Trap on all seas

14
Our navy is not ready to fight mine hazards

The combat strength and strength of the anti-mine forces of the Russian Navy is almost an order of magnitude less than what is needed. In the event of a military conflict, this will lead to great losses and may undermine the solution of the tasks assigned to our fleet.

In the expert community, much attention is paid to discussing the problems of the Russian Navy. In this case, the main subject of analysis is the combat and numerical strength of our shock and anti-submarine forces fleet, various types of anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons, design features and combat capabilities of aircraft carriers, missile, anti-submarine and partly landing ships.

What does the bitter experience teach


However, almost completely dropped out of the attention of the expert community of the problem of mine action. And in vain. After all, today the mine war for the Russian fleet can be one of the main problems. As an example, we can recall the First World War on the Baltic MTD. In fact, mine warfare became the main content of the armed confrontation: mine-barrage and anti-mine actions. At the same time, the bulk of the losses on the ship’s sides were precisely from mine-weapons. During the Second World War, mine weapons also had their say. In some cases, mine-fencing actions were able to solve not only operational, but also operational-strategic tasks. An example is the blockade of the Gulf of Finland, carried out by the German and Finnish commands. As a result, the activities of the Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines on German communications in the Baltic Sea were practically paralyzed. An example of the large-scale and successful use of mine weapons in the post-war period is Iraq’s blockade of offshore oil pipelines in the Persian Gulf. To eliminate this threat, it was necessary to attract the efforts of most of the leading countries of the world, including the USSR, for quite some time.

Naturally, the question arises: can our Navy withstand a mine threat in a war? After all, the possibility of its occurrence is quite real, including with a high-tech adversary. In this case, our fleet will most likely solve strategic defense tasks from the sea (it is worth noting that strategic defense in a war at sea implies active offensive actions on a tactical and even operational scale, but on the whole at a strategic level this will be defense). That is, our fleet will conduct military operations mainly in the waters of the seas and oceans adjacent to our coast - in the Barents, Kara (and other seas through which the Northern Sea Route passes), the Baltic, Black, Okhotsk and Japan Seas, and western Pacific adjacent to Kamchatka.

Analysis of the depths and hydrological conditions of these areas suggests that they are very favorable for the enemy to conduct an “offensive” mine war by means of large-scale active mine-barrage actions. The Barents Sea, having a maximum depth of 600 meters, allows to use mine weapons in almost its entire water area with a total area of ​​1424 of thousands of square kilometers. At the same time on more than 56 percent of this sea, adjacent to our coast, landmines can be used against submarines and surface ships and ships. The situation is similar in other seas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to our coast, as well as in the Baltic Sea. The Sea of ​​Okhotsk is deeper, but up to 38 percent of its water area, mainly in areas adjacent to our coast, are suitable for the use of mine weapons. In the Black Sea, about 100 square kilometers of the water area adjacent to our coast can become the scene of a mine war. Thus, it can be stated that practically the majority of operational-important areas where military operations can unfold are favorable for the use of mine weapons against our fleet.

Dive, swim, shoot ...

At the same time, the developed countries of the world have very impressive arsenals of such weapons. Thus, the stockpiles of mines in the United States are estimated at more than one hundred thousand units. Comparable with their reserves in the NATO countries. Mines of the developed countries of the world are continuously improving in the direction of increasing resistance from the influence of anti-mine forces of a potential enemy and selectivity of hitting targets, as well as increasing the area of ​​damage of mines The experience of the Second World War shows that even a relatively small improvement in the mine weapon significantly complicates the fight against it and increases several times the required composition of the mine action forces to eliminate the mine threat. A distinctive feature of mine weapons is also an extremely long period of preservation of combat value. Thus, mines fired during the First World War were used quite effectively during the Second World War and the subsequent wars, while other types of weapons have already lost their combat significance.

Trap on all seas


Today, mine arsenals of developed countries include a wide range of mine weapons. These are anchor mines, contact mines (mainly of the Second World War and the first decades following it) and non-contact, with an allowable installation depth of up to 1800 meters, bottom mines of various types with an installation depth of from 50 to 100 meters and floating mines.

