Where is the surface fleet going to?
The new shipbuilding program is very optimistic, but with state supportCurrent state of the naval fleet The overwhelming majority of experts in Russia is characterized as crisis, and first of all it concerns its ship structure. As you know, it has practically not been updated over the past 18 years. On June 23, 2010, Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky announced that within the framework of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, it was planned to build 15 surface ships and submarines that would be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. Thus, for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an update is planned for the entire naval association, and, according to reports from competent sources in the defense industry and the Ministry of Defense, similar processes should occur in other Russian fleets. However, what is the Russian Navy today? What are the prospects for the development of this type of our Armed Forces in the next two decades?
But let me start by noting: story modern Russian Navy is inextricably linked with the name of the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov. The warships available today in the Russian Federation, with all their advantages and disadvantages, were for the most part designed during the period when he served as commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy (a record long time - 1956-1985 years). They bear the imprint of this person’s views on the role of naval power in ensuring the national security of the country, and traces of contradictions that arose between the fleet, shipbuilding and military industries.
HAPPY HERITAGE
As for the assessment of the current state of the Russian surface navy, its small size for such a huge country, combined with its exceptional diversity, immediately catches the eye. The Russian Navy includes the following ships of the main classes: one aircraft carrier of Project 1143.5, one (not counting the sister ships moored at the pier) heavy nuclear missile Project 1144 cruiser, three Project 1164 missile cruisers with gas turbine power plants, eight Project 1155 large anti-submarine ships, one Project 1155.1 large anti-submarine ship (formally, it is a development of the previous project, but in fact it is a new ship), one Project 1134B large anti-submarine ship, eight Project 956 destroyers, the same number of patrol ships of five (!) projects - 61, 1135, 1154, 11661 and the newest 20380, more often classified as a corvette; in addition, a large number of landing ships, as well as ships and boats of other classes.
The listed ships of the 12 project are equipped with four different anti-ship (five, if we count the SCRC "Basalt" and "Vulcan" separately on the cruisers of the project 1164), two anti-submarine and five anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as other weapons. Moreover, each complex uses its own launcher (PU) and fire control system.
Against this background, the US naval forces, with which the Russian Navy traditionally compares, compare favorably with it, having only five types of surface ships of the main classes: two types of aircraft carriers, one type of cruisers, one - destroyers and one - frigates and other forces, as before, are not taken into account). These ships carry strategic cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine missiles of the same type, three types of anti-aircraft missiles and others. weapon. At the same time, most of the missile weapons use unified launchers, and the accuracy of the Ajis combat information and control system ensures the accuracy of the fire of destroyers and cruisers that form the basis of the US surface fleet.
The heterogeneity of the surface ships of the Russian Navy, which is also noted in the domestic underfloating (as mentioned in the article published in 24 "MIC" for 2010 a year), is caused by the peculiarities of relations between the Armed Forces and the USSR defense industry in the late Soviet era. During this period, our defense industry de facto imposed on ships designed and built by the Navy, and the customer’s opinion (of the fleet itself) was practically not taken into account or was taken into account only formally. One of the striking consequences of this state of affairs today is the presence of the 956 and 1155 projects in the Russian Navy at the same time. In spite of the fact that from the very beginning naval sailors insisted on the construction of destroyer class ships unified in terms of power engineering and main armament, it was decided to lay down two types of ships for various purposes with similar dimensions, but completely different weapons. Unification was achieved only on the 1155.1 project ("Admiral Chabanenko"), but due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, only one ship of this project entered service.
Already at that time, the danger of heterogeneity was understood, and at the end of the USSR, it was about releasing a limited number of projects on weapons and equipment for ships, which would drastically reduce the “diversity of species”, but this decision was delayed.
Correct "excesses and shortcomings" will now have to be in the implementation of the new shipbuilding program. What ships within its framework should the Russian Navy get?
CASE ABOUT DOMESTIC AIRWAYS
On the misadventures of ships of this class in the Russian Navy, you can write a detective story. Contrary to the fact that their necessity and usefulness were realized by domestic naval specialists as early as the 20 years of the last century, the first aircraft carrying ship entered the USSR Navy only in the 60-e (Moscow anti-submarine cruiser). The first aircraft carrier (AB) with vertical take-off aircraft on board is in the 70 (heavy aircraft carrying cruiser "Kiev"). And only in 1990, a ship appeared capable of receiving airplanes with the usual take-off and landing - “Tbilisi” (now “Admiral Kuznetsov”). He eventually became the last in his generation - his “Varyag” sistership and the “Ulyanovsk” created on the basis of them were never commissioned. However, the "Varyag", sold to China, can still serve under a different name and flag in the Navy of the Middle Kingdom.
