During the military-technical forum “Army-2015”, an extremely interesting and useful “round table” “Sea Underwater Weapon (MPO): Realities and Prospects” was held. About this event, the newspaper "Military Industrial Complex" has already written ("With the nodes themselves"), but it is necessary to clarify a number of fundamental issues. The author of the article actively participated in the discussion of the reports and was designated in this article as a reserve officer.
It is categorically impossible to agree with the thesis of some representatives of the Navy that "the concept of the development of sea underwater weapons (MPO), approved by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2012, lit the green light for the development of new weapons and modernization of existing weapons and military equipment". The author was directly involved in the events related to MPO and the development of the concept of MPO, since he has been actively working on this topic since 2007. The starting point was the concept of modernizing the third-generation nuclear submarines and their armaments, developed in 2006, which was established by order and sent to a number of organizations (VA GSH, Operational Control and Central Directorate of the Navy, Naval Armed Forces, defense industry organizations). For some of the most important points, 2006’s offers are significantly superior to those that are now being implemented under a similar program.
Half a century behind
Taking into account the critical situation with the IGO Navy, Admiral Suchkov, in 2007, an official note was sent to the RF Minister of Defense. The minister said: give a concept (business plan), we will solve the issue of financing for it. However, the development and approval of the MPO concept was disrupted, primarily due to the fault of the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons (OLA) of the Navy. There, in particular, relied on the project "Physicist".
The Fizik-1 torpedo passed state tests in 2007, but the deployment of its serial production was disrupted. Some experts said the Physics was obsolete, its mass production was not practical, and most importantly, its readiness to develop an entirely new modular series of torpedoes with record-breaking characteristics - the Lomonos Development Center. It was also stated that there was all the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for this. This promise was one of the reasons for the almost complete cessation of promising research on IGOs. And why, if the leading organization declares that everything is already there and in a few years it’s supposed to be already on navy?
But Lomonos turned out to be a bluff, to which the officers of the Navy, who retained the honor and conscience, despite considerable administrative pressure, put up tough resistance. In particular, it was succeeded to punch a series practically crushed by intrigues "Physicist-1".
It is necessary to emphasize the obvious artificiality of the torpedo crisis of the Navy. We had developments at a quite decent level, lagged behind in a number of areas, exceeded foreign competitors in a number of others. In the scientific developments until the end of 2000, we were on a par with the West. However, according to the results of the ROC, and most importantly - the level of sea underwater weapons in the ammunition of the fleet, the gap was catastrophic - fifty years. There was no such lag in any type of military equipment.
Recently, the problem of a torpedo crisis has reached the highest level, a number of decisions have been made in the defense industry complex, giving hope for a remedial situation. However, there are too many questions to the military - the Navy and some central structures of the MoD.
The extent of our lag in MPO is tough to raise the question of the objective discovery of causes. Without this, it is impossible to move on. And even more so it is impossible to repeat previously made mistakes.
Developed in 2013, the concept of the Navy's IGO is a document that cannot be used today. The reason is, first of all, that this concept did not reflect the real tasks of the Navy's IGOs and their solutions, but the institutional interests of certain organizations that they were able to carry out in it. Therefore, it was cut off from the real possibilities and problems of the Navy and military-industrial complex.
At the same time, the MPO is the most critical direction of military equipment, which is crucial for ensuring the country's defense and strategic deterrence. The basis of the latter is not the range of the flight and the number of SLBM warheads, but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, the basis of which is the combat strength of the NSNF (for which the MPO is required).
Today, the country and the fleet need an honest and reasonable integrated target program “Marine Underwater Weapon” to overcome the acute crisis of IGOs. Otherwise, the construction of the Russian Navy in its current form does not make sense.
One of the main problems of our MPO is the issue of effective salvo distances, more precisely, their ratios between us and our competitors.
Even at the end of the 48-s of the last century, the effective distances of the Mk80 volley of the MpXNUMX torpedoes were about three times the counter-detection distance of our submarine. In fact, the enemy had the opportunity to virtually with impunity shoot our submarines from distances where our torpedoes turned out to be obviously ineffective. This situation is actually preserved today.
For this reason, an important role in the ammunition of our submarines played PLR, the possibility of which our potential opponent knew and feared.
