Official история Britain’s participation in World War II spans dozens of volumes, although the efforts of the British in all theaters of operations are unlikely to be even one fifth of ours. In this case, the main military secret of England - the fact that the Second World War was provoked by the Anglo-Saxons and they also activated it, remains, of course, between the lines.
But even in the history of the Great Patriotic War not all pages were read, and above all the reasons for our failure in the summer of 1941 were shrouded in mist. Military historians stubbornly ignore a number of strange facts or superficially explain them. Vacuum is filled by authors like Suvorov-Rezun, Mark Solonin, Boris Sokolov and others like them. They paint the 1941 picture of the year with exclusively black colors, using either Goebbels’s well-worn myths, or inventing new ones.
As much as I, like a number of other researchers, try to counteract the detractors of the history of war and understand the incomprehensibilities of the 1941 of the year from the standpoint of the Soviet patriot. The result was, in particular, my books “10 Myths about 1941 Year” and “Myths about 1945 Year”, published under the pseudonym “Sergey Kremlev”. That is why it was annoying and offensive to read the article by Rear Admiral Radiy Anatolyevich Zubkov “Military history helplessness or hidden falsification”, published in No. 34 “NVO” and devoted to the criticism of my article “Secrets of War remain secrets”, published in No. 24 “NVO” .
Dear Radiy Anatolyevich claims that individual historians and researchers, among whom he probably includes me, "instead of revealing secrets and debunking the myths of the past war" are carrying out latent falsification. In particular, regarding the fact that readiness number 1 is on fleets - not a personal initiative of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov.
Perhaps here we must talk about a misunderstanding, because there are not one among the Soviet warlords of the war, except for figures such as General of the Army Pavlov, to whom I would not feel deep respect already because they dragged the "war" of the war without sparing and your belly. This also applies to the Navy Commissar Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov.
However, the Soviet commanders during the war had enough sins, and their main sin, which very few did not fall into, and above all, Marshal Rokossovsky and Marshal aviation Golovanov consists in protecting his Supreme from Khrushchev's insinuations. The latter claimed that Stalin-de was leading the fronts either on the globe, or on a map shoved in the boot of his boot. This stubborn insecurity is hardly explained only by the fear of Khrushchev's "monarchy disfavor." Rather, it seems like a conspiracy of conspiracy of silence. Not without reason in the last pre-war week to this day there are many ambiguities, starting with the fact that the sources stubbornly emphasize that the People’s Commissar Tymoshenko and the NSSh Zhukov on June 14 asked Stalin to authorize the putting the troops on combat alert, but he did not agree. But there were June 15th, and the 16th, and so on ... Why, then, the People's Commissar and the NHS, seeing the increase in tension, did not ask Stalin's consent again? This question begs itself!
And - not he alone ...
Well, you have to ask questions again, something further explaining and analyzing. After all, this is not about personal ambitions, more and more seriously and substantially.
OVER WHAT WE LAUGH
Admiral Zubkov declares that I, “inventing a secret from creating a front-line command post in the Kiev Special Military District in Ternopil (South-Western Front),” makes readers “laugh” at my alleged “concern about the absence of such command posts in other districts.” But here is an exact quotation from my article: “And what is it - KOVO was ordered to deploy field control of the district (that is, already, actually, the front), but ZOVOV was not? Urgent instructions came to Kirponos in Kiev by the second half of 19 June, but didn’t they have time to Pavlov to Minsk and to June 21?
