulles brothers.
November 26 “In Berlin, Molotov received the first detailed answer to Ribbentrop's proposal to form an alliance. Requirements for the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the provision of bases for Soviet land and sea forces in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and the recognition of territories south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf were put forward as preconditions the sphere of dominant influence of the Russians. The secret article assumed the holding of a joint military action in the event of Turkey’s refusal to join the alliance ”(von Papen F. Decree. Op. - C. 459).
Since Moscow, having confirmed its demands, refused to follow German policy as a junior partner of 29 in November, 3 and 7 in December 1940, the Germans conducted operational-strategic games on maps, in which “three stages of the future Eastern campaign were worked out, respectively: border battle; the defeat of the second echelon of the Soviet troops and access to the line Minsk - Kiev; the destruction of Soviet troops east of the Dnieper and the seizure of Moscow and Leningrad "(S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Ibid.). December 18 Hitler finally approved the plan "Barbarossa". The essence of this plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army before the line of the rivers Western Dvina - Dnieper. It was assumed that the largest part of the Red Army grouping in the West would be located in the Belostok salient north of the Pripyat marshes. The plan was based on an extremely low estimate of the Red Army’s combat capability — the same Hitler 9 in January 1941 compared the Red Army with a decapitated colossus on clay feet.
According to Hitler's optimistic schedule, “eight weeks were allotted to the defeat of the Soviet Union. In the middle of July, the Wehrmacht 1941 was to reach Smolensk, and in the middle of August to take Moscow ”(S. Lebedev. The Soviet Union’s Military and Political Crisis 1941 of the Year // http://regnum.ru/news/1545171.html). In the event that the Soviet leadership does not force peace in the fall of Leningrad with Moscow, nor the seizure of Ukraine, Hitler was determined to attack "at least only with the forces of motorized corps up to Yekaterinburg" (von Bock F. I stood at the gates of Moscow. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006. - C. 14). According to Hitler, “15 August 1941, we will be in Moscow, and 1 on October 1941, the war in Russia will end” (von Weizsäcker Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Translated by F. Kapitsa. - M .: Center Polygraph, 2007. - C. 272).
It was only after the attack on the USSR, when the Barbarossa plan cracked at the seams, the Nazis suddenly "became obvious that the Russians defend themselves more bravely and more desperately than Hitler thought they had more weapons и Tanks much better than we expected ”(von Weizsacker E. Decree. cit. - S. 274) that the Red Army had significant forces abroad of the Western Dvina-Dnieper rivers, and the largest part of the Red Army in the West was located in the Lviv ledge south of Pripyat swamps. At its core, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be based on Hitler’s false messages and was more suitable for implementing the principle “On s'engage et puis ... on voit” ascribed to Napoleon than for guaranteed defeat of the Soviet Union during the lightning blitzkrieg.
According to Mikhail Meltyukhov, “all the military planning of the Eastern Expedition was so adventurous that one could doubt whether the German military and political leadership was generally guided by common sense. ... The whole “Eastern campaign” cannot be regarded as anything other than the suicidal adventure of the German leadership ”(MI Meltyukhov, Stalin's Lost Chance // http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/12.html). Meanwhile, the output of the Wehrmacht to the Urals and even Siberia did not mean the complete defeat and destruction of the Soviet Union. For a complete and unconditional victory, Hitler needed to either continue his advance to the East right up to Vladivostok, or seek the incorporation of Japan into the war against the USSR for the conquest of Siberia. However, instead, Hitler, in spite of the interests of Germany and for the good of the interests of the United States, merged the Japanese expansion to the south — in essence, nowhere, into the yawning abyss.
In particular, the “new commander in chief of the United fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was appointed to this post in August 1940, bluntly told then-Prime Minister Prince Konoe: “If they tell me to fight, then in the first six to twelve months of the war against the United States and England, I will act swiftly and demonstrate a continuous chain of victories. But I must warn you: if the war lasts two or three years, I’m not sure of the final victory. " In the event of a long war with the United States, Yamamoto wrote in a private letter, "it’s not enough for us to take Guam and the Philippines, even Hawaii and San Francisco. We need to take Washington and sign the White House peace treaty." The latter was clearly superior to Japan's capabilities ”(Yakovlev NN Decree. Op. - S. 483-484).
“December 9 FDR received Churchill's message. ... Describing the situation in England in dramatic tones, he asked the president to help on a large scale with armaments, ships, order the US fleet to escort ships sailing across the Atlantic, and for this to get permission from Ireland to create American bases on its west coast. ... By this time, the British government had already spent $ 4,5 billion on purchases in the US, and the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to only $ 2 billion. “The moment is near,” Churchill reported, “when we can’t pay more in cash for ships and others Deliveries ”(NN Yakovlev. Decree. Op. - C. 319-320). 17 December 1940, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgentau testified before a congressional commission that England [indeed - SL] was at the end of all her resources ”(Morison, SE, Battle of the Atlantic / Translated from English R. Khoroshchanskaya, G. Gelfand, 2003. - C. 202).
