Military Review

1915 Campaign of the Year on the Caucasus Front

17

The Russian command decided to launch an offensive in Persia, where the Russians tried to interact with the British army based in the Persian Gulf. In the Persian (Erivan) direction, the 4 Caucasian Corps acted, which during the Alashkert operation (from late June to early August 1915) fought hard on the 400-km front against the Turkish group that had three times superior to Russian forces and had strategic task to break through the Russian front. The Ottoman command hoped to shake the entire Russian Caucasian front and create a situation similar to the situation on the Russian European front (the Great Retreat). The maneuvering struggle took place on a very wide front and in specific mountain and desert conditions. The command had to manage separate columns in isolated mountain areas and make additional efforts to organize rear communications and supplies.


The calculations of the enemy were not justified. Russian soldiers and Cossacks, displaying incomparable endurance and great valor, thwarted the plans of the Ottoman command. The Russian troops defeated the enemy, disrupted the large-scale offensive against Kars planned by the Turkish command and facilitated the actions of British troops in Mesopotamia. In October-December 1915, the Russian troops carried out a successful Hamadan operation, which prevented Persia from entering the war on the side of Germany and Turkey. Russian troops took control of the territory of Northern Persia, securing the left flank of the Caucasian army. As a result, the Russian army won the 1915 campaign of the year in the Caucasian theater.

1915 Campaign of the Year on the Caucasus Front

Commander of Russian troops in the Caucasus, Nikolai Yudenich

Situation on the Caucasian front at the beginning of 1915 of the year

At the end of 1914 as a result of the defeat of the 3 of the Turkish army in the Sarykamysh direction (Sarykamysh defeat; Part 2) the general situation for the Russians was favorable on the Caucasian front. The Russian command was counting on success in Turkish Armenia. Here one could hope for the support of the three peoples oppressed by the Ottomans - Armenians, Greeks (mainly on the Black Sea coast) and Assyrian Aisorov (in the zone south-east of Lake Van). The liberation of the whole of Armenia from the Ottoman yoke was considered one of the historical tasks of the confrontation between Russia and Turkey. For this, it was necessary to have a son-in-law of a powerful Turkish fortress - Erzerum, in the area of ​​which the Turks created a whole fortified area.

The deep invasion of Russian troops into Armenia, in addition to military-political significance, made it possible to threaten Anatolia’s main region of the Ottoman Empire and the German Baghdad railway, which was of great strategic importance for Turkish operations led by German officers in the Middle East. At the same time, this success brought the Russians closer to Mosul oil. In addition, the deep penetration of Russian troops into Turkey completely solved the task of protecting the Russian Transcaucasus (in particular, the Baku oil region) occupied by the Russians of Northern Persia and the North Caucasus. The plans of the German-Turkish command for the deep invasion of the Ottoman army into the Caucasus and the deployment of "jihad" (holy war of Muslims against the infidels) among the Muslim nationalities belonging to the Russian Empire collapsed.

After part of the Caucasian army was transferred to the Western front and it lost its strike power, the Russian command temporarily postponed plans to seize Erzerum and a deep invasion of Anatolia, focusing on defense and preparing a future offensive. In February-April 1915, the Russian and Turkish armies, after the crushing defeat of the Ottoman troops during the Sarykamysh operation, were re-formed. The fighting had a local character. By the end of March, the Russian army had cleared the southern Ajaria and the whole Batumi region from the Turks.


Source: Korsun N., G. Alashkert and Hamadan operations M., 1940

The forces of the parties

Russian army. At the end of the Sarykamysh operation, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army and the governor-general of the Caucasus, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, did not leave Tiflis for the front, entrusted the head of the army headquarters, General Yudenich, to the Olta and Kars axes. After the successful completion of the Sarykamysh operation, Nikolay Nikolayevich Yudenich led the Caucasian army. It was a good substitute, Yudenich proved himself excellent on the Caucasian front (One of the best generals of Russia during the First World War, Nikolai Nikolayevich Yudenich). Army headquarters in January 1915 moved from Tiflis to Kars.

