Sunset attack from the sun


And-15



Like any person who is fond of aviation, at one time I read a lot of books dedicated to famous Soviet pilots. Each of us on the shelves of personal libraries are the memoirs of many of our legendary pilots, when reading which they involuntarily took our breath away from what they had done, and our hearts were filled with sincere joy for the fact that they are your fellow tribesmen. Hero pilots who fought on the fronts of World War II were especially proud. The names of Pokryshkin, Vorozheykin, Sultan Amet-Khan and many other Soviet aces became a legend, a symbol of invincibility.

And then, like a bolt from the blue, a time that was known all over came, an avalanche of other information fell upon our heads, which almost buried our idols under us, and with them all the heroic history Soviet Aviation. Everything that came to hand was subjected to ostracism: pilots, airplanes, tactics, industry, number of victories, etc. All those who are not lazy, threw their stone in this garden, not caring about the evidence.


And-153


Of particular interest representatives of the writing brethren focused on the initial period of the war, during which our aircraft survived difficult times. An uncountable number of ideas, thoughts, statements and conclusions were made concerning the causes of heavy defeats in the air battles of the first year of the war. However, to me personally, who read various materials on this subject, it constantly seemed that the authors were not sufficiently convincing in their statements, often exaggerated the situation, and put wrong accents. In the end, I wanted to listen to the opinions of the participants themselves. I thought, what if we give the floor to our illustrious combat pilots, famous commanders and specialists in the field of aviation? We will not “load” them with a discussion of the global problems of confrontation between the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe, and ask them “simple” questions: how were you taught in flight schools and aviation units? How do you assess the tactical and flight training of our fighter pilots at the beginning of the war?

And now we take some books from the shelf (as practice has shown, we don’t need much) and read them ...

The legendary pilot M. Gromov, versed in the flight case, argued that "only after three to five years of constant practice, one can consider himself a real pilot." In confirmation of his words, he gives an impressive picture of the work of a fighter pilot during an air battle: “The complex of objects that are subject to his attention is extremely high: he must watch the enemy, not letting him out of sight for a single second, keep the situation in touch with with your planes and interact with them, listen to commands, monitor fuel, instrument readings, etc. And all this - with the consciousness of the danger threatening him, requiring constant internal mobilization readiness. ... The pilot must be ready for any surprise. Nothing should surprise him. ” Comments are superfluous.

A.V. Talking about the battles at Khalkhin Gol, Vorozheikin recalled the words of a downed Japanese pilot: “I know that you let out weak pilots from military schools. To become a full-fledged fighter, you need to serve at least two or three years in the front, and here you have more than half of the second year of service. ” The prisoner told the truth about the military schools. At that time, the cadets with firing and air battles only got to know each other, and they flew in schools on old planes, so the pilot needed to master a new plane after school, to study its possibilities in a training fight. ” So, we have an averaged time reference for the formation of a full-fledged fighter - at least three years of intensive training in the front line.

People's Commissar of the aviation industry A.I. Shahurin, discussing the training of pilots in the front-line units and the problems of mastering new aircraft before the war, writes: “By the beginning of 1941, when aviation units began to be replenished with new aircraft, there was concern about their development. The mood of the pilots is very different. Some were happy ... Others found these planes more complex, not as maneuverable as the old ones, they considered them too strict in control. It was all true. New combat vehicles were not given immediately. In addition, in the pre-war years, in an effort to achieve trouble-free operation in units, in aerobatic training, aerobatics were less and less used. Few trained in difficult conditions at night. If we add to this that the flight crew in some parts more than half consisted of young people, then it becomes clear why the development of new technology in some places came with a “scratch” and some people expressed distrust of it. It was more familiar to fly on old planes. ”

People's Commissar knew what he was talking about.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that before the war, the norms of the annual raid were reduced. G.N. Zakharov writes: “And so it wasn’t very much to fly, and then there was an order to cut the norms to a minimum. As soon as these norms were cut, the percentage of accidents jumped in all parts. ”

The notorious Commissar of Defense order to transfer Air Force personnel to the barracks position added fuel to the fire. B.N. Eremin recalls: “Everyone who served less than 4 years, was equated to enlisted. Pilots and technicians experienced this order. The mood was idle, depressed. Flight work was reduced, the restructuring took almost all the remaining months of peaceful life ... "

