Soviet anti-submarine defense during the war

Soviet anti-submarine defense during the war

During the Great Patriotic War against our Naval fleet and transport ships, there were more than 150 enemy submarines, of which more than 100 were German in the North, 37 (32 German and 5 Finnish) in the Baltic, 15 (6 German, 6 Italian, 3 Romanian) in the Black Sea. The fight against them was one of the most important tasks of our fleets.

The first thing at the beginning of the war was to create a reliable anti-submarine defense. In accordance with the then existing views, the operational zones of operations of the fleets were divided into areas of naval bases, in which anti-submarine defense was carried by special formations - the protection of water areas (OVR). Outside the bases, enemy ship submarines were to be engaged in combat operations during the execution of operational tasks. The safety of navigation ships provided by the system of convoys.

In the Soviet fleet anti-submarine ships of special construction were small hunters for submarines of the type MO-4. Their displacement did not exceed 56-60 t, while they possessed quite good seaworthiness, high speed (27 nodes), had the necessary armament. Toward the end of the war, new-type anti-submarine ships appeared in the fleets — large submarine-hunters BO-1. Used for anti-submarine warfare and part of the ships mobilized from civilian agencies, and equipped accordingly.

In antisubmarine warfare, an important place was given to the formulation of barriers. In the first months of the war, the Soviet fleets set up anti-submarine mines and network barriers in the bays and on the roads in order to prevent enemy submarines from penetrating there. A system for monitoring submarines was organized: coastal posts, ship patrols, search aircraft, ships and ships during sea crossings.

Thus, by the autumn of 1941, a systemic anti-submarine defense was created in all our fleets. Over the 100 ships and boats, seaplanes and, in addition, various barriers were used to actively combat the enemy submarines.

Thus, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) fleet organized the installation of a special anti-submarine mine barrier at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. At the exit fairways from the Finnish skerries, 10 mine cans were created. In addition, small hunters and torpedo boats delivered 387 mines and 89 mine defenders in the fairways at the exits from Helsinki, Porvo, Borgo, and mine torpedo aviation - 107 bottom mines in the depth of the skerries.

The minefields hampered the actions of German and Finnish submarines, but could not completely eliminate the threat. Therefore, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet embarked on setting up anti-submarine nets and booms for fencing the Luga Bay, where it was planned to organize a maneuverable fleet base. In early August, the Tallinn raid was fenced with nets. Later on, networks were installed in separate communication sections of Tallinn - Kronstadt. They created a “fence”, as it were, covering our maritime posts from the north. In total, 1941 was able to deliver network barriers with a total length of about 38 miles and more than 8 boom miles.

Anti-submarine defense in the Gulf of Finland was complex: position barriers, as well as an active search for submarines with warships and aircraft. In order to reach our communications, Finnish submarines had to pass through the area of ​​mine cans, the observation zone of the observation and communication service posts and the search aircraft. In the southern part of the bay, where the fairways passed, they were to force network barriers, bypass patrol ships and overcome the convoys. Enemy submarines in most cases could not pass through all these obstacles and returned to the skerries without firing a single torpedo.

The battle of the KBF with submarines in 1941 included the defense of base areas, the protection of transports and large warships at the transition, and the active search for submarines at sea. The lack of special anti-submarine forces was partially compensated by various auxiliary ships and aircraft. The use of diverse forces and various methods of struggle fully paid off. In 1941, 740 transports and 1170 warships and boats that delivered 190 thousand people, 8 thousand horses, 670 guns, and 63 passed through sea lanes in convoys without loss. tank, about 8 thousand vehicles, about 29 thousand tons of ammunition and more than 1000 tons of fuel, food and other cargo.