Let me disbelieve! ”
Where is the concern about the absence of PCF in other districts? On the contrary, the construction of the quotation itself shows that I meant a general order to all districts. I mentioned the deployment of the PCF only in KOVO because information about it, to which I referred, appeared in Soviet literature, but not in the official history of the war. Admiral Zubkov further writes: “After all, those who read“ Memories and Reflections ”by Zhukov (volume 1, edition 1995 of the year, p. 361 – 362) know that the front command posts were located: the North-Western Front - in the Panevezys area, Western - near Obuz-Lesny, South-West - in Ternopil, Southern - in Tiraspol. ”
That's right, and when I wrote my article, I, of course, knew this — to be convinced of this, it is enough to read my books. But does Admiral Zubkov know who quotes the publication of GK memoirs? Zhukov 1995 (!!) of the year, that there was no information about the location of the PCF in any lifetime edition of the book! Marshal passed away on 18 on June 1974 of the year, and 26 on March of 1974 of the year was put into set the second, enlarged edition of his memoirs, which is the latest authentic. So there on the page of 264 it is only briefly mentioned that “approximately in 24 hours of 21 of June, the commander of the Kiev district, M.P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on HF ... ”and so on. And on pages 264 – 265 of this edition it is said that on that night Tymoshenko and Zhukov, returning from the Kremlin, “repeatedly spoke on HF with the commanders of the districts ... and their chiefs of staff who were at their command posts”. That's all there is to the KP constituencies in the 1974 edition of the year, the text of which can still be considered exactly Zhukovsky. In the posthumous editions, including the 1995 edition of the year to which Admiral Zubkov refers, there is reason to assume additional notes.
Moreover, the “lifetime” Zhukov, as well as in the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy, also not all ends meet in the description of the last peaceful days. Thus, in the very first edition of 1971, “Memories and Reflections,” on page 235, it also says that the People's Commissar of Defense and the National Security Service spoke with district commanders on “the last peaceful night”, but there were commanders “at the command posts of the fronts”. As we see, in the second lifetime edition, the seditious word "fronts" was removed, which is understandable. God forbid someone inadvertently thinks - how is it? How could it be that, on the eve of the war, the front command posts were deployed, if, allegedly because of Stalin’s stupidity, the district troops were peacefully sleeping in pants?
Yes, when you begin to analyze these memoirs, and other memoirs, as well as declassified documents, you don’t have to laugh, but it often turns out that it’s time to cry. One system of mobilization sunduring packages for the notorious "cover plan" is worth something! It would be possible, of course, to laugh at this idea of the General Staff: in the era of a dynamic, mobile war, write in advance what kind of units should move after the outbreak of hostilities. But the tears of evil impotence are more appropriate here ...
And millions of rifles, for some reason stored at the western borders, although it was clear that in the area of their storage millions of recruits could not be found? Not without reason a number of researchers are now writing not only about negligence, but about the direct betrayal of some of the generals. I note in parentheses that, referring to the behavior of the Soviet generals in 1991 and 1993, or by reading, for example, the excellent book by Major-General Peter Alekseevich Teremov, “Burning shores” of the 1965 publication of the year, you can believe in such a betrayal.
But now it is not about that, but about the reliability of the same memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova in the beginning of the war. I will not occupy the newspaper space, but simply suggest that the readers themselves carefully compare the time and circumstances of the transfer to the fleets of the order on readiness number 1, given by Admiral Zubkov according to the memoirs of the People's Commissar and according to the documents referred to by Admiral Zubkov. I will only draw attention to the fact that Kuznetsov said that he, having sent a telegram to the fleets, also decided to personally call the commanders, starting from the Baltic Fleet, from Tributs, and then immediately spoke with the Northern Fleet, with Golovko. Then Kuznetsov, he said, spoke on the phone with the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet Eliseev. According to the documents, the Baltic Fleet was verbally notified to the People's Commissar on 23.37 21 in June, and the Northern Fleet - on the radio, and only on 0.56 on June 22, 79 minutes after the Baltic Fleet. On the Black Sea, readiness No. 1 - according to the documents - was announced at all in 1.15, that is, 98 minutes after the Baltic Fleet.
What and who to believe?
What to laugh at and what to cry about?
ONCE AGAIN ABOUT SEVASTOPOL
Admiral Zubkov states that I allegedly “tried to express doubt” that Kuznetsov’s order played a significant role in increasing the combat readiness of the Navy, and that I’m expressing a “pejorative ... assessment of the actions of the People's Commissar of the Navy with the words" the fleets turned out to be more or less attacked by the Germans less willing ... ".
However, I did not even think about any derogation of the value of the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, and, noting the relative readiness of the fleets, I meant only that it favorably distinguished fleets from the army.
