Military Review

Features of the use of aircraft in the North during the war

Features of the use of aircraft in the North during the war

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet aviation in the Arctic, it solved almost the entire spectrum of the variety of combat missions. At the same time, the fighting in the North was distinguished by a number of features, due to the nature of the tasks performed, the geographical location of the area and the uniqueness of natural conditions.

In Norway and Northern Finland, a separate German army, Norway, was deployed, which had the task of capturing the city of Murmansk, as well as the main base of our Northern fleet - the city of Polar, the Rybachy Peninsula and the section of the Kirov Railway, located north of Belomorsk. With the beginning of the offensive by the fascist leadership, it was planned to carry out major naval operations in the Barents Sea, aimed at destroying Soviet ships and seizing the naval bases of the Northern Fleet, blocking the sea coast and ensuring control over allied sea lanes. In addition, the fleet had to provide support to its ground forces.

In Norway and Finland, the Germans concentrated more than 240 aircraft that were part of the 5 air fleet. They were assisted by Finnish aviation, numbering more than three hundred combat aircraft. The flight crew had combat experience; moreover, many pilots received special training for operations in northern conditions.

The defense of the Murmansk and Kandalaksha areas was carried out by our 14 Army. In the initial period of the war, its air support was provided by the 1-I mixed aviation division under the command of Colonel M. M. Golovnya, which included the entire 125 of serviceable aircraft. The air force of the Northern Fleet deployed 114 aircraft. They were commanded by Major General A.A. Kuznetsov. As you can see, the Soviet Union was able to concentrate on the north direction of the entire 239 aircraft. In addition, overwhelmingly, these were machines of outdated designs that were inferior to the German ones in almost all tactical and technical data. New models of aircraft and aircraft parts stationed in the North began to arrive after the start of the war. Thus, enemy aircraft in the Arctic had at that time a significant quantitative as well as a qualitative superiority.

In the conditions of the Arctic, the main task of the aviation of the belligerents was the conquest of air supremacy. Although this task was paramount on all fronts, but it was in the Arctic that it acquired particular importance. This is explained as follows. In the treeless tundra, the possibilities of providing camouflage for ground forces and objects are limited, there is no developed network of roads, which often causes crowding on the existing roads of troops and equipment. During air raids, it is impossible to drive off many roads passing through marshy soil or mountainous terrain. As for our air force, the insufficient number of airfields, the difficulty of their construction forced them to base aircraft crowded, and this made it difficult to conceal and increased the danger of destruction. It was even more difficult to organize a disguise and protect ships and ships from air strikes. From this it is obvious that the provision of reliable cover for the ground forces, strategic facilities and naval forces directly depended on the conquest of air supremacy and its retention.

In the initial period of the war, the enemy tried to destroy our planes at their bases. True, 22 June 1941, the German aircraft did not conduct massive strikes on the Soviet northern airfields, and the advance of the ground forces here began a week later than in the western directions of the Soviet-German front. Thanks to this feature, our aviation units were able to better prepare for the fight against the air enemy and to preserve their fleet as much as possible. However, since June 23, the intensity of the actions of the enemy Air Force has increased every day. They were particularly active in the first war month, which accounted for 75% of all airfield attacks during the 6 months of 1941. During this month, our aviation on earth lost 20 aircraft from 26, which were destroyed in the first half of the year.

The Nazis inflicted blows on the airfields in the future, but their effectiveness decreased due to improved organization and increased air defense of airfields, more careful disguise and dispersal of aircraft, redirecting the main efforts of enemy aviation to solve other tasks and, finally, winning air supremacy in the air summer 1943 of the year.

The basis of the struggle for air supremacy was air battles. They were used by both our and German aircraft, as a rule, when carrying out various combat missions by aircraft. Therefore, it is advisable to consider them in inseparable conjunction with them. Attacks on enemy airfields were inflicted both in the course of daily combat with enemy aircraft and in the implementation of special air strike operations. So, to weaken the enemy’s northern grouping, our aviation 25-30 in June 1941 conducted a successful operation to destroy enemy aircraft on Finnish and Norwegian airfields. Its peculiarity was that, due to the large removal of enemy air bases (200-350 km), only part of our fighters participated in the operation. Bombers had to operate in unusual conditions of the polar day. And although, in general, the operation was very efficient (for 6 days, our pilots disabled the 130 order of the German and Finnish aircraft), it was not possible to make a radical change in the air situation in the northern theater.