The chief commander of the Caucasian Military District, General Volsky, was responsible for maintaining calm and guarding communications, strengthening the Baku and Tiflis districts, ensuring the Russian-Persian border within the Yelisavetpol and Baku provinces, maintaining calm in the eastern part of Persian Azerbaijan and observing the Black Sea coast. To solve these problems, militia squads were subordinated to him.

At the beginning of 1915, the Russian Caucasian Army numbered in its ranks: 106 battalions, 222 hundreds and 356 guns. By the beginning of June, the forces of the Caucasian Army had not changed significantly: 112 3 / 4 battalions, 348 guns, 213 hundreds, 20 engineering companies, two air detachments, 43 militias and 8 volunteer troops were in the field troops and fortress garrisons.

The following corps were deployed on the main operational directions: the 2 of Turkestan General Przhevalsky in the direction of Olzha, the 1 of Caucasus General Kalitin in the Sarakamysh-Erzurum direction, the 4 of Caucasus General of Oganov in Erivan. In Persian Azerbaijan, occupied by the Russians, was the Azerbaijani detachment of General Chernozubov from the 4 Caucasian Corps. Primorsky, Chorokhsky and Ardagan detachments operated in the Batumi region. In the area of ​​Sarykamysh and Kars there was an army reserve with forces up to the corps. The reserve was transformed into the 5 Caucasian Corps, as part of the 1 and 2 of the Kuban Plastun brigades and the 3 of the Caucasian Rifle Division.

Taking into account that the Caucasian theater was removed from the central regions of Russia (there was no developed network of communications) and the Caucasian army could not count on rapid strengthening from the outside, the command paid attention to the deployment of already existing units, as well as the formation of new local resources. Thus, the regiments of the 2-th Caucasian Rifle Brigade were deployed in a three-battalion. In addition, the 4-I Caucasian Rifle Division, the 4-I Kuban Plastun Brigade of Kuban and Terek foot hundreds, the 23-I Turkestan Rifle Regiment and a number of artillery units were formed.

In February, the 1915, when the Allies launched the Dardanelles operation, the Russian high command began to work out the idea of ​​the Bosphorus landing operation. As a result, the Russian Stavka took away the reserve of the Caucasian Army - the 5-th Caucasian Corps, and transferred it to Sevastopol and Odessa. These troops were to participate in the storming of Constantinople. The command of the Caucasian army had to form a new reserve, which included the newly formed 4-I Caucasian Rifle Division, 4-I Kuban Plastunskaya and Don foot brigades, as well as the Caucasian Cavalry Division that arrived from the Western Front. The new army reserve was formed by April and had 28 battalions, 36 hundreds and squadrons and 64 guns (near one corps).

Thus, due to the separation of the 5 Caucasian Corps from the Caucasian Army, and then the 20 Infantry Division sent to the Western Russian front, its numerical and qualitative composition was significantly weakened. During the Great Retreat, the Russian General Headquarters was unable to strengthen the Caucasian army, since all the available forces and resources went to the Western Front.

In the summer of 1915, less than half of the army was personnel, which weakened it greatly. The basis of the Caucasian army was only five personnel brigades: two Turkestan (4-I and 5-I), two brigades of the 39-th Infantry Division and the 2-I Caucasian Rifle Brigade. Total 52 battalion, or 43% of the total composition of the Caucasian army. The remaining troops consisted of completely new units with weak cadres. Most of the new units were formed in haste, under the pressure of urgent necessity, in order to at least in some way replenish the loss of units sent from the army to the Western Front. Their armament went at the expense of the district means, so the new units lacked mountain artillery, machine guns, communications equipment, pack carts, ambulance transports and other weapons and property. The combat capability of the new units could not be compared with the priority units, as the battles of the beginning of the 1915 of the year showed.

This led to the fact that the Caucasian army was unable to organize a powerful offensive on the Erzurum direction during the spring-summer of 1915. Moreover, the army command was forced to take into account the possibility of retreat and planned to create an independent garrison in Kars in case the army was under excellent pressure enemy forces will be forced to retreat and maneuver, relying on this fortress. However, the formation of new parts was slow, as there were not enough weapons.

