Tom Christiansen: "The Russians are destroying us; they are robbing us of means of food": Russian-Norwegian relations in the Far North until 1820
Tom Christiansen: "Russians are ruining us; they are depriving us of the means of subsistence."
North as a challenge and source of friction
Why the vast, barren and mostly uninhabited border areas between Russia and Norway in the High North caused conflicts in the pre-nationalist period stories, at the end of the XVIII and the first decades of the XIX centuries? And why did Russia withdraw from solving these conflicts? In the end, poor and small Norway, which regained its statehood only in 1814, was unable to bear the powerful Russian empire. Finally, one may ask whether the conflicts of that era were heralds of the challenges facing this region in our time.
This article attempts to analyze the relationship between Russia and Norway in this almost uninhabited region on the extreme northern periphery of Europe, which is primarily characterized by its colossal dimensions, a very rare population and extremely harsh weather conditions. On the other hand, over time, there was a growing understanding that the region was abundant in natural resources such as fish, minerals, and marine animals - not to mention the oil and gas discovered in the recent era. The resident population of the Murmansk coast, from Grense Jakobselva in north-eastern Norway to Cape Svyatoy Nos at the entrance to the White Sea, was at that time less than a hundred families. This period in the history of the Far North almost does not attract the attention of Russian and Norwegian historians, despite frequent conflicts over borders and natural resources, which regularly darkened the relations between the two countries over the past two centuries. However, it should be emphasized that these conflicts never led to any serious confrontation. Some of the disputes over borders, natural resources, and jurisdictional issues continued to be a source of disagreement after World War II. However, they acquired a multilateral and international aspect, not at all typical of the era from the beginning of the 19th century. until the interwar period.
Our article will cover four main topics. First, there are unresolved issues related to the land and maritime border; secondly, the problem of recent Russian settlements in the undoubtedly Norwegian territory in East Finnmark; thirdly, conflicts between Russian and Norwegian subjects about fishing off the coast of Finnmark; and, finally, the Pomeranian trade, which was a kind of traditional barter between Russian Pomors and residents of northern Norway. Norway’s 400-year-old union with Denmark ended in 1814, with Norway gaining sovereignty and a liberal constitution. But since Denmark and Norway were on the side of the defeated in the Napoleonic wars, Norway was forced to unite with Sweden according to the Kiel Treaty between Denmark and Sweden, signed in January 1814. The terms of this union were discussed in the Moscow Convention between Norway and Sweden, concluded in August of the same year. According to the Scandinavian Union, which existed before 1905, the Swedish king was at the same time the king of Norway, and in addition, all external relations of both states fell under the jurisdiction of Sweden. In all other respects, Norway maintained its own state institutions. In 1809 was Russia and Norway became neighbors as a result of the fact that Sweden, under the Friedrichsgamt Treaty, ceded Russia to Finland. Despite this painful loss, Crown Prince Karl-Johan (King with 1818) followed a conciliatory policy towards Russia: it is believed that it allowed Norway to pursue a policy of territorial consolidation in the High North. The Crimean War (1854-1856) put an end to this stage in the Swedish policy towards Russia. At the beginning of the XIX century. Pasvik, Neiden and Paysen counties, which constituted the border zone between Russia and Norway, had practically no Norwegian population. However, only recently, historians began to pay attention to the fact that the Russian and Norwegian expansion did not take place on no man's land. Therefore, conflicts affected not only two states, but also three ethnic groups - Norwegians, Russians and Saami. The vulnerability of the indigenous Sami culture was due to the fact that in the vast territory of the border districts there were only extremely small communities. For example, in the district of Neiden at the end of the XVIII century. no more than 2-3 families lived. It was the traditional way of life of the coastal Saami that suffered most from the proliferation of Russian and Norwegian fishing and trade enterprises. At the same time, the aforementioned topics did not find any noticeable reflection in Norwegian historiography and discussions about relations with Russia. Central to both Swedish and Norwegian discourse since the mid-19th century. hold fears about the "instinctive thrust of Russia to the seas" in order to create a non-freezing port. Such a desire for expansion is seen as a logical continuation of the growth of the Russian Empire in the XVII-XIX centuries. Although it expanded mainly to the south and east, it was believed that a similar expansion should be expected in the north-western direction due to the need of Russia in the ice-free port to facilitate access to the North Atlantic. This article is based on the assumption that the relationship between Norway and Russia in the north at the beginning of the XIX century. and later (strictly speaking, up to the Bolshevik revolution) should be studied from a different point of view than the perspective of politics, great strategy and diplomacy, which has long been the standard in scientific research and public debate. In many respects, the issues we are considering can be considered the first stages of the macrohistorical process, which continues to this day - namely, expansion into the Arctic and its territorial demarcation. Einar Niemi proposed to base the periodization of the history of the Far North in 1800-1940. questions of "national construction and its needs." In addition, the period 1814-1917's. characterized as "the peak of interaction between two neighboring nations [Russia and Norway] on the shores of the Arctic Ocean." As noted above, in this article we will address the least studied period, t. e. The gap is approximately between 1800 and 1820. Niemi stresses that the roots of the idea of a “Russian threat” date primarily from this period. However, national construction and its needs should be seen as a response to the challenge facing the country. Therefore, the focus of our attention will be the local economic, legal and social conditions that fueled this idea of a threat, and not at all the fears that existed in Stockholm and Christiania before the "big strategy" of Russia, which was plotting expansion in the north.
