The great retreat of the Russian army was the harbinger of the 1917 disaster of the year.

Fall of the New George Fortress


On July 14, 1915, German troops approached the Novogeorgievskaya fortress. Over the next few days German aviation carried out active aerial reconnaissance of the serf area, and then the approaching troops proceeded to encircle and prepare for the siege. The siege of Novogeorgievsk was led by an experienced military commander, Colonel General Hans Hartwig von Bezeler, who became famous for the subjugation of Antwerp. Under his command was the Bezeller Army Group. It originally consisted of the 14th division of the landver of the XVII reserve corps and the combined corps of Dikhut, as well as the reserve brigade of Pfeil, the 21st and 169th brigades of the landver - only 45 infantry battalions. The Bezeller Army Group had 84 heavy artillery guns. The main striking force of the German siege corps was the famous "Big Berts" - mortars with a caliber of 420 mm and a weight of 42,6 tons, with a firing range of 14 km and a projectile weight of 900 kg. At the beginning of the war, the Berthes were one of the largest siege weapons.

German troops surrounded Novogeorgievsk with cautious and insignificant forces. However, the command of the Russian fortress did not show any activity without disturbing the enemy to surround Novogeorgiyevsk. Taking advantage of this, the German forces systematically, pulling up artillery batteries, surrounded Novogeorgievsk, occupying one by one advanced fortifications. 22 July 1915, the command of the 1 of the Russian army, the decision to undermine the forts Zegrzha, Dembe and Belyamin. However, the lack of pyroxylin and the mess and confusion characteristic of the then Russian army led to the fact that they could not even destroy their forts.

A very sad picture of the situation in the Russian army emerges in the report of the Chief of Staff of the 1 Army, Lieutenant-General I. Z. Odishelidze: “Belyaminov's fort is not prepared for destruction: calculations are made, wells are drilled, a network is laid, but neither pyroxylin nor gunpowder is drilled No blocking. For an explosion of fortifications in Dembe, the troops of the 1 of the Turkestan Corps, which was in the rear guard on the positions between Bugo-Narev and Vistula, were transferred to 500 pyroxylin poods instead of the necessary 800, but those, on instructions from the command, were returned to Novogeorgievsk fortress. Zegrzh did not wait for the explosives.

24 July fell Pultusk, and German troops began to cross the river Narev. At the same time, the Russian command ordered on the night of July 25 to withdraw the 28 army and 1 Turkestan corps. On August 5, General Westergagen, who was subordinate to Bezeleru, was ordered to levy Novogeorgievsk from the south. On the same day, shelling of the forward positions of the Dembe and Zegrzh forts was launched. The defenses of these positions, disarmed before the war, were very small and were abandoned on the night of 6 on 7 of August. The environment of Novogeorgievsk was almost complete. Russian troops crossed the Narew, leaving not only the advanced forts, but the entire right bank of the river. By August 11 German troops occupied the Belian fort.

As a result, Westergagen detachment and 169-I Landwehr Brigade, separated by the Vistula - from the south, Xwex-Landwehr Brigade and Pfeil Brigade - from the north-east, XnUMX-Landwehr Division from the north and Dikhut Corps - from the north-west - to 21 August closed around the Russian fortress ring encirclement. At the same time, the Germans conducted an aerial bombardment of fortifications.

The complete passivity of the Russian command allowed the enemy to take up serious fortifications without much resistance. The forces liberated during the clearing of the advanced fortifications were not used to hinder the enemy in imposing a fortress. There were no counterattacks against the attacking enemy, including night attacks, no artillery ambushes, or other active actions. In fact, only the squadron based in Yablon had opposed the enemy.