In the 1941 year, when German and Finnish troops were active in offensive operations, the destruction of enemy aircraft took place mainly in the air. The pilots of the 14 Army Air Forces, 103 th AD this year shot down an 124 aircraft and destroyed 37 vehicles at the airfields.

From the autumn of 1942 to October 1944, there was a relative lull in the activity of the ground forces, which also affected the nature of the combat work of the aviation. The German command, not having sufficient forces to seize Murmansk, switched its aircraft to the task of disrupting sea and railway communications, which carried out the communication of the USSR with its allies and the supply of troops on the Karelian front and the Northern Fleet.

Cover from the air of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the Kirov Railway and the Allied convoys depended directly on the possibility of achieving air superiority. The peculiarity of this struggle was that all types of aviation (long-range, front-line, air defense and sea) and all types (bomber, assault, fighter, reconnaissance) participated in it in close cooperation with each other. During periods in the path of the Allied convoys, in order to prevent enemy aircraft from departing, our bombers usually intensified strikes on its bases.

In the summer of 1943, our aircraft managed to gain dominance in the northern sky. The balance of power was already in our favor. The 7 Air Force, organized in November 1942, and the Northern Fleet air forces had more than 500 aircraft, and the enemy less than 400, and its aircraft fleet decreased every month. By the beginning of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (in October 1944 of the year), the Nazis in northern Norway had only 160 aircraft (in the depth of Norway they were based over 300 intended for operations against allied maritime communications). At this time, the 7 Air Force, with air connections attached to it, had 747 airplanes, and the Northern Fleet air forces had more than 700.

In the course of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, our pilots fought exclusively for the preservation of air superiority previously won. The situation was complicated by the fact that in the harsh northern conditions, the Soviet troops could not ensure the timely construction of new airfields in the liberated territory, and therefore our aviators had to act with the old ones. In the course of the offensive, the distance from the contact line to the airfields based on our aircraft increased, while in the Germans, on the contrary, it decreased. This caused an increase in the danger of the sudden appearance of German aircraft over Soviet troops.

In order to detect enemy aircraft in a timely manner, in addition to using radar equipment, they began to successfully apply the following method: away from German airfields, but not beyond visual visibility, they constantly patrol a pair of our fighter aircraft, and the pilots openly informed the radio command of the actions air enemy.

To maintain air supremacy, enemy planes continued to be destroyed in the air and at airfields. Only 9 of October 1944 of the 7 Air Force pilots conducted 32 aerial combat, as a result of which our fighters shot down 37 of enemy aircraft. It is characteristic that most of these battles took place over enemy territory, which indicates the offensive tactics of Soviet aviation. This success was secured on October 11 by a powerful bombing and attack attack on the German airfield Salmijärvi, on which the aircraft 33 was destroyed. In general, in a few days the Germans lost the order of 100 machines, after which they noticeably weakened their resistance. In total, for the period of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, the Nazi 181 aircraft was destroyed.

In the course of the fight against enemy aircraft, many pilots distinguished themselves. The best-known ace in the Arctic became the double Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel B. F. Safonov. He performed about three hundred combat missions, in which he personally and 41 destroyed an enemy aircraft. They became Heroes of the Soviet Union in the sky of the North and such pilots as: V.S. Adonkin, N.A. Boky, I.V. Bochkov, P.S. Kutahov, L.A. Galchenko, P.G. Sgibnev, G. V. Gromov, P. D. Klimov, A. S. Khlobystov A. A. Kovalenko, P. I. Orlov, E. A. Krivosheee, S. G. Kurzenkov, and many of our other pilots.

