Recently, in the open press, the topic of non-nuclear disarmament of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) has been actively discussed. The idea is this: the United States is simultaneously developing systems of rapid global strike (BSU) and missile defense, which form an integrated offensive-defensive potential. In the foreseeable future, it is possible that high-precision offensive weapons systems will be capable of delivering a disarming strike to the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation without the involvement of nuclear forces and assets, and the missiles (warheads) that survived after it will destroy anti-missiles.
In the first comments on BSU, it was prudent to note that the declared goals of protection against terrorists weapons mass destruction and malicious states of the “axis of evil” are only a temporary cover for the more promising targets of a non-nuclear global strike. Later, there were allegations of directing and declared by the leadership of the United States BSU on the implementation of a disarming and decapitating non-nuclear strike against the Russian Federation with references to the studies of foreign experts. It was stated about the need to immediately take the most urgent measures to parry the BSU.
Arguments for competent
The reasoning is as follows. The possibility of defeating typical SNF facilities with non-nuclear high-precision cruise missiles (KR) has been established - the US already has a significant number of such missiles and is building it up, hypersonic missiles are expected to emerge - there is a real threat to disarming the SNF with only non-nuclear high-precision systems. It is easy to see that in the given chain of facts and effects there is no crucial element for the conclusion - assessment of the capabilities of high-precision non-nuclear weapons to disable not single typical objects, but in general, the Strategic Nuclear Forces as a unique strategic system of a global nature, taking into account all essential features inherent in it properties and relationships.
“At a meeting at the Pentagon about the overrun of precision weapons, those present said that technological superiority loses its value if the enemy has minimal intelligence.”
Without such an analysis, the statement about the possibility of non-nuclear disarmament of the strategic nuclear forces is simply groundlessly postulated, and not justified. The supportive counterarguments of domestic specialists by supporters of such disarmament are ignored, hushed up, as if they do not exist.
In 2009, employees of the Federal State Institution “2 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia” analyzed in detail the factors limiting the possibility of using non-nuclear weapons in the Strategic Nuclear Forces in the pages of the Airspace Defense magazine. In 2013, other specialists of the same organization already turned the attention of the readers of the newspaper “Military-Industrial Courier” to an increase in the charge of the Kyrgyz Republic, the complication of the organization of a strike by non-nuclear weapons on the strategic nuclear forces and the difficulty of monitoring its results.
In the speeches of scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences and specialists of the National Research University of the Ministry of Defense of Russia it was noted that high-precision weapons in the future will increasingly affect the strategic balance and the BSU system will be able to threaten our strategic facilities. At the same time, the theoretical ability to disarm the SNF only on the basis of high-precision weapons, without the use of nuclear weapons by the aggressor, was categorically rejected for the following reasons:
- the damaging abilities of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons when striking highly protected point objects are incomparable, which leads to significant costumes of non-nuclear means;
- possible interference with the guidance systems of the Kyrgyz Republic will further increase the necessary outfits for the destruction of the SNF facilities and will require massaging of the emergency forces and their carriers in the groups of the aggressor;
- to plan such a strike at the same time on several hundreds of targets located on the vast territory of Russia is extremely difficult;
- follow-up monitoring of the results of non-nuclear strike strikes on the strategic nuclear forces is necessary;
- the operation on the use of the WTO against strategic nuclear forces would not have been packed in one strike and, consequently, in one day;
- It takes a long time to prepare such an operation and create an appropriate grouping. This training cannot be hidden and the other side will have time to transfer its nuclear forces and equipment, missile attack warning systems (MNS) and control them into increased combat readiness.
These postulates of opponents of the concept of non-nuclear disarmament are in the nature of qualitative conclusions of the strategic level. They are designed for those who are interested in an objective response and are competent enough to independently carry out very simple calculations and assess the persuasiveness of the arguments presented. The following are examples of similar calculations that have not previously been published. We realize that the newspaper is not the best place for calculations, but we believe that the need to specify at least some aspects of the topic is quite overdue, and we hope for the understanding of readers.
The settlement procedure provides an approximate assessment of the quantities of required orders of non-nuclear weapons to destroy the most representative SNF facilities, a subsequent assessment of the possibility of implementing calculated orders to destroy these facilities during the time determined by their combat readiness (the requirement of a short disarming strike) with a final assessment of the possibility of covert strikes.