The German command, noting the passivity of the Russians, made the risky decision to abandon the correct siege and take the fortress with an accelerated attack, organizing a massive strike in one direction with the support of artillery fire from heavy and superheavy guns. The German command especially relied on the power of artillery, which was to demoralize the passive and few, in the opinion of the German generals, Russian garrison. The direction of the main attack was that the Germans chose the sector formed by the channels of the Vkra and Narev rivers, since the railway branch line running through it provided for the supply of ammunition. The front of the attack was only a kilometer 4 and here the German troops supported the overwhelming fire of 35 batteries. As noted above, the artillery preparation and attack of Novogeorgievsk by the German troops was facilitated by the capture of the defensive fortifications of the Novgeorgievsk fortress after the death of engineer Korotkevich.

Thus, the Germans decided to take a huge fortress on the move, without a gradual siege. The direction of their attack was obvious - along the railway line, which brought heavy weapon and ammunition. If the garrison of Novogeorgievsk were in combat readiness, and he was headed by a determined commander, the Germans could be in a difficult situation.

At dawn 16 August 1915, the German troops launched a general attack by the fort groups XV “Tsar's Gift” and XVI. A powerful onslaught, supported by overwhelming artillery fire, was crowned with success. Germanic attacking groups penetrated the fortifications of the forts XVa and XVb. At the same time, the Germans were able to beat the success of a rather small force - the 5 and 6 companies of the Saxon Landwehr Regiment took Fort XVa on the right flank of the Tsar's Gift, although they suffered serious losses. That is, two companies Landwehr day attack were able to capture the powerful fort of the fortress.

However, despite the successes of the German troops, the fortress could still resist for a long time. The German infantry in the attempts of point breakthroughs suffered great losses. The balance of power was in favor of the defenders. For three days of fierce fighting, the Germans at the price of great blood took only 2 fort from 33. The constantly growing might of artillery shelling did not cause significant damage to the Russian casemate fortifications, since the fortifications of the enormous fortress could withstand hits of heavy projectiles with a caliber of 420 mm. Apparently, even with such a passive defense, the Russian fortress could still hold on. The German command would have to abandon the tactics of fast attack.

A huge role in this situation was played by the personality of the commandant of the fortress. As noted above, commandant Bobyr was not a warrior. The rapid fall of the two forts had a very strong negative impression on General Bobyr, which even the successful repulsion of the German attack 17 of August could not smooth out. Being at a complete loss, on the night of 18 in August, he gave the order to clear the fort groups XV and XVI. This decision was disastrous. Russian troops left five forts, and retreated to the inner line of the forts. It was no longer possible to eliminate the breach in the outer line of the forts. The Germans were able to pull up artillery and fire at the central forts of Novogeorgievsk. Landver received a bridgehead for the development of the offensive. The retreating forces of the Russian garrison lost the opportunity to organize defense at an intermediate position on the r. Vkra The morale of the entire garrison was very much undermined.

Less than a day after the order to clear the fort groups XV and XVI, Bobyr decides to evacuate the fort groups X-XIII. Although no objective reason to leave these fortifications was not. At dawn of 19, the German troops occupied the 10 of the forts left by the Russians and reached the internal defensive line by noon. From the northern approaches, the core of the fortress, crowded with almost completely demoralized troops, was defended by only three forts (I, II, III). The fall of the fortress became inevitable.

Thus, instead of an active and long-lasting defense of the fortress, and for this there were all the resources - manpower, artillery and powerful fortifications, Bobyr with his treacherous actions, with the full connivance of other senior commanders (among the officers there was a plan to arrest Bobyr and elect another head of defense, but remained a good wish), led to the fall of the fortress of Novgeorge.

In order to prevent the enemy from seizing standards and secret documentation, the pilots organized an evacuation. Brave aviators flew over the territory of the enemy 200 kilometers and descended from Belostok. Sub lieutenant K. K. Vakulovsky, head captain Yu. M. Kozmin, head captain A. N. Livotov, head captain I. I. Masalsky and other brave Russian pilots rescued the banners of a number of units, regalia and some secret documents.

Meanwhile, the German troops continued their offensive and within a few hours took the forts III and II. By the evening of August 19, the Germans reached the inner ring of fortifications. General Bobyr, finding further resistance useless, surrendered, was taken to von Bezeler’s main apartment, where he signed an order to surrender the fortress at night, motivated by the reluctance of "further bloodshed."