Among the most modern can be identified American anti-submarine anchor broadband mine Mk60 "Keptor", which is in standby mode, is able to detect and classify submarines and assigned to defeat to destroy the warhead - Mp46 torpedo mod. 4 at a distance of up to 1500 meters. Thus, the lane of this mine is up to 3000 meters. This mine can be installed from surface ships, submarines and from aircraft at depths up to 800 meters. It should be noted and the American self-transported mine Mk67 SLMM. It is based on the outdated Mk37 torpedo. This ground mine with a combined fuse, after exiting the torpedo tube, can travel up to 20 kilometers to the installation site. There are in service with the fleets of NATO and reactive pop-up mines, focused mainly on the defeat of surface ships.

The basis of the NATO mine arsenal is made up of bottom and anchor non-contact mines, which have combined fuses that react to certain characteristics of the magnetic and acoustic fields of ships and submarines. At the same time, their last samples have the capabilities to recognize the type of a target by its magnetoacoustic “portrait”. The damage area of ​​such mines lies in the range from 40 – 50 to 70 meters, depending on the weight of the warhead. Depth of the installation of bottom mines - ranging from 50 to 200 meters, and anchor - to 400 meters and more.

Practically all classes of warships and submarines, naval, tactical and strategic, can serve as carriers of mine weapons. aviation. Surface ships, mainly destroyers, frigates and corvettes, as well as special construction minzags, are mainly used for staging defensive minefields. They are characterized by high mine capacity, up to hundreds or more minutes. For active minefields, submarines and aircraft are used. Nuclear submarines are able to set 30–36 min, diesel-electric (non-nuclear) - up to 12-18. Strategic aircraft can take from 20 to 30 minutes depending on their weight and dimensions, carrier-based and tactical - from 2-3 to 8, and BPA - from 10 to 15.

Mine sowing


According to the experience of past wars, active mine settings can be started even before the start of official hostilities - in a day or two. Given the blurring of the boundaries of war and peace that emerged in recent years, when the United States and its allies created shock groups for a long time, balancing on the brink of war, and began hostilities without an official declaration of war, secretive active mining could start much earlier — in three to five and more than a day. At the same time, the total min-carrying capacity of carriers attracted for these actions, taking into account the possible share of the allocation of strategic and tactical aviation for mine warfare, can be estimated in 600 – 900 mines of various types. This will make it possible to place up to 1100 – 1600 min and more in the active minefields in the form of mine cans, strips or minefields during the period of danger. The main areas of staging such barriers can be water areas adjacent to the naval base and the PB, the probable deployment routes of the submarines and connections of surface ships, patrol areas of the PKK CH, as well as areas of maritime communications. The choice of the carrier of a mine weapon and its mode of movement will be chosen in such a way as to exclude the identification of the fact of mining. Given the limited number of aircraft RLD of Russia and the lack of capabilities of anti-submarine forces, this is quite possible. Minefields can be rarefied - with the likelihood of 0,1 – 0,3 detonation, which can create a limited resource of mines on large areas, constrain the actions of fleet forces in them and cause enemy forces to overvoltage, and with a probability of 0,6 – 0,8, created with the aim blockades of certain areas, in particular, the naval base and naval forces of the fleet, which will disrupt the deployment of enemy force fleet groupings and destroy them in basing areas. Taking into account the disposable resource and operational capabilities of minefield defenses, the enemy is able to block naval weapons from 5 – 6 to 9 – 10 to the naval base and PB in a threatened period, as well as create a mine threat in operational areas with a total area of ​​up to 10 thousand square kilometers In this case, the total area of ​​minefields of various densities can be significantly lower - without having accurate information about the location of mine settings, it will be necessary to close and inspect the minesweepers with much larger areas than the measures of the minefield).

The enemy in a very short time, in two or three days, is able to block with minefields both the basing areas of our fleet and deployment routes. What can the Russian Navy oppose to this threat?

