Military Review

Strategic cooperation in the interests of state security

13



The author of this article for 30 years was an employee of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), created on the same day - 13 of May 1946 of the year as the General Directorate of Missile Weapons (GURVO) of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Being for about 20 years the lead designer of the Pioneer and Topol complexes, the author directly communicated with almost all the services of the Strategic Missile Forces, including all GURVO directorates. In this regard, without setting ourselves a global task to highlight the whole range of MIT and GURVO relations, the author would like to try to show the importance of an integrated approach to the development of rocket weapons personally from his own experience and from the experience of all integrated services of the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute. relationship with only one of the GURVO offices - the seventh office.

FROM REACTIVE SHELLS TO STRATEGIC MISSILES

The specialization of the Scientific Research Institute-1 (Research Institute of Powder Rockets) of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, later transferred to the Ministry of Defense Industry and named Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering in 1966, is clear from its name. Omitting the experience of interaction of the MIT with the GURVO predecessor - the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) - while creating the Temp and Target-S tactical missile systems, as well as the short duration of the Temp-S complex’s presence in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, the author proposes to immediately go to the events of the second half of the sixties, namely, to stories development of the Temp-2С mobile strategic ground-based missile system.

NII-1 created rockets and small tactical missile systems for the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Naval Fleet (Navy). With the advent of Vladimir Pavlovich Chelomey from the organization of Vladimir Pavlovich Chelomey to the post of chief designer Alexander Davidovich Nadiradze (director - chief designer since 1), NII-1961 mainly focused on creating the Temp solid-fuel mobile operational-tactical missile complex (after switching to mixed fuel - Temp-S) with a self-propelled launcher on a specially designed MAZ-1 chassis.

As is known, the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in both the USSR and the USA were liquid. Without going into the description of the merits of different types of fuel within the framework of this article, I would only note that solid fuel “mixed” fuel was first created in the United States, and it was on its basis in the United States that the mass deployment of mine-based mini-family missiles began.

In the USSR, the pioneer of combat missile technology, Sergey Korolev, and Mikhail Yangel, Vladimir Chelomei, and Victor Makeev, who later joined the rocket race, did not retreat, and, probably, could not do so due to the need to eliminate a huge backlog from the USA, from rockets with liquid rocket engines.

The main option in the USSR since the beginning of the sixties was the deployment of ground-based combat missiles in silo launchers. The existing attempts to create missiles with a moving start were of a one-off character. Only Sergey Korolev, realizing that he was gradually lagging behind with Mikhail Yangel and Vladimir Chelomey on kerosene-oxygen rockets, creating missiles with highly efficient, but extremely dangerous fuel in operation, changed the direction of work on combat topics and proceeded to the development of solid-fuel missiles.

The intercontinental ballistic missile RT-2 (RT-2P) created by its cooperation passed flight tests and was serially deployed in the mine version (60 missiles). Solid fuel charges were developed by Boris Zhukov, the missile control system was developed by Nikolay Pilyugin.

On the basis of this rocket - using its second and third stages - a medium-range rocket with a mobile launch was developed. The 8K96 missile system developed by the Leningrad Arsenal Design Bureau (Pyotr Tyurin) with a tracked launcher developed by the KB-3 KB Leningrad Kirovsky Plant (Joseph Kotin, Nikolai Popov, Nikolai Kurin) successfully passed flight tests, but was not adopted for the Soviet Army. The development of the 8K99 mobile missile system with the intercontinental ballistic missile by Mikhail Yangel, which had solid fuel at the first stage and liquid fuel at the second stage, was also stopped at the stage of flight tests.

Vasiliy Mishin, who replaced Sergei Korolyov after his death, showed no interest in solid fuel topics.