On December 29, 1940, Roosevelt agreed to sell weapons to Britain on credit. "We must," he said, "become the great arsenal of democracy." On January 6, the president “proposed the idea of a“ law on assistance to democracies, ”known in history as. lend-lease. Lawyers found a suitable law in the archives, passed in 1892, according to which the Minister of War could lease weapons if he considered it "in the interests of the state." The Lend-Lease bill, drawn up on its basis, received number 1776. The President reminded of a significant date in the history of the United States - the beginning of the American Revolution ”(Yakovlev NN Decree, op. - p. 322). The Lend-Lease Law was passed on March 11, 1941. Churchill, immensely pleased with this course of events, called the new law "the most disinterested act in the history of our people" (GD Hitler's Preparation, Inc. How Britain and the United States Created the Third Reich // https://www.litmir.co/br /? b = 210343 & p = 93). Moreover, at a time when many Americans supported the policy of isolationism and strongly opposed the entry of the United States into the war, Roosevelt, who was re-elected two months earlier for a third term, in spite of everything, in his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1941, urged America to abandon isolationism and take part in the fight against the Nazi regime in Germany.
Roosevelt ended his speech with a statement on the creation of a secure world in the near future (“in our time and throughout the life of our generation”). “He saw the future confrontation as a struggle between good and evil” (D. Tabolkin 100 famous Americans // https://www.litmir.co/br/?b=213782&p=117), a clash of “totalitarianism” and “democracy” ( Meltyukhov M.I.Stalin's missed chance // http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/01.html). All over the world, Roosevelt contrasted the "tyranny of the so-called new order" with a "more magnificent concept of moral order" based on "four fundamental human freedoms": freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear of external aggression. According to him, “a respectable society is able to look without fear at attempts to conquer world domination or to make a revolution” (Four freedoms // http://www.grinchevskiy.ru/1900-1945/chetire-svobody.php).
“An excursion in the messianic spirit was proposed by the president himself” (YN Yakovlev, N.N. Decree. Op. - C. 322). Roosevelt deliberately and purposefully repeatedly reiterated the need to affirm freedom "everywhere in the world": freedom of speech and speech is everywhere in the world, the freedom of every person to worship God in the way he chooses is everywhere in the world, freedom from need is everywhere in the world, freedom from fear is everywhere in the world. According to him, “freedom means the domination of human rights everywhere. ... The implementation of this great concept can continue indefinitely, even to the achievement of victory ”(Four freedoms, ibid.). To the remark of his closest ally Hopkins, they say it affects a decent territory, and the Americans are not particularly concerned about the situation of the population of Java, the president calmly replied: “I’m afraid Harry will be forced to do it one day. The world becomes so tiny that the inhabitants of Java become our neighbors ”(Yakovlev N.N. Ordinance. Op. - S. 322).
Before the speech of Roosevelt 6 in January, 1941, the US encroachment outside of America was rather local and sporadic. While Roosevelt, resolutely stepping over the border drawn by the Monroe doctrine and breaking with isolationism, placed responsibility for global stability on America, he secured the role of "world policeman" for the United States and legitimized Washington's intervention in any country in the world. The so-called defense of countries against potential aggressions by their neighbors Roosevelt’s doctrines gave the US the right to dictate its will to other countries and, by organizing coups d'état for them, invading their territory only promoted the imposition of American world hegemony. By setting the American nation as a reference, the leader and defender of democracy, Roosevelt began the struggle that ended America’s total victory over totalitarian regimes, American world domination, the building of the empire of good and the safe unipolar world of Pax Americana.
Already “January 29, 1941, in Washington, began secret talks between representatives of the American and British headquarters, which lasted for two months. ... The tasks of the meetings of the staff representatives were: a) to work out the most effective measures to be taken by the United States and Britain to defeat Germany and its satellites if the United States were forced to enter the war; b) in coordinating plans for the use of the American and British armed forces in the event of the US entering the war; c) in the development of agreements in relation to the main line of military strategy, the main points of responsibility and degrees of command, if (or when) the United States enters the war. Meetings were convened daily, or in plenary sessions, or in the form of commissions ”(Morison S.E. Decree. Op. - C. 216-217).
