Parliamentary elections in Turkey are held on the day when this article is written, and their results will be summarized after it is handed over to the editorial board. Meanwhile, if the interim calculations reported by the media are correct, R. T. Erdogan’s efforts to change the political reality that has developed after the summer elections which were so unfortunate for him have borne fruit. His ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has every chance to maintain a monopoly on power, no longer worrying about forming a coalition with its rivals, which the Turkish president, apparently, is unable due to the nature of his character, which is noted even by his supporters.
There were falsifications at the elections and stuffing or not, how honest the struggle was, who of the influential politicians and clan leaders “on the ground” the AKP managed to buy, whether the internal opposition from among supporters of F. Gulen was finally suppressed, whether the war unleashed by Erdogan against the Workers Party Kurdistan Region (PKK), based on the results of the Peoples Democracy Party (PDN), how pressure was put on voters and rivals of Erdogan, did it cost him so frankly and unceremoniously to push the constitutional changes to turn s of a parliamentary republic in the presidential, is it really the attacks with mass casualties in Suruç and Ankara have been a provocation of the Turkish secret services aimed at aggravation of the situation before the elections and the beginning of mass "witch hunt" - all this does not matter if he won.
Choice after election
Moreover, the resurrection “after the fight” of the problems of corruption in the ruling party or confrontation with the left and Kemalists because of Gezi Park and Taksim Square looks less meaningful. Not to mention the accusations against Erdogan of dictatorial ambitions and the violation of laws during the construction of the presidential palace. If not for his ambitions, he would never have become president. If it were not for leadership and organizational skills, I would not have done everything that I did, including in economics. And if he manages to win the elections with the gap he needs, he will hold any decisions through parliament. Including those who bury the role of this institution as the main pillar of Turkish democracy. That, however, was in other countries under presidents with such willpower and ambitions like Erdogan, and not even once. Ending after them, because a strong leader is not willing to tolerate other strong leaders alongside him. This is the immutable law of politics - Chinese, American or Turkish, it doesn’t matter.
So the question is not whether JDP Erdogan will be able to get 400 votes (hardly), who will turn him into the sultan of the new Ottoman Ports, but what exactly he will do after the elections. For example, she will try to continue blackmailing Moscow because of Syria on the issue of energy supplies and the construction of the Akkuyu NPP. Or once again hit the Syrian Kurds, which will finally embroil him with the United States, who willy-nilly, trying to demonstrate that in Syria, not only Russia, Iran and Asad are fighting with the Islamic State (IG), are forced to cooperate with them since no one else in partnership with Washington will attack the capital of the IG Rakku. Will he develop the announced military support of the Syrian Turkomans? Not to mention, will it stop provoking a refugee crisis in Europe or is it not a tactic, but the strategy of Erdogan, and Germany, as well as other EU countries, should we continue to expect millions of migrants?
The question is whether Erdogan will rush after the election to create a no-fly or even just a buffer zone on the territory of Syria, risking a direct clash with Iran and the Russian Federation, while not supporting the NATO partners, starting with the United States, in this regard. Whether the “Great Turkish Game” in Aleppo, which, according to politicians of its camp, part of Turkey alienated from their country by the Europeans in the 20-s, is trying to play the Big Turkish game, is not as ingenious as it was with Northern Cyprus, times have changed. Will the support of the Uygur separatists, who quarreled with China, stop? How will act in partnership with Qatar in Central Asia, taking care of the militants in Afghanistan who "saddled" the frontier strip with the republics of the former USSR and the TAPI gas pipeline to deploy Turkmen gas to the EU through the Trans-Caspian TAG (with a very cool attitude to this Azerbaijan project) .
Finally, to what extent the “post-election” Turkish president will support the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab world - from Egypt to Gaza with its Hamas, which complicates its relations with Cairo and the Arabian monarchies, except Qatar. And, of course, to what extent will keep officially denied relations with the IG, including financial ones. The development of the Turkish policy towards Israel, the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the Turkic regions of the Russian Federation and those subjects of the Federation that are of great interest to Ankara (like the Crimea), not to mention Turkey’s neighbors in the Balkans, cannot be said . However, it is possible that R.T. Erdogan will be engaged in “clearing the field” from his former rivals and rebuilding the economy, which has suffered considerable damage as a result of his political experiments.
Kurds only for themselves
All this ultimately depends on the final results of the parliamentary elections in Turkey. While they are unknown, let us draw the reader’s attention to some important points of the current state of affairs in the Middle East (BSV), prepared for IBI, based on the materials of S. E. Babkin, A. Bystrov and Yu. B. Shcheglovina. What is happening in Syria and Iraq, Libya and Egypt, the states of the Sahara and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Yemen, Iran and Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan is of great interest to the “Great Powers”, the situation in the circle of which after the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria Russia has significantly strengthened, simultaneously provoking their reaction to their actions. So, it was announced the arrival in the north of Syria of 50 fighters of US special forces "to assist local self-defense forces."
