Military Review

Sunset attack from the sun

29

And-15



Like any person who is fond of aviation, at one time I read a lot of books dedicated to famous Soviet pilots. Each of us on the shelves of personal libraries are the memoirs of many of our legendary pilots, when reading which they involuntarily took our breath away from what they had done, and our hearts were filled with sincere joy for the fact that they are your fellow tribesmen. Hero pilots who fought on the fronts of World War II were especially proud. The names of Pokryshkin, Vorozheykin, Sultan Amet-Khan and many other Soviet aces became a legend, a symbol of invincibility.

And then, like a bolt from the blue, a time that was known all over came, an avalanche of other information fell upon our heads, which almost buried our idols under us, and with them all the heroic history Soviet Aviation. Everything that came to hand was subjected to ostracism: pilots, airplanes, tactics, industry, number of victories, etc. All those who are not lazy, threw their stone in this garden, not caring about the evidence.


And-153


Of particular interest representatives of the writing brethren focused on the initial period of the war, during which our aircraft survived difficult times. An uncountable number of ideas, thoughts, statements and conclusions were made concerning the causes of heavy defeats in the air battles of the first year of the war. However, to me personally, who read various materials on this subject, it constantly seemed that the authors were not sufficiently convincing in their statements, often exaggerated the situation, and put wrong accents. In the end, I wanted to listen to the opinions of the participants themselves. I thought, what if we give the floor to our illustrious combat pilots, famous commanders and specialists in the field of aviation? We will not “load” them with a discussion of the global problems of confrontation between the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe, and ask them “simple” questions: how were you taught in flight schools and aviation units? How do you assess the tactical and flight training of our fighter pilots at the beginning of the war?

And now we take some books from the shelf (as practice has shown, we don’t need much) and read them ...

The legendary pilot M. Gromov, versed in the flight case, argued that "only after three to five years of constant practice, one can consider himself a real pilot." In confirmation of his words, he gives an impressive picture of the work of a fighter pilot during an air battle: “The complex of objects that are subject to his attention is extremely high: he must watch the enemy, not letting him out of sight for a single second, keep the situation in touch with with your planes and interact with them, listen to commands, monitor fuel, instrument readings, etc. And all this - with the consciousness of the danger threatening him, requiring constant internal mobilization readiness. ... The pilot must be ready for any surprise. Nothing should surprise him. ” Comments are superfluous.

A.V. Talking about the battles at Khalkhin Gol, Vorozheikin recalled the words of a downed Japanese pilot: “I know that you let out weak pilots from military schools. To become a full-fledged fighter, you need to serve at least two or three years in the front, and here you have more than half of the second year of service. ” The prisoner told the truth about the military schools. At that time, the cadets with firing and air battles only got to know each other, and they flew in schools on old planes, so the pilot needed to master a new plane after school, to study its possibilities in a training fight. ” So, we have an averaged time reference for the formation of a full-fledged fighter - at least three years of intensive training in the front line.

People's Commissar of the aviation industry A.I. Shahurin, discussing the training of pilots in the front-line units and the problems of mastering new aircraft before the war, writes: “By the beginning of 1941, when aviation units began to be replenished with new aircraft, there was concern about their development. The mood of the pilots is very different. Some were happy ... Others found these planes more complex, not as maneuverable as the old ones, they considered them too strict in control. It was all true. New combat vehicles were not given immediately. In addition, in the pre-war years, in an effort to achieve trouble-free operation in units, in aerobatic training, aerobatics were less and less used. Few trained in difficult conditions at night. If we add to this that the flight crew in some parts more than half consisted of young people, then it becomes clear why the development of new technology in some places came with a “scratch” and some people expressed distrust of it. It was more familiar to fly on old planes. ”

People's Commissar knew what he was talking about.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that before the war, the norms of the annual raid were reduced. G.N. Zakharov writes: “And so it wasn’t very much to fly, and then there was an order to cut the norms to a minimum. As soon as these norms were cut, the percentage of accidents jumped in all parts. ”

The notorious Commissar of Defense order to transfer Air Force personnel to the barracks position added fuel to the fire. B.N. Eremin recalls: “Everyone who served less than 4 years, was equated to enlisted. Pilots and technicians experienced this order. The mood was idle, depressed. Flight work was reduced, the restructuring took almost all the remaining months of peaceful life ... "