Researchers have demonstrated that the fears of the Norwegians towards Russia are largely based on a fabricated myth. John Rice Crowe, British Consul General in the small northern town of Hammerfest, in his reports of the 1830s. tried to convince the British Foreign Office of Russia's encroachment on Finnmark. At that time, Crowe was probably well aware of the local conflicts between the Norwegians and the Russians, and on this basis he made a strong conclusion that the cause of the conflicts was royal expansionism. During the Crimean War, Crowe's ideas received official approval from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Palmerston, and found expression in the November Treaty of 1855, according to which France and the United Kingdom took upon themselves the defense of the Scandinavian Union from the Russian invasion in exchange for a promise from Sweden and Norway do not cede any lands to the Russian Tsar. The expansion in the Far North, carried out by the efforts of both Russian and Norwegian subjects, created numerous points of contact between them. Although these contacts and tensions never led to armed conflict or serious disagreement between the governments of Norway and Russia, in some local communities they were again and again perceived as a threat. Therefore, it can be assumed that researchers who strongly deny Crowe’s point of view tend to forget that he was well aware of the local situation in the High North. Naval expeditions to Finnmark, organized by the Norwegian authorities in 1816-1818, indicate that the threat was felt even twenty years before Crowe’s alarming reports, although this threat was seen in a completely different way.
Historiography of Russian-Norwegian relations in the Far North
The Norwegian historiography of the epoch immediately following the 1814 year is mainly devoted to the fundamental challenges that the newly created state faced - namely, constitutional consolidation and the need to put completely distracted public finances in order. The very first steps of Norway in foreign policy and the protection of national interests in the Far North almost do not attract the attention of researchers. There are no general works covering the Norwegian-Russian relations in this part of the country in the first decades of the 19th century. In his book on the role of the Soviet Union in Norway’s foreign policy, Egil Danielsen mentions border conflicts of the 1820s, which ended with the 1826 border agreement and the 1834 additional protocol. In the work of Kore Selnes on the history of Russian-Norwegian relations only trade agreements concluded between the two countries in that era. The authors of these works do not pay attention to maritime border disputes, nor measures taken by the Norwegians to strengthen their power, nor illegal settlements, or conflicts over fishing. Accordingly, in general, these publications are maintained in a very positive way ...
There are several studies that examine certain aspects of the Norwegian-Russian relations in the High North, in particular, they are devoted to local historical literature of the northern provinces. But with regard to the topics we are considering, they still can only give a fragmentary picture. The land border issue was comprehensively covered in the influential work of Oscar Albert Johnsen on the political history of Finnmark published in 1920 ... In this book, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the period from the "ancient times and saga epoch" to the signing of an agreement on Johnsen’s border survey at 1826 provides a rigorous review of factors affecting taxes, land borders and local livelihoods, but a serious analysis of the relationship between Norway and Russia in his work tstvuet. The Border Treaty of 1826 has not been the subject of any significant discussion in Norwegian historiography, most likely because it did not later become a source of significant conflict. First of all, this treaty was criticized by Russia and Finland. Johnsen strongly denies that under the 1826 agreement, Norway received more than what it had the historical right to claim, according to the Russians and the Finns. On the contrary, according to Johnsen, the Norwegian side has shown greater moderation given the fears that were generated by the behavior of the Russians in the border districts - fears based on the belief that Russia wants to tear away these territories ... Johnsen claims that it is the Norwegians - soon after , as Sweden was forced to cede to Finland, - initiated the process that led to the conclusion of the 1826 Treaty. By that time, the Copenhagen government prepared a report on what can be done to combat problems orye are Russian nationals. However, nothing came of this attempt to enter into dialogue with Russia. Astri Andresen, studying the history of the Eastern Sami, comes to the conclusion that not all aspects of the 1826 contract remained studied. From the point of view of the Sami, the key problem was the relationship between the state border and the traditional Sami right to trade in border districts, the so-called "Siida". However, it is quite obvious that neither the Norwegian nor the Russian government took into account the interests of the Sami during the negotiation process.
Oscar Albert Johnsen was the first Norwegian historian to draw attention to several controversial points in the development of Norwegian-Russian relations in the early 19th century. The reason for this friction, however, was the actions of Russian subjects, and not the royal policy. The population of Finnmark constantly complained to the Danish-Norwegian authorities about the Russians. According to these complaints, according to Johnsen, the Russians were fishing in the Norwegian territorial waters, collected fin, bird eggs and down, robbed the local population, and moreover, resorted to violence, even against officials. Russian historian Konstantin Chudinov also examines the question of the Russian-Norwegian border settlement. He points out that Karl-Johan’s conciliatory policy towards Russia and the 1817 trade agreement revived the commercial ties between the Russian-Pomors and the Norwegians. Chudinov is considering the issue of the border from the point of view of officials of both countries and, in his opinion, the 1826 Treaty. and the relevant section of the controversial districts did not lead to any conflicts between the neighboring countries. However, Astri Andresen, in a note to Chudinov’s article, argues that the context in which the border treaty was concluded still remains poorly understood. She points out that the relations between various ethnic groups in the border districts were strained, while Chudinov, tracking the official point of view, does not deal with local tensions between Russian and Norwegian subjects. According to Andresen and Johnsen, it was probably these conflicts that served as the basis for the creation of 1826. border commission. Andresen stresses that in the existing situation the East Sami were the worst of all. The history of the issue of territorial waters, especially in its earliest part, was also not subjected to in-depth analysis either from a historical or a legal point of view. Despite the fact that the maritime boundary was of vital importance for the Norwegian coastal communities, the historical aspect of this issue has not yet attracted the attention of researchers. Starting from 1860 up to the verdict in 1951 international court in The Hague - when Britain was the last of the powers to recognize the four-mile maritime border of Norway - that was the subject of constant disputes between Norway and other countries. Norway based its claims on historical and legal precedents of the 18th and early 19th centuries, arguing that the contours of its coastline (including fjords, archipelagoes and fairly extensive water spaces bounded by islands) require such a maritime border that would guarantee the local population, entirely dependent on fishing, livelihood. Accordingly, the question of the extent of territorial waters has always been considered vital for a country. Thus, historical argumentation was often politicized and programmatic. Most Norwegian historians and lawyers share the long-standing official view that in the 18th century there was the practice of restricting territorial waters to a four-mile strip, tacitly approved by all interested states, and that the government memorandum 1812 was should be considered as the first attempt to legally consolidate this practice. A special contribution to clarifying this point of view was made by two researchers - Professor of Law Arnold Restad and specialist in maritime law Captain Christopher Meyer. The Book of Arnold Restada "Royal Waters" (Kongens Stromme) 1912 still considered a landmark work in this area. Restad shows that the Danish-Norwegian authorities in fact claimed to have passed the maritime border four miles from the coast only during periods of armed neutrality. From this, Restad concludes that such a limit was considered a necessary minimum in wartime, while in peace time the king declared his right to all the water spaces that had long been exploited by Norwegian Norwegian nationals - the so-called “royal waters”. Restada's work prompted Christopher Meier to thoroughly study the political and legal history of territorial waters. This is how Meyer’s magnum opus was born - the internationally recognized monograph 1937. "The Limits of Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters".