The effectiveness of ground support for leading defensive and offensive operations depended on the success of our aviation in the struggle for air supremacy. At the beginning of the fascist offensive in the Arctic, its aircraft, which had a large quantitative superiority, carried out attacks on Soviet troops by large groups from 12 to 40 aircraft. In the absence of the necessary countermeasures against air defenses, enemy bombers were most often rearranged in a circle and from dives from 600 to 800 m, with a dive, attacked ground targets with single planes.

With the increased activity of the German ground forces, who sought to seize Murmansk, our aviation provided increasing support to the 14 Army. This is noticeable by the fact that before September 1941 of the year, in order to interact with the troops of the 14 Army, the aircraft made 43% of sorties, but in the next three months - 62%. During this period, the main task of the Northern Fleet aviation was to support the ground forces. In the first four months of the war, when the enemy conducted offensive operations in the Arctic, the air forces of the 14 Army carried out 7979 sorties, the Northern Fleet 8131, of which more than 3000 were used to support the actions and cover of the ground forces.

In September, the 1941 of the 14 Army had 10 day bombers. They mainly struck the enemy rear. And over the battlefield acted mainly fighters, performing the role of attack aircraft. In particular, they used such tactics: the I-153 conducted ground attack of ground targets, and the I-16 covered them. After the assault group consumed up to 70% of ammunition, the cover group proceeded to the assault actions, and its task was performed by the first group.

In the period of stabilization of the front in the Arctic, widespread "free hunting". And this, too, was due to the peculiarities of the North. In the fall and spring there are short days there, and therefore it is necessary to strike the detected target immediately, without waiting for our planes to arrive at the call of the air reconnaissance and the pilots will find the enemy. In February 1943, a special meeting was held among the “hunter” pilots of the 7 Air Army, at which it was pointed out that it was necessary to intensify the actions of the “hunters” and to popularize their experience more widely. After the meeting, the “free hunt” was still widespread.

Soviet aviation, acting in the interests of the ground forces, breaking through the enemy’s defenses and leading the offensive, destroyed enemy strongholds, suppressed artillery batteries, stormed manpower, covered ground forces, conducted constant reconnaissance of the battlefield and German rears. Aviation of the Northern Fleet was of great help to the naval landing forces that were landed on the 10 night of October 1944 on the shore of the Malaya Volokovaya Bay and to the 24 clock on October 12 - in the port of Linahamari.

It is characteristic that in the harsh polar conditions at a high rate of attack of the troops of the 14 Army, artillery units often lagged behind the rifle, and their tasks were assumed by the bomber and assault aircraft, which acted upon by the combined arms units.

The following data convincingly testifies to the effectiveness of aviation operations in providing support from ground forces from the air. During the operation, the aviation forces of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet destroyed several thousand enemy soldiers and officers, more than 800 vehicles and a large number of other military equipment, eliminated 40 various military warehouses, to 30 dugouts and dugouts, suppressed fire around 150 artillery batteries.

During the periods of maritime convoys, the bombers, as indicated above, acted on the enemy's airfields. Fleet air reconnaissance aircraft were searching for enemy submarines, and fighter aircraft covered convoys from enemy aircraft operations.

Providing the wiring of each convoy required a lot of effort. For example, in May, 1942 in the interests of the English convoy PQ-16, consisting of 34 transports, 19 surface escort ships and 2 submarines, our pilots made over a thousand sorties, of which more than 130 - to attack German airfields , 730 - to cover ports, about 250 - for the purpose of reconnaissance and fighter cover ships. During the war, in order to provide convoy escort, the crews of the Northern Fleet aviation performed 11326 sorties, or 20% of all sorties.

The enemy made great efforts, trying to disable the seaports in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk ports, especially during periods when the Allied convoys were in them. But thanks to the organization of powerful air defense, the interaction of the pilots and the ground-based air defense system, the enemy’s attempts to disrupt the work of these ports were unsuccessful, and since May 1943, the raids on them have ceased.