The Great Patriotic War broke out. What did we have? A.I. In his memoirs, Pokryshkin writes that before the war, flight schools prepared pilots for obsolete programs. “For years, in winter and summer, in any weather, we were taught to go to the“ T ”with the gas removed and put the car at the exact sign, within a few meters. Pulling up on the motor was considered a gross violation of the instruction. Even aerobatics and shooting - the most important thing for a fighter - retreated into the background before this element of the flight. ... The new recruitment arrived in aviation from schools that trained young pilots according to the old, long-established program, for such machines as the “seagull”, I-16. Arriving at the front, the pilot immediately got into an almost new world for him; tactical skills acquired at school were clearly insufficient compared to what war demanded. ”

He agrees with him A.V. Vorozheikin: “In schools, the take-off and landing were mainly judged by the training of instructors and cadets: after all, the greatest number of incidents occurred during take-off and landing. Therefore, to other elements of piloting in schools approached condescendingly. There was even a saying: “It takes off well, let's see how it sits” ... Schools didn’t work out such elements of piloting as rapid coups, low-altitude pilotage and other techniques that required the pilot to will, to accurately calculate all of his movements, accompanied by large overloads . ... For example, I didn’t do more than two turns (corkscrew) on the I-16, and very few people knew that the character of the car’s rotation changed abruptly from the third round: the plane was steeper, almost upright drooping nose to the ground, spinning much faster, from the wings cutting through the air, there were unpleasantly hissing sounds. ... In short, our young recruitment had to be retrained. And most importantly - instill a sense of independence in flight, as required by air combat. "


And-16


VC. Babich writes: “Analysis of the air battles conducted by our pilots in December 1941, January, February 1942 showed that it was necessary to resolutely strengthen the combat skills of aviators, starting with their training on the ground. It was necessary to improve the use of airborne and ground-based radio equipment, to constantly study the air and ground enemy, his frequently changing tactics, to persevere in mastering the new methods of combat.

The training level of the aircrew arriving at the front at the end of 1942 did not change much. He is vividly illustrated by A.I. Shakhurin (Battle of Stalingrad, Saratov Aviation Plant). “We are sending aircraft under our own power to the nearest military airfield. On the U-2 plane I am flying to this airfield, I want to see with my own eyes who we are handing the planes to.
I do not see lieutenants among the pilots, only sergeants. I ask:
- What raid do you have on combat aircraft?
Answer:
- One and a half to two hours, and then most often on old aircraft, rarely anyone flying new ones.
I ask the commanders:
- How will the development of a new material part take place?
- The theory was explained to them during their studies, they were also introduced to the features of the aircraft, but here we give one or two flights and then to Stalingrad. Time does not wait. Hmmm, from this episode, I was cold on the skin!

Sunset attack from the sun

Yak-1


Questions about the level of training of pilots? There is? Then we go further and see what B.N. writes about this. Eremin: “For many young pilots who began to fight at Stalingrad, the first combat sortie often became the last. The Hitlerite aces did not forgive even the slightest mistake, and did not leave time to acquire a combat uniform. ” The impressive result of the battles near Stalingrad is brought by S.V. Gribanov: “For December 1942, there were two pilots left in the 434-IAP — deputy. com regiment and commissioner ... "

Little has changed in the issue of training in the combat skills of the pilots in the subsequent years of the war. A.V. Vorozheikin: “During the war, our courses were engaged in the preparation of masters of air combat, but the front showed that they did not prepare as they should. The main weakness of the courses was that little attention was paid to aerial shooting. ... They were trained in the old manner, as in the twenties, when the fighter's maximum speed did not exceed 200-280 km / h. The canvas cone, which the pilots called "sausage", was fired only with barrage, aiming not at the target itself, but at the pre-empted point, hoping that the "sausage" would jump at the cannon line itself. ... With the growth of fighter speeds, the emergence of large-caliber machine guns and guns, the removal of the aiming point was so large that the cone began to go out of sight of the pilot. In addition, the luminous trail in front of the enemy’s nose warned the enemy about the danger, he took a counter-maneuver, the attack failed. ” IN AND. Voronov supports this idea: “In order to shoot down in aerial combat, one must be able to shoot. The trouble is that we are poorly trained in shooting at aerial targets. Therefore, it seems that the Messers are invulnerable ...