Our submarines were involved in antisubmarine warfare in the course of their combat missions. For example, 10 August U-307, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander N.I. Petrova, returning to the base and emerging under the periscope on Dago Island, found the enemy U-144 submarine on the surface and sank it.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, in none of the maritime theaters, enemy submarines practically did not create a significant obstacle to the movement of convoys. In fairness, it is worth noting that during this period we were opposed by a small number of enemy submarine forces. In the Barents Sea in 1941, 3 operated, and then 6 submarines, in the Baltic Sea - 8 German and 5 Finnish, on the Black Sea - only one Romanian boat "Dolphinul". At the same time, the effectiveness of the anti-submarine forces at that time was still low, due to the low degree of their equipment with technical means and the lack of combat experience.

However, already in 1942, the Nazis in the north of Norway concentrated the main large surface ships, a flotilla of submarines (over 20 units) and the 5 air fleet. They were assigned the task of isolating the USSR, interrupting external sea communications.

On the Baltic Sea, the enemy’s goal was to achieve the free navigation of its vessels by completely blocking our fleet in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. To do this, he used his submarines first to the west of the minefield line in the Gogland antisubmarine position system, and then - in the direct guard of the convoys and, finally, most successfully - to independently search for Soviet submarines in places where they were charging batteries. All these tasks performed 10-11 enemy submarines.

On the Black Sea, the main task of the enemy fleets was to take over the supply of ground forces and aviation. And besides, they had to impede the actions of the Soviet fleet and shipping. To this end, in the spring of 1942, the 11-I fleet of Italian submarines was sent to the Black Sea. These were small submarines of the SV type. the submerged displacement of which was 45 t. They had two 450-mm torpedoes, the speed of the 7,5 node in the surface position and the 6,5 node in the underwater position. The crew consisted of five people. The small radius of action (90 miles) limited their use. They needed bases located close to the sea. In May, 6 of such boats were delivered to the Crimea and, based on Yalta, participated in the blockade of Sevastopol.

From June 1941 to May 1944 The Nazis sent 89 submarines to Northern Norway (1941 in the year - 13, 1942 - 33, 1943 - 20 and in the first half of the year 1944 - 23). They operated in the waters of Iceland to the island of Dikson and Vilkitsky Strait. From June 1944 to May 1945, 129 submarines arrived in the ports of Norway, of which more than 30 operated in the Arctic.

Thus, in 1942, 38 enemy submarines were already operating against the Soviet Navy. During this period, the Northern Fleet led the most active fight against enemy submarines. And indeed, in the north against the convoys marching into the Soviet Union with military supplies, and in the opposite direction with raw materials, the Germans began to conduct operations in March 1942, which involved aviation, submarines and surface ships. Each operation involved simultaneously 7 to 23 boats.

This required the rapid development of anti-submarine forces and equipment in the Northern Fleet. Before the arrival of the convoy, patrols intensified, control searches of submarines were made on the approaches to the Kola Peninsula, fairways were trod. Aviation bombed German airfields and bases. When the convoy arrived in the zone of the Northern Fleet, destroyers and patrol ships were included in the security of the transports.

Here is one example of the struggle of surface ships with enemy submarines. The destroyer “Grupyaschyy” 30 March 1942, provided security escort PQ-13. In 19 h 15 min between the waves, the cutting of a submarine, which attacked the nearest transport, was noticed. The destroyer immediately rushed to her, dropping 9 large and 8 small depth charges. The attack was frustrated, and the enemy submarine was sunk.

The definite success of the antisubmarine defense is due to the use of all the forces of the Northern Fleet to guard the convoys and displace submarines from certain areas. Carrying out the attacks, the North Seamen dropped a large number of depth charges (from 12 to several dozen), which blocked possible errors in determining the location of the submarine and increased the likelihood of its destruction. However, the discovered boats were still not subjected to prolonged prosecution, since the fleet did not have the necessary anti-submarine forces for this.