Why did the Soviet leadership for so long refused to build aircraft carriers? This was due to many reasons, but in the late Soviet era it was mainly categorical rejection of "floating airfields" as a means of warfare by a number of top state figures of our country. As a result, the ships of this class had to punch the way to the stocks with a fight.
In 90-s about the construction of aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation there was nothing to think about. In 2000, when the country recovered a bit from the shocks that occurred with it, the question arose again. At present, the possibility of creating such ships directly depends on what the state armaments program will look like. With favorable developments, the first aircraft carrier of the new construction can be laid in the next five years, with unfavorable - the domestic fleet will have to be content with the presence of a single “floating airfield” - “Kuznetsova”, which is planned to be overhauled in the coming years for overhaul with modernization .
If we talk about how a new Russian aircraft carrier may look, here, according to experts, the most realistic prototype is the modern Anglo-French project CVF / PA2, whose characteristics most closely approximate the requirements voiced by the leadership of the Russian Navy: 60 thousand tons, 50-60 aircraft. The likelihood of accepting this project as a basis is also enhanced by the interest of the command of our Navy to cooperate with French ships, which is not hidden in recent years.
WHERE DOES MISTRAL FELL?
The problem of the development of the landing forces of the Russian Navy has recently attracted the close attention of experts. This is due mainly to the discussed prospect of building for the Navy of Russia four Mistral-type amphibious assault ships.
UDC "Mistral", created according to the project BPC 160, is a modern ship of the so-called projection of force, designed primarily for use in local conflicts. He is able to provide a long-term presence of the Marine Corps with aviation support at a remote theater of operations and the landing of marines, including on an unequipped coast, with the help of landing boats and helicopters. The Mistral can also serve as the command and control ship (headquarters ship) of the compound that solves peacekeeping tasks, as well as convincingly “show the flag” in the conflict area. In addition, it is possible to use it as a base and a floating hospital in emergency situations.
Does Russia need such a ship, especially now? Opinions are divided. A number of experts believe that a more urgent task is the massive construction of corvette-frigate class ships, in the future - a destroyer, to replace the rapidly aging guard ships (TFR), destroyers and BOD of Soviet construction.
However, there are other judgments: for example, the military expert, director of the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Ruslan Pukhov, believes that acquiring such a ship simultaneously with ships of the corvette-frigate class is justified taking into account Russia's future needs, which in the coming 20-30 will need sustainable presence of its fleet in the near sea zone, and in the oceans.
One of the key regions in this respect is the Far East, primarily the Kuril ridge. This area is strategically important for our country, however, it practically does not have a developed military and civilian infrastructure.
In such conditions, the UDC is regarded as a mobile element of the military infrastructure, which allows it to quickly deploy the necessary forces in the disputed zone and ensure their functioning. In general, such ships can contribute to the military presence in other strategically important regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, the waters of the Antarctic and other areas of the oceans, where local conflicts are possible, potentially affecting the interests of Russia.
The acquisition of the French UDC and its reproduction in domestic shipyards in addition to the military has industrial value. This contract should provide Russian shipbuilders with the opportunity to become acquainted with Western achievements in the field of technology and production organization, ensure the modernization of shipbuilding facilities involved in the manufacture of ships of this class. Today it is reported that the construction of the UDC is planned to entrust the "Admiralty Shipyards" in St. Petersburg.
However, the Mistral also has its drawbacks. Like many other warships of the modern Navy, it was created in order to reduce the cost of the project "using commercial technologies", that is, with significantly lower survivability requirements compared to combat ships. The armament of the Mistral is limited to two launchers for launching short-range anti-aircraft missiles, two 30-mm artillery mounts Defense and four heavy machine guns, requiring a strong escort.
The internal layout of the ship is determined by the very high requirements for comfort for the crew and paratroopers (450 people), the number of marines on board and useful areas of hangars and cargo decks were sacrificed. And this limits the number of military equipment and helicopters.
The key issue at the moment is the amount of changes that can be made to the structure of the building at the insistence of the Russian Navy. It is known that ships should receive ice reinforcement, which will allow them to operate in the northern latitudes characteristic of Russia. Should also increase the height of the hangar deck - to accommodate domestic helicopters, higher than the French.
The Mistral, however, will not be the only landing craft. In addition to him, the Russian Navy should receive in the coming 10 years at least 3-4 BDK project 1177.1. The headquarters, Ivan Gren, is expected to join the fleet in 2012.
THE FATE OF KRAISERS
New cruisers for the Russian Navy will not be built in the foreseeable future, however, apparently, for other fleets too. In fact, squadron destroyers, which in the course of their development reached the size and firepower of cruisers, took over the functions of this class of ships. At the same time, the remaining in the fleet cruisers can serve for a long time. This also applies to the Russian ships of the projects 1144 and 1164. Their fate directly depends on whether it is expedient to consider a deep modernization of these ships, which will allow them to remain in the 20-30 formation for years.
