This year, the Russian army celebrated the 30 anniversary of the combat service of mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) Topol. The path to the birth of this unique system was very difficult. I, as an employee of the Moscow Institute of Heating Engineering, know this in the smallest details, which I would like to share with the readers of NVO.
In 1975, work began on the Temp-2CM complex - the creation of a multiple-rocket launcher. A preliminary design was released and the necessary ground testing was carried out, after which the work was stopped. In the same year, work was carried out and in December an advance project was released on this complex.
HOW DETERMINED THE COMPOSITION OF THE UNITS
The employees of the head department of the Moscow Heat Engineering Institute, considering that the increase in the launch weight of the Temp-2M2 rocket inevitably led to the creation of a new launcher (7 or 8-core, which was also an issue to be determined during the development of the advance project), analyzed the possibility maintaining the required survivability of the division, which by this time already consists of 11 machines. Strange as it sounds now, the main question was the possibility of creating instead of highly specialized diesel-power machines, canteens and hostels and guard machines of one type of universal combat duty support machine attached to each of the combat vehicles of the complex. Convinced of the possibility of creating such a machine, providing the required autonomy for both power supply and the life of the personnel, the institute management approved the option of building a complex with spatial separation of a division of three batteries and a control panel of the division.
The next tough restriction adopted by us during the design was that the launcher would be completely autonomous in combat use as part of a two-engine starting battery (PU and MOBD). At the PU, it was proposed to locate an autonomous diesel unit, the fuel system of which was combined with the chassis running engine with a guaranteed daily supply of fuel for the diesel unit to operate after the march. The natural next step was to ensure the possibility of launching rockets from any point of the patrol route with the deployment of a navigation system on the launcher and assignment to the ground control system of tasks for the operational calculation of flight missions.
The next and, as life has shown, the main issue was the construction of management of autonomous MP At first, the way of creating for the remote control system the radio channels developed by Nikolay Pilyugin seemed to be seductive (based not only on technical, but also on “political” relations between the main designers). However, common sense prevailed, and for further development it was proposed to deploy at the APU the final link of the command and control system of the missile and missile forces weapons development of NPO "Impulse" (as the company was named after its transfer to the Ministry of General Engineering) Taras Sokolov. It should be noted that the ground control system did not remain “deaf”. In one of the cabins of AAP, the placement of the control panel SU, which provided the setting of operating modes and documentation devices, was provided. The deployment of VHF communications, radio control channel receivers and the combat control equipment itself at APU was envisaged in a single command post of combat control and communications, and the development of design documentation for which the production of prototypes was undertaken by Impulse.
Thus, the composition of the units of the Temp-2CM2 complex in the technical proposal, approved in December 1975, was proposed by the chief designers of MIT and NPOAP:
- PKP regiment as part of 6 machines (combat control vehicle, 2 communication vehicles, 3 combat duty support vehicles) against 9 vehicles as part of the Temp-2С and Pioneer complexes;
- PKP division as part of 4 machines (combat control vehicle and communication vehicle unified with one of the PKP regiment communication vehicles);
- Starting battery as part of 2 machines (autonomous PU and starting battery).
In the regiment 3 battalion on 3 starting battery in each. There are a total of 36 machines of 6 types in the regiment, 9 APU of them. For comparison: in the regiment of the complex "Pioneer-UTTH" - 42 type 10 machines, of which 9 PU. It was envisaged that the division could carry combat duty both in a dispersed form and jointly with the control panel and the starting batteries in the same position. It was possible to carry out the combat duty of any unit in the event of the refusal of one combat duty support machine. In the event of failure of one control panel of a battalion, control of its launchers assumed the control panel of the regiment. The number of inputs to the AAP for receiving orders increased from 1 to 6.
In this form, the technical proposal was submitted to the Rocket Forces, received its approval, and after the release of policy documents on the creation of the complex in 1977 in July, it was reflected in the tactical and technical requirements for the development of the complex.
In connection with the refinement in 1979, the direction of work on the complex as the modernization of the RT-2P missile complex was called RT-2PM ("Topol"). Customer index is 15P158.