The artillery bombardment of the fortress continued after the commandant Bobyr ran across and signed a criminal order to surrender the fortress on the night of 19 on 20 in August. Before that, the commandant ordered the garrison troops to assemble in the square and surrender their weapons. Only five officers did not obey this order (история retained the names of only four of them - Fedorenko, Stefanov, Ber and Berg). They left the fortress and, having overcome a loose environment, which indicates the weakness of the German siege corps, 18 days made their way to the rear of the enemy. Having passed about 400 kilometers, the officers, according to one data, got to Vilna, and according to others - they went to the location of the Russian units near Minsk. For this feat, all five were awarded the Order of Vladimir 4 -th degree with swords and bow.

This incident showed that the encirclement ring was loose and, with morale, part of the garrison could break through to its own. There have been a lot of cases of successful breakthrough of large parts and formations of troops from the environment. So repeatedly the Germans acted, and the Russians. But in the whole huge garrison there were all five brave men who decided on such a step! This is a good example of the fall in the combat capability of the tsarist army.

In the evening of the same day Kaiser Wilhelm II himself arrived in Novogeorgiyevsk - he arrived, as befits a triumphant, accompanied by the highest command officials of the German army. The German emperor Wilhelm telegraphed to the Greek queen that after the capture of the fortress German troops captured 90 thousand prisoners and 1500 guns. Germans somewhat exaggerated the number of prisoners and trophies. It is known that 1680 guns were in service with the fortress, part of which was confiscated by field troops. Military historian Kersnovsky gives the following figures: "The 1096 fortress and 108 field guns are lost in the fortress, 1204 in total is lost." At the same time, the Germans transferred part of the artillery park of the fortress to the Western Front, and they eventually again became trophies, but already the former allies of Russia in the Entente. After the end of the war, the French put these Russian guns in Paris.

The Russian army suffered great damage in manpower. In the historical literature that addresses this issue, there are exaggerated numbers - up to 100-120 thousand people. The most common in the domestic literature is the number in 80 thousand prisoners. The list of the garrison Novogeorgievsk numbered 1547 officers, 490 doctors and officials, 119335 lower ranks. To them you can add the remnants of the retreating Russian parts. But it is necessary to subtract a certain number of deserters who are behind the retreating units. In the New George Fortress surrendered the regiments of the 58, 63, 114, 119 infantry divisions, the entire 16 regiments of the whole. A 23 general fell into captivity to the Germans!

Thus, the losses of the tsarist army by prisoners in Novogeorgievsk were 1,4 times higher than the total losses of captives in the entire Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905, and the number of captive generals in Novogeorgiyevsk was the largest loss for the Russian army during the First World War. The fall of the most powerful fortress of the Russian Empire was the tragic apotheosis of the Great 1915 retreat.

The great retreat of the Russian army was the harbinger of the 1917 disaster of the year.

Fortress plan

Summary of the Great Retreat

22 August Russian troops left the fortress Osovets. On August 26, Brest-Litovsk and Olita were evacuated, and on September 2 they left Grodno with fights. The front stabilized on the Riga-Dvinsk-Baranovichi-Pinsk-Dubno-Tarnopol line. Russia lost 15% territory, 30% industry and about 10% railways.

The fall of Novogeorgiyevsk had a number of consequences both for the situation at the front and for the state as a whole. The German command liberated the 3 divisions, which were reinforced by the 10 army. The Russian High Command, depressed by the fall of Novogeorgievsk and Kovno, decided to evacuate Brest-Litovsk. Although, in the opinion of its commandant V. A. Layming, with reasonable expenditure of food, the fortress was able to defend from six months to 8 months. As a result, a chain of military disasters occurred - the fall and surrender of the strongest fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Brest - Litovsk, the capture of many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. If in June 1915, the Russian army suffered terrible losses as a result of fierce and stubborn fighting, in August - as a result of mass surrender.