Taking into account the Sarykamysh operation, when Russian troops were subjected to a sudden strike by large masses of the Ottoman army, the Russian command strengthened the defenses not only at the front, but also in the rear - in the areas of Sarykamysh, Ardahan, Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki, Aleksandropol, Tiflis and Baku. In these places, fortified areas were created, which were long-term closed fortifications that were in mutual fire links. For their armament they used mainly the tools of the old systems that were in the warehouses of the district. These fortifications were supposed to provide freedom of maneuvering of troops. If necessary, they planned to take a second-rate troops. Measures were taken to streamline the rear and organization of pack transports. Improved communication lines and routes of communication. New railways were laid: horse traction on Alta and steam - on Sarykamysh directions.



Tourelka Army

After a severe defeat in the battle of Sarykamysh, the Turkish command focused on the restoration of the 3 army, which operated in the Caucasus direction. 3-I Turkish army, which began the Sarikamysh operation as part of 90 thousand bayonets and sabers, after the defeat consisted of barely 12 thousand fighters. Then we managed to collect the same number of deserters. Therefore, it was decided to replenish the 3 army (9, 10 and 11 corps) at the expense of the 1 and 2 armies concentrated in the area of ​​the straits, as well as the 4 of the Syrian army. At the same time, at the expense of spare depots, new parts were formed, as well as secondary parts. The following were sent to the Caucasian front: 3-I consolidated, formed from the frames of the 1 of the Constantinople Corps; 5-I consolidated division, formed from the 5-corps; The 5 is a second division, created from marching companies taken from all the divisions located in Anatolia.

The 3 Turkish army in 1915 was headed by Mahmud-Camille Pasha. The chief of staff of the army was the German major Guze. According to the chief of staff of the 3 of the Turkish army, in early June 1915 the army consisted of: 9, 10 and 11 corps, 2-th cavalry division (36 thousand); Hamdi and German Stange’s group operating on the left flank of the Turkish army (10 thousand); Khalila group, directed for operations in Persia (about 20 thousand people). The total number of Turkish forces on the Caucasian front reached 70 thousand people. In addition, about 28 thousand people were trained in the camps and about 7 thousand soldiers were en route.

Thus, the Turkish 3 Army never recovered from the defeat at Sarykamysh, and in the first half of 1915, it was not ready to attack. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the attention of the Turkish command was riveted to the Dardanelles. Owing to the Dardanelles operation, which began in February 1915, the Turkish command considered the main task in the Caucasus direction to be a reflection of the possible offensive of the Russian army, for which it was necessary to restore the full combat capability of the 3 army.

At the same time, with the participation of German instructors and advisers, there was an intensive training of new commanders, the deployment of new personnel from the personnel of the troops that arrived to strengthen the army, and from the previously existing ones. In order to hide their weakness and unpreparedness for active offensive actions, the Ottomans spread rumors about the impending attack on the Caucasus by Persia and tried with the help of agents to cause an uprising of the neighboring tribes of Kurds and the semi-nomadic Muslim population of Azerbaijan.

Party plans

Russian army. After the Sarykamysh operation, which ended in early January 1915, the Caucasian army solved two main tasks: 1) made a regrouping of forces, which dragged on from the fighting on the strategic flanks and sending troops to the European part of Russia; 2) solved the task of securing the flanks. On the right flank, the Black Sea region, this task was completed relatively quickly, on the left flank in Persian Azerbaijan, the struggle took a protracted and tense character.

The strategic task of the Russian Caucasian army was the same. The Russian troops were to maintain at any cost the two main communications of the Caucasus: the Tiflis, Baku, Petrovsk, Rostov and Tiflis-Vladikavkaz railways, and also retain the Baku oil region. To accomplish this task, the headquarters of the Caucasian Army planned to cover and secure approaches to the most important points of the region and communications. The best solution was to conduct offensive actions on enemy territory, and only if it was impossible to accomplish this, should the tasks be reduced, and at the same time the strategic front. Given the vastness of the theater of operations and the small size of the Caucasian army, it was necessary to concentrate efforts on the main line, the success of which improved the situation on the whole front.

