My old readers will probably remember that I have a very positive attitude to the actions and statements of the “new” (since January 2015) deputy chairman of the Central Bank Dmitry Tulin.
Despite the fact that Tulin is responsible in the Central Bank for monetary policy, his sphere of interest (with explicit agreement with the Kremlin, which, according to liberal media, in fact, insisted on his appearance in the Central Bank) fell ruble, relations with banks and politics Central Bank as a whole.
What I liked Tulin:
- He demanded to bring currency trading on the Moscow stock exchange to a civilized state, so that the stock exchange ceased to be a place for a purely speculative acceleration of the exchange rate. For example, Tulin demanded the introduction of "discrete auctions for currency": http://top.rbc.ru/finances/16/03/2015/5506e8ce9a79472c5d7ec84a. It makes no sense to go into technical details, suffice it to say that from a practical point of view, this would greatly complicate the attempts to “break up” the course in the illiquid market. It is significant that the Ministry of Finance, Moscow Exchange and market participants were against this innovation.
- Tulin demands from banks that they cut interest rates on loans following a decrease in the rate of the Central Bank, and not try to “eat up their margin” at the expense of other sectors of the economy. It is easy to guess that he did not earn any sympathy from the banking community: http://ria.ru/economy/20150316/1052848402.html.
Now, judging by the information that the offended "old liberals" merged into Bloomberg, the conflict has moved to a fundamentally new level: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-13/fractures-form-inside -russia-s-central-bank-as-recession-deepens. The positions of the parties (my interpretation is slightly different from the Bloomberg):
- Nabiullina, Siluanov, the banking sector and part of the oligarchy that has not left the offshore companies in principle do not want to change anything. Status quo and all that. You can still cut budget expenditures, carry out reforms, etc.
- Tulin, the Ministry of Economic Development and some influential citizens from the Old Square and the Security Council support another option:
1. The rate to reduce and organize targeted lending industry (Tulin in this sense, a banker from 19 century - believes that banks should invest in factories).
2. In order for the money pumped into industry to not immediately flow into the currency and abroad, it is proposed to introduce (return) capital flow restrictions (attention! It is not proposed to "close all nafig" according to the Soviet or North Korean model, but it is proposed to introduce "some" restrictions).
Much of what is happening in the Russian near-political life can be understood within the framework of the competition between 4 as the main groups of the Russian elite (just don’t need to be considered as parties with hierarchy and discipline. Here the situation resembles football fans: there are fans of Spartak in general, and there are specific “firms.” So, for example, “old liberals” are like fans of a particular team, and, for example, “the Gref family” is a specific “firm”).
1. Liberal compradors.
The proposed image of the future: Russia, integrated into Western civilization.
In fact: Russia, integrated into Western civilization as a raw material colony of the United States.
2. "New Conservatives".
The proposed image of the future: the Russian Empire 2.0.
In fact: "Orthodox Iran" (meaning real Iran with pluses and minuses, and not its caricature in the Western media).
3. "New Liberals".
The proposed image of the future: the country of victorious patriotic capitalism.
In fact: 2007 year as "Groundhog Day" - endless attempts to reproduce the satiety of zero by modifying the existing system.
4. "Red" patriots.
The proposed image of the future: USSR 2.0.
Actually: China 2000-x (again, real China 2000-x is meant, with rapid economic growth, a huge role of the state in the economy, but also the return of a specific social stratification, in which the status consumption of the party elites is not written in Tatler , and on the fence, but from this it is no less real).
What is happening now in the Central Bank and the government is the final direct conflict between the “new liberals” and the liberal compradors and their friends.
It is easy to estimate the arguments against Tulin's position:
1. The introduction of restrictions on the movement of capital (and the purchase of currency) will necessarily cause a tough psychological shock on both business and the public. (Vanguyu: the entire LJ top and all liberal media will be filled with articles and posts with the leitmotif “Well, that's fffffs! Hello, Juche! We're all going to die”).
2. Immediately there will be corruption schemes for the withdrawal of capital (as in China), perhaps the "black market of currency" (here for a specific discussion you need to know the specific proposals, but this information is not yet available).
3. To disperse inflation, it will not even be necessary for the money at a low rate to flow abroad, they can easily flow into other sectors of the economy through the banal misuse of funds. Scheme: I received a loan for the plant - I stole 50% through subcontractors, if it is scaled to the country as a whole, it will detonate with such an inflation bomb that it will not seem like enough to anyone.
4. It will be possible to forget about the return of capital from offshore companies (the business was promised a deadline until December and not to touch the rules of the game until December).
However, despite all the risks (they need to be understood and need to work with them), it is necessary to switch to preferential lending to the industry — it is necessary to pinch the margins and speculative operations to the banks. Two questions remain: whether Tulin and Co. will be able to convince Putin that it is worth taking the risk for the sake of economic growth, and whether they can really stop these risks later. The main risk is that low-interest loans do not become a “feeder for their own people,” because then the economy will actually come to Karachun.
August is a bad month for radical changes, and judging by the fact that information about the conflict has already begun to be poured into the media, 3-6 months remain before the junction. Especially since in December the ultimatum on de-offshore expires. It will be a great moment to tighten the nuts. On the other hand, the situation may arise in such a way that changes will be required earlier.