By all means the enemy aircraft sought to disrupt the work of the Kirov railway. The greatest activity of German aviation in this area in the period from December 1942 to the beginning of the summer 1943, especially in the area from the station. Kandalaksha to Art. Louhi In this direction, the enemy's airfields were closer to the railroad than the Soviet ones, and the flight route passed over the difficult wooded and swampy areas, where there were virtually no Soviet VNOS posts. This allowed the enemy to appear in the area of ​​railway facilities suddenly. At the beginning of the war, raids were carried out mostly by groups of pre-12 bombers without fighter escort. But, encountering increasingly stubborn opposition in the air, enemy bombers began to fly under cover of fighters, and, moreover, in smaller groups. Attempts by the Germans to block our airfields were ineffective: the blocking aircraft suffered significant losses from the actions of ground-based air defense systems and our fighters.

Attempts by the enemy to bombard echelons at stations of the Kirov railway at night with single Ju-88 aircraft turned out to be completely ineffective. Then the enemy aircraft began to catch echelons en route. The situation on the railway was complicated. It was necessary to take urgent measures to strengthen the air defense of the road and the echelons themselves, which were accompanied by special air defense groups. To cover the road section of the Kandalaksha-Loukhi, 122-I fighter air defense systems and 19-th Guards IAP, who managed to provide effective protection of the transport line, were involved.

Our planes fought with the enemy’s sea posts. However, in the initial period of the war, these actions were ineffective due to the small number of the aircraft fleet, the involvement of naval aviation forces to ensure the actions of the ground forces and the lack of necessary experience. As they arrived at parts of the mine-torpedo aviation technology and the development of low torpedo combat by the aircrew, the attacks of the Northern Seamen became more and more effective. If in 1941, the 4 transport was damaged by aircraft, then in 1943, 21 transport, 2 vessel, 5 warships and 19 transports were damaged.

Even more intensified actions of our aviation in violation of enemy sea communications in 1944. In total, during the war, North Sea pilots made 13244 aircraft for action on maritime communications, which accounted for 23% of all sorties. Crews inflicted massive torpedo-bombing attacks on German convoys at sea and in ports, and also destroyed transports and ships during cruising flights. Most of the destroyed enemy transports were the result of the actions of torpedo-carrying aircraft, and the damaged ones - assault. The effectiveness of the attack aircraft has especially increased since the spring of 1944, when they began to use the top-mast method of bombing. The greatest success was achieved by the crews of the Heroes of the Soviet Union I.T. Volynkina, P.A. Galkina, V.N. Kisileva, S.A. Makarevich, D.V. Osyki, G.V. Pavlova, B.P. Syromyatnikova, E.I. Frantseva.

One of the main tasks of aviation was to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Given the conditions of the Arctic, its importance was especially great. Exploration by other means in the boundless tundra was either unacceptable or extremely difficult. Conducting aerial reconnaissance, in addition to countering fighter aviation and ground-based air defense systems, complicated the rugged coast of Northern Norway, the presence of numerous fjords, bays, islands, rocky terrain, polar night, and difficult meteorological conditions.

Giving serious importance to aerial reconnaissance, the Soviet command constantly strengthened its units with experienced personnel, new aircraft, more sophisticated photographic equipment, and improved the organization of the entire airborne reconnaissance service. If in the initial period of the war only a few small reconnaissance air units operated in the North, then already in the second period there was one separate reconnaissance air regiment in the 7 air army and the Northern Fleet air force. Aerial reconnaissance was conducted (tactical - within 100 km, operational - at a depth of up to 300 km) in two ways: by visual observation and by photographing. Her data were communicated to the commanders of the battalions and their peers. During the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation in the interests of aerial reconnaissance, there were up to 20 sorties per day.