Russian Stake was at a loss. General Alekseev, who came to GHQ in September 1914, was “struck by the disorder reigning there, confusion and despondency. Both Nikolai Nikolayevich and Yanushkevich were taken aback by the failures of the North-Western Front and do not know what to do. ” The Supreme Commander Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich did not cope with his task. In such circumstances, Tsar Nicholas II decided to remove the Grand Duke and himself stand at the head of the army. As Kersnovsky wrote: “This was the only way out of the current critical situation. Every hour of delay threatened death. The supreme commander and his staff could not cope with the situation any more - they had to be replaced immediately. And in the absence of a commander in Russia, only the Sovereign could replace the Supreme. ”

It is worth noting that in the same period, the rate plan for the "revival of the atmosphere of the 1812 national war of the year" failed. The decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on organizing the evacuation of the population of the western regions deep into Russia sharply worsened the already unfavorable socio-economic and national situation in Russia. All the roads of Lithuania and Belarusian Polesie were instantly filled with endless chains of carts and crowds of refugees. They mingled with the retreating troops, greatly hindering their movement, and created an atmosphere of demoralization and doom. A huge wave of impoverished, embittered refugees: Russians, Jews and Poles swept the central provinces of Russia. The total number of refugees to Central Russia reached 1915 by the end of 10, millions of people. The guerrilla movement in the rear of the German army along the lines of the 1812 failed. But the authorities organized a huge migration wave, which will be one of the prerequisites of the 1917 state disaster of the year.

“The stake did not realize that,” noted the historian Anton Kersnovsky, “that, having raised all this four millionth mass of women, children and old people, it should also take care of their food. ... Many half-starved people, especially children, died of cholera and typhoid. The survivors, turned into a poor, declassed proletariat, were transported deep into Russia. One of the sources of replenishment of the future red guard was ready. "

“Of all the grave consequences of the war,” Alexander Krivoshein, chief commander of agriculture (one of P. Stolypin’s associates), said at a government meeting on August 12 of the year, urging people to evacuate is the most unexpected, the most terrible and most irreparable phenomenon. And worst of all - it is not caused by real need or popular impulse, but invented by wise strategists to intimidate the enemy. Good way to fight! Curses, diseases, grief and poverty are spreading throughout Russia. Hungry and ragged mobs everywhere instill panic, the last remnants of the rise of the first months of the war quench. They walk in a solid wall, trample on bread, spoil the meadows - the peasantry is beginning to grumble more and more loudly. ... I think that the Germans are not without pleasure watching this "repetition of the 1915 of the year". "

Severe defeats of the Russian army caused delight in the German press and society. German burghers staged solemn demonstrations and processions with banners, posters and shouting cries: “Russland Kaput!” The Russian defeat was rapidly rejoicing in Turkey. However, in fact, the German victories did not lead to a strategic turning point in the war. During the summer of 1915, the Russian army left Galicia, Lithuania and Poland, that is, not only lost all acquisitions of the 1914 campaign, but also lost its own lands. But the strategic plan to defeat the Russian army failed. Russia continued to fight. The Russian army avoided a large-scale encirclement and in the fall of 1915, responded with a number of counterstrikes. The position of Germany and its allies deteriorated every month. The resources of the Central Powers were more scarce than those of the Entente, the protracted war inevitably led Berlin, Vienna and Istanbul to defeat.

The German army failed to achieve a decisive victory and in September 1915 of the year stopped the offensive. Several factors have played their role: 1) fierce resistance of the Russian army, which led to heavy losses of the German and Austro-Hungarian troops. The Germans and the Austrians paid for their victories on the Eastern Front at a very high price. For example, the Prussian Guards Corps suffered only losses in the 1915 of the year on the Eastern Front in 175% of personnel, that is, it was almost destroyed twice. German troops were tired and could not build on success.