MiG-3


Why, flying good cars, we could not always use their high LTD in a fight? The conclusion was that: apart from good cars and trained pilots, one must be able to tactically and correctly apply the technique and weapon in battle, taking into account the technique and tactics of the enemy. In our actions, we clearly looked at the elements of underestimation and a simplified approach to the choice of tactics, the templates for constructing battle formations, lacked cunning ... "

About the tactics written by many masters of air combat. In this regard, we are interested in their assessment of the first half of the war. It is the initial stage of the war that makes it possible to see in a pure form the tactical baggage of the opposing sides. In the course of hostilities, counter diffusion of tactical ideas takes place, so differences in approaches to air combat are quickly eroded and leveled.


LaGG-3


Weak tactical flight training of our pilots in the initial period of the war, indicated by G.V. Zimin, instinctively forced them to stay closer to each other. "Our pilots feel more confident in the" heap. So, in a "bunch", and started the fight, and already further - someone how it goes. Two or three pairs of Germans could easily unleash our “heap”, and, taking advantage of the unsystematic nature of its construction, knock them down. ”

“A comparative analysis of the capabilities of the warring parties shows,” says V.K. Babich, - that in the first period of the war the well-known air combat formula "height - speed - maneuver - fire" could not be born and be realized: the necessary material base was missing. For the enemy were three of the four components of this formula. Even a very brave and experienced pilot could not go to the vertical if his plane gained less height for more time than the enemy. And-16 groups were kept too tight, because increasing the intervals and distances with low fire led to a violation of mutual support. "

K.A. Vershinin in his book quotes the letter of the commander of the IAD A.V. Borman, dated 1943 in spring: “I came to the conclusion that it is necessary to radically change the methods of defensive combat used since the first days of the war. Today they have become a great evil. We need to let the pilots feel their power in a pair. Need a fracture. Regiment commanders should begin the transition to a new one. Fearing losses, they now send a group of 8-12 airplanes to any mission and do not give initiative to leading couples. The commanders of the groups, in turn, fearing the loss of the aircraft from sight, drive in a tight order, linking this to the freedom of maneuver. The outdated form of defensive combat on I-16 and I-153 aircraft is still used in some parts. ” Behind two years of war, and the couple has not yet become a standard tactical structure. In the course of the notorious "defensive circle." The commanders of the lower and middle managers are inactive and hunted down by higher authorities.

An interesting idea about the evolution of tactical ideas is expressed by GN. Zakharov. “Even later, after fighting, gaining experience in battles, we naturally came to understand the tactics of modern air combat by the standards of those. At first, the pilots didn’t even take into account such tactical elements as entering the attack from the side of the sun. ” General Zakharov (in 1938, the flight commander, senior lieutenant, and in 1939, the district air force commander!) Forgot to mention that this “natural way” was covered with the bodies of a huge number of our pilots, whom he could not teach “even tactical elements” . However, did he himself know these "elements"?

As soon as we remembered here about Zakharov’s fantastic career, it would be appropriate to briefly list some of the data on this topic, which S. V.V. Gribanov: “A.K. In 1938, Sedov was a senior lieutenant, squadron commander, and a year later he was already a brigade commander, chief of the Chief Flight Inspectorate of the Red Army Air Force. Vs Holzunov in 1936, the captain, the commander of the squadron, and in 1937 - the commander of the army of special purpose. A.A. In 1936, Gubenko was a senior lieutenant, flight commander, and in 1938, he was a colonel and deputy commander of the District Air Force. G.P. Kravchenko was the captain in 1937, and in 1941 he was lieutenant-general, commander of the district air force. " This writes and VS Shumikhin: “Many of the commanders put forward did not have time to acquire (before the war) the necessary command experience. By the middle of 1941, 43% commanders of all degrees were in positions less than six months, 65% - less than a year. More than 91% of aviation commanders commanded them for less than six months. In 1940 at the age of 29, the Red Army Air Force was headed by Lieutenant-General Aviation P.V. Levers. Marshal A.A. Novikov wrote that, although Rychagov had considerable combat experience and probably was a promising military leader, yet the lack of military education and experience in leadership positions made it hardly advisable to appoint him to such a responsible post. ” These are the "strategists" commanding the country's aviation at the most crucial moment of its history, what kind of "sunset attack from the sun"! ..
Author:
Originator:
http://oldman-va.livejournal.com/1488.html
29 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Just BB
    Just BB 7 November 2015 07: 26
    +8
    Good selection.
    It is a pity that history "goes in a spiral" and few people use it for the future (does not study)
    1. DanSabaka
      DanSabaka 7 November 2015 08: 13
      -3
      Well, how can you learn if History is constantly rewritten, and sometimes simply invented ....
      In a recent series about WWII pilots, the start of the war is being held on I-15 aircraft with fixed gears .... And this was shot about air defense pilots in border regions ...
      1. tasha
        tasha 7 November 2015 11: 23
        +7
        Please explain what you wanted to say with a comment about I-15 at the beginning of the war?