On the other hand, Admiral Zubkov himself questioned the fact that the notes of the participant in the defense of Sevastopol, captain 1 of the rank A.K. Yevseyev, where information is reported that is badly consistent not only with the memoirs of the People's Commissar, but also with official documents. They are stored in the Central Naval Archive (f. 2, op. 1, d. 315, l. 6 – 126), but I am familiar with them from the collection “The Hidden Truth of War: 1941 Year. Unknown documents ”(M .: Russian book, 1992, p. 327 – 337). So Yevseyev reports that "21 of June 1941 of the year, the majority of the Black Sea Fleet ships in full combat readiness ... (without any directives from Moscow. - S. B.) gathered in extensive bays of the main base" because of the last day of large maneuvers. Here is what the former commander of the training detachment of the Black Sea Fleet Yevseyev wrote in December 1942: “... A wonderful Crimean evening arrived. Began dismissal of personnel to the coast. Life in Sevastopol went its usual way. Brightly lit streets and boulevards gleamed. The white houses flooded with fire, theaters and clubs attracted sailors who had left for the city to rest. Crowds of sailors and townspeople dressed in white filled the streets and gardens. The well-known Primorsky Boulevard was, as always, crowded with people walking ... The highest and most senior commanders of the fleet — the participants of the maneuvers — were invited by the fleet command to a banquet on the occasion of the successful completion of the maneuvers ... ”
The garrison alarm, according to Yevseyev, was already declared after the German bombers approached Sevastopol. And even then, many commanders to the question “What kind of airplanes are they?” Answered: “Yes, this is probably Ivan Stepanovich decided to check the readiness of the air defense ...” Admiral I.S. Isakov led the Black Sea Fleet maneuvers. It was he who secretly recorded Yevseyev’s 28 December 1943, ordering them to be classified as “with the right to use everything working in Sevastopol”.
By the way, in 1961, Krymizdat released notes to Evgenia Melnik, the gunner’s wife with the 35 heavy coastal battery, “Path to Underground”. Simple but informative, these notes begin with a description of the night from 21 to 22 on June 1941 of the year, and it agrees with Yevseyev's note. The blackout of the last two pre-war weeks was observed as far as the biggest naval exercises were held, which ended on June 22, for what reason the famous Primbull was brightly illuminated on the evening of June 21, and admirals gathered at the banquet.
I am a former Crimean, Kerch, not only from films, but also from veterans' stories, I know from the walls of Kerch that were cut by shrapnel, that the Black Sea people were fighting heroically, but the Black Sea people had many complaints about Admiral Oktyabrsky and other leading admirals. Alexander Shirokorad also wrote about the gross, tragic miscalculations of the naval leadership in mine settings after the start of the war, who cannot be counted as anti-patriots and falsifiers of history. But this - by the way.
LOGIC AGAINST MEMOIRS
The last peaceful day of the Black Sea Fleet. The cruiser "Molotov" in Sevastopol the day before the start of the war. 1941 Photo of the Year
If you believe the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and the same Admiral Zubkov, then on the last peaceful night only the Commissar of Defense and the Navy, not Stalin, acted adequately to the situation, that is, with vigor, vigilance and almost at your own peril. Admiral Zubkov writes: “As for the initiative when introducing operational readiness No. 1 ... however strange it may seem to Brezkun, she is N.G. Kuznetsov was indeed manifested, since he did not receive direct instructions from Stalin on this. And the introduction of 21 June 1941 operational readiness number 1, and the introduction of another 19 June operational readiness number 2, and an order to open fire on aircraft violating the airspace of the country in the fleet bases, issued by the 3 directive in March - all this was done by Kuznetsov without sanction Stalin. "
Strangely it turns out - we are told that after the 1937 of the year, “everyone was afraid,” and then the most important decisions were made - without the instructions and knowledge of Stalin. But let us see how Kuznetsov himself describes the situation in which he decided to give orders to the fleets? For details, I refer the reader to his memoirs or to the appropriate place of my article in 24 No. NVO, and here I remind you: Kuznetsov writes that Tymoshenko summoned him on June 21 in the evening, said that the Germans were expected to attack, and Zhukov “showed the telegram he sent prepared for the border districts. " After that, the “memoir” Kuznetsov allegedly immediately and without further ado ordered Rear Admiral Alafuzov: “Run into the headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the total actual readiness number one ...”