2) The apparent reluctance of a part of the German generals to advance further into Russia. Many were afraid to repeat the experience of Napoleon and Charles XII. The German army could get bogged down on the colossal expanses of Russia and be defeated on the Western Front.

3) The ever-increasing length of communications to supply the German army, the deterioration of the road network in the depths of Russia and the approaching autumn season of rains and winter, which sharply worsened the possibilities for movement and active combat operations. From each week of the offensive, the German infantry officers assessed the Russian positions as more and more difficult to attack and demanded more and more lengthy artillery preparation.

4) It became clear that the strategic plan to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Russian army failed. A new plan was required.


Retreating Russian troops

Sources:
Afonasenko I.M., Bahurin Yu. A. Port-Arthur on the Vistula. The fortress Novogeorgievsk during the First World War. M., 2009.
Bakhurin Yu. A. Causes of the fall of Novogeorgievsk fortress in August 1915 // Military-Historical Journal. 2009. No.8. C. 71-76.
Brusilov A.A. Memories. M., 1963 // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/brusilov/index.html.
Golovin HH Russia in the First World War. Paris, 1939 // http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html.
Zayonchkovsky AM World War I. SPb., 2002.
The history of the First World War 1914-1918. Ed. I. I. Rostunova. M., 1975. // http://militera.lib.ru/h/ww1/index.html.
Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian army. M., 1994 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/kersnovsky1/index.html.
Rostunov I.I. The Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976.
Utkin A.I. The First World War. M., 2001.
Shambarov V. The Last Battle of the Emperors. M., 2013.
Yakovlev N. N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994.
http://rusplt.ru/ww1/.
Ctrl Enter

Noticed a mistake Highlight text and press. Ctrl + Enter

16 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. parusnik 1 September 2015 07: 28 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    But the authorities organized a huge migration wave, which will become one of the prerequisites for the state disaster of 1917. ... This wave, it was necessary to arrange in the domestic plan, to provide work and food .. And how to do this, the authorities simply could not imagine ..
  2. Jääkorppi 1 September 2015 08: 02 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    But Bobryr still spanked!
  3. TWR
    TWR 1 September 2015 09: 48 New
    • -4
    • 0
    -4
    The great retreat of the Russian army was the harbinger of the 1917 disaster of the year.

    The author mixed everything up. The disaster occurred in January 1918. And in 1917. there was a revolution. February
    Maybe he was referring to the events of the fall of 1917? So this "historical event" would not even be worth mentioning it. If the Bolsheviks hadn’t fanned him like that. Just a small showdown between two armed groups. There were a great many of these in Petrograd.
    1. Alexey RA 1 September 2015 11: 41 New
      • 4
      • 0
      +4
      Quote: TWR

      The author mixed everything up. The disaster occurred in January 1918.

      The catastrophe occurred precisely in 1917. First there was Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet (for which special thanks to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries). Then - the failure of the summer offensive. And as the apotheosis - Moonsund operation.
      Especially in these events, citizen Kerensky pleases. At first, he, as deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, pushed Order No. 1 in every possible way, including getting his approval by the Provisional Government (of which he was also a member). And then he, as Minister of War, wept for a fall in discipline and demanded the imposition of the death penalty.
      1. TWR
        TWR 1 September 2015 11: 56 New
        • -4
        • 0
        -4
        Quote: Alexey RA
        First was Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet (for which special thanks to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries). Then - the failure of the summer offensive. And as the apotheosis - Moonsund operation.

        In fact, it does not and did not matter. Minor events for the story. Even remembering them makes no sense.
        1. parusnik 1 September 2015 12: 51 New
          • 2
          • 0
          +2
          In fact, it does not and did not matter. Minor events for the story. Even remembering them makes no sense...And here, Denikin, Wrangel and other participants in the “white” movement ..so they don’t think so .. especially about Order No. 1 ..
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Svateev 1 September 2015 12: 53 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          Quote: TWR
          In fact, it does not and did not matter.