        Some I-15 fought in the 1941 year, not to mention the I-15 bis.
        1. DanSabaka
          DanSabaka 8 November 2015 11: 44
          0
          fought, I do not argue ... but not in the air defense units ...
          1. tasha
            tasha 9 November 2015 06: 11
            0
            Svetlishin, Nikolai Andreevich
            Air defense forces of the country in the Great Patriotic War.

            40 fighter aviation regiments allocated from the Air Force for air defense of the country had about 1500 aircraft

            The fighter aviation units allocated for the country's air defense were equipped with aircraft only at 60%. On their arsenal were fighters: I-15 – 1%, I-16 – 66%, I-153 – 24%, Yak-1 and MiG-1 – 9%; A number of MiG-3 and LaGG-3 aircraft were also received.
  2. valokordin
    valokordin 7 November 2015 09: 01
    +3
    Quote: Just VV
    Good selection.
    It is a pity that history "goes in a spiral" and few people use it for the future (does not study)

    Remember the words of the leader of the world proletariat "Learning military affairs in a real way"
    1. ASK505
      ASK505 7 November 2015 12: 38
      +5
      Quote: valokordin
      Remember the words of the leader of the world proletariat "Learning military affairs in a real way"


      Why so modest. These are the words of Lenin. Once on the day of November 7, we all congratulated each other on the holiday of the Great October Revolution. Happy holiday, who remembers!
  3. Yak-3P
    Yak-3P 7 November 2015 09: 02
    +4
    best of all embody the character and condition of the flyers memoirs of Vorozheykin and Avdeev recommend to those interested
  4. lilian
    lilian 7 November 2015 09: 20
    10
    The fact that our rafts had a small plaque all buzzed ears. But what do I think, after training, in part, that the pilots do not fly and do not train? Or did the USSR Air Force originate two or three years before the war?
    By the war there was already a significant number of pilots with a good touch. There were also insufficiently experienced graduates, but the fact that they were thrown into battle was a necessary measure connected with the dangerous situation at the front at the beginning of the war.

    By the way, from the memoirs of veterans it is known that the newcomers were not immediately thrown into dangerous battles, they were trained on not too dangerous tasks. The very title of the film "Only old men go to battle" speaks about it. In the first sorties they had a task of t.s. "do what I do". Do not break away from the leader, throw bombs where he throws, shoot where he shoots and in no case lag behind the leader. As they gained experience, they were already entrusted with more complex tasks.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 7 November 2015 10: 04
      14
      But what do I think, after training, in part, that the pilots do not fly and do not train?