Strategic cooperation in the interests of state security

Alexander Davidovich Nadiradze. Photos from www.ras.ru


FROM TEMP-S TO TEMP-2С

After the reorganization of the USSR industry in 1965, the Ministry of General Machine-Building responded for the development of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles of ground-based (ICBM) and sea-based (SLBM) bases, the Ministry of Defense Industry was responsible for developing tactical missile systems, and the Land Forces were responsible for developing tactical missile systems. troops (GAU).

Under these conditions, immediately after the creation of the Temp-S complex, the teams of Alexander Nadiradze and Boris Zhukov began to design a mobile ground-based missile system with the Temp-2С ICBM. It should be noted that the ideological mastermind of the work was Dmitry Ustinov. A supporter of this work before his death was Sergey Korolev.

To put it mildly, the Ministry of General Engineering and the Strategic Missile Forces did not show enthusiasm for this program. The developer of the Temp-S rocket control system, the Sverdlovsk Automation Research Institute (Nikolai Semikhatov), ​​entered Minoboshmash and switched to the development of control systems for SLBMs. There were no enterprises capable of creating a control system for the Temp-2С rocket in the system of the Ministry of Defense Industry.

The main GURVO directorates in charge of the development of the Temp-2C complex, which are alternately head units, were rocket control (25453-A w / h) and ground equipment control (25453-B w / h).

Now, looking back almost 50 years, it becomes clear that without having experience creating and operating mobile missile systems, as well as taking into account the enormous load of GURVO on the formation of the strategic missile forces in a "civil war" between several main designers of missiles and a small "civil war" "When creating a combat control system, there could be no other, not negative, attitude of the Strategic Missile Forces services to mobile subjects. Had no practical experience in creating mobile missile systems as a system weapons neither the NII-4 team, nor the team of the head developer of the ground equipment of the Temp-2С complex - the design bureau of the Barrikady plant (George Sergeyev).

The 8K96 and 9K99 missile systems had a regimental structure - in one field position, six tracked launchers were connected by cables to the 200-kilowatt diesel power plant and the regimental command center (PCP) machines. In the combat control unit of the PKP regiment, the terminal equipment of the combat control system (SBU) and the equipment of the unified remote control system (ODUA) developed by the Impulse Design Bureau were located. Nobody was engaged in the development of vital activity of personnel in the development of the missile complex, it was tacitly implied that there would be some mythical "combined arms means."

Under these conditions, the Director and Chief Designer of MIT, Alexander Nadiradze, understood that the fate of the complex depended not only on the creation of the rocket and the launcher, but also on the development of methods for the combat use and operation of the missile complex as a weapon system and the creation within the framework of a single development work technical means to ensure continuous combat duty in the field.

To solve these problems, the 19 sector was formed in the structure of the institute, which was directly subordinate to the deputy director, chief designer Boris Lagutin. Within a few years, the 19 sector (Alexander Vinogradov, Lev Solomonov, Lev Kokurin) became the 110 department, and since October 1970 has become a complex department, which became the head of the institute and for more than 20 years directly supervised all cooperation in creating missile complexes.

By the end of 1968, several decisions were made based on the results of the work that determined the appearance of the Temp-2C complex:

- on 7 t, the launch weight of the rocket was increased, which led to almost stopping the work on the tracked variant of the launcher;

- The Research Institute of Automation and Instrument Making (NIIAP) was officially involved in work on the complex by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, while Nikolay Pilyugin took over the development of not only the missile control system, but also the remote control system;

- the divisional structure for building the missile system was agreed with the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as the number of personnel of the missile system units.

As a result, each of the three divisions included 9 units (two launchers, a preparation and start-up machine, two cars - diesel power stations, two support vehicles, two guards). Of the seven types of units, six were developed by the OKB of the Barrikady plant, one by the Moscow searchlight plant. The development of 6 types of machines was supervised by the second GURVO control, only the control and start machine — jointly by the 2 and 7 controls.