          The order that canceled one-man management in the army does not matter? !!
          Are you trolling? Bored, decided to cheer up the discussion? Are you not afraid that you will have to refute your own stupidities yourself?
          1. TWR
            TWR 1 September 2015 13: 33 New
            • 0
            • 0
            0
            Quote: Svateev
            The order that canceled one-man management in the army does not matter? !!

            The army itself in those conditions no longer mattered. And you are worrying about some order.
          2. The comment was deleted.
        4. Alexey RA 1 September 2015 13: 33 New
          • 2
          • 0
          +2
          Quote: TWR
          In fact, it does not and did not matter. Minor events for the story. Even remembering them makes no sense.

          Well then, about January 1918 it makes no sense to recall. For its roots grow from February 1917 and the official collapse of army subordination and unity of command.
          The army, the commanders of which are forced to coordinate every step with the soldiers' councils, cannot fight. That confirmed the summer offensive: the assault units went on the attack, and the line - staged a rally on the topic let us die, ali is not worth it ... but it’s better to go home at all.
          1. TWR
            TWR 1 September 2015 13: 36 New
            • 0
            • 0
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The army, the commanders of which are forced to coordinate every step with the soldiers' councils, cannot fight.

            She was not needed. A revolution has taken place in the country. All. After revolutions in the countries where it occurred, armies usually do not exist for some time. Even if they exist on paper. Such states simply do not need them for some time. This is historical reality.
            1. Alexey RA 1 September 2015 14: 34 New
              • 1
              • 0
              +1
              Quote: TWR
              She was not needed. A revolution has taken place in the country. All. After revolutions in the countries where it occurred, armies usually do not exist for some time. Even if they exist on paper. Such states simply do not need them for some time. This is historical reality.

              Especially, apparently, the army did not need the country participating in the World War, the new post-February government of which confirmed all obligations to the Entente. laughing
              By the way, a member of this government was a man who actively pushed Order No. 1. Here is such a pluralism of opinions in one head, you panim ...

              And even if there had not been a war, historical reality tells us that a country with a victorious revolution urgently needs an army. For the neighbors of such a country silently strive to chop off pieces from it, hiding behind elegant words about the restoration of the ruling dynasty, the legally elected government, democracy, etc.
              1. TWR
                TWR 1 September 2015 14: 52 New
                • 0
                • 0
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Especially, apparently, the army was not needed for the country participating in the World War

                After the revolution, such a country automatically leaves the war. Regardless of declarations. Because he can’t fight.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                the new post-February government which has confirmed all obligations to the Entente.

                With the same success, it could promise to jump to the moon.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                And even if there had not been a war, historical reality tells us that a country with a victorious revolution urgently needs an army.

                You read poorly what I wrote. I wrote:
                armies usually some time can not be.

                Quote: Alexey RA
                For the neighbors of such a country silently strive to chop off pieces from it, hiding behind elegant words about the restoration of the ruling dynasty, the legally elected government, democracy, etc.

                They strive. therefore OFTEN countries in which capitalism is replacing feudalism begin with the advent of authoritarian regimes and the outbreak of war.
                1. Captain nemo 1 September 2015 15: 13 New
                  • 2
                  • 0
                  +2
                  Quote: TWR
                  After the revolution, such a country automatically leaves the war. Regardless of declarations. Because he can’t fight.

                  It’s an interesting movie, so in December 1941 a revolution took place in Moscow and the Wehrmacht “automatically” with disgrace withdraws its troops for the Curzon Line, because the Red Army can no longer fight the German troops after the revolution?
                2. Alexey RA 1 September 2015 16: 03 New
                  • 1
                  • 0
                  +1
                  Quote: TWR
                  After the revolution, such a country automatically leaves the war. Regardless of declarations. Because he can’t fight.