The Great Patriotic War broke out. What did we have? A.I. In his memoirs, Pokryshkin writes that before the war, flight schools prepared pilots for obsolete programs. “For years, in winter and summer, in any weather, we were taught to go to the“ T ”with the gas removed and put the car at the exact sign, within a few meters. Pulling up on the motor was considered a gross violation of the instruction. Even aerobatics and shooting - the most important thing for a fighter - retreated into the background before this element of the flight. ... The new recruitment arrived in aviation from schools that trained young pilots according to the old, long-established program, for such machines as the “seagull”, I-16. Arriving at the front, the pilot immediately got into an almost new world for him; tactical skills acquired at school were clearly insufficient compared to what war demanded. ”

He agrees with him A.V. Vorozheikin: “In schools, the take-off and landing were mainly judged by the training of instructors and cadets: after all, the greatest number of incidents occurred during take-off and landing. Therefore, to other elements of piloting in schools approached condescendingly. There was even a saying: “It takes off well, let's see how it sits” ... Schools didn’t work out such elements of piloting as rapid coups, low-altitude pilotage and other techniques that required the pilot to will, to accurately calculate all of his movements, accompanied by large overloads . ... For example, I didn’t do more than two turns (corkscrew) on the I-16, and very few people knew that the character of the car’s rotation changed abruptly from the third round: the plane was steeper, almost upright drooping nose to the ground, spinning much faster, from the wings cutting through the air, there were unpleasantly hissing sounds. ... In short, our young recruitment had to be retrained. And most importantly - instill a sense of independence in flight, as required by air combat. "


And-16


VC. Babich writes: “Analysis of the air battles conducted by our pilots in December 1941, January, February 1942 showed that it was necessary to resolutely strengthen the combat skills of aviators, starting with their training on the ground. It was necessary to improve the use of airborne and ground-based radio equipment, to constantly study the air and ground enemy, his frequently changing tactics, to persevere in mastering the new methods of combat.

The training level of the aircrew arriving at the front at the end of 1942 did not change much. He is vividly illustrated by A.I. Shakhurin (Battle of Stalingrad, Saratov Aviation Plant). “We are sending aircraft under our own power to the nearest military airfield. On the U-2 plane I am flying to this airfield, I want to see with my own eyes who we are handing the planes to.
I do not see lieutenants among the pilots, only sergeants. I ask:
- What raid do you have on combat aircraft?
Answer:
- One and a half to two hours, and then most often on old aircraft, rarely anyone flying new ones.
I ask the commanders:
- How will the development of a new material part take place?
- The theory was explained to them during their studies, they were also introduced to the features of the aircraft, but here we give one or two flights and then to Stalingrad. Time does not wait. Hmmm, from this episode, I was cold on the skin!

Sunset attack from the sun

Yak-1


Questions about the level of training of pilots? There is? Then we go further and see what B.N. writes about this. Eremin: “For many young pilots who began to fight at Stalingrad, the first combat sortie often became the last. The Hitlerite aces did not forgive even the slightest mistake, and did not leave time to acquire a combat uniform. ” The impressive result of the battles near Stalingrad is brought by S.V. Gribanov: “For December 1942, there were two pilots left in the 434-IAP — deputy. com regiment and commissioner ... "

Little has changed in the issue of training in the combat skills of the pilots in the subsequent years of the war. A.V. Vorozheikin: “During the war, our courses were engaged in the preparation of masters of air combat, but the front showed that they did not prepare as they should. The main weakness of the courses was that little attention was paid to aerial shooting. ... They were trained in the old manner, as in the twenties, when the fighter's maximum speed did not exceed 200-280 km / h. The canvas cone, which the pilots called "sausage", was fired only with barrage, aiming not at the target itself, but at the pre-empted point, hoping that the "sausage" would jump at the cannon line itself. ... With the growth of fighter speeds, the emergence of large-caliber machine guns and guns, the removal of the aiming point was so large that the cone began to go out of sight of the pilot. In addition, the luminous trail in front of the enemy’s nose warned the enemy about the danger, he took a counter-maneuver, the attack failed. ” IN AND. Voronov supports this idea: “In order to shoot down in aerial combat, one must be able to shoot. The trouble is that we are poorly trained in shooting at aerial targets. Therefore, it seems that the Messers are invulnerable ...