It includes 55 mine and mine ships, including 17 marine minesweepers, 21 base and 17 raid ships. The main purpose of naval minesweepers is to combat the danger of mines outside the waters of naval bases and bases, in particular for the MIP of naval connections along deployment routes. Such ships have the Black Sea Fleet the most - eleven units. Northern and Pacific are significantly smaller - four and two, respectively. Strange distribution, given the characteristics of the theater and the scale of the potential mine threat. There are no base minesweepers who solve the tasks of an SME mainly in the operational zones of the Navy and Naval Forces as a part of the Black Sea Fleet. And in the Baltic, Northern and Pacific, there are five, seven and seven, respectively. Two more such ships are part of the Caspian Flotilla. Minesweepers targeting mine threat in areas of the naval base and the coastal zone, as well as in the open sea directly adjacent to them, mostly in the Baltic Fleet (9) and the Caspian Flotilla (5), and the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets have only two and one accordingly. In the Northern Fleet there are none at all.

Mine action minesweepers are part of the shipboard trawling groups (KTG) of two or three, maximum four fighting units. Thus, the disposable composition of the PMO ships makes it possible to form one or two CTGs in the Northern Fleet, one CTG in the Pacific Fleet and five CTGs in the Black Sea Fleet for operations in the sea and ocean zones. For actions in the areas of responsibility and water areas of the naval base and naval base, it is possible to form five to eight CTGs at the Baltic Fleet, two or three at the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet and only one at the Black Sea Fleet.

To search for and destroy mines, these ships have a fairly wide range of anti-mine weapons. These are various types of contact and non-contact trawls, mine finders, etc. However, the search and destruction mine range for all is very small and ranges from 30 – 60 to 200 – 300 meters. At the same time, the allowable speed of the carrier can vary within very wide limits: from five to eight nodes for certain types of contact trawls and mine finders to 14 – 18 nodes for high-speed trawls, mostly non-contact ones. The probability of detecting mines also varies widely: from 0,1 – 0,2 for non-contact trawls of obsolete types against mines with a multiplicity of operation to 0,7 – 0,9 for contact trawls and min searchers. Thus, the possibilities for examining the water area of ​​one CTG can be estimated from the 1,2 – 2 to 3,5 – 5 square kilometers per hour. Very limited potential.

From among other forces of the MIP, the minesweeper helicopters Mi-14BT can be called. In the Russian Navy, there are only three of them, judging by the open data, and all are in storage. It is obvious that their contribution to the solution of operational-scale software will be negligible. There are no other special forces and equipment of the Russian fleet that could be important in more or less serious military operations.

The complex of the tasks of the MPS, which are solved by these forces, can be reduced to two main ones: the search and destruction of mines in the designated water area, the wiring of a group of ships behind the trawls in the mine hazardous area. The mine action forces of the Northern Fleet are able to simultaneously provide wiring for the trawls of no more than two ship groups and survey areas from 60 to 110 square miles of the naval and naval areas, as well as their areas of responsibility, within a day. For the Pacific Fleet, these figures have the values ​​of one and 70 – 120, respectively. The Baltic Fleet, without having minesweepers of the sea and ocean zones, can provide wiring to the bases of responsibility for bases of up to three ship groups and inspect 90 – 160 square kilometers of the water area near the naval base and PB in one day. The Black Sea Fleet, having a relatively powerful group of sea-minesweepers, has the potential to ensure, even in sea zones, wiring up to five ship groups, or by retargeting the tasks of the PMO of home-based areas to clear 100 – 180 square kilometers.

Now we will compare these possibilities with the needs of the fleets. In the marine and oceanic zones, the SF and the Pacific Fleet will operate from 15 – 20 to 40 and more different groups of warships and submarines. As part of only one heterogeneous strike connection, which solves the problem of defeating an enemy carrier group, there may be from 5 – 6 to 10 – 12 various tactical groups and units. And it is also necessary to ensure the protection of coastal maritime communications, where the traffic flow is usually much higher. Thus, the trawling forces of our ocean fleets do not have the ability to escort ships and ships behind the trawls, except for one or two particularly important groups. The situation is similar in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Although there is a gap between needs and capabilities significantly less than in the ocean fleets, the number of ship groups and ships for which wiring may be required exceeds the resource of mine-sweeping forces by almost an order of magnitude.