Here it is necessary to note the following circumstance. Somewhere between 1975 and 1977 for years outside the framework of the creation of all missile systems by the Missile Forces and the Ministry of General Machinery, it was decided to create a new generation of automated command and control system (ASMU Signal-A for individual TTT and separate financing). When signing the TTT of the Ministry of Defense to the Temp-2SM complex by the main designers, the requirements for the combat control equipment were formulated as follows: “The equipment of the ASBU units of the missile complex must be developed taking into account the TTT on the ASBU and provide ...”. In the approved version of the TTT it was written: “The equipment of the ASBU of the missile complex should be developed according to the TTT on the ASBU and provide ...”
Who could have known that the periods of creation of the Topol missile system and the combat control equipment included in it, on the one hand, (and on the other hand, the same equipment was called the lower echelons 5Г, 5Д, 6Г and 7Г of the combat control system ” Signal-A ”) will not coincide so drastically.
At the initial stage of development, everything looked simple. MIT had no disagreements with the 25453-L military unit. The institute issued private technical assignments for the use of regimental and divisional units and the development of a command and control post for APU, coordinated with military missions at NPO Impulse. NPO "Impulse" agreed with the developers of machines of the complex (CB "Selena" and OKB-1 ON "Barricades") equipment placement issues. All this allowed the entire cooperation to conduct preliminary design.
Then the first bell rang. In the conclusion of the Missile Forces, it was stated that the presented materials were not coordinated by the chief designers and did not correspond to the TTT for the ASBU system. It turned out that the TTT on the ASBU laid temperature requirements for the equipment more stringent than in the requirements from the developers of the units. There were also discrepancies between the compositions of the NZU equipment embedded in the TTT on the system and those agreed with the developers of the units (RBU return channels). I can not explain in detail how a way out was found. He, in my opinion, illustrates the complete constructiveness of work at this stage of collaboration between the industry and the 25453-L military unit.
In the office of the Chief of the Seventh Directorate of Major General of the Communications Forces Igor Kovalev, interested representatives gathered at the working level, wrote one page of text for some 20 – 30 minutes (what is the discrepancy and what should be guided by further work), after which they dispersed. After 10 days, we received a document without any changes, with our signatures (without the signatures of our leadership), but entitled “Minutes of the meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Rocket Forces” and with his approving signature. The issue on the agenda was removed forever.
It was also easy to resolve the issue of the appearance and the provision of combat control equipment for the start of joint flight tests. It should be borne in mind that the first three launches of Topol mobile missiles, in accordance with their international obligations, were to be carried out from a converted coal-launch launcher, where all ground equipment was abnormal or was deployed abnormally. True, this restriction was valid only for the third quarter of 1981 of the year, and we were behind the deadlines of 1,5 of the year, but no one decided to change the decisions made. As a result, the first launch of Topol was carried out on 8 February 1983 of the year from the converted mine PU of the RT-2P missile using the corresponding equivalents of command and control equipment to the silo and temporary command point 53-NIIP MO (Plesetsk Cosmodrome). The following two rocket launches were conducted along the same lines.
However, by the end of 1983, it was necessary to move on to the fourth launch - the first launch from a mobile launcher, and there was no command and control equipment for either the AUP or the command posts. Needle for fiction is tricky - equivalents of combat control equipment of the combat control were transferred from the silo into the empty bunker of the mobile control unit 15У128, routine checks of the rocket at the technical and launch positions were set from the control panel, regularly deployed at the UTA, and the commands for launching the rocket - from the same equivalent placed in that temporary KP. The control panel of the division was not involved in the launch. So it was still 5 missile launches. Prototypes of the Zenit division control panel machine and the Granit regimental control panel with laid cables and empty racks of combat control equipment were tested at the Krasnodar Instrument Plant Systems, on issues that do not require the operation of the combat control system. The 15У128 launchers (with an empty bunker of combat control equipment) and MOXD 15В148 passed interdepartmental tests at the 53 NIIP MO. Acceptance tests of the chassis and missile transport tests were also conducted there.