The Swedish historian Salomon Kraft wrote a detailed study of the Pomeranian trade in northern Norway in the first half of the XIX century. In Kraft's presentation, trade contacts between these remote regions of Norway and Russia developed naturally, to meet the needs of the population. In Kraft's work, nothing indicates that the central Russian authorities played an important role in the development of this trade. Jens Petter Nielsen noticed a tendency in both countries towards an almost idyllic description of relations between Russians and Norwegians before 1917, especially in local historiography. Norwegian Prime Minister Gru Harlem Brundtland even argued that the Cold War was an exception to the peaceful history of good-neighborly relations between the two countries from a thousand-year history ... However, it is difficult to justify this point of view by referring to any sources. On the contrary, research shows that continuous conflicts in the Far North occurred long before the mid-19th century. the myth of the "Russian threat". The hyperbola, voiced by the Prime Minister, is most likely due to the hope that the relations between Russia and Norway would soon be normalized after the end of the Cold War after the 1917 revolution was normalized. Moreover, the Prime Minister sought to form new principles of multilateral cooperation in the basin of the Barents Sea. Considering this, it is not surprising that historians pay the most attention to the least problematic aspect in Russian-Norwegian relations - Pomeranian trade.
Testimonies of contemporaries
The relationship between the Russians and the Norwegians in the Far North is dedicated to three serious works belonging to the pen of the witnesses. The first of these is the report of the commission of Professor Jon Eriksen, published in 1772. (“Reflections on Premeditated Claims on Russian Lapland and Other Issues”). Eriksen argued that the lack of a state border in the High North was the cause of conflict, and that such a state of things allowed the Russians to settle the coast of Finnmark. He believed that the status of the general counties of Neiden, Pasvik and Paysen as a usum communem should be done away with, agreeing on their division. Moreover, he believed that the problems that arose in Finnmark were caused primarily by the presence of fisheries that had arisen in the 1740's. The economic activities of the Russians created "a kind of servitus realis on these hereditary lands of His Majesty," and Eriksen feared that in the long run this situation would lead to new Russian claims. However, the historical right of Russians to fish on the coast of Finnmark was recognized by the Swedish-Norwegian authorities in the 1838 trade agreement. Eriksen emphasized that the question of passing the border should be resolved as soon as possible. He also pointed out that Norway has more historical grounds for claiming these lands than the Russian Tsar. Since Eriksen wrote his report long before Sweden ceded Finland to Russia, his proposal clearly shows that the development of the economy was the cause of the conflicts, and not the new state borders that were drawn during and as a result of the Napoleonic wars ... The second of these testimonies is the Jens Rathke report submitted in 1805. to the Trading Board ... В 1800-1802 гг. Ratke made several trips along the northern coast of Norway and Russia, including to study the fisheries. He paints a picture of the lively Russian economic activity in Finnmark, which included fishing and trade. According to him, Russians use more advanced methods of fishing than those that were used by local Norwegians and Sami. Moreover, the Russian fishing season is longer. As a result, they pose a threat to the traditional way of life of Norwegians and Saami. In addition, Ratke noted the growth of Russian settlements in eastern Finnmark and referred to complaints from local residents. On the whole, Ratke describes the economic activity of Russians with almost the same words that Eriksen used to resort to thirty years before. His story gives an idea of how new fishing methods and trade penetrated into this region. However, Ratke also did not believe that this expansion was carried out on the orders of the central Russian government. The third and most colorful description is written by Leopold von Buch. Like the two previous authors, he was also a scientist who traveled through the northern territories of Norway and Russia. In the same vein as Ratke, von Buch describes how Russians penetrate to the west thanks to their astounding enterprise and energy, but also notes that the Norwegian population fell into complete dependence on grain imports from Russia. In his observations and conclusions, he for the most part repeats Ratke. According to von Buch, concern about Russian activity is more than reasonable: in all fjords and bays, along all the islands off the coast, there are a lot of Russian three-masted ships. According to his estimates, in July-August there are several thousand Russians in Finnmark. In addition, he noted a tendency towards further Russian expansion. If before the Russians did not appear west of the town of Vadsø, now they can be found much further south, up to Tromsø. Von Buch in the most dramatic tones described the consequences of the Russian expansion, stating that the waters of Vardø for a whole year become a Russian patrimony. Russian fishermen seized the entire coast, and in the sea from the permanent Norwegian and Sami settlements full of Russian ships. Their holds are filled with fish that the inhabitants of Vardø, who suffer from hunger, do not see. Year after year, the coastal population is complaining more desperately that "the Russians are ruining us, they are depriving us of the means to livelihood and prevent us from fishing." The common feature of these three reports is an emphasis on the dual nature of the relationship between Russians and Norwegians. On the one hand, the life of the population of the Far North was completely dependent on trade with the Russians, which had absolutely nothing to replace. On the other hand, both the population and the local authorities were afraid that this would lead to the permanent settlement of the coast by the Russians and to the complete displacement of local fishermen. In sum, all three reports confirm that the source of the conflicts in Finnmark was the exploitation of natural resources and that the anxiety of the Norwegians increased in parallel with the increase in Russian activity. There is no doubt that anti-Russian sentiments were caused by the arrival of a modernized society in the Far North.