MiG-3


Why, flying good cars, we could not always use their high LTD in a fight? The conclusion was that: apart from good cars and trained pilots, one must be able to tactically and correctly apply the technique and weapon in battle, taking into account the technique and tactics of the enemy. In our actions, we clearly looked at the elements of underestimation and a simplified approach to the choice of tactics, the templates for constructing battle formations, lacked cunning ... "

About the tactics written by many masters of air combat. In this regard, we are interested in their assessment of the first half of the war. It is the initial stage of the war that makes it possible to see in a pure form the tactical baggage of the opposing sides. In the course of hostilities, counter diffusion of tactical ideas takes place, so differences in approaches to air combat are quickly eroded and leveled.


LaGG-3


Weak tactical flight training of our pilots in the initial period of the war, indicated by G.V. Zimin, instinctively forced them to stay closer to each other. "Our pilots feel more confident in the" heap. So, in a "bunch", and started the fight, and already further - someone how it goes. Two or three pairs of Germans could easily unleash our “heap”, and, taking advantage of the unsystematic nature of its construction, knock them down. ”

“A comparative analysis of the capabilities of the warring parties shows,” says V.K. Babich, - that in the first period of the war the well-known air combat formula "height - speed - maneuver - fire" could not be born and be realized: the necessary material base was missing. For the enemy were three of the four components of this formula. Even a very brave and experienced pilot could not go to the vertical if his plane gained less height for more time than the enemy. And-16 groups were kept too tight, because increasing the intervals and distances with low fire led to a violation of mutual support. "

K.A. Vershinin in his book quotes the letter of the commander of the IAD A.V. Borman, dated 1943 in spring: “I came to the conclusion that it is necessary to radically change the methods of defensive combat used since the first days of the war. Today they have become a great evil. We need to let the pilots feel their power in a pair. Need a fracture. Regiment commanders should begin the transition to a new one. Fearing losses, they now send a group of 8-12 airplanes to any mission and do not give initiative to leading couples. The commanders of the groups, in turn, fearing the loss of the aircraft from sight, drive in a tight order, linking this to the freedom of maneuver. The outdated form of defensive combat on I-16 and I-153 aircraft is still used in some parts. ” Behind two years of war, and the couple has not yet become a standard tactical structure. In the course of the notorious "defensive circle." The commanders of the lower and middle managers are inactive and hunted down by higher authorities.

An interesting idea about the evolution of tactical ideas is expressed by GN. Zakharov. “Even later, after fighting, gaining experience in battles, we naturally came to understand the tactics of modern air combat by the standards of those. At first, the pilots didn’t even take into account such tactical elements as entering the attack from the side of the sun. ” General Zakharov (in 1938, the flight commander, senior lieutenant, and in 1939, the district air force commander!) Forgot to mention that this “natural way” was covered with the bodies of a huge number of our pilots, whom he could not teach “even tactical elements” . However, did he himself know these "elements"?

As soon as we remembered here about Zakharov’s fantastic career, it would be appropriate to briefly list some of the data on this topic, which S. V.V. Gribanov: “A.K. In 1938, Sedov was a senior lieutenant, squadron commander, and a year later he was already a brigade commander, chief of the Chief Flight Inspectorate of the Red Army Air Force. Vs Holzunov in 1936, the captain, the commander of the squadron, and in 1937 - the commander of the army of special purpose. A.A. In 1936, Gubenko was a senior lieutenant, flight commander, and in 1938, he was a colonel and deputy commander of the District Air Force. G.P. Kravchenko was the captain in 1937, and in 1941 he was lieutenant-general, commander of the district air force. " This writes and VS Shumikhin: “Many of the commanders put forward did not have time to acquire (before the war) the necessary command experience. By the middle of 1941, 43% commanders of all degrees were in positions less than six months, 65% - less than a year. More than 91% of aviation commanders commanded them for less than six months. In 1940 at the age of 29, the Red Army Air Force was headed by Lieutenant-General Aviation P.V. Levers. Marshal A.A. Novikov wrote that, although Rychagov had considerable combat experience and probably was a promising military leader, yet the lack of military education and experience in leadership positions made it hardly advisable to appoint him to such a responsible post. ” These are the "strategists" commanding the country's aviation at the most crucial moment of its history, what kind of "sunset attack from the sun"! ..
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  1. Just BB 7 November 2015 07: 26 New
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    Good selection.
    It is a pity that the story "goes in a spiral" and few people use it for the future (does not study)
    1. DanSabaka 7 November 2015 08: 13 New
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      Well, how can you learn if History is constantly rewritten, and sometimes simply invented ....
      In a recent series about WWII pilots, the start of the war is being held on I-15 aircraft with fixed gears .... And this was shot about air defense pilots in border regions ...
      1. tasha 7 November 2015 11: 23 New
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        Please explain what you wanted to say with a comment about I-15 at the beginning of the war?