THE PATIENCE OF THE MANAGEMENT VSE-SO
The development of the Signal-A equipment began on a new element base from scratch. In the experimental production of NPO Impulse there was practically no equipment needed for the manufacture of equipment. The capacity of the pilot plant was clearly not enough.
Under these conditions, the Ministry of General Machinery as a whole paid insufficient attention to this issue. The fifth commander-in-chief of the Ministry of General Labor, first of all the first deputy head of the central board, Evgeny Chugunov, did what they could, but no one could have cleared the gap, I would even say, jump over the chasm.
The serial production of the Signal-A equipment was entrusted to the Kharkov software "Monolith" (Instrument Engineering Plant named after T. Shevchenko), later the manufacture of regimental links of the system was transferred to the Kharkov software "Kommunar". For the manufacture of individual units, the Kiev Radio Factory and the Omsk Production Association Progress were also involved.
Considering the limited capabilities of Impulse Research and Production Association, Monolith Production Association was involved in the manufacture and prototypes of the equipment by the decisions of the Ministry. The efforts of the Ministry of General Machinery included the equipping of the production facilities of the serial plants and the experimental plant of the research and production association Impulse. In a fairly quick time, in spite of the fact that the notice of the change in the CD went from Leningrad to Kharkov, in my opinion, by wagons (I mean not only speed, but also their number), the NPO Impuls stand was equipped with prototypes of equipment. The military office of the Monolith PA became the face, not the back, of the situation.
However, despite all the measures taken, already at the beginning of 1984, it was extremely clear to all specialists that there could be no talk of a series of equipment, and therefore of the entire complex, in 1984. At MITE, some specialists conducted, without advertising, the elaboration of other possible schemes for constructing the Topol complex. NPO "Impulse", primarily in the face of the chief designer Vitaly Melnik, was preparing one after the other decisions on the "phasing ...". Moscow Institute them until May 1984, they meekly signed them, then they were considered and approved by the Missile Forces. After that, almost instantly, employees of the Moscow Institute of Heating Engineering presented the necessary extracts from the draft decisions of the MIC on the number and delivery time of the NZU equipment and ... everything needed for the implementation of the required directives. Naturally, I do not know what and how the leadership of the Seventh Administration reported to their superiors and what the leadership of GURVO reported to the top.
The Temp-2CM mobile missile system is ready for launch.
Photo site www.cdbtitan.ru
Photo site www.cdbtitan.ru
The patience of the management of the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute broke only when the next decision on “phasing”, providing for “division duty on wire lines only”, someone in the Rocket Forces without agreement with the MIT wrote that “duty is carried out only at point permanent dislocation ".
It should also be noted that, in accordance with the directive documents on the “Speed” complex, the serial production of which was planned to begin two years later, it was prescribed to standardize ground equipment not with the “Topol” complex, but through the “Pioneer” complex.
In the first decade of June 1984, after consulting with their ministers, Alexander Nadiradze and Nikolai Pilyugin sent a short letter (no more than 10 – 15 lines) to the USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, suggesting that they should start deploying the “ Topol "with the provision of duty on the scheme of the complex" Pioneer ".
It is well known what happened next: the “strengthening” of the leadership of the GURVO and the NGO Impulse, a review of the state of affairs regarding the development of the ASMA “Signal-A” at a meeting with the USSR Minister of Defense.
I recall only that according to this scheme, all 8 regiments (complex 15П158.1) of the program 1984 – 1985 were put on combat duty. According to the same scheme, missile launches (both test and control and serial) were carried out in 1985. For the NZU hardware of the Topol complex, a separate solution was used to introduce the refined stages of creation - the 7G and 6G links with an incomplete software version (the so-called 64К version) and the 6G link with the 5P link of the serial control panel of the Barrier-M regiment (the Pioner-UTTH link) ).
WAYS OF RETREAT NO.