The dual situation was with the supervision of the PKP regiment: the 7 control of GURVO understood under the control panel of the regiment and even assigned a separate military index to only three machines (a combat control vehicle and two communication machines) developed by the Krasnoyarsk plant of TV sets of the Ministry of Radio Industry (Leonid Pokrovsky), and supervised work on them in conjunction with the troops of the Strategic Missile Forces, but the combat unit of the complex - PKP regiment - consisted of 9 machines.

I consider it necessary to note that during this period there was a serious qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the structures responsible for combat command and control (group - sector - later department), but the 7 management of GURVO we as a structure with which we need to contact our employees every day MIT, practically not perceived. For us at this time, all 7-management - this is one name - Igor Rusanov (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, later Lieutenant-General of the General Staff of the Armed Forces).

SIGNIFICANT DIVISIONS

Practically the only serious issue that required fundamental decisions to refine the development of the Temp-1969C complex during the 1972 – 2 period was the need for automation of missile launch control, during which, by a separate decision of the Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers the launch of the division in addition to the “Blizzard” equipment previously located in it, the centralized (backup) command and control system of the OBB “Impulse”, the final link of the 6П systems was developed combat control missile forces and missiles "Signal", as well as provided with an automatic pairing 6P link with a remote control system.

The latter demanded from the leadership of MIT and GURVO not so much an operational solution of technical issues as extremely tactful “political” moves, given the tense relationship between the leadership of NIIAP and OKB “Impulse”.

The relationship between the Moscow Heat Engineering Institute and the 25453-A military unit began to change from the 1973 year - the time of issuance of directive documents on the creation of the Pioneer missile system. On the one hand, the prospects for the mass deployment of the Pioneer complex, unlike the Temp-2C missile complex, naturally required the use of more modern communications and increased reliability of bringing command and control to the complex (implementation of backup SSU equipment). The introduction of a third launcher into the battalion was also highly desirable. But, on the other hand, the extremely tight deadlines for the creation of the Pioneer did not allow retreating from the cruel position of the directive documents on the full unification of the ground equipment of the Temp-2С and Pioneer complexes.

Disagreements between the industry and the Strategic Missile Forces on these issues lasted for about two years and ended only in the first half of 1975, with a reasonable compromise, which 7 management of GURVO played an active role in achieving.

After carrying out and submitting relevant technical studies to the Strategic Missile Forces by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense Industry and the command of the Strategic Missile Forces, it was decided:

- first, not to associate the completion of joint flight tests of the Pioneer missile system, the start of mass production and the deployment of the complex with the above-mentioned issues;

- secondly, to divide the introduction of the third launcher into the division and the introduction of promising means of communication into the complex;

- thirdly, to prepare separate resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on improving the ground equipment of the projects.

In 1974 – 1975, joint flight tests of the Pioneer complex (15P645 index) were completed, March 11, 1976, was adopted by the Soviet Army by resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, and on March 31 a resolution was issued to carry out work on the modernized complex "Pioneer" with the introduction of the third launcher complex into the division.

The work on the Pioner-K complex (15P645K index) was reduced to the work on optimizing the energy consumption of the complex’s units and modernizing diesel-power station machines, which allowed keeping the number of other machines in the divisions and developing new automated remote control systems by the specialists of the Research Institute of Automation and Instrumentation and its placement in the machine preparation and start.

The active and well-coordinated work of the industry and the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as the goodwill of Nikolay Pilyugin, who took the first three sets of CDS equipment at his enterprise, allowed not only to complete joint tests of the 15P645K complex in 1976 year, but also to switch to its serial production from the first regiment of the 1977 program of the year. Subsequently, the first three regiments 15P645 (program 1976 of the year) were also converted into a complex 15P645K.

I consider it necessary to note that already at this moment we began to feel positively the structural features of the 7 control. In contrast to missiles and ground equipment, the issues of pilot work and serial production were not under the jurisdiction of separate departments, but were concentrated in one department. An important role was played by 7-e management in large modifications of almost all systems of the complex to ensure reliable duty of the complex at points of permanent deployment in special units 15У111. It is especially necessary to note the role of the 7 control as an integrated one when creating the 15P645М complex.