Taking into account the experience of previous wars and calculations, it can be assumed that the direct losses of our fleet from mine weapons can be from 10 – 15 to 20 – 25 percent of warships and submarines. Significant damage will be inflicted on the civilian fleet.

We have to admit that our Navy is completely unprepared to combat the danger of mines. Moreover, the degree of lagging behind the needs in this area is significantly higher than that in other areas of naval confrontation.

Old but good weapon


A natural question: can our fleets respond to the enemy with an adequate mine threat?

Reasons to expect an affirmative answer we have. After all, the Russian and Soviet fleets demonstrated in the past a very high level of mine wars, especially offensive ones.

In the USSR, great attention was paid to the development of mine weapons. Immediately after the end of the war, large-scale work began on the creation of ammunition of the new generation, taking into account the military experience gained. Already in the middle of the 50-s, new types of mines were developed, including those that appeared in foreign fleets only a few decades later. In particular, the world's first anchor jet-pop-up mine CRM, which entered service in 1957 year. In the future, special attention was paid to the search for qualitatively new ideas and concepts. It was in the USSR at the beginning of the 70 that the world's first broadband mine, the anti-submarine mine torpedo, was created. In the US, a similar concept to the Mk60 “Keptor” appeared only by the middle of the 80-s. Development continued and other samples. In particular, the RM-1 and the PM-2, used respectively from naval aircraft and submarines, replaced the CRM mine.

Arsenals of mine weapons of the USSR Navy were very significant. According to foreign experts, they could reach several tens of thousands of different mines.

The features of mines as weapons make it possible to effectively apply not only the latest models, but also those that were created quite a long time ago. Iraq, blocking the Strait of Hormuz during the war with Iran, used 2500 mines on a par with the more modern and formally outdated samples, but fighting them remained as difficult as during the First World War. To eliminate the mine threat in this area, it took the efforts of all the leading countries of the world together with the United States and the USSR. Therefore, mine weapons in the Russian Navy, even created in the 50s of the last century, with proper use are quite effective in our time. Probably, the part of the arsenal inherited by Russia from the USSR over the past years has significantly decreased. Naval mine is a constructively sophisticated type of weapon. In the 90 and zero years there were no sufficient funds to maintain them (like many others) in a state of combat capability. Therefore, we can assume that in the arsenals of the Navy several thousand pieces of mine weapons have been preserved, which can be used in a possible war. However, this amount is enough. The Russian fleet has almost the entire nomenclature of modern mines, remaining among the world leaders in this regard. There are various ground mines weighing from 500 to 1500 kilograms, equipped with combined fuses, allowing the use of aircraft, surface ships and submarines. Among the modern samples of this class are the large mines MDM-1 and MDM-2 weighing about a ton. Both allow use from surface ships. The first can be installed from 533-mm submarine torpedo tubes, and the second from airplanes. The depth of their production can reach 120, and the radius of the affected area - up to 50 – 70 meters. In the same row, one can distinguish a small bottom mine MDM-3 weighing about 500 kilograms, intended for use at depths up to 30 meters. A significant number of traditional anchor mines (mostly non-contact ones) remain, including deep-water ones, which can be used at depths up to 1500 meters. There is a considerable number of reactive-pop-up mines in the mine arsenals - PM-1 and PM-2. An important place in the mine weapon system of the Russian Navy is occupied by broadband mines, designed primarily to destroy submarines. The most modern model of them is the anti-submarine complex PMK-2. Made in dimensions 533-mm torpedoes, it can be used with aircraft and submarines. The permissible depth at the installation site is 1000 meters, and the radius of destruction, by analogy with the American “Keptor” and based on the analysis of the principle of its operation, is two kilometers or more. At the same time, the weight of the 130 kilogram charge ensures the destruction of any modern submarine.