Given the defeat of the 3rd Turkish army in early 1915, the Russian command believed that the enemy was not capable of active action in the near future, he needed time to recover. That it is necessary to use a period of calm to regroup forces and prepare for a new offensive. The Russian command had information that the Turkish command was going to transfer significant reinforcements from the area of ​​the Straits to restore the defeated 3rd Army. The Erivan direction was previously considered the most dangerous direction, here the enemy could carry out a strategic bypass of the 3rd Army's right flank. Batumi direction was considered secondary due to terrain conditions. In addition, the Turks could develop an offensive on the Black Sea coast only in case of neutralization of the Russian Black Sea fleet. However, in this case, the organization of a large landing required considerable time and effort, which allowed the Russian command to correctly respond and fend off the threat. Directions Erzurum - Sarykamysh - Kars and Olty - Ardagan remained of paramount importance as the area of ​​the future decisive offensive.

Turkish army. Plans for a deep invasion of the Caucasus, which were adopted during the 1914 campaign of the year, after the defeat of the 3 of the Turkish army, had to be postponed. Although the Turkish agents continued to spread rumors about an offensive in the Caucasus in order to misinform the enemy and cause unrest of Muslim subjects of Russia.

Since February, 1915 has been extremely complicated for Turkey in the area of ​​the Dardanelles Strait. Here, the allied command, initiated by Winston Churchill, launched a large-scale operation to seize Constantinople, the straits and the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war. At that moment, the Ottoman Empire’s connection with the Central Powers was weak, due to the existence of the Serbian Front on the Balkan Peninsula. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, which entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, were able to crush Serbia only in the late autumn of 1915, opening a direct link with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the advance of the Anglo-French forces on the Dardanelles was, although risky for the Allies, but a very dangerous operation for Turkey.

From the point of view of the Big Game, this move of Britain and France was hostile to Russia, since the Allies planned to seize the territories claimed by the Russians. Churchill wanted to outrun the Russians in the capture of the straits. However, from a military point of view, the Allies somewhat helped the Russian army, since all the attention of the Turkish command was now focused on the straits and the Ottomans could not send large forces to the Caucasus. The main and best forces of the Turkish army were concentrated in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. The Bosphorus was strengthened in case of a possible attack by the Russian forces.

True, the diversion of the whole Russian corps and one division (5-y Caucasian Army Corps and 20-Infantry Division) from the Caucasian Front, which were initially concentrated in Odessa and Crimea for the landing of amphibious assault forces in the Strait of the Bosphorus, and then used in the Western front, and weakened the Russian Caucasian Army. Yudenich's army was unable to go on a decisive offensive in the spring and summer, and this was caused by the Allied operation in the Dardanelles. 5 Caucasian Corps was returned to the Caucasian theater of military operations only in 1916 year.

Therefore, on the main directions of the Caucasian Front (Erzurum and Altinsky), the German-Turkish command decided to go on the defensive, repelling the attacks of the Russian Caucasian army with the forces of the 3 Army, which they tried to restore as far as possible. At the same time, in order to divert the Russian command from the main direction (Erzerum), the Turkish command decided to strike in the north-western regions of Persia, in the Erivan direction. For this purpose, the forces of the right wing of the 3 Army and numerous irregular Kurdish formations were used. This offensive was to pose a threat to the entire left flank and center of the Caucasian Army, as well as the Baku oil region. Then it was possible to build on success by returning to the plans of the 1914 campaign of the year and completely clear the Transcaucasus from the Russians.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
1915 Campaign
Military plans of the Entente and the Central Powers for 1915 year
Death of the 20 Russian Corps
"Rubber War" in the Carpathians
Battle for Prasnysh
Italian "jackal" enters the war
Battle of the Isonzo
Second Battle of the Isonzo
Germany turns east
Bosphorus bait for Russia
Gorlitsky breakthrough
The defeat of the 3 Army Radko-Dmitriev. The death of the 48 "Steel" division of General Kornilov
Departure of Russian armies from Galicia. Loss of Przemysl and Lviv
The great retreat of the Russian army
The fall of Warsaw
Fall of the Newgeorg Fortress
The great retreat of the Russian army was the harbinger of the 1917 disaster of the year.
17 comments
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  1. igor1981
    igor1981 3 September 2015 09: 14 New
    +4
    It is a pity that as a result of the revolution and the Bolsheviks left the war, Russia had to abandon part of the territory in Transcaucasia (together with Mount Ararat). These territories would now belong to today's Armenia.
    Perhaps someday these territories can be returned to their homeland, part of Armenia, together with a small section of the coast (access to the Black Sea).
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Aleksander
      Aleksander 3 September 2015 11: 40 New
      +3
      Quote: igor1981
      It is a pity that as a result of the revolution and the Bolsheviks left the war, Russia had to abandon part of the territory in the Caucasus