In 1943, the task of fighting enemy submarines rose seriously for the Black Sea Fleet, in connection with the deployment of German submarines to the 6 area. German submariners managed to counteract our shipments. So, 31 March 1943, they damaged the torpedo tanker "Kremlin", which, without losing buoyancy, reached Batumi under its own power. July 15 submarine U-24 sank the minesweeper "Defender". Then came the attacks on the motobots and other small objects. In addition, submarines bombarded the train between Tuapse and Sochi. All this required the adoption of urgent measures to strengthen the defense. Anti-submarine forces were increased by transporting boats from the Caspian Sea, Ladoga and the White Sea, as well as the number of reconnaissance aircraft. At the ports and bases were put mine and bonsetovye obstacles.

The measures taken reduced the loss of our ships, and in 1944, the anti-submarine warfare in the Black Sea Fleet took on an offensive character. So, in the summer of 1944, on the approach to Constance and at the mouth of the Danube, aircraft delivered mines. In the middle part of the Black Sea in the path of submarines aircraft conducted a systematic search. In the ports of the Caucasus, and then of the Crimea, search and strike groups of anti-submarine boats were deployed, which pursued every discovered submarine. As a result, losses from submarine strikes did not exceed 2%. total number of vessels passed through communications.

At the beginning of the Yassy-Kishinev operation, the Black Sea Fleet aviation bombed enemy ships in the ports of Constanцаa and Sulin, as a result of which 20 ships were sunk, including the German U-9 submarine. Two boats (U-18 and U-24) were severely damaged and because of a hopeless situation were flooded by crews. The last three fascist submarines (U-19, U-20, U-23) after leaving the war of Romania and Bulgaria were flooded by their crews off the Turkish coast.

In 1944, the fight against submarines was resumed on the Baltic Sea. From June to September, 10-12 German and 5 Finnish submarines attempted to thwart the assistance of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ground forces in the Vyborg gulf and trawling fairways through the Gogland mine-artillery position in the Gulf of Narva. They fired torpedoes on any ships, including boats, not excluding small hunters. Using acoustic self-guided torpedoes, the enemy sank several combat boats, creating a tense situation in the entire eastern part of the bay.

The intentions and tactics of the enemy became completely clear to the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet after the small hunter No. 30 in the Vyborg Gulf in July sank the German U-103 submarine. Six people from her crew, including commander V. Schmidt, rushed out of the torpedo tubes to the surface and were picked up by a small hunter. In September, this boat was raised and brought to Kronstadt. From the compartments extracted codes, instructions, encryption machine. Of great importance was the disclosure of all the data on the newest homing torpedo T-250.

The events in the Vyborg gulf and the attacks of enemy submarines in other areas demanded that the entire anti-submarine defense system be activated, and that aviation should be more widely involved in the fight against submarines. At the exit of the skerries in the Vyborg Bay, minefields were placed. The patrol began to send two boats, which were instructed to be only on the move. If the submarines could be detected by airplanes or other means, the boats were used as a search and strike group, which shortened the time many times from the moment of detection to the beginning of the search. A special 29-I anti-submarine air squadron was formed. In addition, the search for submarines systematically attracted aircraft 15 th separate reconnaissance air regiment and 9 th assault air division.

A rare submarine that went into the sea, was not detected and not attacked by our anti-submarine forces. More than half of the submarines operating on communications were damaged by boats and aircraft. Convinced of the activity of the Soviet anti-submarine forces, the enemy was forced to limit the actions of submarines during the daytime.

From June to September 1944, the anti-submarine forces of the fleet repulsed numerous 15-17 attacks by enemy submarines. The Germans could not prevent the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from supporting the ground forces in the Vyborg offensive operation. They also failed to prevent our ships from trawling in the Gulf of Narva. By the beginning of the Tallinn offensive, the minesweepers made passes through the southern flank of Gogland's fortified position. Boats and ships went to the west, supporting the ground forces.

To constrain the actions of enemy submarines in the western part of the Gulf, the 10 Battalion Minesweeper Battalion deployed on enemy fairways of the 7 minefield lines, total 594 mines. U-1945 and U-676 submarines exploded on these mines in January and February 745.