        Some I-15 fought in the 1941 year, not to mention the I-15 bis.
        1. DanSabaka 8 November 2015 11: 44 New
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          fought, I do not argue ... but not in the air defense units ...
          1. tasha 9 November 2015 06: 11 New
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            Svetlishin, Nikolai Andreevich
            Air defense forces of the country in the Great Patriotic War.

            40 fighter aviation regiments allocated from the Air Force for air defense of the country had about 1500 aircraft

            The fighter aviation units allocated for the country's air defense were equipped with aircraft only at 60%. On their arsenal were fighters: I-15 – 1%, I-16 – 66%, I-153 – 24%, Yak-1 and MiG-1 – 9%; A number of MiG-3 and LaGG-3 aircraft were also received.
  2. valokordin 7 November 2015 09: 01 New
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    Quote: Just VV
    Good selection.
    It is a pity that the story "goes in a spiral" and few people use it for the future (does not study)

    Remember the words of the leader of the world proletariat "Learning military affairs in the present way"
    1. ASK505 7 November 2015 12: 38 New
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      Quote: valokordin
      Remember the words of the leader of the world proletariat "Learning military affairs in the present way"


      Why so modest. These are the words of Lenin. Once on the day of November 7, we all congratulated each other on the holiday of the Great October Revolution. Happy holiday, who remembers!
  3. Yak-3P 7 November 2015 09: 02 New
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    best of all embody the character and condition of the flyers memoirs of Vorozheykin and Avdeev recommend to those interested
  4. lilian 7 November 2015 09: 20 New
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    The fact that our rafts had a small plaque all buzzed ears. But what do I think, after training, in part, that the pilots do not fly and do not train? Or did the USSR Air Force originate two or three years before the war?
    By the war there was already a significant number of pilots with a good touch. There were also insufficiently experienced graduates, but the fact that they were thrown into battle was a necessary measure connected with the dangerous situation at the front at the beginning of the war.

    By the way, from the memoirs of veterans it is known that newcomers were not immediately thrown into dangerous fights, they were trained on not too dangerous tasks. The very name of the film "Only Old Men Go to Battle" speaks about this. In the first flights, they had a task t.s. "do what I do." Do not tear yourself away from the leader, throw bombs where he throws, shoot where he shoots and in no case keep up with the leader. As experience gained, they were already entrusted with more complex tasks.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Aleksandr72 7 November 2015 10: 04 New
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      But what do I think, after training, in part, that the pilots do not fly and do not train?