      The fact of the matter is that before the war in the aviation of the Red Army, the time allotted for training flights was significantly reduced. This is usually associated with a shortage of aviation gasoline, which was produced using imported (mainly American) components. In connection with the United States' declaration of a "moral" embargo (due to the Winter War), these supplies were stopped. I had to cut the limits. But new aircraft in the units practically did not fly at all (with rare exceptions). The reason: the planes are raw, not run in, unknown, the resource is very small, all the prerequisites for flight accidents and, accordingly, the organizational conclusions on them are present. It’s out of harm's way and "learned" to fly on new machines "flying on foot", in theory, and not in practice. And even on new machines (the same MiG-3) they flew in the old-fashioned way, completely not taking into account all the strengths of the new technology and, on the contrary, emphasizing its shortcomings by using old techniques (horizontal maneuver and fighting on bends instead of going vertical, etc.), about which you can read, for example, in the books of Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin about the initial period of the war. In addition, in the aviation of the Red Army, in contrast to the Luftwaffe, there were not enough pilots with combat experience (there was no one to transfer experience to young people), there was absolutely no experience in controlling large air forces, massing them in the right place, which was brilliant in the Luftwaffe and why the Air Force The Red Army came only in 1944. Therefore, in 1941, almost all of the Red Army Air Force pilots were "novices" in comparison with the enemy, even those who had a significant pre-war raid. Therefore, they died, not sparing themselves in battle.
      Honor and glory to them! And eternal memory!
      I have the honor.
    3. Alex
      Alex 7 November 2015 17: 21
      +5
      Quote: lilian
      In the first sorties they had a task of t.s. "do what I do". Do not break away from the leader, throw bombs where he throws, shoot where he shoots and in no case lag behind the leader. As they gained experience, they were already entrusted with more complex tasks.


      "In the first battle, your task is to grab the leader's tail with a stranglehold and not lag even a meter behind. You can not shoot down enemy aircraft, just not lose the leader. Look carefully about the sides. Just gape, open your mitten - they will go to hell."
      Komesk Titarenko (s).
  5. Miner
    Miner 7 November 2015 09: 42
    +9
    Not bad, very bad!
    This is me about the article, and not about what it says about the realities of our air forces of that time :(

    And although I have been familiar with almost everything from the material that the Author refers to for a long time, nevertheless, an attempt to systematize fragments of different authors cannot leave anyone indifferent - it is very well written.


    I hope that this is not one article, but the beginning of a whole cycle on this topic.


    The author is five.

    Our pilots - our understanding of the severity of their work and all the difficulties that they then faced (fucking! This phrase does not at all reflect the intensity of emotions and the strength that we experience, imagining everything that was then with them, with our pilots The air force of that time!).

    For us and our descendants, understanding what war is and being prepared (as well as being unprepared) for it and understanding what the price of it is ...



    PS
    The author, and other authors, should not stop, for this topic has a development potential. And its development seems to be very important.
  6. Bagno new
    Bagno new 7 November 2015 09: 44
    18 th
    yes, ours throughout the war did not know how to fly ... it is worth mentioning the fact that on our front the Germans very effectively used the old J-87 until the very end of the war ... which even during the battle for England disappeared from the western front .. and yes .. read Rudel’s memoirs .. everything is well described there ...
    1. ASK505
      ASK505 7 November 2015 12: 45
      +8
      Quote: BagnoNew
      yes, ours throughout the war did not know how to fly ... it is worth mentioning the fact that on our front the Germans very effectively used the old J-87 until the very end of the war ... which even during the battle for England disappeared from the western front .. and yes .. read Rudel’s memoirs .. everything is well described there ...


      There everything is perfectly sucked from the finger. How can one trust the Goebbels office today with the abundance of material on the subject on the Web? By the way. And from the end of 87 our Chasing Lapotniki Yu-1943s was already racing to bring down. By 1944, the Yu-87 had already disappeared on the Eastern Front.
      1. Bagno new
        Bagno new 7 November 2015 14: 38
        -8
        Quote: ASK505
        By 1944, the Yu-87 had already disappeared on the Eastern Front.

        this is not true .. read Popel’s memoirs ... he describes the crossing of the Bug in the 44th .. there the chances to bomb our columns and crossings of the outdated 87s and oldies of the 110s unhindered .. this is the level of our red air forces ...
    2. Petrol
      Petrol 9 November 2015 14: 52
      0
      Bagno new
      about "the Germans used the old Ju-87 very effectively until the end of the war", I will not, I will describe something from my own.
      my tactics teachers were those who went through the great Patriotic war, so I tell you from their words that there was a difference in the tactics of using aviation at our airborne theater on both sides hollowing the enemy’s operational depth, there was a deployment of the depth of the front of the Germans even u-88 from 1943 sometimes used as attack aircraft or dive bombers to stop the tank wedges of the Red Army.
  7. dobr5919
    dobr5919 7 November 2015 11: 06
    11
    The myth in the style of "fill up". No pre-war training? See the loss of the Germans, with excellent training and experience of the Battle of England, in the air battles of the first days of the war. Some 2 weeks of dominance in the sky and there was no smell, but losses for 50%, while the tanks were airfields Not plowed. And not in Stalingrad and Kuban, they put the main "experts", not being able to fly and shoot? About the ZAPs, the author, as I understand it, did not even hear ... I'm not saying that everything was perfect, there were enough jambs, but, And for that matter, our system was able to repulse the first, almost knockout blow, without letting the ground troops mix with the ground, knock out the gaining strength and the number of opponents, create resistance and time to surpass and destroy the enemy, who until the last days had the best equipment. This means that the command and the training methods that it implemented were correct. Machine guns cannot be filled up with corpses, a bad system does not win a good one ...
  8. Oldman
    7 November 2015 12: 26
    -1
    Quote: dobr5919
    The author, as I understand it, did not even hear about ZAPA ...