At the end of 1944, anti-submarine defenses of Stockholm-Leningrad communications across the northern coast of the bay deployed anti-submarine forces. The brigade of the naval ships and the 6 th Red Banner Division of small hunters were relocated to the Aland Islands. Anti-submarine forces were also on Hanko and in the Porkkala Udd region.

By the beginning of 1945, 138 small hunters and patrol boats from 90 were equipped with sonar stations from 9. Sharply increased the number of submarine detections in the submerged position. 1945 January 6, 3 minesweepers in escorting 124 small hunters came from Tallinn to mine in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. At the junction, MO-679 made hydroacoustic contact with the U-XNUMX submarine, attacked and sank it.

In the middle and southern part of the Baltic Sea, our aircraft and submarines operated against the enemy’s submarine fleet. Thus, in September-November, the fleet air forces inflicted eight bomb-assault strikes on the port of Liepāja, this is about 350 sorties. The main objective was the destruction of vehicles, but several submarines were also damaged. The German fascist command was forced on October 4 to relocate a submarine flotilla from Liepaja to the bay of Danzig. In October-December 1944, our submarines delivered 80 mines in the Kohlberg, Sassnitz, Brewsterort and Fr. Bornholm. At the end of the 1944 of the year, three German U-boats were blown up by mines and sank. All this significantly reduced the effectiveness of enemy submarine forces.

The anti-submarine defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was, however, only aggressive (as described by the German historian J. Meister), but also skillful enough. And above all, adept at massaging anti-submarine forces in crucial areas.

In 1944, the effectiveness of the fight against submarines and the Northern Fleet increased. The following circumstances contributed to this. Soviet aviation in the North held air superiority. The number of ships and aircraft grew rapidly, their technical equipment improved. In 1944, a brigade of patrol ships was formed, followed by a brigade of submarine hunters. For their search 77 aircraft were allocated, which could simultaneously carry 280 anti-submarine bombs. In August of the same year, 9 squadron destroyers arrived in England from the division of the Italian fleet. All this created real opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of the fight against enemy submarines.

Each submarine discovered was attacked and prosecuted. Over the last four months of the war 6300 depth and 250 aerial bombs were dropped on the enemy. Many boats were damaged and 3 sunk.

In general, convoys to the northern ports of the Soviet Union were carried out successfully. So, from 40 convoys that counted just 811 transports, 33 ships returned to bases for various reasons, 58 were sunk, that is, losses were about 8%. From the convoys returning from the USSR, 24 transport was lost — less than 4%. During this time, the Northern Fleet and the Allied Navy sank 38 enemy submarines.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the struggle of surface ships with submarines was continuously improved. If in the first years it was ineffective, which is explained by the lack of ships, their weak technical equipment, then in subsequent years these shortcomings became obsolete. The fleets received new anti-submarine ships and boats with more sophisticated underwater surveillance devices. So, in 1944, on ships and boats of the Black Sea Fleet there were about 100 hydroacoustic stations; By the end of the war, about half of the SFs from 218 ships and anti-submarine defense boats were equipped with sonar equipment.

Aviation not only supplemented the search for surface ships, but also significantly expanded the zone of influence of our forces on enemy boats. In the early years of the war, aircraft that had no technical means of detection were used for visual search. Subsequently, the number of aircraft increased, their technical equipment improved. For example, in the Federation Council, 1941 was used in the interests of PLO in 65, and in 1942 - 124 aircraft. During the war, SF aircraft made search of submarines 7045 of sorties, discovered 73 submarines, making 47 attacks on them. On the Black Sea Fleet in January, 1943 included 27 airplanes as part of PLO aviation, in May 1944 - 75. During the entire war, the Black Sea Fleet aircraft made search for submarines 8669 of sorties.