NO COMMUNICATION - NOW

The introduction of promising means of communication, primarily between the command posts of the divisions and the mobile command post of the regiment, became topical for the Pioneer missile system. The low-powered radio stations P-2 used for these purposes in units of the Temp-111С and Pioneer complexes did not provide a radio communication range more than 40 km, which limited the maneuverability of the regimental units.

The difficulty of introducing communication facilities (Blesk radio stations) into the new generation complex was that these radio stations were developed by the Voronezh Telecommunications Research Institute for tactical and technical requirements that were not coordinated with the missile system developers, and the Rocket Forces insisted that Communication took place without increasing the number of vehicles in the division.

In March, the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering prepared a report 1975, which justified the impossibility of introducing the Blesk radio stations into the Pioneer complex as part of its complex. It was also shown that the introduction of advanced communications requires the development of a new generation of the control panel of the division (from two machines) and the control panel of the regiment.

As a result of consideration of the report on the initiative of the Missile Forces (first of all, 7 of the GURVO Directorate), a joint decision was taken by the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Missile Forces to provide for the development of the Pioneer complex of a new mobile command center of the Vympel division the command and control vehicle and the mobile command post of the Barrier-M regiment consisting of three vehicles: the command and control vehicle, the communication machine unified with the communication equipment of the control panel of the division, and the trail machine osfer connection.

In 1977, the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers was issued, entrusting the development of the control panel of the division and the control panel of the regiment to the design bureau of the Krasnoyarsk plant of televisions (chief designer Leonid Pokrovsky) for the production of experimental and serial models specially built in the interests of the mass production of the Pioneer complex Krasnodar instrument factory of the Ministry of Industry and Communications. To accompany the production of the control panel of the division and the control panel of the regiment, a design bureau was created at the Krasnodar Instrument Plant (later Selena Design Bureau), and Yury Khoroshkin invited from the Voronezh Research Institute of Communications was appointed chief designer.

Since this work was envisaged by the decree as an independent R & D, then, naturally, the 7 control was the head of it in GURVO. Once again, the favorable factor was the combination of issues of pilot work and serial production in one management.

Thanks to the initiative of Valery Romanovsky, head of the combat management department of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, the wisdom and prudence of his assistants Nikolai Ukharov, Valentin Maryin, employees of the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute of retired officers Alexander Nefedov, Dmitry Bednarsky, conducted joint tests of the Pioneer complex with promising communications (15P645M complex) successfully and practically on time.

At the same time, the newly appointed head of the 7 division, Major General of the Communications Forces Igor Kovalev (later the deputy head of the GURVO), played a huge role both directly in the work and in educating young officers of the department as complex officials. Nikolay Neverov, Lev Suslov and other officers showed themselves to be powerful complex commanders.

A reliable two-way radio communication was provided via telecode and voice channels of VHF radio communication: between the control panel of the division and the control panel of the regiment - up to 70 km, and between the control panel of the regiment and command post of the division (regiment) - up to 100 km. In addition, the necessary elements of the reserve command and control system were also placed in the vehicles. As a result, the complex 15P645M was adopted by the Soviet army.

An independent mass production of the 15P645М complex was not conducted, however, its creation in the form of an independent development work made it possible to optimize the work on creating the Pioneer-UTTH complex. His equipment was delivered to the troops as part of the Pioneer-UTH complex.

IMPROVED "PIONEER"

In 1977, a decree was issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to work on the Pioneer missile system with improved tactical and technical characteristics. Most of the work was to improve the accuracy of shooting and increase the zone of breeding warheads. Joint flight tests of the Pioneer-UTTH rocket complex (15P653 complex) were successfully carried out at the 4-th State Central Range (GPC) in 1979 – 1980.