Problems with the detection of low-noise submarines at large distances lead some of our experts to conclude that the torpedo is a melee weapon. The implementation of such a conclusion in practice will mean for the enemy the possibility of unpunished execution of our submarines in battle. To solve this problem, we need both the PCR and long-range remote-controlled torpedoes with the approach to the submarine torpedoes as a high-precision complex that provides covert defeat of targets from long distances. Long range shooting definitely requires telecontrol, but most naval torpedoes have not and never have. In those products where there is a telecontrol, it is frozen at the level of 60's.
Against the background of extremely low characteristics of existing domestic telecontrol systems, voices are heard that we do not need it at all. At the same time, the foreign experience of TU is completely ignored. For example, the remote control of the 211ТТ1 torpedo created more than ten years ago (in common parlance - “Chinese physicist”) is twice as important as what we have today in our UGST.
For effective shooting at long distances, you need a combination of high speed, long range and high stealth of its movement. In terms of ensuring high speed, the only opportunity for us today is thermal energy power plants. In the West, new electric ESAs have surpassed thermal, but we do not have the necessary batteries, but there is a complete lack of R & D in this area. In fact, today the technical level of the batteries used by the Navy corresponds to Western 50 – 60-s (water-activated open-cycle battery, the design of which we borrowed from the American Mk44 torpedo of the end of the 50-s). Batteries torpedoes - one of the most critical issues of domestic torpedo building, and without the appropriate state funding and the formulation of the problem, this problem will not be solved.
At the same time, the emerging opportunities for effective modernization of the USET-80 torpedoes (with the installation of the VDPM engine) make it possible to bring this torpedo to the level of modern requirements with the advent of new batteries.
Some drawbacks of thermal ESAs suggest that the future of 530 caliber millimeters and more is for electric ESAs; however, for torpedoes of 324 millimeter caliber, thermal ESAs have an unequivocal priority due to their ability to deliver more power. It should be noted: in the near future for carriers of the fifth generation, we may find ourselves in a situation where it is necessary to switch to an increased caliber of torpedoes. The key issue here is the real modern requirements for stealth submarine torpedoes, the fulfillment of which on torpedoes of a millimeter 530 caliber may be unlikely.
It makes sense to briefly examine certain aspects of a large torpedo problem.
At one time, the Russian Navy had an absolute priority in the use and development of anti-torpedoes, up to the world's first excellent results in targeting anti-torpedoes on torpedoes at the Theodosia test site in 1998.
However, for a number of reasons, the progress of R & D on the creation of active PTZ facilities has slowed dramatically. In fact, today we are doing what could and should have appeared on the submarine and NC Navy ten years ago. Along with the progress achieved, the problems are clear, there is an understanding of which way to go.
High-speed underwater missiles
The main conceptual flaw in the development of high-speed underwater missiles (SPM) is that since the beginning of the 80-s of the last century the effective distances from the volley torpedoes of the enemy have significantly exceeded the effective distances of the ABM. In addition, under the conditions of “clean water”, the SPR in terms of the delivery time of the warhead to the target completely loses to modern PLUR. At the same time, the most interesting and promising direction for the development of supercavitation ammunition, a small-caliber one, in which the West has been operating successfully, has remained undervalued for a long time. From the positive in the reports of the “round table” of “Army-15”, it should be noted that the promise of the “small-caliber direction” of the SPR is recognized by leading domestic experts.
320 caliber torpedoes mm
During the "round table" on this topic a lively discussion unfolded. G. Tikhonov, the representative of KMPO Gidropribor OJSC, announced the proposal on the implementation of the “short development work” for development aviation torpedoes based on the MGT-1 small-sized torpedo (product 294), the warhead of a broadband mine complex. It is categorically impossible to agree with this proposal, since the new small-sized torpedo of the Package complex has higher performance characteristics and it is advisable to consider it as a single base model of a small-sized torpedo of the Navy with support for use from ships, submarines, aircraft, and as a combat part of PLUR. At the same time, it is necessary to introduce a telecontrol and an anti-torpedo mode (originally incorporated into it by power reserve) on a modernized version of this torpedo.