In the course of the struggle with submarines, the most serious problem was finding them in a submerged position. The most important role in this was played by the rapid development of sonar tools. In closed and shallow sea basins, barriers of mines and networks were of great importance, especially if they acquired the character of protected positions.

The fight against enemy submarines, which were the striking force in the maritime theaters until the very end of the war, went beyond the antisubmarine defense as a type of combat support and became one of the main tasks of the fleet. The greatest effect brought the combined use of surface, submarine forces and aviation in the organization of close cooperation between them. The struggle of anti-submarine forces against submarines especially clearly confirmed that its outcome is not decided by a simple numerical superiority, but primarily by more sophisticated technical means of detecting and defeating the enemy, the qualitative superiority of forces and means, the appropriate level of development of naval art. The development of anti-submarine forces in the postwar period went in this direction.

Khorkov G. Soviet surface ships in World War II. M .: Military Publishing House, 1981. C.4, 14-18, 71-82, 119-123, 131-135
Makhov S. Secrets of submarine warfare. 1914 — 1945. M .: Veche, 2012, C.316-319, 322-406.
Basov A. Fight against submarines // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1976. No. 7. S. 40-46.
Kuznetsov A. Loss of submarine fleets of opponents of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War // Flotomaster. 2001. No.5. C. 33-41.
Kuznetsov A. Loss of submarine fleets of opponents of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War // Flotomaster. 2001. No.6. C. 28-39.
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  1. +5
    28 September 2015
    The topic is very interesting, but unfortunately it is not fully disclosed. request The Soviet hunters for submarines are practically not described, their weapons and the effectiveness of its use. It is not clear why the publication of photographs of Soviet post-war anti-submarine ships.
    1. +1
      28 September 2015
      Quote: Bongo
      but unfortunately it is not fully disclosed

      Yeah, nothing about the article. Rather, a draft outline of a review article, for children under 10 years old, with the most common facts and figures.
  2. +3
    28 September 2015
    frankly not impressed - the loss of Soviet boats was greater. on mines. from torpedoes of fascist submarines. it means that "them" had a better organization.
    1. 0
      28 September 2015
      And you do not compare the success of the Germans in the vast expanses of the ocean with our successes in our closed theaters.
      And if you compare on the same theater, then everything is not so bad. And do not talk about the North, there most of the losses of transports in the zone of responsibility of the Allies
      1. +2
        28 September 2015
        There are no claims to the crews of boats in the Baltic, going to their deaths for the sake of Victory, but there is to the Soviet command - the senseless death of boats in the Baltic by mines and an open shortage of them in the North, an open theater. where it is not so easy to block with mines. all this gives the right to say that "they" had a better organization. "

        in 1941, if there was a Baltic Fleet in Tallinn, it would be possible to cut it off from Kronstadt with mines! with almost no enemy at sea. at the same time there were skirmishes with German boats - I don’t remember how many of our boats were killed by torpedoes. I remember the fate of C11 - there is infa about the death of mines and torpedoes. I don’t know what to believe. (I see an analogy with "Sverdlov").
        1. 0
          28 September 2015
          Quote: Andy
          senseless death in the mines of boats in the Baltic and their apparent lack in the North, an open theater. where minami block is not so easy

          On the SF there was one big problem, whose name is basing. In fact, they began to build a fleet base only in the second half of the 30s.
          In the same 1941, the same EMs were forced to spend a resource of mechanisms when parked in the base — the supply of water, electricity and steam from the shore was not organized. The result is a little predictable - there were no more than 2/3 of the ships on the EM. The rest needed repairs.
          It was possible to fill the Polar submarine. But this would not significantly increase the number of combat-ready forces of the fleet.
      2. The comment was deleted.
  3. 0
    28 September 2015
    Quote: Bongo
    Practically not described by the Soviet submarine hunters for their weapons