The Pentagon spokesman reported this event as “the start of a large-scale advisory mission that does not involve escorting local fighters during operations against the IS”, stressing that the United States does not intend to deliver ammunition directly to the Syrian Kurdistan self-defense forces fighting with extremists, although they will continue to support them . Hearings in the US Congress on the situation in the region have become, apparently, a turning point for the administration of President B. Obama in determining tactics in Syria and Iraq. The US President clearly pushed for a change in his position of the Russian Federation, actively operating in Syria. It is clear that the White House is simply trying to seize the initiative.
In Syria, Washington was unable to determine the strength positioned as the main counterweight to the B. Assad regime. By giving this direction to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, which stimulated the armed forms of the fight against Assad, the United States condemned the Syrian resistance to Islamization. It was provided by Riyadh and Doha: in the first stage, the Islamists were in the minority, but Saudi and Qatari financial investments predetermined their dominance while saturating the opposition forces with foreign jihadists. According to the Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC), the proportion of such volunteers reaches an aggregate 40 percent of the IG in Syria and Iraq. In the first case, the number of foreigners in the IG and the Prosaudian Jabhat an Nusre is up to 60 percent.
The United States could prevent this if it supported the Syrian Free Army (SSA), which was taken care of by Ankara. Her authority in Syria was small, but the main thing that stopped her support for Washington was the personal dislike of Obama and Erdogan. The result was a vacuum. Today, the Pentagon and the CIA can offer the White House only a very limited set of options, and the Kurds among them have no alternative. So the United States, in any case, is forced to balance between providing them with material and technical assistance and stable relations with Ankara. Such assistance is already being provided - recently the Americans dropped 50 Kurds of military cargo to the Kurds. To deny this is meaningless and official denials from the United States belong exclusively to the category of "smoke screen".
US special forces in Syria will have to direct planes at targets during the planned offensive against Rakka. Despite assurances to the contrary, he will need to act in the advanced parts of the advancing Kurds. Otherwise, there is no point in being there commando. At the same time, the Kurds will not go further than Raqqi. They want to create their autonomy and are not ready to perform other tasks. And if Damascus announces the granting of this autonomy, the Kurds will fight the Islamists in an alliance with Assad and, as is clear from the visit of their representatives to Moscow, Russia. As judging by the results of the military operation conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces, the authority of the Russian army as a serious force in the region is growing. Why, explains the report of the human rights NGO Syrian Human Rights Watch (CISS) based in the UK on the results of the actions of Russian pilots.
According to her, about 600 people died during the month of the operation, most of them militants. Attacks were targeted at 10 of Syria’s 14 provinces. Among the killed 410 militants of various groups, including the IG. As for the coalition led by the United States, over 13 people were killed in Syria in 3649 months, including 3276 IS fighters, 147 - Jabhat al-Nusra and other fighters, total - 3423 fighters. Thus, according to the CISS, which cannot be suspected of pro-Russian sympathies, in the destruction of jihadists aviation The Russian Federation was twice as effective as the coalition. The actions of the Russian aviation and Syrian forces have led to the fact that the number of jihadist formations in Syria has decreased by a third due to losses and mass desertion.
In some areas, the Islamists are achieving local success. IG holds positions in a number of areas, since over several years they have been turned into fortified areas with an extensive network of underground passages and shelters. At the same time, there was an organized withdrawal from the most threatened directions of IS militants and their export abroad by detachments led by commanders: to Libya and Yemen. Last arrived more than 500 people on three aircraft. In this case, the Emirate of Qatar is transferring from Syria, where the militants face a real threat in the face of the Russian Federation Military Space Force, the Assad army, Iranians and local militias, to other fronts "valuable" fired shots.
Libya: from dawn to discord
The author described in detail the current situation in Yemen (“Shots past the“ gates ”,“ Fighting on a quilt ”). As for Libya, the most significant event there was the death of October 27 during a helicopter attack of twelve leading field commanders of the Islamist coalition Dawn of Libya. All of them were members of the inner circle of the former member of the “Libyan militant group” A. Belhadj and his deputy H. al-Sharif. Colonels Kh. Budayya, S. S. Saks and the commander of the artillery brigade Z. S. al-Rahman, who played an important role in the fight against the government units in Tobruk attacking Tripoli, were killed. At the same time, against the background of the consultations held in Morocco on the peaceful withdrawal from the Libyan armed conflict and the agreements on the establishment of a national unity government between tripolitans, rallying around Belhadj, and the missionaries, serious contradictions arose.
None of the groups claimed responsibility for the attack. Most likely in this case, a special operation was carried out to eliminate the Islamists, possibly a raid of Egyptian helicopters that make up the main part of the “Air Force Tobruk”. A number of Misuratovists fear that this will provoke a resumption of hostilities, disrupting the peaceful settlement. This wing is led by F. Bashashgha and A.-R. Al-Swayli is in favor of implementing the Moroccan accords. According to the plan, UN Special Representative for Libya B. Leon F. Bashashgh should head the National Security Council, and A.-R. Al-Swayli - Council of State: two bodies that are key in the proposed future power architecture.