“At the end of 1940, the Japanese leadership learned that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union. ... 23 February 1941 Mr. Ribbentrop quite transparently made it clear to Japanese Ambassador Oshima that Germany was preparing for war against the USSR, and expressed a wish to join Japan in the war "to achieve its goals in the Far East." However, the Japanese were afraid of starting a war against the USSR at the same time as Germany. The memories of the Khalkhin-Gol events were too fresh for Japan. Therefore, they again spoke of a pact with the USSR, which, on the one hand, was supposed to protect Japan from the north, and on the other, could be an excuse for refusing to attack the Soviet Union immediately after the onset of German aggression ”(Koshkin AA Decree. Op. - C. 103-104).
To clarify the situation, “it was decided to send Matsuoka to Europe so that at the talks ... with the German leaders it would be clear if Germany was really preparing for an attack on the USSR, and if so, when such an attack could occur” (Koshkin A.A. Decree op. - C. 104). In parallel, “since the end of 1940, secret Japanese-American negotiations have been going on. The Konoe government sought to have the United States recognize Japanese domination in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The exorbitant demands of Tokyo from the very beginning doomed the negotiations to fail. Nevertheless, Roosevelt continued them "(Yakovlev NN Decree. Op. - S. 345).
“12 March 1941 Mr. Matsuoka traveled to Europe. Going to Moscow, he had the authority to conclude a non-aggression pact or neutrality pact with the Soviet government, but under Japanese conditions. ... As can be seen from the content of the conversation, Matsuoka, in the form of transparent hints, tried to probe Stalin’s position on the prospect of the USSR joining the Tripartite Pact in one form or another. At the same time, the Japanese minister openly proposed, in the interests of “exterminating the Anglo-Saxons”, “to go hand in hand” with the Soviet Union. Developing the idea of involving the USSR in this block, Matsuoka relied on information about the Molotov negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin in November 1940 ”(Koshkin AA Decree. Op. S. 105, 109).
During the Berlin talks with 27 on 29 in March, Hitler mislead his Far Eastern ally about his future plans and diligently urged Matsuoka to attack England in Southeast Asia (Yakovlev NN Decree. Op. - S. 586; Koshkin A.A. Decree op. - S. 111-112; Schmidt P. The Translator of Hitler (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/schmidt/07.html). “Subsequently, Matsuoka admits that as a result of his visit to Berlin, he estimated the likelihood of the beginning of the German-Soviet war as 50 on 50. “If I knew that they would go to war, I would prefer to take a more friendly position towards Germany and would not conclude a neutrality pact (with the USSR),” he said on June 25 1941 at a meeting of the government’s coordination council and imperial stakes. But it will be later. In the meantime, negotiations were to be held in Moscow ”(Koshkin A. A. Decree. Op. - C. 114).
Matsuoka returned to Moscow from Berlin on April 7. Meanwhile, in America, Hell on April 9 received Japanese proposals for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, China's recognition of Japan's capture of Manchuria, the application of the "open door" doctrine in the Japanese-American interpretation to China, the restoration of trade relations between the US and Japan, and the provision of free access for Japan to sources of raw materials and providing it with a loan. “Actually, there was nothing to negotiate about. Acceptance of these proposals would mean the consent of the United States to Japanese domination in the Far East ”(NN Yakovlev, op. Cit. - p. 606). “On April 13, 1941, a Neutrality Pact was signed in the Kremlin between Japan and the Soviet Union. At the same time, a Declaration on mutual respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo was signed ”(AA Koshkin, op. Cit. - p. 124). The Soviet-Japanese treaty was ratified on April 25, 1941. Despite the vigorous protests of their foreign minister, "the Japanese decided to continue negotiations in Washington, as well as hide them from the Germans" (W. Churchill. World War II // http://www.litmir.info/br/?b=6061&p= 28).
“The reaction of the US government to the conclusion of this Pact was painful and comparable with the impression that Washington had on the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR on 1939 of the year. In 1939, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Russia; in April, 1941, they were strengthened so that by June of this year. the trade turnover between both states was reduced to zero ”(A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin, Ibid.). “15 April 1941, President Roosevelt officially authorized the US military to participate in the war in China on a voluntary basis. Formally, the volunteers entered into an agreement with the Chinese company CAMSO (“Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company”), and the servicemen received leave for their part in the United States for the duration of the contract. ... Officially, a new unit consisting of three fighter squadrons entered service on August 1 of the year 1941 "(Flying Tigers // https://ru.wikipedia.org).
“But Roosevelt did not stop there. China has become another country that began to receive military aid under a lend-lease ”(How Roosevelt provoked an attack by Japan. Ibid.). In particular, for the American pilots, the government of Chiang Kai-shek bought X-NUMX R-100C Tomahawk aircraft (Flying Tigers, ibid.) In the USA for the American credit (under Lend-Lease). “April 40 ... Chiang Kai-shek made a public condemnation of the Covenant, arguing that it creates convenience for Japanese aggression against England and America and worsens the situation in China” (A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin Ibid.).