The position areas (PR) of the stationary missile complexes (RK), where the main potential of the Strategic Missile Forces is located, are selected as the most representative objects of the SNF. According to the open press (MIC, No. 28, 2014, No. 6, 2015), it is conditionally assumed that by the year 2020, the stationary RC will have 180 intercontinental ballistic missiles (30 in Kozelsk, Dombarovsky, Uzhur and 90 in Tatischev) .
Back in 2009, Major General Vladimir Belous argued that in order to remove a stationary ICBM, it was necessary to ensure penetration of the armored roof of a silo launcher (silo) through the action of a powerful charge. Thus, the calculation of the polygon dressing at the silos is reduced to determining the number of missiles needed for a direct hit of at least one of them into the roof of a structure with a given probability with known accuracy of the spacecraft.
The diameter of the roof of the silo is six meters. CR indicators: accuracy (circular probable deviation, KVO) - 3, 5, 8, 10 meters, reliability (total probability of serviceability by the moment of impact on the roof) - 0,9, given probability of hitting the mine - no less than 0,95.
Reliability of the Kyrgyz Republic (0,9) is taken in view of the labor data “Military art in local wars and armed conflicts” (A. V. Usikov et al., “Voenizdat”, 2008). According to US independent experts, in the operation “Desert Fox” (1998 year, 415 launches of the Kyrgyz sea and air basing) to 20 percent of the Kyrgyz Republic did not reach their goals, and about 10 percent before the launch turned out to be technically faulty. Therefore, the adopted value underestimates the requirements for the KR along with in the interests of supporters of non-nuclear disarmament. The same can be said about the given probability of hitting a mine.
Currently, a significant portion of deployed SLCMs are represented by Tomahawks, which were put into service in 1993. They have a range of approximately 1800 kilometers and KVO 10 – 15 meters. Such CRs cannot be used for attacks on silos. To develop more advanced missiles and equip the US Navy in the required quantity requires considerable time. But being guided by the most difficult option, we will carry out further calculations for hypothetical SLCMs, whose QUO is three meters, and no interference is put to target systems of the spacecraft in a positional area.
90 silos in five minutes
How could the calculated outfits of non-nuclear cruise missiles be used to destroy stationary RK, taking into account the combat readiness of the complexes, that is, within the allowable time, before the launch of the ICBM? This question is key, since the process of defeating an ICBM by cruise missiles is fundamentally different from a ballistic defeat. If the latter can theoretically attack all silos in a positional area at the same time, then the CD is only sequential, in turn. During this time period, part of the ICBMs can start if their launches begin from the moment they strike the first silo silo. Determine the time of readiness of the ICBM.
1 December 2008, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov said that after receiving the approval of the Supreme Commander, the time to complete the task of launching missiles would not exceed two or three minutes. Major-General Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, RAS, who had previously dealt with nuclear planning issues in the Security Council of the Russian Federation, argued that in order to implement a reciprocal strike, the order to launch an ICBM should arrive about five minutes before the approach of the enemy’s military units. Let us take a large value for analysis (5 minutes) and forget for a while that during the specified interval, part of the ICBM can start for the reason indicated above.
Consider the attack of cruise missiles in the position region of Tatishchevo (90 silo). It is assumed that the defeat of the mines is carried out consistently in depth PR. For an effective attack, it is necessary that the boundaries of the area cross the 450 cruise missiles and hit all the 90 silos in five minutes. For clarity, a theoretical version of the formalized scheme of the position area and impact on it is proposed.
The silos are strictly orderly - nine ranks of 10 silos with intervals and 10 kilometers, the depth is 80 kilometers. When attacking from one direction and speed 800 kilometers per hour, the KR will fly this distance in six minutes. Therefore, for an attack of each silo with a full polygon outfit in no more than five minutes, the aggressor must form two phalanxes of the Kyrgyz Republic for 225 missiles simultaneously attacking the OL from opposite sides and having a depth of two minutes (27 km) each at a speed of RS equal to 800 kilometers per hour. Front phalanx - 90 kilometers. To verify this by simple calculations is not difficult. That is, the density of missile strikes from one direction should be 112,5 CU / min, and the total - 225 CU / min. If the time of the readiness of the ICBMs for launching is taken to be equal to three minutes, then all the CUs should line up in two lines of 225 missiles and simultaneously cross the boundaries of the PR.
To assess the possibility of implementing these requests to the short duration of the strike, we turn to the experience of military conflicts. In the operation “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia, 1999 KR (and not 90) was used in the first massed rocket and air strike (MRA) in 450. The depth of the KR echelon is 40 minutes (rather than two), the density of the raid on the entire front of the strike is 2,25 CR / min (and not 225). In the second MRAU, 133 KR was applied, the depth of the echelon is the same, the density of the raid is 3,32 KR / min. In 2003, in Iraq, the first air offensive operation took 500 cruise missiles, but in two days (and not in two minutes), in two MRAUs and with a significant number of selective strikes.