Improved during the war and aviation management. This was facilitated by: departures of operational groups in the area of ​​active hostilities, the development of communications, especially radio, which became the main means of controlling aviation. The interaction between aviation and ground forces was not clearly organized. Poor designation of the front line, unstable communication between aviation and combined-arms headquarters sometimes led to the fact that air strikes were inflicted on secondary targets and not at a specified time. The most perfect was the interaction between the types of troops in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. Even before it began, the command post of the commander of the 7 th air army was deployed along with the command post of the commander of the 14 army; KP commanders of 260 and 261 of mixed aviation divisions of Colonel G. A. Kalugin and Major General Aviation And D. Udonin - next to KP of commanders of 99 and 131 of rifle corps with whom they interacted. In each division of these corps there were aviation representatives with the necessary radio equipment for targeting combat aircraft to the target. In advance, a table was developed for signals of interaction between aviation and ground forces, designations of the front line, etc.

The organization of interaction between aviation units of the front, fleet, air defense and long-range aviation was constantly improved. An effective form of solving this task was the transfer of air force units to the operational subordination to the commander, whose formations in this period solved the main task. In 1942-1943 a number of aviation units of the Karelian Front, by order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, three times were under the operational control of the commander of the Northern Fleet Air Force. During the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, a part of the Northern Fleet aviation, the 122-th Fighter Aviation Division and the 113-bomber division RVGK were under the operational control of the commander of the 7-Air Army

The meteorological features of the region and, in particular, the long polar nights had a great influence on the combat work of aviation in the North. Weather conditions were taken into account both at the planning stage of combat operations and during the performance of combat missions by air units. Thus, during the planning of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, the 7 Air Force headquarters developed two options for the combat use of aviation: the first for meteorological conditions that allow the use of all its deliveries, the second in case of bad weather that does not allow the use of bombers. In the Arctic, there were frequent cases of complete cessation of any kind of flights due to adverse weather conditions. During the polar night, there was also a significant decrease in the activity of the combat work of aviation. But in the summer, when there was a long polar day, there was a sharp increase in the voltage of combat work. For example, during the periods of passage of convoys and in the days of the summer offensive of the fascists in 1941, the Soviet pilots made up to 10 sorties per day.

With a lot of difficulties and features of operation and repair in the harsh conditions of the Polar region, the engineering and technical staff had to face. The work was complicated not only by the harsh weather, but also by the obsolete mate part, the underdeveloped repair network, the shortage of trained aviation specialists, and the acute shortage of spare parts in the initial period of the war. The result was the fact that in 1942, the air forces of the Karelian Front had on average 17-19% of defective machines. By the autumn of 1943, in the 7-th Air Army, in order to remedy the situation, mobile aircraft repair bases were created that could significantly improve the situation.

Many difficulties were created when servicing the aircraft fleet, the specific features of the basing of aviation units in the Arctic. Work from ground strips of field aerodromes caused rapid wear of the equipment, increased air humidity and strong temperature fluctuations caused the aggregates to corrode, and the technical staff had to carry out regular maintenance more often. Naturally, the heaviest car maintenance was in the winter. Cleaning the aircraft from ice, warming up the engines, which were constantly required to be ready for launch, draining fluids from the engine and systems after the flight, all this required a lot of time and effort, which in winter increased one and a half times compared to the summer period.

For aviation rear specialists, the tasks of aerodrome support of aviation units presented the greatest difficulty. To find one site for the airfield, it was necessary to examine the area of ​​several thousand square kilometers. For these tasks used aircraft PO-2. The task was complicated in winter, when snow cover covered the ground, and the polar night reduced visibility. In this case, assistance was provided by rare locals and hunters who knew the surroundings.

The construction of airfields in the Arctic - is extremely time-consuming. Therefore, in the first period of the war, the airfield network was developed at the expense of those sites, the construction and reconstruction of which began in the prewar period. Already later began to build new ones. Subsequently, there was a need to reconstruct and expand the existing ones, due to the fact that the new construction aircraft that came into service required more lengthy runways.

A lot of difficulties fell to the share of signalmen. The wired connection, poorly developed by 1941, was regularly broken. Permanent lines of communication, which passed near the roads, with the strikes of enemy aircraft on highways failed. In the conditions of the Far North, radio became the primary means, but its use was hampered by the lack of equipment, especially at the beginning of the war, as well as by strong ionospheric storms, most often occurring in spring and autumn. The most difficult thing was to provide communications for the air unit when they entered the ice airfields.