    I spent my adolescence among fighter pilots and front-line soldiers. Although my father had nothing to do with aviation, his friends were all pilots. I remember Uncle Lesha, the lieutenant colonel. Let me tell you his story briefly. He graduated from the Chuguev School of Pilots before the war, and he, together with Kozhedub (talked a lot about him), is left as an instructor at the school. The war began, everyone was eager to go to the front, and Uncle Lesha was among them. Only at the beginning of 1944 was his report satisfied, and he was sent to the ZAP. During the six months spent in ZAP, he made only two flights. Why six months? And none of the "merchants" wanted to take him - why would a "young" pilot be in the regiment, who is utterly stronger than all the old people. And only a chance helped him get to the front - among one of the groups of "merchants" was his former cadet, who helped Uncle Lesha. Uncle Lesha got into the most ordinary IAP of the most ordinary IAD, there was only one GSS for the whole IAD, and he served in the division headquarters. For another two months, Uncle Lesha, along with the same "recruits", hung out in the regiment idle, carrying out all sorts of assignments and service orders. During these two months, he performed several flights, there were no tactics classes. Here it must be said that the regiment at that time was intensively used to escort bombers and attack aircraft, and suffered losses. One day the squadron commander said that tomorrow the young would go into battle. In the morning, one of Uncle Lesha's friends flew out, and did not return, they shot him down. After lunch it was Uncle Lesha's turn. As he told me, he was just pounding with excitement and worries about his downed friend. After a short instruction, we took off and went to meet with the attack aircraft. Suddenly someone yelled on the radio: "Germans!" and all shied away in different directions. Uncle Lesha was confused by surprise, and at some point lost sight of his host. He looked around, said Uncle Lesha, and from behind and below in about twenty meters a huge blunt muzzle of a "Fokker" pops up ... A blow, the engine stalled and La-5FN fell down, and below the forest. Only the skill of the instructor made it possible to land the plane in a clearing overgrown with young growth. This is the story, and it was at the end of the war. And you tell us about the ZAP and the methods of preparation ... Uncle Lesha ended the war in Czechoslovakia, having five shot down Fritzes on his account.
    1. ASK505
      ASK505 7 November 2015 13: 04
      0
      Quote: Oldman
      Suddenly someone yelled on the radio: "Germans!" and all shied away in different directions.

      Quote: Oldman
      and from behind and from below in about twenty meters a huge blunt muzzle of a "Fokker" pops up ... The impact, the engine stalled and La-5FN fell down, and below the forest.

      Quote: Oldman
      and from behind and from below in about twenty meters a huge blunt muzzle of a "Fokker" pops up ... The impact, the engine stalled and La-5FN fell down, and below the forest.