As for the small-sized torpedoes MGT-1 (the domestic version of the American torpedoes Mk46), on the one hand, we should thank the management of Dagdiesel, who managed to keep the technology and production line in a very difficult situation, and on the other, MGT-1 should be fighting part of the broadband mine complexes (with simplified SSN). The opinion of a number of specialists about the need to use basic miniature torpedoes in mine complexes cannot be categorically agreed. And it is not only that such a decision significantly increases the cost of a mine, thus calling into question the expediency of its creation, but the main thing is that setting up a modern torpedo as part of a modern mine is a direct prerequisite for disclosing state secrets. In 1968, the US Navy successfully stole two newest PM-2 mines from near Vladivostok. Since then, the underwater technology has gone far in its development, and taking into account this factor, the combat unit of the exposed mine must be a “simplified torpedo”, which has a moderate cost and does not contain specially protected information.
Ultra Small Torpedoes
One cannot agree with the opinion of the representatives of the 1 Central Research Institute on the base sample of the 124 caliber of a millimeter. As a result of the development of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" of the start of the 2000-x of such a product, not only low TTX, but also a very high cost. Many experts reasonably raise the question of the optimal caliber 210 – 220 of millimeters, which sharply increases the performance characteristics of ultra-small products for various purposes, provides telecontrol and simplifies their development, testing and development in the fleet with the necessary shooting statistics.
Shoot more, shoot more often
Difficult environmental conditions of use require large statistics of torpedo firing in conditions close to real combat conditions — with massive use of firefighters, in the Arctic and at extreme distances.
For example, by adopting the Mk2006 mod.48 torpedo in 7 (about the same time as the Fizika-1 state tests), the US Navy for 2011 – 2012 had time to fire more than 300 torpedo shots Mk48 mod.7 Spiral XNNX -th modification of the software 4-th model of the torpedo). That's not counting the many hundreds of shots of the previous Mk4 samples from the latest model modifications (mod.7 Spiral 48-7).
Total for the period of testing the torpedo StingRay mod.1 150 firing was carried out. However, here it is necessary to take into account that when developing the first modification of StingRay (mod.0) about 500 tests were conducted. To reduce this number of firing for mod.1, the system for collecting and recording data of all firing and implementing a “dry landfill” on its base allowed us to pre-test new CCH solutions based on the available statistical results.
A separate issue is the testing of torpedo weapons in the Arctic.
The US and British navies conduct them on a regular basis during the ICEX's periodic exercises with the execution of mass torpedo shots.
For example, during the ICEX 2003, the Connecticut PLA released it within two weeks, and the ICEX 2003 station personnel removed the ADSAR torpedoes from under the 18 ice.
In a series of tests, Connecticut PLA attacked a target simulator provided by the US Navy Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) with torpedoes, but in most cases the ship, using the telecontrol capabilities, used itself as a target for its own torpedoes.
Economic indicators of the operation of torpedoes are a very important requirement and directly affect the quality of fine-tuning and development of torpedoes in the fleet and, accordingly, the possibility of disclosing the full performance characteristics laid down in the design. The foundation of mass torpedo firing is the low cost of the shot and the participation of the fleet in the operation of torpedoes.
It remains to be regretted that for the time being we are not in a position to conduct tests of our own torpedoes on a scale like our western competitors.
1. Considering our half a century lag in torpedo batteries, the only option for torpedo submarines with high performance characteristics is the use and development of Physics. It is necessary to open full-fledged R & D on the deep modernization of this torpedo.
2. Taking into account the prospects of the electric direction, it is necessary to complete the Ihtiosaur development work on the development of a new electric torpedo. The results of the “competing OCD” (leading organization) will be possible to speak only after conducting objective tests.
3. The key "torpedo event" in the defense industry should be KNIER "SNG-GPA" - "Investigation of the state and ways of development of promising CLS and PTZ tools with conducting complex tests in natural conditions" - with the aim of revealing the real situation and creating the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for the main the issue of torpedo weapons and PTZ.
4. A deep modernization of the “Package” complex is required in accordance with the proposals prepared for the military industrial complex in April 2013.
5. Anti-torpedoes play an exceptional role in the PTZ, it is necessary to mass their introduction on ships with the transition to promising complexes with a multiple increase in efficiency from the “Package-E / NK” level.
6. According to the results of KNIER "SSN-GPD" it is necessary to open the ROC on a promising SGPD, really providing a solution to the problem of PTZ against the latest enemy torpedoes.