But whatever the conditions and difficulties, even in the harsh Arctic, our soldiers and officers honestly carried out their combat work, bringing the common Victory closer.

Inozemtsev I. The Winged Defenders of the North. M .: Voenizdat, 1975. C. 3-26, 94-131.
Inozemtsev I. In the sky of the Arctic and Karelia. M .: Voenizdat, 1987. C. 82-138.
Inozemtsev I. Combat use of aviation in the Arctic // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1976. No. 1. S. 20-28.
Ivanov P. Wings over the sea. M .: Voenizdat, 1973. C. 240-246.
G. Kuznetsov. Fighting aviation of the Northern Fleet // Military-Historical Journal. 1976. No.3. C. 39-48.
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  1. Insurgent LC
    Insurgent LC 23 October 2015 06: 39 New
    no matter how difficult it was, but our pilots brought Victory closer and fulfilled their duty with happiness
    1. uncle
      uncle 23 October 2015 14: 52 New
      The Finnish Air Force shot down 1621 aircraft of the USSR, losing 210. Finnish aces E.Jutiläinen - 92 victories, H.Wind - 78 victories, E. Luukanen - 51 victories.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 23 October 2015 15: 38 New
        Quote: Uncle
        The Finnish Air Force shot down 1621 aircraft of the USSR, losing 210.

        Ahem ... maybe still reported downed?
        Quote: Uncle
        Finnish aces E.Jutiläinen - 92 victories, H.Wind - 78 victories, E. Luukanen - 51 victories.

        Yeah ... at the same time, among the victories of Yuutilainen are the Soviet "lightning" and two Soviet "mustangs". smile
        1. uncle
          uncle 23 October 2015 16: 21 New
          Yes, this is Finnish data and -F-2A Buffalo.
      2. 97110
        97110 23 October 2015 15: 51 New
        Quote: Uncle
        Finnish Air Force shot down

        But this is such a trifle in comparison with the efforts of Ukrainian litaks. Here the father-in-law told that he drank the car. That is yes. And the Finns - what to say about these sleepy flies ...
      3. svp67
        svp67 23 October 2015 18: 19 New
        Quote: Uncle
        The Finnish Air Force shot down 1621 aircraft of the USSR, losing 210. Finnish aces E.Jutiläinen - 92 victories, H.Wind - 78 victories, E. Luukanen - 51 victories.

        Yes, yes ... And how did it help Finland? Here explain. Who defeated whom? Could Youutilainen, Vind, Luukanen protect the sky not only over their troops, but also over their country? Yes, 92, 78 and 51, this is a lot of victory, but the result was disastrous for them, meaning victory in the air must be analyzed not only from this point.
        1. uncle
          uncle 23 October 2015 20: 30 New
          30.11.1939/250/265000 Soviet aircraft bombed the cities of Finland. Thus began the Soviet-Finnish War. The Finnish army fought bravely but the forces were not equal. The Finnish army is 32-114, 425 tanks, 760000 aircraft. Soviet Army-2289-2446, 26000 tanks, 167 aircraft. The Finns lost 180000 killed, the USSR - 11-1941 but the forces were not equal. According to the Moscow Peace Treaty, Finland lost XNUMX% of its territory. Finland again occupied these territories in XNUMX, but again the forces were not equal and again lost them. Finland became an ally of Germany to return these territories.
          1. pilot8878
            pilot8878 23 October 2015 23: 32 New
            Quote: Uncle
            Soviet-Finnish War began

            Before it began, the Finnish government was offered very advantageous options for moving the border farther from Leningrad in exchange for a much larger area. The arrogance of the Finns incited by England, coupled with regular provocations at the border, led to what they led to. The losses of the Red Army in this war are very serious, but they made it possible to identify a number of problems in the organization of troops and begin perestroika before the start of the big war.
            1. uncle
              uncle 24 October 2015 01: 14 New
              Between the USSR and Finland there was an agreement on non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of conflicts - 21.01.1932/14.12.1939/XNUMX. So what, it didn’t hurt! For aggression, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nation - XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
  2. Aleksandr72
    Aleksandr72 23 October 2015 07: 04 New
    And although the whole operation was very effective (for 6 days our pilots disabled about 130 German and Finnish aircraft), they failed to make a radical change in the air situation in the northern theater.