      La-5FN is a very formidable car and was in no way inferior to the Mass and Fokker. With all due respect to war veteran Uncle Lesha, something is wrong here. In 1944, a group of experienced pilots did not notice the enemy’s aircraft and let them go from the tail ... Next. Shooting from 20 m is a guarantee of your own death from the debris of La-5FN. Your whole post is inflated with pessimism and doom.
      1. vova1973
        vova1973 7 November 2015 14: 03
        +1
        And how many meters did they usually shoot to shoot down? You read the aces memoirs they recommended to shoot when you see the rivets of the plane.
      2. Petrol
        Petrol 10 November 2015 11: 55
        0
        ASK505
        I have a tactics teacher
        this is how he told me when in the Kuban they shot down a couple of Germans with lags, so during interrogation the German leader said that he did not see the approaching enemy planes, but saw only a flock of cranes crossing courses at an altitude of 3 thousand. meters then before the next question the German was told - "well, breathe!"
    2. dobr5919
      dobr5919 7 November 2015 16: 09
      +6
      The story described by you raises vague doubts in me ... Well, okay. Tell me then why, for the general picture of the state of affairs, do you take the "story" of Lesha and not the story of Kozhedub since their path is so similar? the same reason why there is no mention of ZAPs in your opus and why they were needed (in aviation schools they taught to FLY, in ZAPakh they taught to Fight. Of course, in different ways, where it is better somewhere worse, but someone cut out in the sky 4 lists of "green hearts" , koi were the ases from the ases. To know Kozhedub's path, the majority always walked.)
      And about the "side of the sun", nonsense! The maneuver comes from tactics, which comes from the concept of using aviation. The task of the Germans, the destruction of enemy aircraft. Our PROVIDING AND PROTECTION of the actions of GROUND FORCES. Everything, hence the impossibility of "height-speed-maneuver-fire" , where to take all this while covering the leading edge, when escorting humpbacks, etc., more when breaking away from the wards, the chance of losing them is extremely high. And for the failure of the combat mission, they could shoot them. This opportunity appeared only after the creation of the number of superiority, when part of the forces can be allocated for hunting. Nikitich, by the way, was a hunter and won, basically, therefore, he approached the target both at speed with height and with the maneuver that was needed. Well, with regards to shooting, read Pepelyaev, WHAT AND for what taught to shoot.
    3. dobr5919
      dobr5919 7 November 2015 21: 32
      +1
      I will not tell you about ZAPs, let Shugaev Boris, fighter, saft "I remember" do it.
      By January 1943, in fact, I had already completed training on the I-16. And so, another request came to us: to give a hundred pilots, even if they had completed I-16. The selected fell into the reserve aviation regiment, which retrained the pilots who arrived from hospitals and schools, and besides, the regiments flew there to retrain to new materiel. But it turned out that about half of those selected did not pass navigational training, and they were returned back. In their place had to pick up others. And then all the navigational flights were completed at that time. So they included me in the group. That's how I graduated from college and was sent to ZAP.

      Our reserve air regiment was stationed in the Azerbaijani city of Adjikabul. It was intended to retrain the combat regiments coming from the front to the American "Airacobras". However, the first months, until my future 66th regiment arrived at the ZAP, we studied theory, flew up a bit, but we did not study there thoroughly. My training at the ZAP continued when the regiment in which I was enrolled received the Airacobra aircraft. We studied these machines together with combat pilots who had previously flown the Yak-1. They have already fought a lot, and in terms of piloting technique they were aces. In fact, they only needed to study the materiel, and we were still yellow-haired chickens. Of course, they tried to keep an eye on us so that we would not be killed in the "cobras". I flew in a circle, to the aerobatics zone. Then they were used in combat: air battles, ground attack. We fought in air battles both in group and one-on-one, but more often in pairs. Thank God, we had someone to learn from, although our brother was more than half of the regiment. For example, one of the best pilots of the 66th regiment, twice hero of the Soviet Union, Pavel Mikhailovich Kamozin was with us. He received the first star in another regiment on LaGG-3.
  9. Oldman
    7 November 2015 13: 54
    +1
    Quote: ASK505
    Your whole post is inflated with pessimism and doom.

    I do not see pessimism and doom there. I brought a real picture of the war. By the way, the same Uncle Lesha ended the war in another, regiment of the guards, and he had the best memories of him.
    Quote: ASK505
    Shooting with 20 m is a guarantee of your own death from the debris of La-5FN.

    I gave a specific figure that I remember. And then, why should there be a guaranteed death? It depends on who is sitting in this fokker, depending on what angle the fire was opened, etc. ... I did not ask about such details.
    Quote: ASK505
    In 1944, the group with experienced pilots did not notice the enemy planes and let them go from the tail ...