About delivery vehicles - sadly


However, the arsenals themselves do not allow us to wage a mine war. A prerequisite is the presence of carriers of these weapons that meet certain requirements. Among them, first of all, it should be noted the ability to mine mine secrets. For if the fact of a mine action is recorded by the enemy, he will take effective measures to neutralize. Near its bases, this will be the destruction of a minefield, which is quite feasible in a limited area. And the defensive minefields of our fleet, if they are revealed, are easy to get around - it’s impossible to block a large area with mines and you should leave safe fairways for your ships and vessels. Another important requirement for the carrier is the high positioning accuracy. Inaccurately exposed mine barrage may be outside the zone of movement of the enemy, thereby losing operational significance, and also pose a threat to its own forces. Military story replete with examples of such errors, including in the domestic fleet. In particular, several warships and ships were lost on their defensive minefields during the Second World War. Another important requirement is the sufficient min-carrying capacity of the carriers, which makes it possible to ensure the formulation of the quantity required to achieve a given operational effect.

The Russian fleet can use surface warships (mainly minesweepers, patrol ships, destroyers, corvettes, frigates and landing craft), submarines and naval aircraft to perform mine operations.

The highest lift capacity is provided by surface ships. A destroyer or frigate is able to take from 20 – 30 to 50 min. Minesweepers, patrol ships and corvettes hold from 10 – 15 to 25 – 30 mines of various types. Most of all mines can take landing ships - from 50 – 60 to 100 and more. As a rule, surface ships have relatively high positioning accuracy. However, they do not meet the requirements of concealment of actions, especially in the far sea zone, near the enemy’s basing system. Therefore, they can be used mainly for defensive minefields. For the production of such a few days before the reliably expected war, the main part of minesweepers and landing ships can be involved. Their total lifting capacity can be estimated in 500 – 600 min on BF, 700 – 800 min on Black Sea Fleet, to 600 on SF and TOF.

Nuclear submarines meet almost all the requirements for mine weapon carriers. They can be most effectively used for the implementation of active mine settings. However, they take mine ammunition instead of standard torpedoes. And those of them from 24 to 36 maximum. And of them several torpedoes of large caliber - 650 millimeters. Such TAs are unsuitable for use of mine weapons. Still need to have some torpedoes for self-defense. As a result, when using a submarine exclusively for mine-barrage actions, it will be able to take on board from 14 – 20 to 40 min. At the same time, it must be remembered that there are few nuclear submarines in the Russian fleet, they are not enough for other tasks. Diesel-electric submarines can take on less than mines - within 12 – 16. Moreover, in the case of attracting them to active mine-barrage actions, it will be more difficult to refocus these boats to solve other tasks than nuclear ones, because the economic speed of the underwater course of diesel boats during deployment is two to three times lower.

The use of any classes of submarines for defensive minefields is clearly inappropriate.

Taking into account the above, it is possible to estimate the submarine submarine forces lifting capacity, taking into account the possible number of ships allocated for mine action. On the SF, this may be 50 – 80 minutes, on the Pacific Fleet - 30 – 40, on the BF and BSF - the maximum 15 – 20. In fact, this is all that our fleets can really count on in active mine actions.

The composition of naval aviation for mine settings can be naval assault aircraft (Su-24 aircraft in the Air Force belong to the class of front-line bombers), anti-submarine aircraft (Il-38, Tu-142 and obsolete, stored in warehouses, but quite suitable for solving problems mine-defensive actions Be-12) and transport (An-12 and An-26) aviation. The main advantage of naval aviation is the ability to perform several sorties in a short time. Compared with similar indicators of foreign fleets, the use of naval aviation can be as follows: naval assault - up to two sorties per day per aircraft, anti-submarine and transport - up to one departure per day or three, depending on the remoteness of the area of ​​operations and the nature of the tasks. However, the secrecy of actions of naval aviation aircraft during the period of danger can be ensured mainly in the near sea zone. The experience of wars and armed conflicts shows that the waters attaching to the advanced bases of NATO and the United States, as well as the areas of maneuvering and deployment of their ship groups will be controlled by X-deck (E-2C Hokai) and ground-based aircraft (E-3 of various modifications) . Therefore, to ensure the secrecy of active mine operations by naval aviation in these areas is almost impossible. Minimum carrying capacity of aircraft based on normal combat load, the number of suspension points of armaments and the volume of cargo compartments can be estimated in 2 – 4 mines, respectively, of large and small caliber for Su-24 and Be-12, 4 – 12 min for Il-38 and Tu-142 , 3 – 10 min for An-26 and 10 – 20 min for An-12.