    without diminishing the heroism of the Soviet pilots, who did everything they could and even more, such a high performance of air raids on enemy airfields seems to me personally not quite what it really was. Do not forget, this is 1941 - the Luftwaffe not only has a qualitative and quantitative superiority, but it is also very important - a well-established service of the airborne aerospace defense and much better organized management of its air units. Even in 1943-1944, the destruction of only 3-4 German aircraft during Soviet air strikes at the Luftwaffe air bases in Norway - Hebukten, Luostari, Allakurtti was considered a great success. And here 1941 was just 6 days of operation and 130 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground. Somehow I can’t believe it, especially considering what German and Finnish aviation then did during air raids on Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Rybachy, etc. Until the end of 1943.
    The article was liked by its informativeness and wide coverage of the issues of combat use of Soviet aviation in the sky of the Arctic.
    I have the honor.
    1. Riperbahn
      Riperbahn 23 October 2015 13: 31 New
      You are right - Murmansk from the Luftwaffe raids burned down almost all, but the port continued to work, taking convoys, the Kirov Railway did not stop for a minute. Only this speaks of the effective work of the aviation of the Northern Fleet and the 14th Army. All military cargoes were received, unloaded and pushed to the European theater of operations. For this I had to pay civilians and urban infrastructure. Everything for the front, everything for the Victory. No wonder Murmansk is a Hero City.
  3. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack 23 October 2015 07: 21 New
    Photo MBR-2 pleased. beautiful in its own way airplane. Thank you for the article!
  4. ivanovbg
    ivanovbg 23 October 2015 07: 39 New
    The article is good, but the photos are again not signed. Judging by them, the "pawns" were mainly working in the North? And what is this miracle-yudo-ski-hydroplane in the middle of the article?
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 23 October 2015 08: 32 New
      In the photo from top to bottom:
      - SB-2 with motors M-100A,
      - Pe-2 arr. 1941 with a streamlined turret of the TSS navigator with a ShKAS machine gun,
      - The future twice Hero of the Soviet Union B. Safonov in my I-16 cockpit,
      - Suspension of a torpedo on the IL-4 mine-torpedo regiment KSF
      - Seaplane-close reconnaissance Beriev MBR-2 in the winter version (skiing)
      - Preparation for departure of the long-range reconnaissance seaplane Consolidated PBY "Catalina", which were supplied to the USSR both before the war and during its course, being the main Soviet seaplane in the second half of the Great Patriotic War. In the north, in the second half of the 30s, the civilian version of the Catalina, called the GST (transport seaplane), was used for ice reconnaissance and servicing of the SevMorPuti.
      I have the honor.
      1. ivanovbg
        ivanovbg 23 October 2015 08: 38 New
        Thanks for the clarification, I'm really interested.
    3. michell
      michell 24 October 2015 09: 52 New
      Quote: ivanovbg
      Judging by them, the "pawns" were mainly working in the North?

      Moreover, the North - the only, as far as I know, place on the Soviet-German front, where Pe-3 heavy fighters were used - flew to cover the Allied convoys from German bombers.
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 23 October 2015 08: 05 New
    Thank you, wonderful article, capacious, informative ..
  6. Arjuna
    Arjuna 23 October 2015 08: 26 New
    The author remark, the port is called - Liinahomari.
    1. gramatey
      gramatey 23 October 2015 09: 05 New
      I will correct my typo too - Liinahamari. The Russian had and has its own name - Devkin backwater.
  7. kondrat13
    kondrat13 23 October 2015 09: 09 New
    Then LiinakhAmari
  8. alexej123
    alexej123 23 October 2015 10: 09 New
    I love V.S. Pikul. I have read his books dozens of times and continue to reread them. "Requiem for the PQ-17 Caravan" and "Ocean Patrol" tell of the war in the north. Now you read the articles and understand that Pikul also has documentary works in many ways. By the way, the question is, what other fiction books tell about the war in the north? Much has been written for the blockade of Leningrad, for Stalingrad and other significant battles. But for some reason I did not meet about the events in the north of that time.
    1. 97110
      97110 23 October 2015 15: 56 New
      Quote: alexej123
      But for some reason I did not meet about events in the north of that time