      The fact of the matter is that before the war in aviation, the Red Army significantly reduced the time allotted for training flights. This is usually associated with a shortage of aviation gasoline, the production of which was carried out using imported (mainly American) components. In connection with the US announcement of a “moral” embargo (due to the Winter War), these deliveries ceased. I had to cut the limits. But new planes in parts did not fly at all (with rare exceptions). The reason: the aircraft are raw, not run-in, unknown, the resource is very small, there are all the prerequisites for flight accidents and, accordingly, organizational conclusions on them. So far from sin, they also “learned” to fly on new machines “flying on foot”, in theory, and not in practice. And even on new machines (the same MiG-3s) they flew the old-fashioned way, completely disregarding all the strengths of the new technology and, on the contrary, bulging out its shortcomings by using old techniques (horizontal maneuver and bend in bends instead of going into vertical, etc.), what can be read, for example, in the books of Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin about the initial period of the war. In addition, in the aviation of the Red Army, unlike the Luftwaffe, there were not enough pilots with combat experience (there was no one to pass on the experience to the youth), there was absolutely no experience in managing large air forces, massaging them in the right place, which brilliantly were able in the Luftwaffe and what the Air Force The Red Army came only in 1944. Therefore, in 1941, almost all the Red Army Air Force pilots were "novices" in comparison with the enemy, even those who had a significant pre-war raid. Therefore, they died, not sparing themselves in battle.
      Honor and glory to them! And eternal memory!
      I have the honor.
    3. Alex 7 November 2015 17: 21 New
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      Quote: lilian
      In the first flights, they had a task t.s. "do what I do." Do not tear yourself away from the leader, throw bombs where he throws, shoot where he shoots and in no case keep up with the leader. As experience gained, they were already entrusted with more complex tasks.


      "In the first battle, you have the task of grabbing onto the tail of the leader with a dead grip and not falling behind a meter. You can’t shoot down enemy planes, just don’t lose the leader. Look carefully at the sides. Just gape, open the mittens and eat them to hell."
      Komesk Titarenko (s).
  5. Miner 7 November 2015 09: 42 New
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    Not bad, very bad!
    This is me about the article, and not about what it says about the realities of our air forces of that time :(

    And although I have been familiar with almost everything from the material that the Author refers to for a long time, nevertheless, an attempt to systematize fragments of different authors cannot leave anyone indifferent - it is very well written.


    I hope that this is not one article, but the beginning of a whole cycle on this topic.


    The author is five.

    Our pilots - our understanding of the severity of their work and all the difficulties that they then faced (fucking! This phrase does not at all reflect the intensity of emotions and the strength that we experience, imagining everything that was then with them, with our pilots The air force of that time!).

    For us and our descendants, understanding what war is and being prepared (as well as being unprepared) for it and understanding what the price of it is ...



    PS
    The author, and other authors, should not stop, for this topic has a development potential. And its development seems to be very important.
  6. Bagno new 7 November 2015 09: 44 New
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    yes, ours throughout the war did not know how to fly ... it is worth mentioning the fact that on our front the Germans very effectively used the old J-87 until the very end of the war ... which even during the battle for England disappeared from the western front .. and yes .. read Rudel’s memoirs .. everything is well described there ...
    1. ASK505 7 November 2015 12: 45 New
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      Quote: BagnoNew
      yes, ours throughout the war did not know how to fly ... it is worth mentioning the fact that on our front the Germans very effectively used the old J-87 until the very end of the war ... which even during the battle for England disappeared from the western front .. and yes .. read Rudel’s memoirs .. everything is well described there ...


      There everything is perfectly sucked from the finger. How can one trust the Goebbels office today with the abundance of material on the subject on the Web? By the way. And from the end of 87 our Chasing Lapotniki Yu-1943s was already racing to bring down. By 1944, the Yu-87 had already disappeared on the Eastern Front.
      1. Bagno new 7 November 2015 14: 38 New
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        Quote: ASK505
        By 1944, the Yu-87 had already disappeared on the Eastern Front.

        this is not true .. read Popel’s memoirs ... he describes the crossing of the Bug in the 44th .. there the chances to bomb our columns and crossings of the outdated 87s and oldies of the 110s unhindered .. this is the level of our red air forces ...
    2. Petrol 9 November 2015 14: 52 New
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      Bagno new
      about the "Germans very effectively used the old U-87 until the very end of the war," I will not describe what I will describe from my own.
      my tactics teachers were those who went through the great Patriotic war, so I tell you from their words that there was a difference in the tactics of using aviation at our airborne theater on both sides hollowing the enemy’s operational depth, there was a deployment of the depth of the front of the Germans even u-88 from 1943 sometimes used as attack aircraft or dive bombers to stop the tank wedges of the Red Army.
  7. dobr5919 7 November 2015 11: 06 New
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    Myth in the style of "overwhelming the groups." No pre-training? See the losses of the Germans, with excellent training and experience in the Battle of England, in the air battles of the first days of the war. Some 2 weeks were dominated by the skies and there was no smell at all for 50%, while the tanks were airdromes they didn’t plow. But didn’t they even in Stalingrad and Kuban put the main "experts", not knowing how to fly and shoot? About ZAPA, the author, as I understand it, didn’t even hear ... I don’t say that everything was perfect, there were enough jambs but, it’s not worth it to bend too. And for that matter, our system was able to repulse the first, almost knockout blow without letting it from the air, mix ground troops with the ground, knock out the anticorrels that gained strength and number, create resistance and time to surpass and destroy the enemy, who until the last days had the best equipment. And that means the command and training methods that he introduced were correct. Machine guns cannot be overwhelmed with corpses, a bad system does not defeat a good one ...
  8. Oldman 7 November 2015 12: 26 New
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    Quote: dobr5919
    The author, as I understand it, did not even hear about ZAPA ...