The accumulated experience allowed the cooperation of the Moscow Institute, with the leading role of the 7 GURVO Directorate, to carry out work on the development and improvement of reserve command and control systems.

In 1984 – 1985, the Gorn special purpose missile complex was successfully developed, tested and put on combat duty, and the 7 control was also the headquarters for GURVO. The special head unit for the complex was developed by the head unit of the missile unit under the direction of the still young, but already promising, Yuri Solomon.
Author:
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http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2015-09-18/6_cooperation.html
13 comments
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  1. Amurets
    Amurets 19 September 2015 06: 04 New
    +4
    Still, how far back we were thrown off by the betrayal of interests of the USSR, first by Gorbachev, and then by the betrayal of the interests of Russia by Yeltsin.
  2. Grim Reaper
    Grim Reaper 19 September 2015 06: 50 New
    +1
    At 100 km VHF radio communication is not possible without additional transponders. Either within the line of sight (km 10-20 depending on the height of the antennas), or, at the very beginning of the VHF range, from a thousand km onwards, but 100 km .... Well, the laws of physics can and do change in wartime .. .))))
    1. veksha50
      veksha50 19 September 2015 09: 32 New
      +3
      Quote: Ecilop
      Well, the laws of physics can and do change in wartime ...))))



      Hmm ... they change, especially after a nuclear strike ... in the affected area and around it, any radio communication disappears, but VHF communication improves both in quality and in range ... Such is the game of nature and physical principles ...
    2. Nick
      Nick 19 September 2015 23: 26 New
      0
      Quote: Ecilop
      At 100 km VHF radio communication is not possible without additional transponders. Either within the line of sight (km 10-20 depending on the height of the antennas), or, at the very beginning of the VHF range, from a thousand km onwards, but 100 km .... Well, the laws of physics can and do change in wartime .. .))))

      The height of the antenna can significantly increase the range of reception / transmission IMHO
  3. kind
    kind 19 September 2015 07: 15 New
    0
    Temp-C I taught. Both launcher and rocket. The complex was structurally advanced, but its accuracy left much to be desired.
  4. Aksakal_07
    Aksakal_07 19 September 2015 08: 18 New
    +2
    What is the article about? About everything and about nothing. Everything is piled up: who was friends against whom, what departments were engaged in what squabbles, scraps of tactical and technical data of types of missiles, eulogies addressed to different designers and bosses ... In short, not an article, but snippets of conversations in the smoking-room about the industry’s interlovers.
  5. Old26
    Old26 19 September 2015 10: 06 New
    +2
    Quote: Aksakal_07
    What is the article about? About everything and about nothing. Everything is piled up: who was friends against whom, what departments were engaged in what squabbles, scraps of tactical and technical data of types of missiles, eulogies addressed to different designers and bosses ... In short, not an article, but snippets of conversations in the smoking-room about the industry’s interlovers.


    Article set A PLUSbecause there are very few such publications now. But I have to agree with the comrade Aksakal_07. An article about everything and about nothing. the beginning seems to be about creating a complex TEMP-2Cbut then switching to communication problems. But only to create TEMPA-2S, of its variants and “sequels”, it would be possible to write a separate, not even an article, but a book, since the topic is very interesting, but almost not covered.
    1. Amurets
      Amurets 19 September 2015 15: 18 New
      +1
      I agree! A lot remains in the shadows. About such personalities as Nadiradze; Invincible; Tyurin; Makeev brothers; Utkin brothers very, very little is known. And about the other creators of weapons the same thing. By the way, with the holiday Volodya.
  6. AlexA
    AlexA 19 September 2015 10: 16 New
    +6
    Quote: Aksakal_07
    and snippets of talk in the smoking room about the industry’s internals.