In the annual report on the state of the kingdom, the newly crowned Karl XIII Juhan 1818 in February informed the parliament that the government had to end the unrest in Finnmark and protect the common people from the violence it suffered from foreign fishermen and merchants in this remote part of the kingdom . It is obvious that in the years following the proclamation of Norwegian independence in 1814, a much more serious situation developed in Finnmark than the almost idyllic picture painted by many historians that received recognition in political discourse.
Taking countermeasures: restoring the fortress of Vardehus and naval expeditions 1816-1819.
Concerns about Russian activity had not only reports of commissions, traveler stories, diplomatic sentences, and official rulings. In addition, Norway sought sovereignty over the disputed lands and pursued an active policy of consolidating its territory. The fact that the government took the situation seriously was evidenced by the return of the garrison to Vardeus fortress (Norway's northeastern outpost from the beginning of the 14th century) and the adoption of measures Karl-Yuhan reported to parliament in 1818. The old fortress Vardykhus decayed and lost military value by the end of the XVIII century. In a government memorandum 1793, it was stated that, due to the degree of destruction, the fortress could not perform any military functions and should be abolished. However, according to Leopold von Buch, as soon as the fortress was closed, the Russians returned to the area. Therefore, the king already in 1800, two years after the abolition of the fortress, decided to return the garrison to it. In 1807, von Buch declared the tremendous importance of a fortress: if Finnmark did not become a Russian province, it was only because of the presence of a captain, lieutenant and roughly 20 soldier in the fortress. Their presence ensured that this remote region would remain within the kingdom. If it were not for the fortress, the political connections of Finnmark with Copenhagen would have been severed due to the grain trade that tied Finnmark to Arkhangelsk and the settlement of the coast by the Russians. Even more important than the existence of the garrison were other measures aimed at establishing Norwegian sovereignty. In a situation where the Norwegian fleet was disbanded and the young nation struggled for political survival due to a catastrophic shortage of finances, the authorities still considered it necessary to send armed naval expeditions to Finnmark three years in a row, starting with 1816. . The naval command ordered the expeditions to "maintain royal power and protect order in the harbors and coastal waters", and, if necessary, resort to force, "not considering the possible superiority of the enemy." The situation was considered so serious that for the first time in the history of a young state, the authorities found it necessary to use force. The most important source on the history of these expeditions is the diary of Junior Lieutenant Thomas Konou ... 19-year-old Thomas Konou was the captain of the armed schooner Axel Thorsen.
In mid-February 1816, Senior Lieutenant Hartwig Casper Christie, commander of the coastal flotillastationed in central Norway, in Trondheim, received orders to prepare for the first of these expeditions. The squadron left Trondheim on May 7. Christie was entrusted to protect the sovereign rights of Norway at sea and on land on the coast of Finnmark ... According to Thomas Konou, officers learned about the purpose of the expedition only upon arrival in Vadsø in early July. The order read to the team stated that the main task of the expedition was to oversee the activities of Russians who illegally fish, build houses wherever they want, and do not pay duties. In addition to this task, the squadron was required to carry out cartographic work, since there were no sea charts of the coast of northern Norway ... In addition, there were no navigations, no organized coastal pilotage service, nor a list of harbors, anchorage and places suitable for mooring. How scarce the information about the northern territories was, it became apparent after 1814. From the reports of Colonel Benoni Obert about the condition of the Norwegian fortresses and coastal batteries, it is clear that the authorities did not even have information about the fortifications in this part of the country. The commission set up to conduct the inspection did not have the practical opportunity to visit fortifications in the Far North. Accordingly, this task was entrusted to the Finnmark squadron. The naval expedition found out that the fortress of Vardehus had no military significance, despite the fact that the garrison had recently been returned to it, and the fortress walls and buildings were renovated. This shows how poorly these areas were integrated into the life of the country. Having approached Hammerfest, the expedition first met with the Russians on Norwegian territory. They were noticed both on land and at sea, in characteristic boats (lodjer). Thomas Konow noted that the entire coast from Hammerfest to the Varangerfjord was full of Russian fishermen and merchants, although he did not indicate their exact numbers. However, in 1820, the magazine Budstikken said that annually in those waters there were up to 200 Russian boats and hundreds of two-masted vessels.
Naval expeditions 1817 and 1818 it is difficult to reconstruct with the same completeness as the 1816 expedition. However, it is obvious that all these expeditions were guided by the same orders; It is also known that the Chief Finnmark official was ordered to hire two Russian translators for the 1817 expedition. However, the 1816 expedition, according to the authorities, was successful. In January, 1817 Hartwig Casper Christie received a dispatch from the naval command, in which the Swedish governor of Norway expressed his satisfaction, and crown prince Karl-Johan gave the same assessment to the expedition in March. The expeditions to Finnmark, apparently having completed their tasks, were discontinued after three years. In his report on the state of the kingdom for 1818, the crown prince emphasized how important it is that Norway has a sufficient number of warships able to protect the honor of His Majesty and the kingdom and protect trade. The next time the fleet visited Finnmark again only during a cholera epidemic at the beginning of the 1830s. From this it is clear that naval expeditions were able to ensure the sovereignty of Norway over Finnmark. In 1820, the Budstikken magazine confirmed this by reporting that the fleet took control of the situation. The military measures taken by the Norwegian government demonstrate that it considered it necessary to stop the invasion of Russian nationals in Finnmark, and Thomas Konou reports that, guided by the order, the squadron resorted to force several times. But it should also emphasize the modesty of these measures: the Norwegian government, obviously, did not consider that the problems in Finnmark were created by the purposeful activities of the Russian authorities. Both the restoration of the fortress of Vardihus and the naval expeditions to Finnmark were conceived in principle as purely police measures.