But what should the first thing be to ask the real Narkom of the Navy after he was informed by the people's commissar of defense and the NGS? There are no miracles in the world, and the real Kuznetsov was obliged to ask: “Did your actions be coordinated with Comrade Stalin?” - to which the real Tymoshenko and Zhukov could not but reply: “But how? We act with his direct sanction, and you, too, should carry it out! ”Or did Admiral Zubkov really believe that in reality it could have been otherwise?
Of course, no documentary evidence can be found on this score, but the very logic of events and common sense tell us that it could not be otherwise. Moreover, the fact that since June 19, the fleets had entered readiness number 20, logically and historically confirms the fact that Stalin authorized the bringing of troops into combat readiness already on June 19, which I wrote about.
The directive from 3 of March on the opening of fire on airplanes violating the border near the fleet bases could not be adopted without Stalin’s approval. With regard to German aircraft violating the land frontier, there was a strict ban, because the Germans attributed the violations to the loss of orientation by the pilots, which still seemed plausible. As for the fleet bases, then such an explanation did not “work”, the intentional nature of the violation was obvious, and the photo-intelligence of the fleet bases was potentially much more dangerous than the photo-intelligence of the deployment of army units.
Further, Admiral Zubkov declares: “Sergey Brezkun asserts:“ There are many reasons to assume that the army and the navy received Stalin’s first sanction ... received in advance — somewhere 18 – 19 June 1941 of the year ”. Such bases he apparently considers the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense against 19 June 1941 about deploying front command posts to 23 – 25 June and about disguising airfields, military units and other military facilities in Western border districts, and 30 reconnaissance mission by June 18 June of the commander of the 43 th fighter air division ZAPOV Colonel Zakharov along the state border. However, Brezkun does not provide any evidence of Stalin’s involvement in these events. ”
I don’t know, first, why this distinguished opponent decided that I regard the mentioned orders and the flight of Colonel Zakharov as confirmation of the version about Stalin’s advance readiness of the troops. There are much more reasons for such a version, both documentary and memoirical, as well as logical. But not everything can be cited in a newspaper article, for which reason I refer Admiral Zubkov and interested readers, for example, to my books, in particular about Beria and Stalin. It says a lot more about that.
Secondly, as regards specifically the reconnaissance flight of Colonel Zakharov, the meaning of which I first analyzed in detail in my book about L.P. Beria, there really is no documentary evidence of Stalin’s involvement in this event. But if, excuse me, you find a man and a woman who escaped a year ago during a shipwreck, in company with a three-month baby, on a deserted island, then you, although you didn’t keep a candle over them, rightly assume who the father and mother of this baby is. So, all the circumstances of the flight of Colonel Zakharov (his detailed description by Zakharov himself is given in my books) logically unequivocally point to the direct involvement in this event not only of Stalin, but also of Beria. At the same time, I do not categorically state (as A. Martirosyan does, for example) that Stalin 19 of June gave the necessary sanction. I just say that a comprehensive analysis of the last prewar week allows us to reasonably assume that such a sanction was given and that the joint and benign efforts of many are necessary in order for this version to be reliably confirmed.
AND SOME SOMETHING ABOUT ORDERS
I emphasize once again that, as far as I can, I try to debunk the myths about the war, for today too many people are covered with a thick crust of dirt about the truth about Stalin, about his associates, his commanders and naval commanders ... About those who fell in the first days of the war, and those who gave strength, and then - and life, fighting on its fronts for almost four years. By false myths, this truth began to grow over with Khrushchev. Thus, in 1961, Voenizdat published the first volume of the “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 – 1945”. The six-volume work was developed by a team of researchers from the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Academician Peter Pospelov was the chairman of the Editorial Committee. And in this capital (exactly 2 kg weight) volume on page 100 it was stated: “The Soviet Armed Forces achieved considerable success in their development, which worried the imperialist circles of the West ... These circles in search of ways to weaken the Red Army used Beria and his accomplices to destroy many of the most experienced and trained commanders and political workers. "
Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria had no relation to the 1937 – 1938 army and naval purges, working in those years as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia. He became the people's commissar of internal affairs at the end of 1938, and at the post of people's commissar he returned to the Red Army and the RKKF many experienced and trained commanders and political workers, including the future Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky.