      Article IV of the Brest Treaty 3.03.1918:
      - [i] Russia will do everything in its power to ensure the earliest possible cleansing of the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their orderly return to Turkey.
      The districts of Ardagan, Kars and Batum will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops.

      [/ i] [i "] From the side of the new Bolshevik government it was act of national betrayal"[/ i] -V. Putin about the Brest peace.

      I will add- the betrayals of the feat of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers and officers described in the article.
      Thanks to the author for the reminder that Russia fought not only with Germany, and in 1915 the Russian army had victories as well.
      1. dmb
        dmb 3 September 2015 12: 23 New
        0
        Where and when did he say that? If this is not a “duck”, then finally a “hidden Trotskyist” has been found, for he fully shares Mr. Bronstein’s opinion on the Brest Peace. There is a true option that Vova blurted out this because of little education, ignorance of the history of his own country, as well as a complete lack of ability to analyze the military-political situation. But such an option is even worse than “Trotskyism”, because today it “guarantees” something to us, and with such abilities it is fraught. Outraged admirers of the leader, "prominent historians" I want to ask what they could oppose to the organized force of the German army in the event of a renunciation of peace.
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. Aleksander
          Aleksander 3 September 2015 12: 53 New
          0
          Quote: dmb
          There is a true option that Vova blurted out such a thing due to little education, ignorance of the history of his own country, as well as a complete lack of ability to analyze the military-political situation.

          Judging by the categorical statements, do you really lay claim to the standard of "education" and the ability to analyze the military-political situation? " belay lol Everyone has the right to his own opinion and expression thereof, and yours is just one among others.
          Brest peace, yes- "act of national betrayal", here Putin is right. For some reason, there are a lot of articles on this subject, but you don’t need them, you know the" truth ".
          then finally a "hidden Trotskyist" was found, such an option is even worse than "Trotskyism,

          Are you all fighting the Trotskyists, “Bukharinites”, “right and left opportunists”? .lol Don’t worry, there are none of them long ago, as well as the “right” Communists, both of them disappeared, clutching each other in the throat, forever, like a nightmare. yes
          1. dmb
            dmb 3 September 2015 15: 45 New
            -1
            Well, I’m certainly not a standard, but here I am trying to justify my opinion, unlike your Leader. And I try to do this not with a vague mention of "a bunch of articles", but with specifics. The first thing is closer to you, so you (apparently out of false modesty) have declined to answer the question I posed about the power that can stop the Germans. Regarding the wars with the “Trotskyists and Bukharinites”, this is you who have just mentioned the fans, for a simple analysis of their comments says that they are the most fiercely clatter about this.
            1. Aleksander
              Aleksander 3 September 2015 16: 34 New
              +1
              Quote: dmb
              Well, I’m certainly not a standard, but here I am trying to justify my opinion, unlike your Leader. And I try to do this not with a vague mention of "a bunch of articles", but specifics


              The specifics ?! belay Yeah, understandably, the “disclosures” of the “Trotskyist” are concrete ...lol It’s ridiculous. ] I don’t have any Leaders — no ub. Bastards of a diamond (who signed a shameful treaty) and Lenin, nor any of your other Rosenfeld Leaders, Zalkinds, etc. And Putin, too.
              Quote: dmb
              from the answer to my question

              you are not only NOTHING did not prove his position, even her not expressed clearly.. Express clearly your point of view, justify, and only then ask questions .. yes
              1. dmb
                dmb 3 September 2015 20: 03 New
                -2
                Judging by the incoherence of the text you have written, it is unpromising to formulate questions for you, because I have put it more specifically. I wish you to continue to remain in the happy awareness of your righteousness.
                1. Aleksander
                  Aleksander 3 September 2015 20: 21 New
                  +2
                  Judging by the incoherence of the text you wrote, it is unpromising to formulate questions for you, because I have more than specifically stated it. I wish you to continue to remain in a happy awareness of your innocence