The capabilities of fleet aviation for the performance of mine settings two to three days before the outbreak of hostilities can be assessed as follows: ocean fleets (SF and TOF) - from 300 to 500 min depending on their type and the allocated aviation resource, fleets of closed MTVD (PF and BF) - up to 200 – 250.

Opportunities only a little from need


Based on the characteristics of the forces attracted to mine settings, it is possible to predict their probable distribution according to the decision of mine action. In the far sea and ocean zones, near the enemy’s home system, they will be carried out by submarines. In remote areas of the near-sea zone, outside the enemy’s airspace control system, on probable deployment routes of enemy submarines and in the defense system of combat areas of their forces (in particular, on SSBN patrol areas), naval aviation will be involved in mine-defensive actions. And in the areas of responsibility of the naval base and the PB, as well as in the system of covering the areas of coastal sea communications, the main burden of the task will fall on surface ships.

During the period of danger and the first days of hostilities, in the active minefields, ocean fleets will be able to set from 30 to 80 mines, and fleets of closed MTVD - in 15 – 20. In the system of covering combat zones of the fleet forces and on probable deployment routes of enemy submarines in remote areas of the near-sea zone of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet - by 300 – 500 mines, BSF and BF - by 150 – 200, and in defensive minefields - by 500 – 600 and 500 – 800, respectively. In the future, the possibilities of conducting mine-barrage actions will be significantly reduced, since the main forces of the fleets will be involved in solving more important tasks (in particular, the MEP).

The capabilities of our fleets to carry out mine-barrage actions show that in the near sea zone our Navy can create a rather serious mine threat, providing cover for the main home areas, sea lanes and water areas of combat operations and deployment of fleet forces. However, in the distant sea and ocean zones, the possibilities are limited to creating a mine for a threat only in one or two naval forces (PB) of the enemy’s fleet from among the many that they have on the MTR. Thus, it can be stated that if our fleet still has certain capabilities to cover its forces with defensive barriers, then it cannot conduct an offensive mine war. At the same time, potential adversaries have almost an order of magnitude greater opportunities to conduct similar active actions. Against the background of the almost complete inability of our fleet to parry the mine threat even near its own coast, it is necessary to take emergency measures.
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  1. +3
    20 September 2015 08: 50
    Mine weapons are very serious weapons. However, its development has slowed down somewhat due to the fact that they are not given as much attention as other types of weapons. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that "classic" passive anchor mines are easily detected by modern means, as well as active bottom mines have become vulnerable to modern detection equipment due to their "contrast" at the bottom, as well as the action of weak radiation from the operation of their equipment. However, even such mines can greatly slow down and complicate the operational-tactical deployment of the fleet's activities. Modern mine weapons must survive a new revolution - mines must become "smart" self-transporting. Mines are no longer as cheap weapons as they used to be, which means they need to be used in fewer quantities, but their effectiveness should be increased due to revolutionary technologies. Well, for example, create a special coating that modifies the appearance of a mine after it is placed at the bottom making it indistinguishable from surrounding stones or rocks, mines can be located in special hidden places of the world ocean at the bottom and begin their advance to the place of application by special commands, according to the same teams, they can go back to the place of "gathering", etc.
  2. +3
    20 September 2015 09: 08
    - What about ?? Me - in this? Single-breasted? What are you? Don't you know that no one is fighting in a single-breasted one now? Ugliness! The war is on the doorstep, and we are not ready! No, we are not ready for war! (From the movie "The Same Mühausen")

    It is good that this problem was raised for review. To lament that we are not ready for a mine war is at least ridiculous. Remember who headed Russia and the Ministry of Defense in the last 25 years. And what attention was paid to the army, navy, aviation. The absence of any programs and concepts for the development of the defense system and weapons was determined by the state of the economy. Officials from all bodies and levels of government wanted to spit on Russia's defense capabilities. And in relation to the fleet, no one thought so at all. Not having the slightest idea of ​​the tactical and strategic purpose of the Navy, they allocated funds on a leftover basis, and the then leadership of the fleet sat quietly and was silent in a rag, fearing something to blurt out. Forgotten the covenant of Peter Alekseevich "A state that has an army and a navy has both hands!"
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. 0
      20 September 2015 15: 15
      Quote: sso-250659
      . Wailing that we are not ready for a mine war is at least ridiculous.