Initially, such work will take place on the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which is under repair in Severodvinsk. According to the available information, it is planned to equip it with the newest universal ship shooting complexes (UBCS), which will allow the use of various weapons, combining missiles of various types depending on the specific mission of the ship. The cruiser’s electronic equipment will also be improved. Under favorable conditions, the remaining ships of the project must undergo such modernization.
The fate of the 1164 project can be determined by the fate of the last built ship of this type - the Admiral Lobov ("Ukraine") missile cruiser, which has been standing at the wall of the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev, Ukraine for almost 20 years. The negotiations that have resumed at the moment for acquiring it for the Russian Navy and a radical modernization allow us to hope that in case of their successful outcome and putting the ship into operation, the remaining three cruisers will also be upgraded.
The Future of the Future
The new ships of this class are to replace both the destroyers themselves and the large anti-submarine ships in the Russian Navy. Information about the prospective destroyers for the Russian fleet is still rather scarce: it is known that the industry is completing the development of a ship design that should have a displacement of about 10 thousand tons, armament that includes a UKSK, artillery calibers of 130-152 mm, anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems of close combat, two helicopters, etc. The development of the project should be completed by 2012-2013, then, apparently, we should expect the laying of the lead ship. Taking into account current prices, it can be considered a success if it is possible to build 20-10 similar ships without foreign aid within the next 12 years, each of which in its capabilities will correspond to approximately 2-3 destroyers of Project 956. The overwhelming majority of large anti-submarine ships and destroyers currently in service in the fleet will be out of order during this time.
FRIGATE AND CORVETA: HEIRS OF THE WARPAINE
More is known about frigates. At a minimum, they will be two projects. Such a departure from the declared striving for unification is due to the fact that the newest 22350 project is being mastered by the industry rather difficultly and one does not have to wait for the early release of the required number of ships. Currently, as is known, two frigates of the new project are being built. The head - “Admiral Gorshkov” should be commissioned in 2011, the second - “Admiral Kasaton” - in 2013-2014. As a result, for the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet and, apparently, for other fleets, ships of the already developed 11356 project, which is being successfully built for the Indian Navy, will also be erected. They will be maximally unified with the frigates of the new project on electronic equipment and armaments: they will all have the UBCS and the latest fire control systems, which provide them with the capabilities of the western Aegis-class ships. It is assumed that over the next 20 years the fleet will receive the 20-24 frigate, approximately equally divided in both projects.
New frigates will replace obsolete watchdogs. The change of classification from the standard Soviet TFR to the western “frigate” is due to the increased multifunctionality of these ships. Traditionally, the Soviet TFR were primarily patrol ships with rather limited capabilities to counter surface ships and enemy aircraft. Frigates armed with medium-range air defense systems and anti-ship missiles have much greater capabilities, and their ability to withstand the submarine threat is greatly enhanced due to the presence of helicopters, which most of the Soviet TFRs with the exception of the latter did not have.
With increasing capabilities, the range of tasks of these ships also expands: they will be able to accompany large fleet combat units (aircraft carriers, cruisers), providing their escort, support the landing of troops, patrol territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, carry out independent tasks, for example, to combat piracy, patrolling in conflict zones, etc.
Similar tasks with smaller dimensions and reduced composition of weapons will perform corvettes. The head corvette of the new project 20380 "Steregushchy" joined the fleet in the 2007 year and is being tested. At the beginning of 2010, the second ship of the project, the “Smart”, was launched. Its commissioning is expected next year. In 2012-2013, three more ships of this project will join the Navy.
In addition, it is planned to continue the construction of ships of the project 20380. Starting from the next year, the next series of corvettes are expected to be laid, somewhat improved compared to the previous ones according to the results of tests of the lead ship. The 20380 Corvettes are also multifunctional warships with very wide capabilities. Starting from the second ship of the project (“Savvy”), they are equipped with UCSS, which, in combination with other fire weapons, provides high firepower and the ability to combine weapons, depending on the specific task.
SUBTOTAL
The replenishment of the surface fleet of the Russian Navy outlined above does not take into account the multitude of other necessary combat and auxiliary units, the description of which is simply impossible within the framework of a newspaper article. At the same time, all the mentioned ships should form the backbone, the basis of the surface fleet, its main forces ensuring the fulfillment of 90% of its missions. The indicated number of ships is quite impressive, however, it is not excessive and, if there is political will and monetary investment, it can be built on existing Russian shipyards.
At the same time, the formation of the Navy should be one of the first places among the military priorities of the state: the growing power of modern fleets and their ability to act against the coast require an adequate tool capable of countering the threat from the sea.
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