                  You really-DO NOT SPEAK. Her -NOT substantiated-there is absolutely NOTHING. Conclusion - you THERE IS NOTHING to say (there is not enough knowledge of the co-tutorial). Fair? It’s a pity you are losing so much, not trying to find out the world from all sides, and not just from the communist that has rotted and disappeared a long time ago. I wish, nevertheless, to try hi
                  ask you questions
                  PS Who are you to f ... lecture me? hi
                2. The comment was deleted.
    3. strannik1985
      strannik1985 3 September 2015 19: 32 New
      -3
      Excuse me, what do the Bolsheviks have to do with it? In order to abandon something, it is necessary to control these territories, and how to do it if, after order number 1 (the work of the Petrosoviet, but without a War Minister’s visa, you could wipe your ass with this paper, and it got to the point that Kerensky himself traveled around the capital units and brought the order to the personnel), the army was an amorphous mass, which confirmed the failure of the summer offensive (only the assault units remained relatively combat-ready) and the Mozund operation.
      You might think the Bolsheviks refused to sign (rather than drag out the negotiations) the Germans this could somehow stop.
  2. Jääkorppi
    Jääkorppi 3 September 2015 10: 57 New
    +2
    Thank you for the article! Great for the centenary of World War I!
  3. zczczc
    zczczc 3 September 2015 11: 01 New
    -4
    Very, and again a very interesting series. Thanks to the author or authors.

    It is a pity that as a result of the revolution and the Bolsheviks left the war, Russia had to abandon part of the territory in the Caucasus

    This is 100% yes.

    These territories would now belong to today's Armenia.

    old tales of great Armenia.

    together with a small stretch of coast (access to the Black Sea).

    dreaming is not bad. By the way, don’t wish Batumi to be part of this great Armenia, ahh ???
    1. igor1981
      igor1981 3 September 2015 11: 17 New
      +1
      Personally, I don’t dream of a great Armenia and only stated what happened with the collapse of tsarist Russia. This means that with the collapse of the country, it was necessary to make territorial concessions in favor of Turkey. And these lands were torn away precisely from Armenia where they lived from time immemorial. No wonder the Turks were there so intensely slaughtered Armenians ...
      And before you write something, teach at least a little history.
      1. Pancho
        Pancho 3 September 2015 15: 50 New
        -3
        But doesn’t it bother you that the lands obtained by the blood of Russian soldiers have departed and would have left Armenia?
        1. igor1981
          igor1981 3 September 2015 17: 59 New
          -1
          This is now Armenia an independent country, and at that time this territory was part of the Russian Empire, and later part of the USSR. So at that time, these territories were not lost by Armenia, but by the Russian state.
          1. Pancho
            Pancho 3 September 2015 19: 13 New
            -3
            The difference for us is that you are either Armenian or half, and I am Russian. And if these lands were seized from Armenia (at that time it was not part of the Russian Empire), then why shouldn’t the Armenians take their lands from the Turks themselves?
            1. igor1981
              igor1981 3 September 2015 20: 22 New
              +1
              I am not Armenian and not half; I am Russian. And I do not propose to return these lands from the Turks by the hands of Russia, for this now there is no necessary situation at the moment. But we must remember this. After all, Crimea 2 years ago could return to Russia, no. But it so happened that in view of the circumstances in Ukraine, Russia had a chance to correct Khrushchev's annoying (treacherous) mistake and return his lands home. Thanks for this to Putin, his will and courage. hi
              Everything has its time.
            2. The comment was deleted.
        2. The comment was deleted.
  4. zczczc
    zczczc 3 September 2015 11: 28 New
    -4
    therefore I write that
    a little history
    taught.
    . And these lands were torn away precisely from Armenia where they lived from time immemorial. No wonder the Turks were there so intensely slaughtered Armenians ...

    you should
    before you write something, teach at least a little history.
    and different sources.