    I spent my adolescence among fighter pilots and war veterans. Although my father was not related to aviation, his friends were all pilots. I remember Uncle Lesha, lieutenant colonel. I’ll briefly tell his story. Before the war he graduated from the Chuguev School of Pilots, and he, along with Kozhedub (he talked a lot about him), is left as an instructor in the school. The war began, everyone was eager for the front, and Uncle Lesha among them. Only at the beginning of 1944 did his report be satisfied, and he was sent to ZAP. For the six months spent in ZAP, he made only two flights. Why half a year? And none of the "merchants" wanted to take him - why in the regiment is a "young" pilot, who is utterly stronger than all the old men. And only a chance helped him get to the front - among one of the groups of "merchants" was his former cadet, who helped Uncle Lesha. Uncle Lesha got into the most ordinary IAP of the most ordinary IAD, there was only one GSS for the entire IAD, and he served in the division headquarters. For another two months, Uncle Lesha, along with the same "recruits", hung around in the regiment idle, carrying out all sorts of errands and work orders. During these two months, he completed several flights, there were no lessons on tactics. It must be said here that at that time the regiment was intensively used, escorted by bombers and attack aircraft, and suffered losses. One day, the comasque said that tomorrow the young will go into battle. In the morning one of Uncle Lesha's friends flew out, and did not return, they shot down. After lunch, it was Uncle Lesha's turn. As he told me, he was simply pounded with excitement and anxiety for a downed friend. After a short instruction took off and went to meet with the attack aircraft. Suddenly someone shouted on the radio: "Germans!" and everyone shied away in different directions. Uncle Lesha was confused by surprise, and at some point he lost sight of his host. Uncle Lesha looked around, and from behind, from about twenty meters away, a huge stupid snout of the “fokker” pops up ... A blow, the motor stalled and La-5FN fell down, and below was a forest. Only the skill of the instructor allowed us to land the plane in a clearing overgrown with young animals. Here's a story, and that was at the end of the war. And you are telling us about ZAP and methods of preparation ... Uncle Lesha ended the war in Czechoslovakia with five shot down Fritz on his account.
    1. ASK505 7 November 2015 13: 04 New
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      Quote: Oldman
      Suddenly someone shouted on the radio: "Germans!" and everyone shied away in different directions.

      Quote: Oldman
      and from behind, from below, about twenty meters away, a huge stupid snout of the "fokker" pops up ... A blow, the engine stalled and the La-5FN rained down, and the forest below.

      Quote: Oldman
      and from behind, from below, about twenty meters away, a huge stupid snout of the "fokker" pops up ... A blow, the engine stalled and the La-5FN rained down, and the forest below.