    You are unduly annoyed, colleague.
    Having served in the Strategic Missile Forces for 30 years, I can confirm that something like that was the case. It is important to know the nature of the relationship when creating complex systems. This is a natural interaction algorithm. Yes, with "squabbles." Weak people and great demons. Moreover, one must think how to overcome these squabbles. And the interaction experience that the author outlined is extremely useful. Today it will still have to be applied. And dig in the mud. Cleanliness is unacceptable.
    We will be adults. Will learn.
    1. Amurets
      Amurets 19 September 2015 15: 25 New
      +1
      I can only support the plus. Digging into someone else's dirty linen is not my hypostasis. And yes everywhere it is different, but something like that.
    2. vlbelugin
      vlbelugin 19 September 2015 20: 09 New
      0
      As a man who served in the Strategic Missile Forces for more than 20 years in the missile regiment with the Pioneers. Since 1978. Thoroughly know about communication problems. The connection between the PKP regiment and the PKP division is 70 km. - bluff. Communication was provided by R-111 which the author negatively responded to. The antenna "Volumetric vibrator" in the field position (mast height 15m) and "Pin" on the march. The divisions from the PKP regiment did not go far. The connection between the PKP regiment and the KP division in the R-137 100 km will never give. A tropospheric station will provide 100 km, but it is specific for its location in a field position.
      He served in the regiment where the "Pioneers" were first put on combat duty. Petrikov, Belarus. All experiments on practical application were carried out on us. With the connection of course there was a blockage.
      On the Topol, he himself was already the commander of the PKP regiment and the communications were much better. More modern communications were delivered there.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  7. Old26
    Old26 19 September 2015 19: 32 New
    0
    A few years ago I got an interesting book. Unfortunately, only in electronic form. Called the "Strategic Direction". Book about MIT. And about his developments (and of course about people). Much interesting has been written. And much has already been added to the known (the mosaic begins to take shape). The history of the creation of TEMPA-S is a whole stratum in the history of Russian rocket science. Plus the political background, plus the risk of our leadership, which, by directly violating the OSV-2 Treaty, arranged all this so that our "sworn friends" didn’t were able to prove.

    They say that last year a book about TsKB-7 Arsenal was also published. After all, if we know a lot or a little about such "monsters" of Russian rocket science, such as Korolev, Chelomey, Yangel, Makeev, but we know, then almost nothing about Tyurin and its products. But such developments he had almost thirty (meaning missile projects).

    PS Nikolay - thanks. The truth is no longer in the industry, but as they say, there are no former.
  8. gregor6549
    gregor6549 20 September 2015 13: 48 New
    0
    With all due respect to the merits of the author of the article, the article itself was not very impressed. Yes, at that time there were certain roughnesses between enterprises and organizations responsible for the development and manufacture of weapons and military equipment for the USSR Armed Forces, but such roughnesses were everywhere and were caused by many reasons (political, technical, personal, etc.). Some decisions were recognized infidels, which are the only correct ones, then everything changed, sometimes exactly the opposite. And it is not surprising that the mobile "strategists" in the early stages of their development did not find many supporters. You can, for example, recall that the element base of that time was much better suited for stationary complexes than for mobile ones, i.e. even with sufficiently compact BRs, the control and communication system turned out to be so cumbersome that they could still be called mobile, but they obviously didn’t pull the mobile name. So everything that the author describes was a normal "abnormal" process in almost all areas of the defense industry. The main thing is that as a result of this abnormal process, quite normal weapon systems and military equipment appeared. But in the United States, mobile strategic missile systems have been marred and thrown and are now biting their elbows, looking at Poplar and Yars. All that they have in this regard more or less succeeded is mobile complexes of cruise missiles.
  9. mahor
    mahor 24 January 2016 10: 40 New
    0
    Here is such a Pioneer:
  10. mahor
    mahor 24 January 2016 10: 42 New
    0
    first stage construction:
  11. mahor
    mahor 24 January 2016 10: 44 New
    0
    rocket complex Pioneer:

    All photos from the website militarirasha.ru