      I remembered "Boatswain from the Fog" by P. Shestakov. If nothing is confused - old age.
      1. alexej123
        alexej123 20 November 2015 13: 42 New
        Thanks for the advice, I'll look in the internet.
  9. AAV
    AAV 23 October 2015 10: 26 New
    Thanks to the author for the article.

    I would like to mention one pilot who fought in the aviation of the Northern Fleet - Zakhar Artemovich Sorokin.
    This man repeated the feat of Alexei Maresyev - returned to duty and continued to fight after amputation of the feet of both legs. He fought in the regiment, commanded by B.F. Safonov. Unfortunately, about Sorokin’s exploit, and not only his one, not much has been written as about Maresyev’s exploit.
    Since childhood, I remember a thin booklet "Duel in the Snowy Desert", written by the hero himself.
  10. Monster_Fat
    Monster_Fat 23 October 2015 10: 38 New
    Read the books by Vladimir Pershavin
    He also has about the war in the north, for example: "Marines against Hitler's" white wolves "
    1. alexej123
      alexej123 20 November 2015 13: 57 New
      Thanks for the advice, I'll look.
    2. alexej123
      alexej123 20 November 2015 13: 57 New
      Thanks for the advice, I'll look.
  11. fa2998
    fa2998 23 October 2015 11: 16 New
    Quote: ivanovbg
    Judging by them, the "pawns" were mainly working in the North?

    There is something missing in the article! There is not enough Leadz-Lease aircraft. After all, it was in the North that they began to serve and fought with dignity. Of course, patriotism and "import substitution" are excellent, but let's write what happened. Don't take an example from our overseas "partners "they have double standards with them. And by the way, many of our aces fought on" imported "ones. Sorry, who offended! hi RS - "Catalina" I saw - I'm talking about combat fighter planes and bombers (torpedo bombers). yes
  12. Olezhek
    Olezhek 23 October 2015 20: 25 New
    Explanatory written!
  13. xomaNN
    xomaNN 23 October 2015 20: 49 New
    Thank you for the article about our North Sea pilots! My father served in the North, and we lived in Severomorsk-2 (Maly). This photo was taken twice by my father B. Safonov in Maly in 1965.
  14. moskowit
    moskowit 23 October 2015 21: 47 New
    Thanks. Interesting. Informative.
  15. rubin6286
    rubin6286 24 October 2015 08: 28 New
    The article is frankly weak and superficial. The author used as primary sources, mainly, literature published between 1973 and 1987 and limited himself to only a few books. This is surprising because quite a lot has been written about the air war in the North, including and on the internet. Only one book by M.A. Zhirokhova “Assy over the tundra. Air war in the Arctic 1941-1944 " Moscow Publishing Center Centerpolygraph 2011 gives a fairly complete picture of the hostilities and tactics of the warring parties. Foreign sources suffer from overt bias, but it’s worth reading such books as I. Utilainen “I beat the Stalinist Falcons”, E. Luukkanen “I shot down an entire air regiment”, as well as a number of Soviet military memoirs: S. Kurzenkov “Under us is the land and the sea ”, V.F. Golubev“ For you, Leningrad ”,
    N.M. Lavrentyev et al. “Naval Aviation in the Great Patriotic War”,
    M.Zefirov “Ases of the Luftwaffe. Daytime fighters vol. 1-2 ", Z. A. Sorokin" Winged Guardsmen "M. Voenizdat, 1966, I. Orlenko “Winged torpedo bombers”, “We are Tallinn” and many others. A detailed list of books can be found on