Borders and territorial rights
One of the main reasons for the development of the conflict between the two peoples lay in the fact that Russian expansion into this region did not have any obstacles in the form of the established border between Norway and Russia. The frontier territories included extensive common districts (Neiden, Pasvik and Paisen) inhabited by the indigenous peoples of the region. In 1814, the only border agreement was the 1751 agreement between the united kingdom of Denmark and Norway and Sweden, which contained two provisions: one concerning the border demarcation conditions to the south of the general districts, and the second known as the article on the Laplandians (Saami) - stipulated the rights of the indigenous people to graze, fish and hunt in these districts. When in the 1721 after the Great Northern War, fisheries and regional trade began to develop here seriously, the Far North was neither legally nor administratively prepared for such an economic expansion, and over time it became clear that the 1751 contract was absolutely insufficient to prevent friction generated by the growth of economic activity and the seizure of new lands and water spaces. In addition to the unresolved question of the border in the general districts, both the Norwegians and the Russians declared their historical rights in the territory of their neighbors. Danish and Norwegian kings for centuries claimed the lands of the Kola Peninsula. That is why the royal officials in Finnmark to collect taxes in 1613-1813. undertook expeditions to Kola, in the region from Nayden to Ponoi. In turn, the Russians declared their right to tax land up to Malangen in the west. However, after 1600, the Russians did not collect taxes west of Varanger. Norwegian kings from the Middle Ages considered the land west of the Varanger Fjord as Norwegian territory in the XIV century. built the fortress Vardёhus, which served as the northeast outpost of the country. The land to the east of Varanger Fjord was never considered part of Norway itself, but in the years preceding the signing of the Norwegian-Russian border treaty 1826, Norway seized a large part of it.
Oscar Albert Johnsen shows that the Norwegians had a fate for Finland in the settlement of the border issue. The Royal Decree issued in August of 1816 required that the border with Sweden be clarified in accordance with the 1751 agreement, and the border line should be drawn through the general districts from Skékkemieks to the Arctic Ocean. This decree was another Norwegian initiative to establish a permanent border with Russia. But she did not bring quick results. The decision to send a naval expedition to Finnmark was made before the royal decree and was one of Norway’s many attempts to consolidate land in the High North. In addition, the question of the passage of the sea border was resolved in 1814 only partially. At that time, no country claimed the exact definition of the length of its territorial waters, and we don’t know any Danish-Norwegian maps on which the maritime boundaries were marked or mentioned. But at the same time, for various purposes it was practiced to hold maritime boundaries on the basis of historical precedents. There were four main categories of maritime boundaries: quarantine boundaries at the time of epidemics, customs boundaries, fisheries boundaries, and neutral waters. The distance separating these boundaries from the coast varied from country to country.
In the Norwegian legal and historical tradition, the above-mentioned government memorandum 1812. considered as the first attempt to legally fix the general principle of the maritime border four miles from the coast. Moreover, the magnitude of four miles as the width of the territorial waters appears in several royal decrees issued in the XVIII century. But such an idea of the extent of territorial waters was not suitable for deciding the question of the ownership of fisheries, as evidenced by conflicts with Russian fishermen in the Barents Sea. The fact is that in the memorandum 1812 the passage of maritime boundaries was regulated only with respect to the prize right, and nothing was said about the fisheries. However, during the unfolding in the first half of the twentieth century. the struggle for the four-mile limit on the sea was referred to as a historical proof of the long-standing Norwegian tradition in all cases to hold the maritime border four miles from the coast. In fact, the memorandum 1812, became known to the public only in 1830, after Y. Chr. Berg published his history of army reserves. Accordingly, neither the Russian authorities nor the fishermen could have known about the undeclared sea border. Needless to say, the official decree on territorial waters would not be kept secret. There is no evidence that the Russian authorities ever protested against traditional maritime borders. On the contrary, von Buch claims that Russian nationals who harvested fish off the coast of Finnmark have never declared that they are in Russian waters. The four-mile width of territorial waters was finally recognized by Russia and included in the 1838 trade agreement. Christopher Meyer argues that coastal waters were divided into internal and external waters by the so-called political coastline, which ran four miles from the coast, generally following its outlines. Inland waters, according to Meyer, had the same legal status as the land territory, and, accordingly, any activity within them certainly fell under royal laws. The length of the outer territorial waters depended on the purpose for which they were used; there were a variety of historical precedents that determined the conduct of fishing, customs and quarantine borders. Meyer’s controversial statement boils down to the fact that, with respect to fishing grounds, Norway has long considered even those waters that are far beyond the four-mile belt, which is internationally recognized only as neutral waters and with respect to prize law. Sources on naval expeditions to Finnmark generally support this view. The orders given to the expeditions did not contain any explicit mention of the fishing limits. True, Thomas Konou noted that Russians catch fish impermissibly close to the shore, but the main thing from his notes is that the king allowed the Russians to fish outside the four-mile zone. From this we can conclude that the waters outside the four-mile zone in relation to fisheries were under royal jurisdiction, since the king could give permission to use them. Thus, conflicts 1810-x.