    About MO-4 I am planning a separate article with a history of creation and combat use. The same article about the organization of defense in the fleets of its effectiveness and development over the years of the war.
  4. +3
    28 September 2015
    "Subject" is similar to an essay or a "term paper" and was written, most likely, precisely for this. The topic does not indicate that ASW in the USSR in the initial period of the war was practically absent due to the complete absence of high-quality sound direction finders, sonars, depth charges with a high sink rate, bomb throwers and high-quality visual means of observation and identification. All this appeared in the Navy only starting from 1943 due to supplies from the Allies. Unfortunately in the USSR, at that time, it was not possible to establish an effective system of aviation anti-aircraft defense, thanks to which the allies managed to win the "submarine war".
    1. 0
      28 September 2015
      And also in the subject it is not indicated that during the Second World War the Soviet merchant fleet from submarines suffered the least losses. There is such a value as% of sunken ships (% of tonnage) by enemy submarines. And in the USSR it is the smallest among all countries of the world. That is, in other words, the effectiveness of the Soviet PLO was maximum, and the tonnage losses in the Soviet PLO zone were the smallest in the world. And there is no absolutely effective PLO. Losses will always be. The only difference is the loss of tonnage.
      1. -1
        29 September 2015
        The USSR merchant fleet suffered losses from aircraft in ports. Interest does not make sense.
        1. 0
          29 September 2015
          Interest is always calculated from the number of vessels carried in convoys. This is the only indicator of the success or failure of anti-submarine defense. You can count% lost ships quantitatively or% lost tonnage. But this is the only criterion for evaluating PLO.
  5. +1
    28 September 2015
    The effectiveness of the PLO in those years was unfortunately not so good. By the way, about the convoy-8% of losses this is not the merit of our fleet, but of the British, and especially not our PLOShnikov, no offense was told to them.

    But there are a number of reasons: firstly, the enemy didn’t use their submarines massively against us, because almost all of their forces were thrown at Atlanika, and later on the SPM, they didn’t care about us for the most part, before how in the north the convoys did not go.

    Secondly, our lag in a number of technical issues is the lack of an ASE, the absence of a radar, and so on.
  6. +2
    28 September 2015
    Soviet PLOs were sunk by direct actions (and not from delivered mines) for the entire 5 war of German submarines.
    U-250 in the Baltic from MO-103, U-144 in the Baltic from U-307 submarine, U-679 in the Baltic from MO-124, U-362 in the Kara Sea from TRSH-116 and U-639 from S-101 .
    Soviet losses from enemy PLO were an order of magnitude higher.
  7. +1
    28 September 2015
    In 1944, the effectiveness of the fight against submarines in the Northern Fleet increased.

    Yeah ... so increased that the German submarines worked almost like at a training ground.
    Here is a typical KOH wiring. Time - April 1945. Convoy PK-9.
    Upon exit, it was divided into 2 groups:
    The first group of convoy PK-9: EM “Decent”, TR “Onega”, TSC T-115, T-116, BO-215, BO-220, BO-225, BO-227 and BO-228, BO-131.
    The second group: TR “Idefjord”, EM “Karl Liebknecht” (commander of the convoy), EM “Daring”, EM “Hard”, as well as the ships of the Norwegian Navy: corvette “Eglantine” and three military vehicles - “Romoy”, “Karmoy” , "Jeloy."

    After 3 hours, at 03:15, after the release, both groups merged. In total, 2 TR accounted for 20 escort ships (14 GAS, 11 RBU).
    At 08.41 TR “Idefjord” received a torpedo hit in the area of ​​the first hold. The vessel remained afloat with a slight trim on the bow. TR managed to drag to the base.
    At 08.50 a torpedo hit the middle of the Onega TR. TP sunk.

    Here it is: at the Linahamari-Kola Bay crossing, 20 escortmen could not cover 2 TR. Loss of KOH - 50%. At the same time, the submarines calmly penetrated the KOH warrant.