                  You tell the Third Republic. laughing
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                  2. TWR
                    TWR 1 September 2015 16: 17 New
                    • 0
                    • 0
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Tell the third republic

                    I do not understand what you're talking about. If the "overthrow" of Napoleon III, then this is nonsense. A game of children's swing. The bourgeois revolution in France took place in 1789. Since then, France has in fact been a bourgeois state. Despite the "lush bouquet" of subsequent "emperors".
                    As for the authoritarian bourgeois rulers unleashing wars, in France it was the "emperor" Napoleon Bonaparte.
              2. The comment was deleted.
            2. The comment was deleted.
            3. Svateev 2 September 2015 11: 33 New
              • 0
              • 0
              0
              Quote: TWR
              After revolutions in the countries where it occurred, armies usually do not exist for some time. Even if they exist on paper. Such states simply do not need them for some time. This is historical reality.

              Yeah! "Neither peace nor war, but to dissolve the army" - Trotsky. Just let’s remember what Trotsky’s policy turned into - the German offensive directly on Petrograd. Do you even remember why we celebrate 23 on February? Because these days in 1918, the units of the hastily knocked together Red Guard with some still combat-ready units of the army stopped this advance of the Germans. Already at the near approaches to the capital of the country they stopped. And then the Soviet government was forced to go to the "obscene Brest Peace" with Germany. Remember how much territory of Russia you had to give for this world?
              Therefore, we don’t have to boil Trotskyism of pure water here!
              1. TWR
                TWR 2 September 2015 12: 26 New
                • 0
                • 0
                0
                Quote: Svateev
                "Neither peace nor war, but to dissolve the army" - Trotsky. Just let’s remember what Trotsky’s policy turned into - the German offensive directly on Petrograd.

                In this case, we must listen to Trotsky. The man who organized the pre-seizure of power by the Bolsheviks was not stupid at all. Moreover, he could call for anything. That would not change anything. Objective factors are stronger than subjective ones.
                Quote: Svateev
                Do you even remember why we are celebrating February 23rd? Because these days in 1918, units of the hastily knocked together Red Guard with some still combat-ready units of the army stopped this German offensive. Already at the near approaches to the capital of the country they stopped.

                You do not tell me Bolshevik tales. I have known them since childhood. Just like the fact that these are just tales. Myth making.
                Quote: Svateev
                And then the Soviet government was forced to go to the "obscene Brest Peace" with Germany.

                Why "raunchy"? This is almost the only act of the Bolsheviks, which I support.
                Quote: Svateev
                Remember how much territory of Russia you had to give for this world?

                Not Russia, but Sodepia. And in general, one should part with a stranger easily. But his own must be carefully guarded.
                Quote: Svateev
                Therefore, we don’t have to boil Trotskyism of pure water here!

                I do not think that this is Trotskyism. I didn’t even read it. I think you too. But, in any case, I’m not sure that Trotskyism is worse than Leninism. Or Stalinism. And many more different isms.
          2. The comment was deleted.
        5. Captain nemo 1 September 2015 15: 04 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          Quote: TWR
          In fact, it does not and did not matter. Minor events for the story. Even remembering them makes no sense.

          But in the Latvian division, this order number 1 was sent in three letters, and the tsarist army’s subordination continued to be respected in it, is this probably also a trifle for you against the background of the entire Russian army of the Russian Empire (the Russian Republic according to Kerensky)?
        6. The comment was deleted.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. Svateev 1 September 2015 12: 45 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Quote: TWR
      autumn events 1917? So this "historical event" would not even be worth mentioning it. If the Bolsheviks hadn’t fanned him like that.

      The Great October Socialist Revolution is the replacement of ownership of all means of production from private to state. Factories - workers (nationalized, that is, taken from the owners and transferred to the management of factory committees), land - to the peasants (taken from the landowners and other owners and distributed among the peasants). This is the first time in the world. And not worth mentioning ?! Well, you, my friend, and the original!
      What is the result of all this grand coup? The question is the following. But to say that this event is not worth mentioning ...
      1. TWR
        TWR 1 September 2015 13: 32 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Quote: Svateev
        What is the result of all this grand coup

        You have chosen the right word for the events of January 1918. I would clarify a restoration coup. This is about choosing the main production method.
        And I want to upset you, in the fall of 1917. nothing particularly remarkable happened in Russia. You have the wrong sources of information. Universal robbery in Russia was not a consequence of the events of October 1917.
        1. Captain nemo 1 September 2015 14: 47 New
          • 0
          • 0
          0
          Quote: TWR
          And I want to upset you, in the fall of 1917. nothing particularly remarkable happened in Russia.