But although a number of decrees defended the sovereign rights of Norway and stipulated the rights of Russians to fishing, trade and temporary settlements in Finnmark, one important problem remained: the lack of regulatory institutions. The Norwegian military presence in Finnmark was not enough to ensure sovereignty over these lands. Accordingly, the task of maintaining the existing legal regime was assigned to expeditions sent to Finnmark. These expeditions ensured order only in the undoubtedly Norwegian territories west of the disputed districts. Thomas Konou’s diary contains a wealth of evidence that Norwegian sovereignty in Finnmark was challenged by Russian subjects on their own initiative; on the other hand, there is no evidence that the Russian authorities opposed the legal regime of Finnmark. The most serious challenge facing the expeditions was the creation of Russian settlements. For the first time, Konou noted this fact in his diary on arriving at Cyber 3 on July 1816. The squadron had been warned in advance that many houses had been built there. Konou was amazed at how the Russians managed to build a "whole city" in such proximity to the fortress Vardåhus. The next time he mentioned the Russian settlement of 10 July, being at Hamninsberg. The inhabitants of both settlements were ordered to dismantle their homes until the fall. A month later, the expedition discovered another Russian settlement. On August 11, Senior Lieutenant Christie arrested several Russians in Gamvik who built houses near the harbor. In fact, they had a legal right to land use, but they were not allowed to build houses. On the same day, Konou inspected in Berlevåg the place where the warehouse had previously stood. After being demolished by someone Mikhail Ostrov [Michalew Aasttroff], another Russian built a house in his place. He was ordered to dismantle the house before leaving Norway. When the 23 August expedition arrived in Botsfjord, it turned out that over the summer the Russians had built several new houses there, despite previous warnings. These houses were ordered to be demolished the very next day, otherwise the houses would have been demolished by an airborne detachment. Both an armed schooner and a cutter were prepared for battle. A warning shot was fired from a nasal cannon, and the guns on both ships were loaded with projectiles designed to defeat manpower. The Russians the next day did not begin to disassemble the houses, sending instead a delegation of three armed to the schooner. They asked for indulgence and brought gifts - bread and gingerbread. But Senior Lieutenant Christie remained adamant. Without waiting for the demolition of houses, at noon he ordered the landing party of an 28 man to land, half of which had weapon. At the same time, an armed schooner turned her guns on the Russian village. Only after that did the Russians obey the order and by six in the evening all the houses were dismantled.
The construction of permanent Russian settlements was, of course, regarded as the most serious threat to Norwegian sovereignty. According to official regulations, the Russians had no right to build houses and stay in Norway for the winter. Naval expeditions found that abyssal Russian settlements are primarily created on the Varanger Peninsula. Actually, it was only there that these settlements were recorded, with the exception of Gamvik on the Nordkin peninsula. The settling of eastern Finnmark by the Russians was a direct consequence of the development of fisheries and trade. Russian settlers were mostly fishermen, less often merchants who needed land bases, which they were allowed to build for the summer season. However, there is no particular doubt that illegal settlements arose as a result of overall economic growth in the region, not being an integral part of the “colonization” process organized or encouraged by the central Russian authorities, despite the fact that such fears were heard again and again among the local population in northern Norway.
Seasonal fishing development
As already mentioned, after the Great Northern War, seasonal fishing off the coast of Finnmark underwent important changes. It was attended by residents of other areas of northern Norway and the Pomors, who lived along the shores of the White Sea. Hammerfest, Tromsø and Vardø villages by the end of the 18th century. received municipal privileges (Vadsø - in 1833). Thus, the development of fisheries and trade contributed to the overall economic growth in this part of the country. However, fisheries did not bring with them any significant changes in Finnmark until the end of the XIX century, mainly due to the fact that the fishermen arrived from Russia and from other parts of northern Norway. At the same time, the researchers are not aware of any significant clashes between the Norwegians and the Russians in the 18th century, therefore, conflicts that occurred after 1814 were considered an exception. The city of Hammerfest is considered a pioneer in the modernization of fisheries in the Far North. Thomas Konou paints a picturesque picture of this small town, emphasizing the abundance of fish in the surrounding waters. The sea was full of boats, and the streets were so overwhelmed with fishy entrails that it was difficult to keep on their feet. After the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the proportion of Norwegians engaged in these fisheries declined markedly, while the Russians did not reduce their activity at all. Even in 1820, it was reported that the number of Russian fishermen in these waters is constantly increasing. However, both the Norwegian government and the local population after 1814 perceived the Russian presence as a threat, mainly because of the change in the ratio between the Norwegians and the Russians, and not because of the real influx of the latter. Leopold von Buch notes an important characteristic feature of the Russians, which largely escaped the attention of Norwegian historians, namely, “amazing inventiveness and enterprise”, which was in stark contrast to the erratic approach of the Norwegians in terms of fishing methods.