      La-5FN is a very formidable car and was in no way inferior to the Mass and Fokker. With all due respect to war veteran Uncle Lesha, something is wrong here. In 1944, a group of experienced pilots did not notice the enemy’s aircraft and let them go from the tail ... Next. Shooting from 20 m is a guarantee of your own death from the debris of La-5FN. Your whole post is inflated with pessimism and doom.
      1. vova1973 7 November 2015 14: 03 New
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        And how many meters did they usually shoot to shoot down? You read the aces memoirs they recommended to shoot when you see the rivets of the plane.
      2. Petrol 10 November 2015 11: 55 New
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        ASK505
        I have a tactics teacher
        so he told when a couple of Germans were shot down in the Kuban by lags, so the German host said during interrogation that he didn’t see the approaching aircraft of the enemy, but saw only a flock of cranes crossing courses at an altitude of 3 thousand. meters then, before the next question, the Germans were told - "well, breathe!"
    2. dobr5919 7 November 2015 16: 09 New
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      The story described by you causes me vague doubts ... Well, okay. Tell me then why, for the general picture of the state of affairs, you take the "history" of Lesha and not the history of Kozhedub since their path is so similar? the reason why your opus doesn’t mention ZAPs and why they were needed (they taught you how to fly in aviation schools, how to fight in ZAPs. Of course, it’s different in different ways, it’s better somewhere worse, but someone cut out 4 list of “green hearts” in the sky , koi were aces from aces. To know along the path of Kozhedub, the majority went all the same.)
      And about the "side of the sun", nonsense! The maneuver comes from tactics that come from the concept of using aviation. The Germans task, destroying enemy aircraft. Our ENSURANCE AND PROTECTION of actions of the GROUND TROOPS. All of this is the impossibility of "height-speed-maneuver-fire" , where it’s all to take cover of the front edge, accompanied by humpbacked, etc., when separated from the guardians, the chance of losing them is extremely great. And for disrupting the combat mission they could shoot about. Such an opportunity appeared only after creating the overweight, when part of the forces can be allocated for hunting. By the way, Nikitich conquered the hunter mainly because he approached the target and at speed with altitude, and with what maneuver was needed. Well, as regards shooting, read Pepelyaev, WHAT and why taught to shoot.
    3. dobr5919 7 November 2015 21: 32 New
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      I will not tell you about ZAP, let it be done by Boris Shugaev, fighter, software "I remember."
      By January 1943, in fact, I had already completed training on the I-16. And so, another request came to us: to give a hundred pilots, even if they had completed I-16. The selected fell into the reserve aviation regiment, which retrained the pilots who arrived from hospitals and schools, and besides, the regiments flew there to retrain to new materiel. But it turned out that about half of those selected did not pass navigational training, and they were returned back. In their place had to pick up others. And then all the navigational flights were completed at that time. So they included me in the group. That's how I graduated from college and was sent to ZAP.

      Our reserve aviation regiment was stationed in the Azerbaijani city of Adjikabul. It was intended for the retraining of military regiments coming from the front to the American "Aero Cobra". However, the first months, until my future 66th regiment arrived in the ZAP, we studied theory, flew up a little, but we didn’t study thoroughly there. My training in ZAP continued when the regiment to which I was enrolled received Aircobra aircraft. We studied these machines along with combat pilots who had previously flown on the Yak-1. They have already fought a lot, and in the sense of piloting technology there were aces. In fact, they only needed to study the materiel, and we were still yellow-chickened chickens. Of course, they tried to keep an eye on us so that we would not be killed on the cobras. I flew in a circle to the aerobatics zone. Then they went through combat use: aerial combat, attack. We fought aerial fights both in groups and one-on-one, but more often steam to steam. Thank God there was nobody to learn from us, although our brother had more than half of the regiment. For example, with us was one of the best pilots of the 66th regiment, twice a hero of the Soviet Union, Pavel Mikhailovich Kamozin. He received the first star in another regiment on LaGG-3.
  9. Oldman 7 November 2015 13: 54 New
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    Quote: ASK505
    Your whole post is inflated with pessimism and doom.

    I do not see pessimism and doom there. I brought a real picture of the war. By the way, the same Uncle Lesha ended the war in another, regiment of the guards, and he had the best memories of him.
    Quote: ASK505
    Shooting with 20 m is a guarantee of your own death from the debris of La-5FN.

    I gave a specific figure that I remember. And then, why should there be a guaranteed death? It depends on who is sitting in this fokker, depending on what angle the fire was opened, etc. ... I did not ask about such details.
    Quote: ASK505
    In 1944, the group with experienced pilots did not notice the enemy planes and let them go from the tail ...