    No wonder that in the same 1945 the command of the Northern Fleet asked the British to help with the PLO in the area of ​​the main base of the fleet.
    1. -1
      28 September 2015
      Learn the story - PK-9 is one of the examples of effective anti-aircraft warfare from World War 2.
      1. +1
        29 September 2015
        Quote: Denis_469
        Learn the story - PK-9 is one of the examples of effective anti-aircraft warfare from World War 2.

        I'm afraid to even imagine what you think inefficient PLO.
        If an example of an effective PLO is how in April 1945 20 escort ships were unable to cover 2 transports, losing one of them and miraculously dragging the other to the base. Despite the fact that the cover ships had 14 GAS and 11 Hedgehog and Squid rocket launchers.
        1. 0
          29 September 2015
          What's not effective? For example, a convoy called "The Convoy That Almost Died". There is a name about one of the convoys for which all infa is still classified. Even the convoy order is secret so that no one can locate all the affected transports. I've tried to establish the effectiveness of all attacks on that convoy, but ran into the secrecy of the documents on it. Therefore, I was able to establish the results of only about half of the attacks. Can 2/3 attacks maximum. This is an example of how one should not fight at sea at all.
  8. +2
    28 September 2015
    Quote: chunga-changa
    but unfortunately it is not fully disclosed

    Quote: Anton Gavrilov
    The effectiveness of PLO in our years was, alas, not much.

    Quote: Nikita Gromov
    Soviet PLOs were sunk by direct actions (and not from delivered mines) for the entire 5 war of German submarines.

    The task of anti-submarine defense should not be considered solely as the destruction of enemy submarines. The main task after all was not the destruction, but the prevention of the effective work of the enemy submarine fleet.
    Was there any reason for an escort ship to leave a caravan to finish off an enemy submarine discovered (and improve the statistics of destroyed submarines) or was it important to thwart the attack and force submariners to abandon subsequent pursuit and continue to defend the caravan from other enemy submarines?
    Here is a direct analogy with the actions of the Luftwaffe aces and Soviet pilots during the war.
  9. 0
    28 September 2015
    The article is not reliable, to say the least. The author does not know that submarines also fought against us during the Second World War: Turkey, Sweden, the USA and Great Britain. Plus, the basis of the PLO is not the destruction of enemy submarines, but the safety of its shipping and combat operations. It is not necessary to sink boats - it is enough to drive them away. Our opponents had single combat successes. In general, the Soviet PLO was very high quality and successful.

    The above-mentioned PK-9 convoy of 1945 is only a confirmation of the success of the Soviet PLO. Three submarines participated in the attacks on the convoy: U-3, U-286 and U-481. 997 submarine - "U-1" was sunk by the escort and later found on the ground with traces of artillery shells. German submarines carried out at least 286 torpedo attacks against the convoy with the release of 8 torpedoes (of which 14 "TV" homing torpedoes). As a result, only 5 transport was sunk. 1 submarine was exchanged for 1 transport. Yes, there were still damaged ships of the convoy, but there were no sunken ones. Not a single escort of WW1 convoys has yet been able to repel a simultaneous attack on a convoy by a group of submarines. This is a clear success for PLO. Especially considering the fact that in addition to 2 sunk "U-1" also "U-286" was heavily damaged by the escort and forced to start returning to the base. When 997 (!) Submarines can sink only 3 (!) Transport, then this is an unequivocal success in guarding the convoy.
    1. 0
      29 September 2015
      Quote: Denis_469
      Three submarines participated in the attacks on the convoy: U-3, U-286 and U-481. 997 submarine - "U-1" was sunk by the escort and later found on the ground with traces of artillery shells.