The lag in the creation of the NZU of the Signal-A system and its failure to test this year also created a big uncertainty in the 1985 program of the year that continued in 1986. In this regard, I cannot help reminding the words of the new head of the GURVO, Alexander Ryazhskikh, quoted by him in his memoirs, that, having expressed in a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Vladimir Tolubko (therefore, this conversation took place in the first half of 1985), the entire program of the complex can be deployed in a wired manner, he received the answer of Vladimir Tolubko, that neither he nor anyone in the country can stop the deployment of the missiles.
But back to the 1986 program of the year. It should be noted that, at the insistence of the Missile Forces, new modifications of the chassis (7917 index) and launcher (15У168 index) were developed, allowing to improve the conditions for finding personnel on the PU, however, the timing of their introduction into mass production was not determined.
The developers of the complex had, of course, fears that if development of the PU 15Х168 modification was needed if the timing of the new chassis and Signal-A equipment mismatch, then it must be planned in a timely manner. And in the protocol of one of the working meetings at the Ministry of Defense, Alexander Ryazhskikh and Alexander Vinogradov made a working record that these elements should be implemented on the launcher simultaneously, starting with the first serial launcher of the 1986 program of the year. As a result, it turned out that there was simply no way back for industry and GURVO.
At the experimental stand of the NPO Impulse, the regimental equipment was finally assembled, and in parallel with the ongoing development, the first bench test of the joint tests was started. And here a new substantial consequence of the fact that the system hardware was created on the new element base was revealed. The failures of microcircuits (primarily the so-called electrolytic corrosion) were so widespread that it was only possible to dream of achieving any acceptable performance of the equipment.
Then, at the initiative of GURVO, it was decided that of the four serial regiments of the 1986 program, the first regiment was transferred "to test the combat and operational characteristics of the complex" and later transferred to the training center of the landfill.
Joint tests of the Topol complex were led by the State Commission on Testing of the Complex, chaired by the First Deputy Head of the GURVO General Lieutenant Anatoly Funtikova, and by the tests of the Signal-A system, including the system components that make up the complex, the chairmanship of the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Missile Forces, Lieutenant-General Igor Sergeev, and the subcommittees appointed by them. Even we, industrial workers, sometimes had a hard time. And if you add here a third party - the head of the GURVO?
Without describing in detail the period of putting the first launchers of the 1986 program of the year onto the Barrikada software, I will only say that all nine APU 15Х168 arrived at the Plesetsk test site in the first decade of August. Began the first inclusion - with negative results.
FIRST PLC IS BECOME TESTED
I will allow to put here a small analysis of the principles of building an experimental stand of NPO Impulse, and accordingly of the stands of serial plants in comparison, for example, with the complex control system stands in the NPO automatics and instrument-making and serial plants of control systems. The integrated control system stand is necessarily complemented by standard elements of the power supply system and other standard systems or equivalents of onboard and ground systems that are interfaced with the control system, developed and manufactured by enterprises that develop the corresponding systems. This allows it on the stand to work out, first of all, the pairing of adjacent systems with the control system, the compliance of the system pairing parameters with previously agreed protocols and, if necessary, clarify the pairing parameters with carrying out the necessary modifications before entering the field tests.
Experienced booth NPO "Impulse" did not meet these criteria. Elements of the power supply system were purchased randomly, radio equivalents, control systems and other systems were developed and manufactured by Impulse. This could lead (and sometimes resulted in view of a different understanding of the developers) to the incompatibility of the combat control equipment with the interface protocols coordinated with adjacent systems, and testing the interface issues of the automated control system with the adjacent systems began the testing ground after installing the equipment on regular places in the units of the complex.
According to the results of the tests, the road was opened for three subsequent regiments for work on putting them on combat duty, which was carried out practically at the specified time (the first regiment was in 1987 year, the next two were at the beginning of 1988 year). In January 1987, a joint decision was made on the order of work on the Topol complex in the current year and its appearance. It was planned to add the 5G link (and, accordingly, the Granit regiment PKP) to the NZU range, and to increase the NZU software level (96K version), which would fully implement all the requirements for maintaining combat duty in all combat readiness units of the Topol complex provided for by the Rocket Forces ". Again, it was planned to carry out bench testing of the equipment in the NPO Impuls with the transition to field testing as part of one division and the control panel of the regiment, and only then the full regimental composition of the complex. For the testing ground stage, the Defense Ministry allowed the use of the equipment of the first production regiment, but unlike the previous year, it was planned to send the regiment to the troops for combat duty.