Perhaps the Norwegians were too poor and could fish only for the bait in the vicinity of their places of residence, but beyond that, many of them were "lazy, wallowing in poverty and drunkenness." At the same time, the Russians were not only distinguished by diligence and perseverance, but also used much more advanced methods of fishing. In the spring, they caught the bait that they were taking to Russia, and in the summer they returned to take part in their own fishing. In general, von Buch was quite impressed with the Russian activity in Finnmark, although he shared the fears of the Norwegians who were worried about their future. Jens Ratke came to the same conclusions regarding the Russians. From this it is easy to conclude that local ideas about the Russian threat were generated at the beginning of the XIX century. conflicts over fisheries. The seasonal influx of Russians from the White Sea and Norwegians from the south of the country was perceived by the locals as an invasion. Moreover, seasonal fishermen used more advanced fishing methods than the local population. Locals fished from the shore, while Russians, boating, set up fishing gear along the entire shore. Of course, the catch of local fishermen from this decreased. The complex and ecologically balanced principles of pasture sharing and distribution of other rights adopted by the Sami gradually died out in the 18th century. Thomas Konou notes the sharply increased exploitation of local resources and the corresponding pressure to which Sami culture has been subjected. Danish-Norwegian authorities have sought to regulate Russian activity in Finnmark since the mid-18th century. According to the 1747 rescript, the Russians had no right to fish closer than four nautical miles from the coast, and every fishing boat had to pay tax. However, Thomas Konou writes that the Russians have shied away from paying duty on fish exported to Russia. The development of trade and fisheries in the XVIII century. in the end, Russian nationals provided certain privileges in Norway, known as "cyber rights" and scientists in the 1838 trade agreement. According to the agreement, Russian fishermen had the right to arrange a temporary land base for the fishing season during the fishing season. Norwegian fishermen received a similar right to the Murmansk coast. This indicates that both the Russian and the Norwegian authorities at that time recognized that their subjects had certain historical rights in the neighboring territories.
Pomeranian trade
The term "pomeranian trade" refers to the commercial activities of Russian nationals - coast-dwellers, inhabitants of the White Sea coast - who arrived in Finnmark in the summer, trading from their ships with the local population. They mainly sold grain, as well as rope and fishing gear, buying Norwegian fish, hides and handicrafts instead. In addition, merchants who lived there constantly traded, and barter exchange was also conducted. The growth of the Pomeranian trade was a direct consequence of the development of fisheries. There is no doubt that the Pomeranian trade has benefited the people of the region - numerous evidence suggests that local communities were extremely approving of it. Most historians who wrote about the Pomeranian trade viewed this phenomenon from a local point of view, therefore, it is usually presented in sources and in historical literature in a positive way. Accordingly, there is a tendency to ignore the problems associated with this trade, and the lack of control over it by the authorities. Obviously, Russian merchants created difficulties mainly for officials, but not for the general population. In local terms, this trade did not entail any worthy mention of the conflicts between the Norwegians and the Russians. However, the Danish-Norwegian authorities could occasionally experience difficulties due to its limited ability to monitor compliance with tax and monopoly laws.
The latter belonged to the merchant houses of Copenhagen, which belonged to the pomeranian trade with hostility. The main impression that can be learned from the study of historical materials is that the Pomeranian trade after 1814 served as the most important link between Russia and Norway. Both from the Norwegian and Russian sides of the border, the life of the population depended on this exchange. And this dependence put the authorities at a standstill - they did not know how to put the Pomor trade under control, despite several attempts to completely stop it. Jens Rathke testifies that the population of Finnmark enjoyed trading with the Russians and that fishing was conducted here with great diligence while the fish managed to sell them to the Russians. But he also points to a number of problems inherent in trade in Finnmark. In particular, he was disturbed by the large-scale sale of strong drinks and tobacco. These new products had a particularly negative effect on the Saami lifestyle. Leopold von Buch noted that the Russians did not always comply with government regulations and Norwegian laws. But he paid attention to the popularity of the Pomeranian trade. Although Russian merchants were sometimes accused of fraud, the local population was always enthusiastically “awaiting the arrival of the Russians”. According to Salomon Kraft, the volume of Pomeranian trade in the XVIII century. was relatively small. This breakthrough is observed only after 1800. As a result, the first years of the XIX century deserve particularly close study. Thomas Konou confirms that trade regulations were often violated and that local authorities mainly tried to enforce export laws and customs regulations. Violation of laws and regulations was unacceptable for them, but at the same time they had no opportunity to influence the merchants. The monopoly on trade in Finnmark in 1681 was given to the Hanseatic city of Bergen. But the Bergen merchants lost their privileges in 1715. This was followed by a period of practically free trade in the north, which lasted until 1728. From that time on, monopoly rights were granted to Copenhagen merchant houses, which retained their privileges until the liberalization of trade in 1789. Also , royal trade was carried out in Finnmark. However, it was impossible to monitor compliance with monopoly rights in the extreme northern region of the kingdom.
On the one hand, city trading houses that had monopoly rights sought to get rid of competition from the Russians, since it undermined their economic situation. But on the other hand, direct trade with Russians was extremely profitable for fishing communities. Since local residents depended on Russian goods, they willy-nilly had to break laws and rules. The remoteness of Finnmark entailed the absence of a real alternative to the import of grain from Russia. Pomeranian trade sometimes became even vital for the population of the Far North. Therefore, it was legalized in 1787, with the simultaneous cancellation of the existing trade privileges. According to the new decree from 1796, for the period from July 15 to August 15, direct trade between local fishermen and Russian merchants was allowed. Subsequently, until 1814, direct trade developed unhindered. The dependence of northern Norway on trade with Russia was fully manifested during the British blockade following the 1807 war. Since 1809, direct trade between the Norwegians and Russians in Finnmark was resolved almost without any restrictions. However, in 1814, with the end of the war, this permission was canceled. Dispatch of naval expeditions, in particular, served the purpose of restoring direct trade restrictions. But already in 1818, the government had to abandon these attempts, and direct trade was again liberalized. One of the tasks entrusted to the Finnmark squadrons was to supervise the observance of customs regulations, and Konou noted in his diary that the Russians did not pay duties. In the summer of 1816, the squadron was informed that, according to the new royal decree, the Russians should not pay duties on goods exported from Norway, but they should present their goods at customs. In general, the features of the Pomeranian trade made compliance with official requirements extremely difficult task. Residents of this region, regardless of nationality, actually created a self-sufficient economy with the participation of interdependent parties. In addition, in Norway, conflicts of interest were observed between the local population, local trading houses, trading houses that received royal privilege, and the central authorities. The success of efforts to consolidate the country, undertaken after Norway gained independence in 1814, essentially depended on the destruction of the transnational economy on the northern periphery of Norway and Russia by legal and power methods. But this task could be solved only in the case of the emergence of alternative sources of supply and markets that form the basis for economic transactions. Therefore, it was extremely difficult to establish border controls aimed at destroying the local economy, which in many respects was a single entity.