      ... according to the currently available data, it can be argued that only two German submarines, U-9 and U-481, most likely acted against the PK-997 convoy. At the same time, the first of them, took a position in the square AC8499 - northwest of Rybachy, in the area of ​​Cape German, and the second - east of Rybachy. Thanks to the radio interception, the position of the first submarine was known to the headquarters of the SF Squadron and was marked on the tracing lines of the convoys PK-7 and PK-9.
      In addition, it should be noted that until April 20, 1945, the U-8852 submarine occupied the position in AC294 square, southeast of Rybachy. However, on the same day she left this position and began the transition to Harstad, where she arrived on April 24. Thus, almost certainly, this boat did not participate in events related to PK-9. At least, she didn’t make torpedo attacks on the convoy - this is evidenced by the surviving data on the attacks of this boat. At the same time, the position of this boat was also known to the Headquarters of the SF Squadron and it was also marked on the tracing lines of the convoys, moreover, in the area of ​​this position there was a PLO attack of the escort of the convoy KP-7 at 12.27 on April 21, 1945.
      Finally, according to the research of A.Ya. Kuznetsova, under certain circumstances, the U-9 submarine could also be on the path of PK-286. However, the possibility of her participating in attacks on the convoy, as well as the possibility of her death from PLO attacks of PK-9 ships, is currently considered, nevertheless, to be rather insignificant.

      By the way, the British - FR Loch Insh, Anguilla and Cotton, who provided for the GVSF Navy PLO, also claim the sinking of U-286.
      Quote: Denis_469
      German submarines carried out at least 8 torpedo attacks against the convoy with the release of 14 torpedoes (of which 5 "TV" homing torpedoes). As a result, only 1 transport was sunk. 1 submarine was exchanged for 1 transport. Yes, there were still damaged ships of the convoy, but there were no sunken ones.

      Your description reminds of an anecdote about an article in Pravda about the race of the US Secretary General and President, in which the Yankees won: Comrade Secretary General came to the finish line among the first, the American president - penultimate.
      There were 2 vehicles in the convoy. They were covered by 20 (twenty) escort ships. As a result, the submarines sank one TR and severely damaged the second. That is, they achieved hits on all TR KON. In doing so, they attacked from inside the warrant.
      1. 0
        29 September 2015
        Quote: Alexey RA
        By the way, the British - FR Loch Insh, Anguilla and Cotton, who provided for the GVSF Navy PLO, also claim the sinking of U-286.

        In reality, the British on April 29 bombed "U-968". Therefore, this is just an English statement that has no confirmation. especially considering the presence of projectile damage on the U-286 hull.

        Quote: Alexey RA
        There were 2 vehicles in the convoy. They were covered by 20 (twenty) escort ships. As a result, the submarines sank one TR and severely damaged the second. That is, they achieved hits on all TR KON. At the same time, they attacked from inside the warrant.

        No, the attacks were outside the warrant. Because dofiga torpedoes did not hit the target. And again - the attack of a group of submarines is completely unable to repel a single guard of any convoy. In other words, I can say that there have not yet been facts in history of successfully repelling the attacks of a group of submarines by guarding the convoy. Not at all. Nowhere and never. Because you want our fleet to be able to do what no one else in the world knew how to do.
  10. 0
    28 September 2015
    About the Soviet PLO: Northern Fleet: "The consistent improvement of the forms and methods of action of the forces of the Northern Fleet to ensure internal sea communications contributed to the successful implementation of this task with relatively small losses. Of the number of lost transports, 11 died while moving in convoys, which amounted to 0,43% of the total the number of ships held in them. " - for comparison, the article indicates the loss of the English guard in 8%.
    Baltic Fleet before the evacuation of Tallinn: "In the convoys conducted from the first day of the war until the evacuation of Tallinn, four ships were killed by German air strikes, which accounted for 15,4% of the total number of losses and 0,2% of the total number of units in the convoys. German submarines sunk 7,7% of the total number of ship losses in convoys (excluding the transition during the evacuation of Tallinn). " - losses amounted to 7,7%. Again, less than the English 8% loss.
    How bad can be anti-submarine defense with such a percentage of losses? This is a chic PLO. No country in the world can show similar results.
  11. 0
    October 3 2017
    full article DUTER of an engineer-tyhnar

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