      Why is it ridiculous, this, alas, is not a new problem ... Before the Second World War, for example, things weren’t going smoothly either - the 1941 Tallinn crossing alone was worth what and what losses the Baltic Fleet suffered, especially in minefields .. .
      To hush up the problem and pretend that now everything is in openwork is not just ridiculous, but also dangerous ....
      1. 0
        20 September 2015 22: 16
        Quote: ranger
        Before the Second World War, for example, things weren’t going smoothly either - the 1941 Tallinn crossing alone was worth what and what losses the Baltic Fleet suffered, especially in minefields ...

        In the Tallinn crossing, it was not so much a shortage of trawls and military vehicles as in the mess with planning the transition.
        The bet was placed on 53 minesweepers located in Tallinn. But the trouble is that about half of them - twenty-three - minesweepers, ten - basic minesweepers and twenty - slow-moving. There were no trawls on eighteen minesweeper boats. They failed during the previous trawlings, while the rest had one or two sets, and they were clearly not enough. At the same time, in the warehouses of the Main Base, subversive teams destroyed trawls and minesweepers that were transported from Kronstadt to Tallinn just before the war.

        Despite the instructions in the guidance documents on the mandatory circumvention of the edges of the minesweeper when crossing the barriers, this simple tactical technique, which allowed the ships to be held in the minesweeper, was not foreseen in terms of transition, although there were milestones on Aegna Island. To circle the fairways cleared of mines, minesweepers traveling without trawls could be used. After that, the convoys could force the Yuminda minefield along the minesweeper at night and go out to the Gogland Island in the morning, i.e., enter the zone of activity of our fighter aircraft. This would significantly reduce losses from air strikes.
        (c) V.M. Yoltukhovsky. "Mine war in the Baltic, 1941".
      2. 0
        21 September 2015 07: 07
        Quote: ranger
        Why ridiculous, this, alas, is not a new problem ...

        The point is not ridiculous, but the need to solve this problem as quickly as possible.
    3. 0
      20 September 2015 16: 20
      Quote: sso-250659
      The absence of any programs and concepts for the development of the defense system and armaments was determined by the state of the economy. Officials from all bodies and levels of government wanted to spit on Russia's defense capabilities.