In our opinion, the fulfillment of the requirement to create two phalanges (not even a rank) of cruise missiles with calculated parameters, taking into account the experience of combat participation of the Kyrgyz Republic in the foreseeable period is extremely doubtful, even if there is a three-meter SLCM with the QUO, 0,9 reliability and in the absence of interference area. For ALCMs, among which there are samples with a QUO of three to five meters, the creation of such constructions seems even more unrealistic due to the movement of carriers. In addition, if we accept that the strike on the first silo is similar to the command for launching ICBMs, then part of the ICBMs during the strike will start as noted above. Otherwise, with the assumed probability of defeating the silo (0,95), the average number of undestructed ICBMs in the OL Tatishchevo OL will be 4,5 units. In a specific (and only) implementation of a disarming strike, the number of such missiles may be much larger.
The accuracy of the guidance of the CD, as any technical characteristic, is not strictly fixed, but is within certain limits, increasing the outfits of the CD relative to the nominal value. The cumulative use in PR of fumes (aerosols) against systems such as “Digismek”, electronic interference to Navstar navigation systems, altimeter CR expands this range, forcing the enemy to increase the outfits of the KR, without removing to an acceptable level the uncertainty fraught with catastrophic damage to the aggressor. It is known that in the 2003 year at a meeting at the Pentagon about the overrun of precision weapons, those present said that technological superiority loses its significance if the enemy has minimal ingenuity.
The answer is inevitable
Let us evaluate the possibility of a covert withdrawal by the enemy of the construction of the CU with the specified parameters on the boundaries of the PR Tatischevo. The approximate number of cells of the Mk-41 launchers on the Orly Burk destroyers is 90, on the Ticonderox cruisers 120. Assuming that about 70 percent of the cells were used for the CD (the rest are occupied by missile defense, air defense, anti-ship missiles), we get that the aggressor will need to enter seven destroyers or six cruisers into the Black Sea to deliver the 450 missiles. In terms of their composition, these groups are unthinkable for peacetime and, in our opinion, cannot be created secretly from all the existing intelligence systems of the Russian Federation in a threatened period.
Consequently, the forces of the Navy and Air Defense of the Russian Federation remain at the highest degree of readiness and cannot fail to detect a massive launch by the aggressor 450 KR. The distance from the Black Sea coast to the OL Tatishchevo is about 1000 kilometers or 75 minutes of a cruise missile flying at a speed of 800 kilometers per hour. All this time, the "parade" systems of the Kyrgyz Republic will be subjected to at least fighter attacks, which will increase the number of survivors of the strategic rocket launchers. Simultaneously, the fighters will be the reference points for the information system. The strategic and military-political leadership of the Russian Federation will be presented with a picture of the movement of a massive raid in the direction of the largest strategic position area in Russia. Therefore, long before the emergence of hypothetical phalanges (ranks) to the borders of the area, all ICBMs start from it (and even have time to hit US cities). Thus, the question of whether the ICBM launches will begin after the first strike at the silo is removed automatically. Taking into account the considered aspects of non-nuclear disarmament, the analysis of the features of the destruction of other objects of the strategic nuclear forces can be considered redundant. The composition of the SNF given in the article is conditional, but its possible downward change will not make fundamental changes in the possibilities of implementing both short-term and non-nuclear strike secrecy.
A nuclear response to a non-nuclear strike against the SNF should not be doubted, since it is enshrined in all Military Doctrines, beginning with the 1993 adopted in November.
The set of factors demonstrated and left beyond the framework of the analysis that act when a potential aggressor solves a problem that threatens the very existence of the United States makes it possible to assign the concept of non-nuclear disarmament of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces to a theoretical area that diffusely overlaps with the realm of science fiction, but not to ideas that are important for the practice of military construction .
The main threat to the strategic nuclear forces were and will remain nuclear weapons of an aerospace attack. Non-nuclear missiles can complement them and influence the strategic balance, destroying not silos, but, for example, elements of strategic airfields aviation, bases of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. They can also be used to destroy the Krona facilities at permanent deployment points of mobile missiles (assuming that some missiles can remain in these facilities when dispersed), mobile missiles at field positions, bridges, etc.
Thus, when solving the tasks of participation in strategic nuclear deterrence, the aerospace defense of the SNF must be created primarily to combat nuclear attack weapons.