    Well, well, here is another real episode that the chief engineer of one IAD of the 1 IAK told me. Operation Bagration. A squadron (incomplete squadron, GSS commander, experienced pilots) flies out on a mission, and it’s all shot down right above its airfield, not one has survived. Command not to believe this person who saw it all with his own eyes? These are the realities of war, specific tragic episodes with which front-line life is full. Unfortunately, not everything in that war was regulated by charters and instructions; a simple human factor was also in use.
    1. Pushkar 7 November 2015 19: 03 New
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      Quote: Oldman
      I brought a real picture of the war.
      Well, here's another real episode
      Are you sure? So it was ALWAYS in ALL fights? My father was a navigator of a bomber and told that in 1944 commanders of crews with a raid of 6-8 hours came to ZAP. But he also told how they flew AFTER ZAP. Father and his guests (veterans gathered every May) told a lot of hard and heroic, victorious. They told how often from the departure attack aircraft brought dead riflemen and they also talked about burning tank columns of Germans. In general, there was everything, but their generation won. (to avoid questions - Aeroflot veterans were going to visit us, flying into the war on all types of aircraft)
  10. Bashibuzuk 7 November 2015 18: 08 New
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    Yes, in the comments there’s a little different, Mama don’t worry.
    There is a site airfors.ru - airforce.ru/
    The site has a huge number of memoirs of fought pilots, and not in the style of memories, but in the style of "conversations for life."
    Before that, from childhood he was fond of military flight memoirs, he read above the roof.
    And the eyes erupted only after the site. When I was already over 40.
    .
    We laid our own at the beginning of the war. The Germans at the end.
    Who won, I think everyone is in the know.
    Everything else is from the evil one.
    1. Sling cutter 7 November 2015 20: 28 New
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      the commander comes out and says: "You will fly there." And here is the link, 4 aircraft, 3 experienced, and one for the first time, young. We only had this, in other regiments, I know that nothing even similar, but we had the smallest losses. True, it happened like this, the commander says: “Everything, it’s time for you, I’m releasing you as a leader,” and I say: “Commander, let's still fly, I’m confident in myself, but I’m not sure that I will have a partner like you”
      Krivosheev Grigory Vasilievich (from an interview)
  11. Raider 7 November 2015 19: 58 New
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    The worst thing is "hatred". Even now we are fond of it, if you read "VO". It is wiser to evaluate and learn from the enemy. Sometimes you read some .... The spirit is needed unconditionally, but with reason.
  12. naitchanter 20 November 2015 22: 36 New
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    Quote: Raider
    The worst thing is "hatred". Even now we are fond of it, if you read "VO". It is wiser to evaluate and learn from the enemy. Sometimes you read some .... The spirit is needed unconditionally, but with reason.

    As I agree with you! An article is discussed in which the author writes about two survivors from the regiment, about flocks flying in 43 ... And against this background there is such inexhaustible optimism.
  13. Warrior2015 11 December 2015 22: 26 New
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    Excellent article, very clearly clarifying the situation, which led to the fact that numerically much larger Soviet aircraft Luftwaffe just boldly from the sky in a couple of months 41 of the year!

    - What raid do you have on combat aircraft?
    They answer: - One and a half to two hours, and then most often on old planes, rarely anyone flying new ones. I ask the commanders: - How will the development of a new material part take place? - The theory was explained to them during their studies, they were also introduced to the features of the aircraft, but here we give one or two flights and then to Stalingrad. Time does not wait. Hmmm, from this episode, I was cold on the skin!

    This is just awful ... Reich pilots were trained in 3 of the year and had a minimum of 350 hours of flight (only during the war, this minimum was gradually reduced, but it didn’t even come close to the "raid" of the Soviet Air Force). But after all, the thing is that no one from any level of government HAS REBELED AGAINST THE SENDING TO THE slaughter of young stock. And this is called a welfare state?!?

    At first, the pilots didn’t even take into account such tactical elements as entering the attack from the side of the sun. ” General Zakharov (in 1938, the flight commander, senior lieutenant, and in 1939, the district air force commander!) Forgot to mention that this “natural way” was covered with the bodies of a huge number of our pilots, whom he could not teach “even tactical elements” . However, did he himself know these "elements"?
    Yeah, did not know that you can crank such a fantastic career! But it turns out that this is how it happens if the “great leader” decides to trust and the old shots with the Spanish experience to threaten!