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But this, so to speak, is an admonition to certain information, to reflect on certain orders of the prewar period ...
27 December 1940, the new People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Tymoshenko, who replaced Marshal Voroshilov, issued Order No. 0367, which read:
“By the order of NKO 1939, No. 0145, obligatory masking of all newly constructed operational airfields was required. The Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force was to carry out these measures not only on operational, but also on the entire airfield network of the Air Force. However, none of the districts paid proper attention to this order and did not fulfill it.
It is necessary to realize that without a thorough camouflage of all airfields, the creation of false airfields and the masking of all material parts in modern warfare, combat operations of aviation are inconceivable.
3. All airfields ... must be sown with due regard for masking and applicable to the surrounding terrain by selecting appropriate grasses. On airfields to imitate fields, meadows, vegetable gardens, pits, ditches, ditches, roads, in order to completely merge the background of the airfield with the background of the surrounding terrain. By 1 July 1941, complete the masking of all airfields located in the 500-km strip from the border.
9. The Air Force Inspector-General to establish control and report on progress on a monthly basis.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko ”.
What does the deadline for the execution of the order “by 1 July 1941” mean?
This means that if the commission appointed by the People's Commissar to verify the execution of his order No. 0367 from 27 December 1940, 1 July flew over the entire 500-kilometer strip from the border, then ideally it would have to see the airfield instead of airfields gardens and pits. In this case, all the main work on masking by the middle of June 1941, the year should have ended.
Alas, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0367 from 27.12.1940 of the year was not executed in the same way as the order No. 0145 of 09.09.1939 of the year was not executed.
The question is, after the outbreak of war, the Air Force Inspector-General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General Aviation Yakov Smushkevich and Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General Aviation Pavel Rychagov? But Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated them in 1954 year.
Actually, Tymoshenko also gave the order, and he clearly forgot to demand that he fulfill it in terms of the monthly reports of the Air Force Inspector. Otherwise, the order would be executed! And so in the order number 0042 from 19 June 1941, the People's Commissar Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov stated:
“So far, no major has been done to disguise airfields and major military facilities.
The airfield fields are not planted, the take-off strips for the color of the terrain are not painted, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the observer’s attention by tens of kilometers.
The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft on airfields in the complete absence of their concealment and poor organization of airfield service with the use of unmasking signs finally unmask the airfield ... "
As followed from the same order, the Air Force leadership did not bother to arrange false airfields for 19 June 1941, too. And the crowding of technology can be judged by the photos of our planes destroyed on the ground. Burnt, destroyed, they stand wing to wing, and even in two rows.
Many ground generals on the part of the criminal neglect of the affairs of the service from the aviation generals left not far. And this was mentioned in the same order No. 0042 from 19 June 1941:
“Artillery and mechanized mechanized units display a similar carelessness for masking: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are beneficial for defeating from the air.
Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection, and are well observed not only from air but also from the ground.
Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations. ”
And this is not all the killer facts of this kind! Is it possible now to be surprised that the war began as it began? And is it guilty that it began like this, Stalin?
We really lack the true history of the war, but we are unlikely to have it without revealing, but glossing over the unattractive facts, if not of direct betrayal, then of criminal negligence and irresponsibility of a large part of the higher generals of the Red Army, explained by no means cleansing (the repressed were even worse, that show, for example, transcripts of meetings of the Supreme Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), and an insufficient sense of responsibility, which had to be eliminated at a high price. Without touching on this topic in detail, it can be noted that even after half a century, in the summer of 1991, the then higher generals, instead of defending the constitutional order, were totally covered by inaction and connivance of the enemies.
As for specifically Admiral Kuznetsov, the marshals of Tymoshenko and Zhukov, they drank their bitter cup and guided the war that started as a whole with dignity - who is more successful, who is less, but honestly. However, do not make them knights without fear and reproach - they, as I understand it, didn’t have fear, but they deserved the accusations. But reproach is not reproach. Reproach does not exclude our gratitude and respect for those who stood next to Stalin at the head of that war and won it, having assimilated its first lessons correctly.