          Let’s arrest Lavrov, Shoigu and others tomorrow morning, and give Putin the opportunity to escape in an armored car if he wants. And in the evening you will speak on TV and without a shadow of embarrassment declare that “Nothing happened” continue to go to work because we here at the top think for you how to arrange your life long and happy?
          Well, so that no one would be offended, we will allow those who stormed the Kremlin to rob a little of the Armory.
      2. Captain nemo 1 September 2015 15: 51 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Quote: Svateev
        land - to the peasants (taken from the landowners and other owners and distributed among the peasants). This is the first time in the world. And not worth mentioning?

        From the wiki:
        landowners as a mass phenomenon lost their economic importance, peasants in 1916 sowed (on their own and leased land) 89,3% of the land and owned 94% of farm animals
        - the peasants, probably not very rich, from the expropriation of landowners' land, probably lost more after the proletarian revolution of 1917 than gained.
        1. Alexey RA 1 September 2015 17: 16 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          Quote: Captain Nemo
          landowner farms as a mass phenomenon lost their economic significance, peasants in 1916 sowed (on their own and rented land) 89,3% of the land and owned 94% of farm animals

          The key is highlighted.
          In order to stand out for peasant land itself, you need to open the chapter "Land tenure and land use" from "Russia 1913 Statistical and Documentary Handbook". We take Table No. 3 "Private land ownership in 47 provinces of European Russia in 1905-1914 (without the Baltic States)" and Table No. 4 "Peasant land ownership in 47 provinces of European Russia in 1905-1914 (without the Baltic)."
          On 01.01.1915/XNUMX/XNUMX:
          Nobles, officials, officers own 39 562 469 tithes of land.
          The clergy - another 302 acres.
          Merchants and honorary citizens - 11 131 850 tithes.
          Petty bourgeois - 3 dessiatins.
          Commercial and other - 3 991 449 acres.

          Peasants in general (including communities, personal property, societies and partnerships) - 167 tithes. Moreover, half of this land - 495 acres - accounted for precisely the community ..
          1. Captain nemo 1 September 2015 18: 10 New
            • 0
            • 0
            0
            Merchants and honorary citizens should rather be referred to urban lands.
            Ore and non-ore quarries that also occupy some territory are industry.
            Nobles, officials, officers - we attribute them to landowners who had less arable land, which is about 6%, they had more forests and pasture meadows that were not suitable for arable land, which the peasantry had less and then it really needed them.
            Communal lands are not landlords' lands and their proletarians did not promise to take peasants from the community.
      3. The comment was deleted.
  4. apro 1 September 2015 10: 51 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    The great retreat of the Russian army became a harbinger of the catastrophe of 1917, the author is somewhat stepping aside, the main reason for the catastrophe of February 1917 with the collapse of the Russian empire was the thoughtless entry into the war that Russia did not need at all. Military failure is a painful thing but with purposeful leadership and a healthy society never will lead to disaster, Russia is too big a piece for Germany to swallow right away. Well they gave in the face but time the main depreciator of German victories, the longer the war the worse the Germans.
  5. Sergey-8848 1 September 2015 12: 47 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Gloomy picture of retreat. The war was not needed (contraindicated for us), but we got involved, and here is the result.
    We can research and discuss, change - no, because we ourselves live.
  6. timyr 1 September 2015 16: 39 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Well, it was necessary to work out French loans, save beautiful France. True, the military-industrial complex was not, and so they got it.
  7. SHOKER 1 September 2015 20: 12 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Russians are like a spring - the more you squeeze, the harder it will hit