Conclusion
One of the starting points for this study was the opinion put forward by historians, and not only by them, that the idea of the Russian threat was a political fiction adopted by the Norwegian social elite from the middle of the 19th century. It is argued that this idea was completely alien to the population of Finnmark, who had long-standing and close ties with Russia. After the end of the Cold War, this approach gave rise to an idyllic tendency inherent in historical works on relations between Russia and Norway in the High North. Another starting point was the intention to determine the nature of conflicts in the north in order to ascertain whether there are any elements of continuity with respect to the current situation. As we can see, clearly expressed conflicts of interest between different groups of residents of the Far North existed long before the emergence of the idea of Russian expansionist designs. The protectionist measures applied by the Norwegian authorities were caused by the behavior of Russian citizens before and after 1814. Accordingly, these measures were based not so much on the political elite’s feeling of the Russian threat as on all kinds of banal conflicts over fishing, commerce and illegal settlements.
The Norwegian authorities had no special reason to believe that the incidents in the Far North were caused by the expansionist designs of the Russian state. These conflicts were viewed as an unavoidable consequence of economic activity in an almost uninhabited, undeveloped, unexplored and unresponsive region, which also turned out to be rich in natural resources. The Norwegian government has shown marked determination in an effort to strengthen its position in Finnmark. Naval expeditions were instructed to use all necessary measures to protect national interests, and those without hesitation executed this order. Given the extreme imbalance of power between Norway and Russia, it can be assumed that the Russians would take decisive countermeasures if their strategic intentions ran into resistance from a militarily weak neighbor. But that did not happen. The reason was probably that the Russian government had little interest in the High North, thereby giving Norway free rein.
Naval expeditions to Finnmark were undertaken at the time of the birth of several conflicts related to the establishment of sovereignty over the Arctic and its economic use. Penetration to the Far North, which took place in the 19th and 20th centuries, gave rise to new frictions. Russian subjects were the first to encroach on Norwegian fishing interests and territorial rights in this region, but from the second half of the 19th century onwards. there is the emergence of new players who have penetrated both the national territories and the terra nullius of the Far North: fishermen, hunters, prospectors, miners, researchers and scientists from many countries stated their claims. However, until the First World War, there were no armed conflicts in the region - only incidents occurred that required the use of ordinary police measures. The Paris conference 1920 recognized the rights of Norway to the Spitsbergen archipelago, but since all signatories received the full right to exploit the natural resources of the archipelago, until the Second World War there were no serious political conflicts in this regard. The claims of Soviet power on the twelve-mile width of the territorial waters and the annexation of all land between the North Pole and the northern coast of Russia in 1921, declared in 1926, created problems for fishermen and hunters who had lost access to the traditional fishing and hunting grounds on the Kola coast to Belyi the sea and the Arctic.
Pirjo Saariniemi argues that despite the extensive contacts, geographical proximity and similar living conditions, the "tangible and intangible cultures" of Norwegians and Pomors are nonetheless fundamentally different from each other. " Thomas Konou left us colorful stories about how Norwegian officers faced these differences in mentality, lifestyle and culture. Although in modern historical literature almost no attention is paid to cultural differences, they are striking in historical sources. We can say that although at the beginning of the XIX century. there was no state border between the two countries, and notable cultural “borders” nevertheless lay between the various peoples of the region. In general, this study shows that the basis of the Russian-Norwegian conflicts in Finnmark and in the controversial districts were not abstract or irrational ideas about the threat from a neighbor, but rather trivial differences regarding rights and borders. Penetration into no man’s territory spawned new contacts between different ethnic groups and cultures. However, no serious conflicts between the Russian and Norwegian government arose before the Second World War, when the USSR Foreign Minister Molotov declared non-recognition of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Therefore, it would be illogical to analyze the relations between Russians, Norwegians and Saami in the High North only from the point of view of international relations and security issues. An honest researcher should treat statements about a thousand years of peace and friendship as the same "fabricated myths" as the myth of the "Russian threat."
In this region, one of the historically established mechanisms for the emergence of conflicts is very clearly visible. The latter invariably follow the discovery of new resources and the introduction of profitable methods for their exploitation. The essence of the problem often lies in the fact that these resources are located in regions where local government is weak or completely absent. Therefore, the development of resources is often accompanied by a statement of rights to the relevant land and water areas or their annexation. Perhaps, on closer examination, we will reveal another pattern. The region covered in this article was affected by the First World War, but by no means due to local conflicts over borders and resources. The conflicts in the Arctic that took place in the interwar period did not entail a serious resonance in international relations. However, the political configuration that developed during the Second World War and during the Cold War turned the Arctic into a region of geostrategic confrontation, when even the solution to traditional conflicts over borders and resources had to be sought within the framework of a multilateral security system. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, security aspects in the Far North receded into the background, and it can be assumed that history has returned to the region. Regular conflicts are now resolved on a bilateral basis, but it may well be that sooner or later the situation will change again.
This text is an abbreviated version of the article (references to literature are omitted), in Russian, first published in the publication: RUSSIAN COLLECTION: Studies in the history of Russia / Ed.-comp. O.R. Ayrapetov, Miroslav Jovanovic, M.A. Kolerov, Bruce Menning, Paul Cheysti. Volume VIII. M., 2010.
- Tom Kristiansen - Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, Oslo
- http://www.regnum.ru/news/1463778.html
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