Thus, Hitler deprived Germany of support from Japan in the war with the Soviet Union, allowing the allies to destroy their opponents in turn, rather than condemning Japan to death after Germany. In particular, 27 March 1941, the secret negotiations between England and the United States concluded with the conclusion of the agreement "ABC-1", "which reflected the basic principles of Anglo-American cooperation during the war. ... At the same time in Washington, an agreement was signed with Canada "ABC-22" on the joint defense of Canada and the United States. This agreement was included in the ABC-1 agreement a characteristic feature of these agreements was the main strategic concept of the Second World War, which was to break Hitler first ”(Morison S.E. Decree. Op. - C. 217-218).
On April 18, the United States government announced the establishment of a demarcation line between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. “This line, which ran along the 26th meridian of longitude, then became the de facto maritime border of the United States. It included in the United States zone all British territories on or near the American continent, Greenland and the Azores, and was soon continued to the east, including Iceland. In accordance with this declaration, American warships were to patrol the waters of the Western Hemisphere and, incidentally, inform England about the enemy's activities in the area. However, the United States remained a non-belligerent party and at this stage could not yet provide direct protection ... to the caravans. This responsibility lay entirely on the British ships, which were supposed to provide protection ... of ships along the entire route "(Churchill W. World War II // http://www.litmir.co/br/?b=73575&ShowDeleted=1&p=27) ...
On May 10, 1941, Hitler's deputy for the leadership of the Nazi Party, R. Hess, flew to England. On May 12, 1941, the British government informed the world about the Hess mission. According to Churchill, Stalin saw during the flight of Hess "some secret negotiations or a conspiracy about joint actions of England and Germany during the invasion of Russia, which ended in failure" (W. Churchill. World War II //. Http://www.litmir.co / br /? b = 73575 & ShowDeleted = 1 & p = 13). “Even before the start of the Soviet-German war, on June 5, 1941, the American government began negotiations with the new Japanese ambassador to the United States, K. Nomura, to reach a compromise in China and the countries of East Asia. These negotiations continued during the summer and fall of 1941; their duration testifies to the intention of Prime Minister Konoe to peacefully agree with Hull on the non-intervention of the United States on the alienation of the French and Dutch colonies in the South Seas ”(A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin, ibid.).
"June 10, the leadership of the Ministry of War of Japan has developed a document" Course of measures to resolve current problems. " It envisaged: taking advantage of a convenient moment, to use armed forces both in the South and in the North; Remaining committed to the Tripartite Pact, in any case, it is up to them to decide on the use of armed forces independently, to continue military operations on mainland China ”(Koshkin AA, Ordinance. Op. - C. 133). 11 June 1941 was issued to the Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy for draft Directive No. 32 on “Preparations for the period after the implementation of the“ Barbarossa ”plan. “The final version of directive No. 32 was adopted already during the war of Germany against the USSR - 30 June 1941 of the year” (History of the Second World War. Decree. Op. - C. 242). 22 June 1941, the Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
Thus, after the defeat of France, Japan decided to seize the Pacific colonies of the overthrown European empires. To legitimize its claims, Japan began negotiations with Germany and Italy on the division of spheres of influence, and, in order to eliminate the threat from the Soviet Union, first began to normalize relations with the USSR. Soon Japan did raise the question of allocating its sphere of influence to the Soviet Union. In words, Hitler agreed with the Japanese, but in practice he put forward unacceptable conditions for Moscow at negotiations with Molotov and ordered him to prepare for war with the Soviet Union without notifying the Japanese, for the sake of American national interests, torpedoed the Soviet Union’s accession to the “Pact of Three”. After that, America finally broke off with isolationism, declared it aimed at building the doctrine of Roosevelt under the pretext of fighting all good against all bad Pax Americana, decided to enter the war and began to coordinate its efforts with England, agreeing to put all its efforts to defeat Germany first and then Japan
In order to prevent the defeat of the Soviet Union during a lightning blitzkrieg and delaying hostilities, Hitler established a plan for war with the USSR on his false messages. When the Japanese still heard about Hitler’s plans, he was afraid of helping the Wehrmacht Kwantung Army from the East, misled the Japanese about his attack on the USSR and assured them of the urgency of attacking England and the United States. Allowing Japan to conclude a treaty of neutrality with the USSR, and giving rise to Germany’s attack on the USSR after the German attack did not immediately declare war on the USSR. Moreover, Japan was now free not only not to make hasty decisions, but also to make a choice regarding the direction of its aggression to the North or the South, based on the military successes or failures of Germany.
Empire of good. Documentary film by K. Semin
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