Here I want to make a small digression about the specifics of work in 1987, in MIT and in the Seventh Administration. At the beginning of the year, changes took place in the structure of the integrated department of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering - a bush from three departments was formed on the basis of the combat command and control department (later a separate department was formed). The staff of the Seventh Directorate, still consisting of four departments (three OCD and one serial), had a large additional burden to monitor the implementation of electronic industry enterprises to improve the reliability of the element base, agreed after the meeting of the Head of GURVO and the Minister of Electronic Industry. For other divisions of MIT and GURVO, the topic “Complex Topol” as OCD ”was practically closed due to the implementation of all the tasks facing these structures.
The works on the stand of NPO Impulse according to 96K went with some lag. It should be noted that during the development of the equipment not only software was increased. Hardware improvements of a large number of blocks were also required and implemented.
All this jeopardized the entire 1987 work program of the year. This required clarification of the direction of work. In September, formally initiated by the Moscow Institute of Heating Engineering (and the gray cardinal was the head of the Seventh Directorate, Viktor Khalin), a decision was made to conduct the testing ground in full regimental team in November-December 1987.
SYSTEM DOES NOT ROLL
When all units of the complex were located in the field, two Topol missiles were launched, while the second launch was carried out with an imitation of the failure of the control panel of the division. The State Commission recommended the complex for adoption by the Soviet Army, however, it was necessary to implement approximately 80 comments and recommendations, about 30 of which were prior to the launch of combat duty. Later, the subcommittee for testing the ground NZU of the State Commission for Testing the Signal-A system supplemented the condition for adopting equipment for conducting additional tests of one division for reliability.
In the first decade of March, 1988, with the personal participation of Viktor Khalin, confirmed the effectiveness of the implementation of priority improvements, which allowed the launch of a full-scale transfer to the troops of all 1987 regiments of the year and work on their combat duty.
In September, 1987, the tests of NZU equipment in one regiment for reliability were successfully completed, which finally allowed to recommend the Topol complex for adoption by the Soviet Army. And it was carried out on December 1 1988 of the year with the release of the relevant decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
The implementation of the full version (version 256K) of the Signal-A system NZU equipment and their state tests as part of the machines of one experimental division were completed only in the 1991 year. This version was not launched in the Topol series, but created the necessary groundwork for the next generation of missile systems.
Another lyrical digression. The experience of creating the NZU of the Signal system practically, in my opinion, confirmed the “Pilyugin law”, which consists in the fact that one emergency start-up gives experience more than a dozen normal ones.
In addition, and this is my opinion shared by all my colleagues at MIT, the system can not be created. The system is something amorphous. In fact, equipment sets are created, each of which has its own design documentation, its own terms of creation, etc. Of course, they should be coordinated by common documents on the system, but an important factor is the link between the development of equipment and the development of objects to which this equipment enters, an understanding of the specifics of using these objects. In my opinion, this was well understood by the first chief designer of the ASBU Taras Sokolov (unlike some who replaced him in this post).
And one more consideration, which I cannot relate to all developers of equipment, but which undoubtedly applies to all developers of Signal-A equipment known to me. I do not know what influenced this (complexity, time, organization of work), but in the system of NPO Impuls, there was not one person for any equipment who knew the whole equipment thoroughly and comprehensively. For each analysis of the causes of failures or abnormal work, it was necessary to involve in each equipment at least three specialists who know their own “piece”. I am not writing this in this article by chance. The fact is that in these conditions, strangely complexed, military personnel of the military acceptance team, whose opinion meant a lot to both GURVO employees and industry workers, became real complexors. Of course, I can’t name them all, but some simply have to - Boris Kozlov, Anatoly Blazhis, Igor Ustinov, Vladimir Igumnov, Igor Shtogrin. I think that it is not by chance that Igor Ustinov and Vladimir Igumnov are currently heading the NGO Impulse after their resignation.