    Well, well, here is another real episode that the chief engineer of one IAD of the 1 IAK told me. Operation Bagration. A squadron (incomplete squadron, GSS commander, experienced pilots) flies out on a mission, and it’s all shot down right above its airfield, not one has survived. Command not to believe this person who saw it all with his own eyes? These are the realities of war, specific tragic episodes with which front-line life is full. Unfortunately, not everything in that war was regulated by charters and instructions; a simple human factor was also in use.
    1. Pushkar
      Pushkar 7 November 2015 19: 03
      +2
      Quote: Oldman
      I brought a real picture of the war.
      Well, here's another real episode
      Are you sure? So it was ALWAYS in ALL fights? My father was a navigator of a bomber and told that in 1944 commanders of crews with a raid of 6-8 hours came to ZAP. But he also told how they flew AFTER ZAP. Father and his guests (veterans gathered every May) told a lot of hard and heroic, victorious. They told how often from the departure attack aircraft brought dead riflemen and they also talked about burning tank columns of Germans. In general, there was everything, but their generation won. (to avoid questions - Aeroflot veterans were going to visit us, flying into the war on all types of aircraft)
  10. Bashibuzuk
    Bashibuzuk 7 November 2015 18: 08
    +3
    Yes, in the comments there’s a little different, Mama don’t worry.
    There is a site airfors.ru - airforce.ru/
    The site contains a huge number of memoirs of pilots who fought, and not in the style of memories, but in the style of "conversations for life".
    Before that, from childhood he was fond of military flight memoirs, he read above the roof.
    And the eyes erupted only after the site. When I was already over 40.
    Etc.
    We laid our own at the beginning of the war. The Germans at the end.
    Who won, I think everyone is in the know.
    Everything else is from the evil one.
    1. Sling cutter
      Sling cutter 7 November 2015 20: 28
      +1
      the commander comes out and says: "You will fly there." And here is the flight, 4 aircraft, 3 experienced, and one for the first time, young. We only had this, in other regiments, I know that nothing even similar, but we had the least losses. True, it also happened, the commander said: "That's it, it's time for you, I'm letting you out as the leader," and I say: "Commander, let's still fly, I'm confident in myself, but I'm not sure that my partner will be like you."
      Krivosheev Grigory Vasilievich (from an interview)
  11. Raider
    Raider 7 November 2015 19: 58
    +2
    The most frightening thing is the "hat-making". Even now we are addicted to this, if you read "VO". It makes more sense to evaluate and learn from the enemy. Sometimes you read some .... The Spirit is definitely needed, but with reason.
  12. naitchanter
    naitchanter 20 November 2015 22: 36
    0
    Quote: Raider
    The most frightening thing is the "hat-making". Even now we are addicted to this, if you read "VO". It makes more sense to evaluate and learn from the enemy. Sometimes you read some .... The Spirit is definitely needed, but with reason.

    As I agree with you! An article is discussed in which the author writes about two survivors from the regiment, about flocks flying in 43 ... And against this background there is such inexhaustible optimism.
  13. Warrior2015
    Warrior2015 11 December 2015 22: 26
    0
    Excellent article, very clearly clarifying the situation, which led to the fact that numerically much larger Soviet aircraft Luftwaffe just boldly from the sky in a couple of months 41 of the year!

    - What raid do you have on combat aircraft?
    They answer: - One and a half to two hours, and then most often on old planes, rarely anyone flying new ones. I ask the commanders: - How will the development of a new material part take place? - The theory was explained to them during their studies, they were also introduced to the features of the aircraft, but here we give one or two flights and then to Stalingrad. Time does not wait. Hmmm, from this episode, I was cold on the skin!

    It's just awful ... The Reich pilots trained for 3 years and had a MINIMUM of 350 flight hours (only during the war this minimum was gradually reduced, but did not even come close to the "raid" of the Soviet Air Force). But here's the thing - that no one from any level of power RISED AGAINST SENDING YOUNG STUFF FOR SLAUGHTER. And this is called a welfare state?!?

    At first, the pilots didn’t even take into account such tactical elements as entering the attack from the side of the sun. ” General Zakharov (in 1938, the flight commander, senior lieutenant, and in 1939, the district air force commander!) Forgot to mention that this “natural way” was covered with the bodies of a huge number of our pilots, whom he could not teach “even tactical elements” . However, did he himself know these "elements"?
    Yes, I didn’t know that you could have such a fantastic career! But it turns out this is how it happens if the "great leader" decides to clothe him with confidence, and the old cadres with the Spanish experience are threatened!