Belhadj, who is supported by Qatar and Algeria, was against it. Recently, he was in Turkey, trying to enlist the support of Ankara and minimize the threat of personal financial sanctions of the EU. H. al-Sharif remained chief in Tripoli, being responsible for security issues. It was he who provided security for the main airport in the vicinity of Tripoli - al-Mitigi, from which from late September regular flights to Tunisia began. Tripolitans get help through this airport. weapons and militants from Qatar. They control the television studio Al-Nabaa, which is organized with the financial and technical assistance of the same Qataris. In their area of responsibility is the Huba prison in the capital, which contains prominent representatives of the overthrown regime: A. Sennusi, A. R. Dorba, al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and S. Gaddafi.
A blow from helicopters eliminated the leadership of the clan tripolitans in the person of H. al-Sharif. The initiators could have been Misuratov, and General H. Haftar. On October XI, in Cairo, Speaker of the House of Representatives A.S. Issa discussed with the Egyptian President A.F. Al-Sisi the details of the coup in Tobruk, called upon to remove Prime Minister A.At-Thani, by creating a Military Council headed by H. Haftar, who would take over management functions on the model of Gaddafi. The elimination of the leadership of the Tripolitans and the seizure of the capital by H. Haftar fit into the plan, which did not work in its original form, but could provoke the failure of the Moroccan accords and the beginning of a new round of armed struggle. The main reason for this is the non-acceptance of the plan of B. Leon by the main foreign sponsors of the warring parties in Libya in the face of Egypt and Qatar.
Qatar is not the only monarchy of the Arabian Peninsula, which has its own interests in Africa. It is characteristic that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are consolidated there. The Emirates began to actively use the ports of Eritrea as logistics naval bases. This was preceded by a sharp diplomatic scandal between Djibouti and Riyadh from Abu Dhabi. The occasion was insults inflicted by the commander of the Air Force Djibouti military attache of the UAE. Djibouti removed emirates firms from contracting for the reconstruction of the seaport and the acquisition of a controlling stake in its shares. The incident led to a mutual recall of ambassadors of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Djibouti. After the rupture of relations, the UAE and KSA abandoned their plans to build a military air and naval base in Djibouti in favor of Eritrea.
It should be borne in mind that Djibouti and Ethiopia resist any attempt by Eritrea to break the economic and political blockade, trying to transform it into a rogue state at the level of the African Union. Fortunately, its structure is military communism with forced mobilization into the labor armies. Asmara is experiencing a shortage of cash currency, which makes it negotiable in terms of using the country's maritime and logistics infrastructure. Israeli submarines were based there, using its territory to replenish water supplies, repairs and recreation. Next - supply routes for smuggled weapons from Yemen and Iran. Moreover, until recently, Eritreans worked in this business with Yemeni Housits. The main stream of illegal immigration from Africa to the Arabian Peninsula goes through Eritrea.
The attempt by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to draw Eritrea into its orbit has several goals. They are trying to stop Eritrean contacts with Iranians and Housits as part of their arms deals, offering lucrative preferences. For example, delivery of cheap fuel from Saudi Arabia to Eritrea has been arranged and “urgent financial assistance” worth hundreds of millions of US dollars has been provided. The port of Asab is convenient for supplying the forces of the Arabian coalition in Yemen. In addition, by concluding an alliance with Asmara, Riyadh gets a tool to destabilize the situation in Ethiopia, pursuing an anti-Saudi policy with the elimination of Islamist-controlled structures under the kingdom. The intensification of subversive activities against Addis Ababa goes through the Oromo and Ogaden tribes controlled by Eritrea.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are planning to gain a foothold in Eritrea for a long time. The UAE, according to some sources, rented the port of Asab for 30 years. At the same time, they are working with the leadership of Somaliland to lease the former Navy base in Berbera. Mogadishu in exchange for neutrality in this matter promised major financial assistance. It is planned to create a network of local bases around the coast of the Horn of Africa. According to the UAE satellite intelligence data, the port of Asab is mainly used, where there are three UAE military cargo ships. All of them are purchased in 2012. One of them was involved in October 17 for the transfer of Sudanese troops (450 people) from Port Sudan to Yemen. At the same time, the participation of Eritrea in the actions of the Arabian Coalition in Yemen is not limited to the provision of ports. About 400, Eritreans have been transferred from Asab to Aden, and this is clearly not the last military contingent to be used in Yemen to minimize the loss of Arabian monarchies.
Summing up, we state: the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, among which Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates can be distinguished, continue to fight for hegemony in the Arab world, the most revealing example of which was the Arab Spring. They combine economic and financial pressure, information war, bribing local ruling circles, direct intervention (as in Yemen) and the “war of proxy” (in Syria and Libya). These countries manipulate the United States, Britain, France and other NATO and EU members for their own purely selfish interests. To a lesser extent, this applies to Turkey, which has its hegemonic aspirations and interests in the region, to the defense of which Ankara is not too successfully trying to attract the NATO bloc, primarily the United States. It is much more difficult to manipulate it, although having become involved in the Syrian war, Erdogan himself created many problems for himself, which he is unlikely to be able to solve.