      Not entirely true. For some officials, military spending is a gold mine, for others it is an opportunity to promote themselves, and for both categories the minesweeper-class ships are not interesting, give them a scale, such as "modernization" of the TAKR Nakhimov, this is where the field is not plowed for embezzlement and for PR, patriots write with boiling water listing how many missiles it will be possible to shove in and which ones ... then that Nakhimov will not go anywhere beyond the first mine (in case of war), everyone is absolutely indifferent ...
  3. -2
    20 September 2015 10: 25
    From what sources did the author take information?
  4. +1
    20 September 2015 14: 26
    The author is right in the main - the mine’s mine defense is needed on a new intellectual basis, otherwise all combat units can be locked up in bases or cut off from them once. There is only one way out - it is necessary to prepare defense lines ahead of time. I would like to hear what the adversary has and what we are going to oppose him in counteraction. But in VO something does not sound this side of the question.
    Professionals, where are you, enlighten!
  5. 0
    20 September 2015 16: 40
    we, according to military doctrine, are not conducting offensive actions and in modern conditions the main task of mines is the fight against submarines. To combat submarines, we are releasing diesel-electric submarines and multi-purpose nuclear submarines, as well as producing small corvette-type ships (patrol ship). We have also modernized the airborne search tools for these submarines: helicopters and anti-submarine aircraft. Therefore, we have organized a mobile complex to ensure the search for Pl in any area of ​​our coastal zone. The advantages of this complex are obvious; it is mobile in contrast to minefields and has a quick reaction and, naturally, is much less expensive than throwing mines all over the coast.
    An offensive offensive war - well, it’s kind of work in the far zone - for this we simply don’t have naval groups whose raid would need to be supported by minefields or defense against enemy counterattacks - therefore an offensive mine war has no meaning. And with surface ships, as before, the most effective means of destruction is aviation with anti-ship missiles.
    Well, and most importantly, as for me, it’s much more important to install stationary sonars in the area of ​​your military and important strategic civilian naval bases and ports - it’s much more important to know what and where it’s floating than to stick it all with mines. That is, I see more important the development of precisely the means of underwater and surface reconnaissance - and the means of destruction in principle will work without fail.
    Yes, I think there are bay places and entrances to large rivers that need to be blocked in the event of a military conflict - where our ships do not go but the enemy is undesirable here, yes, I agree mines are needed - just like that they are scattered by mines given their unrealistic cost.
  6. +1
    20 September 2015 17: 48
    Why don’t you serve Mr. Sivkov for the good of the fatherland, but are only trying to convince us with your articles that we are so defenseless before the enemy. Or do you consider yourself smarter than military, scientists, analysts? Or just wanted to be clever.
  7. -1
    20 September 2015 19: 15
    The author complains about the lack of basic minesweepers on the Russian Navy. But BT can be any vessel with a trawl, echo sounder and a remote fuse of enemy mines. In the worst case, you can stupidly take iron barrels, throw explosives and scrap metal into them (so that they go to the bottom), install the simplest remote or hydrostatic fuse and clean them with water around their bases. Spending money on basic minesweepers in peacetime seems to me D&G (expensive and stupid :))
    1. 0
      20 September 2015 22: 27
      Quote: ivanovbg
      But BT can be any vessel with a trawl, echo sounder and a remote fuse of enemy mines. hydrostatic fuse and clean them with water around their bases.

      You will first find the trawl, echo sounder and "remote detonator of enemy mines". smile
      The "echo sounder" will not work here - at least a mine detecting GAS is needed + a "reference" picture of the bottom in the area of ​​the naval base is very desirable (the removal of which should systematically, even in peacetime, be dealt with by the same BTShch).
      "Remote fuse" is a complex with an unmanned underwater vehicle. The thing is also not cheap.

      And most importantly - all this must be able to use. Where on any vessel will you find a qualified operator of gas or air conditioning? And if you prepare them in peacetime, isn’t it easier to do it on a specialized ship, where all these systems are installed properly and which operators will not have to get used to later?
      Simply put, taking into account the equipment and training of the team, a specialized BTSC will cost a little more than mobilized, and its efficiency will be higher.
      Quote: ivanovbg
      In the worst case, you can stupidly take iron barrels, throw explosives and scrap metal in them (so that they go to the bottom), install a simple remote or hydrostatic fuse and clean them with water around their bases.

      Kamrad, would you read anything about the activities of the mine-sweeping forces of the Navy in the Great Patriotic War. Even then, this did not work - after processing the fairways and water areas of the BGB bases, mines were still located. At best, minesweepers. At worst ... they worked under ships and ships.
  8. 0
    21 September 2015 09: 52
    YES, the article is called ... And all about business ... How much more do we need to do again what we ourselves ditched while listening to the lulling fables of the liberals in the 90s. And they again raise their heads in order to seize power, but now they are already fulfilling multimillion-dollar grants from the West.
  9. 0
    21 September 2015 20: 31
    The question is, how many modern minesweepers does the super duper fleet of "light elves" have? At least a series was laid down and launched and almost surrendered Alexander Obukhov (conducts mooring tests)
    project 12700 will go into series. The number of production ships of the project 12700 at this time is not known exactly
    And what about the "light elves?"
  10. 0
    1 January 2022 16: 24
    It is necessary to make a clarification, a quote: "capable of detecting and classifying submarines and destroying them with a warhead - torpedo Mk46 mod. 4 at a distance of up to 1500 meters. Thus, the strike range of this mine is up to 3000 meters." Unfortunately, the author of the article identifies the detection (response) range with the destruction range. torpedo Mk.46 has a warhead weighing only 44 kg detonation of the charge (mod Mk.46.3) occurs at a distance of 0.6 m from the target.

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